

POLYBIUS
AND
ROMAN IMPERIALISM



DONALD WALTER BARONOWSKI
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Donald Walter Baronowski

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LONDON • NEW DELHI • NEW YORK • SYDNEY

Bloomsbury Academic

An imprint of Bloomsbury Publishing Plc

50 Bedford Square
London
WC1B 3DP
UK

1385 Broadway
New York
NY 10018
USA

www.bloomsbury.com

First published in 2011 by Bristol Classical Press
an imprint of Bloomsbury Academic
Reprinted by Bloomsbury Academic 2013

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British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.

ISBN: PB: 978-0-7156-3942-9
E-pub: 978-1-4725-1987-0
E-pdf: 978-1-4725-1988-7

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

A catalog record for this book is available from the Library of Congress.

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MATRI MANIBUSQUE PATRIS D D D

Recessional

God of our fathers, known of old,
Lord of our far-flung battle-line,
Beneath whose awful Hand we hold
Dominion over palm and pine –
Lord God of Hosts, be with us yet,
Lest we forget – lest we forget!

The tumult and the shouting dies;
The Captains and the Kings depart:
Still stands Thine ancient sacrifice,
An humble and a contrite heart.
Lord God of Hosts, be with us yet,
Lest we forget – lest we forget!

Far-called, our navies melt away;
On dune and headland sinks the fire:
Lo, all our pomp of yesterday
Is one with Nineveh and Tyre!
Judge of the Nations, spare us yet,
Lest we forget – lest we forget!

If, drunk with sight of power, we loose
Wild tongues that have not Thee in awe,
Such boastings as the Gentiles use,
Or lesser breeds without the Law –
Lord God of Hosts, be with us yet,
Lest we forget – lest we forget!

For heathen heart that puts her trust
In reeking tube and iron shard,
All valiant dust that builds on dust,
And guarding, calls not Thee to guard,
For frantic boast and foolish word –
Thy mercy on Thy People, Lord!

From *Rudyard Kipling's Verse*. Definitive
edition (London: Hodder and Stoughton,
1940; reprinted 1960)

Preface

The aim of this book is to explore the complexity and ambivalence of Polybius' views about Roman imperialism. Although many scholars have discussed or commented on various aspects of this problem, there exists no general treatment showing how the Achaean historian relates to his intellectual milieu and how his acceptance of imperialism and his admiration of Roman power were tempered by manifestations of intellectual independence vis-à-vis the imperial nation. The present study is designed in some measure to supply the need for a broader investigation of a question so often debated among contemporary historians of antiquity. It shares with C.B. Champion, *Cultural Politics in Polybius's Histories* (Berkeley 2004), a vision of the ancient historian as a writer who expresses complex attitudes about Rome. While Champion focuses on Polybius' varying representation of the Romans as civilized or uncivilized, my own study concentrates on the question of how he reacted to the expansion of Roman power over other peoples, and to what extent he identified himself with the ruling nation.

The Introduction includes a short biography of Polybius, a brief discussion of the chronology of the *Histories* as well as the Romans' view of Polybius, a survey of scholarly opinion regarding his judgement of Roman imperialism, and observations on his conception of the Roman *arkhê* and how this is related to modern conceptions of imperialism. Part I, consisting of the first three chapters, studies the intellectual milieu in which Polybius thought and wrote. Here are surveyed the attitudes towards Roman supremacy expressed by philosophers (Chapter 1), poets and prophetic writers (Chapter 2) and historians (Chapter 3) in the third, second and first centuries BC.

Part II, comprising Chapters 4 to 9, deals specifically with Polybius' own reaction to Roman power. Chapters 4 and 5 explore how the views of Polybius are related fundamentally to those of other intellectuals active in the period from the middle of the third to the early first century. It will be argued that, like the philosophers, Polybius essentially approved of imperialism, but that, unlike them, he did not propose any justification for the phenomenon. It will be maintained that he shared with many other writers a fundamental admiration of Roman power. His attitude can be studied in considerable detail. Polybius approved of imperialist expansion if certain principles were observed: imperialist states must cite decent pretexts when they initiate wars (Chapter 4), observe justice in their

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foreign policy when warfare is not involved (Chapter 4), and practise beneficence and moderation towards weaker nations at all stages of their imperial development, from acquisition through expansion to preservation (Chapter 5). In his view the Romans, on the whole, fulfilled these requirements, and although their foreign policy was sometimes unjust, certain allowances could often be made for lapses from the strictest rectitude. Thus, in the *Histories* as a whole, Polybius took a generally favourable view of Roman domination (Chapters 4 and 5).

On the other hand, the Achaean historian also evinced a certain *distance intérieure* with regard to Rome. This is evident from the abstract principles that he advocates relating to imperialism, from his view of the aggressive drive underlying this phenomenon, and from his occasional criticism of Roman policy (Chapters 4 and 5). His intellectual independence may also be observed in his concern for the subjects of Rome, a concern implied in his recommendation of beneficence and moderation as the basis of imperial rule (Chapter 5), and in his condemnation of states and leaders who damaged the interests of subject peoples by mismanaging their relations with Rome (Chapters 4 and 6). Moreover, Polybius advanced his own interests and convictions by aiding the Romans at Carthage and in Achaëa (Chapter 7). His ambivalence about the civilization of the Romans and his muted suggestion that their success could not be fully explained in rational terms also illustrate a certain intellectual detachment (Chapter 8), as do his reflections on the eventual decline and fall of Roman power (Chapter 9).

The Conclusions summarize the arguments put forward in the main body of the book and add further observations on several points. In fine Polybius, who preserved his intellectual independence and integrity, deserves the understanding and respect of modern readers.

Polybius maintained that, in the sphere of international relations, power should be exercised with justice, moderation and beneficence for the advantage of great and weak alike. This doctrine, proclaimed when Rome was the only great power in the Mediterranean world (though not the only significant one), suggests the continuing relevance of Polybius for our own times.

Although this book is intended primarily for students and scholars working in the fields of ancient Greek and Roman history and literature, I hope it will also attract a wider audience, including persons interested in political thought, international relations and historiography. In my study of Polybius I have used the edition of Buettner-Wobst. All translations from the *Histories* are my own.

In the fourteen years that I have worked on this study of Polybius and Roman imperialism, I have been privileged to enjoy the encouragement, advice and assistance of colleagues and friends, among them Beaudoin Caron, Zhongping Chen, Eric Csapo, Damien Janos, George Kirikopoulos, Georgii Mikula, Margaret Miller, Robert Morstein-Marx, John Porter,

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Wade Richardson, Lionel Sanders, Eva Steinlauf, Michael Swan and Michael Woloch. Arthur Eckstein, Michael Silverthorne and George Snider read an advanced draft of my book. I am grateful to these three scholars and to the publisher's anonymous reader for their valuable suggestions, comments and criticism, which greatly improved the quality of my work. I alone, of course, am responsible for persisting errors and the defects of ignorance, inadvertence and obstinacy.

Arthur Eckstein has persuaded me to reconsider my earlier views about pretexts in Polybius. The elaboration of my study of the Jewish-Christian Sibylline oracles springs from the advice of Gregory Nagy. Lionel Sanders inspired me to reflect on the complexities and contradictions of the heart and mind, a human characteristic that must be considered in any attempt to understand the political ideas and historical attitudes of the elusive Polybius. Michael Silverthorne encouraged me to learn about Greek and Roman political theory. Among my teachers, I am particularly indebted to Colin Gordon and Michael Woloch, who encouraged my first steps in ancient history, to William Dusing for guiding my earliest study of the sources for the period treated by Polybius, and to Peter Derow and Graham Sumner for instilling in me an interest in that author as an historian and thinker.

I am profoundly grateful to the Center for Hellenic Studies, which gave me the opportunity to spend several weeks during each of three summers (1997, 2000, 2001) pursuing my research in Washington, DC. Access to the splendid collections of the Center and the Library of Congress was of incalculable value in my study of the earlier scholarship. I would like to thank Deborah Boedeker and Kurt Raaflaub (Co-Directors) as well as Gregory Nagy (Director) and Douglas Frame (Associate Director) for their advice and encouragement. Ellen Roth (Librarian of the Center) and Phoebe Peacock (Classics Reference Specialist at the Library of Congress) provided invaluable assistance in my search for essential materials. Over the years, the excellent staff of the McGill University Libraries have unfailingly helped me to locate items in their collections and to obtain interlibrary loans. Their support and kindness are deeply appreciated. I am also grateful for access to the Bibliothèque des lettres et sciences humaines of the Université de Montréal, which features particularly strong holdings in the history of religions. Charles Ritory, of the Arts Computer Network, McGill University, provided valuable technical support. The expert advice and guidance of Deborah Blake, Editorial Director of Bristol Classical Press, greatly facilitated my work on the final version of this book.

I owe a great deal to my friends George and Leila Kirikopoulos for their unfailing generosity and hospitality. On many occasions, George Kirikopoulos has lent or given me valuable items from his impressive personal library. The most splendid of these esteemed gifts is a copy of the revised version of Schweighauser's edition of Polybius, with Greek

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text and Latin translation, published by Ambrosius Firmin Didot, Paris 1839.

A study of this kind necessarily rests on the work of outstanding scholars. My debt to them will be evident throughout this book. If I may be permitted to single out those who have been most influential in shaping my own understanding of Polybius, I would name Peter Derow, Arthur Eckstein, Jean-Louis Ferrary, Doron Mendels, Arnaldo Momigliano, Domenico Musti, Paul Pédech and F. W. Walbank.

Donald Walter Baronowski

List of Abbreviations

With a few modifications introduced for the sake of clarity, the abbreviations employed in this study are those found in standard works of reference. Thus the titles of journals are abbreviated as in *Année Philologique*; for epigraphical publications the conventions of *Supplementum Epigraphicum Graecum* are adopted; for archaeological publications I have followed the system used by the *American Journal of Archaeology*; for the names of ancient authors and the titles of their works, as well as the titles of papyrological publications, see S. Hornblower and A. Spawforth (eds), *The Oxford Classical Dictionary*, 3rd edn, revised, Oxford 2003. The following special abbreviations are used:

ANRW = H. Temporini and W. Haase (eds), *Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt: Geschichte und Kultur Roms im Spiegel der neueren Forschung*, Berlin-New York 1972-.

B-W = T. Buettner-Wobst (ed.), *Polybii Historiae*, 5 vols, Stuttgart 1889-1905.

DPA = R. Goulet (ed.), *Dictionnaire des philosophes antiques*, Paris 1989-.

E-K = L. Edelstein and I.G. Kidd (eds), *Posidonius*, vol. 1: *The Fragments*, 2nd edn, Cambridge 1989; vol. 2: *The Commentary*, Cambridge 1988; vol. 3: *The Translation of the Fragments*, Cambridge 1999.

FGrHist = F. Jacoby (ed.), *Die Fragmente der griechischen Historiker*, Berlin-Leiden 1923-.

FGH = C. Müller (ed.), *Fragmenta Historicorum Graecorum*, 5 vols, Paris 1841-1870.

FRH = H. Beck and U. Walter (eds), *Die Frühen Römischen Historiker*, vol. 1, 2nd edn, Darmstadt 2005; vol. 2, Darmstadt 2004.

GGM = C. Müller (ed.), *Geographi Graeci Minores*, 2 vols, Paris 1855-1861.

HR¹ = H. Peter (ed.), *Historicorum Romanorum Reliquiae*, vol. 1, 2nd edn, Leipzig 1914, reprinted Stuttgart 1967.

Mauersberger = A. Mauersberger et al. (eds), *Polybios-Lexikon*, 3 vols in 8 fascicules, vol. 1 in 2nd edn, Berlin 1998-2006.

MRR = T.R.S. Broughton, *The Magistrates of the Roman Republic*, vols 1-2, reprinted with supplement, New York 1968; vol. 3, Atlanta, GA 1986.

ORF^b = H. Malcovati (ed.), *Oratorum Romanorum Fragmenta Liberae Rei Publicae*, 3rd edn, Turin 1967.

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RE = A. von Pauly, G. Wissowa and W. Kroll (eds), *Real-Encyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft*, Stuttgart 1893-1980.

*SIG*³ = W. Dittenberger (ed.), *Sylloge Inscriptionum Graecarum*, 4 vols, 3rd edn, Leipzig 1915-1924.

SVF = H. von Arnim (ed.), *Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta*, 4 vols, Leipzig 1903-1924.

StV 3 = H.H. Schmitt (ed.), *Die Staatsverträge des Altertums*, vol. 3: *Die Verträge der griechisch-römischen Welt von 338 bis 200 v. Chr.*, Munich 1969.

Introduction

Life of Polybius

Although the facts about Polybius' life have been discussed more fully elsewhere, it will be helpful to provide a brief summary here.¹ Polybius of Megalopolis, soldier, politician, political detainee, historian, *homme de droite*, statesman, lived in the second century BC, during the great period of Roman expansion in the eastern Mediterranean. His life spanned the years c. 200-117 BC.² His father Lycortas held high political office in the Achaean League, serving as *stratêgos* (the highest elected magistrate) several times in the 180s.³ Lycortas, an Achaean nationalist, was a political ally of Philopoemen, a dominant figure in the affairs of the League between 210 and his death in the year 182.⁴ When still a young man, Polybius attached himself to the latter (Plut. *An seni* 790e-791a; cf. Polyb. 22.19, referring to 184/3). He carried the ashes of Philopoemen in the funeral procession honouring his mentor, who died while leading a military expedition against Messene, which had seceded from the Achaean League (Plut. *Phil.* 21.3-9). Later, probably before his removal to Rome in 167, Polybius wrote a biography of Philopoemen in three books (Polyb. 10.21.5-8).⁵ In 181/0, he and his father were among the Achaean envoys chosen to visit the Ptolemaic court. The mission, however, never departed because Ptolemy V died at this time. Polybius relates that he was under the legal age for undertaking such diplomatic service, usually thought to be thirty years (Polyb. 24.6).

After these early distinctions, Polybius pursued a successful political career, serving as hipparch (the second most important elected magistrate) in 170/69 (Polyb. 28.6.9; cf. 28.7; 28.12.1-6; 28.13). During his tenure of office, he supported a policy of cooperation with Rome against Perseus in the Third Macedonian War, even though his own father advocated strict neutrality (Polyb. 28.6). In the following year, he continued to play an important role in the deliberations of the Achaean League. At this time, he initially supported a plan according to which the Achaeans would provide military forces to aid the brothers Ptolemy VI and Ptolemy VIII against Antiochus IV, these forces to be commanded by Lycortas and himself. Polybius, however, withdrew from the debate when the consul Quintus Marcius Philippus asked the League to support Roman policy by sending envoys to reconcile the parties (Polyb. 29.23-5).

At the end of the Third Macedonian War, in 168/7, Polybius joined a

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contingent of Achaeans, over a thousand in number, named by Callicrates and the Romans as opponents of Rome, who were transported for detention in Italy (Polyb. 30.6-7; 30.13; 30.32; 32.5.6; Paus. 7.10.6-11; cf. Polyb. 28.3.7-10). Although the other prisoners were held in various towns of Etruria (Paus. 7.10.11), Polybius himself was permitted to remain in Rome, thanks to his friendship with Publius Cornelius Scipio Aemilianus and Quintus Fabius Maximus Aemilianus, the sons of Aemilius Paullus, conqueror of Perseus (Polyb. 31.23.1-25.1; 31.29.8). Here he began to work on the *Histories*, a lengthy composition destined eventually to recount the growth of Roman power in the Mediterranean world during the period 264-145. It was probably in the years 152/1-151/0, while still technically a political detainee, that he accompanied Scipio Aemilianus, military tribune and then legate, on a journey that took him to Gaul, Spain and North Africa.⁶ Finally, in 151/0, Polybius and the other survivors among the Achaean *détenus* were allowed to return home (Polyb. 35.6; Paus. 7.10.12).

In 150/49, after the Romans had declared war on Carthage, the consul Manius Manilius asked the Achaean League to send Polybius to Sicily. This request shows that Polybius was well known and respected in high Roman circles. When he reached Corcyra, he learned that the Carthaginians had surrendered to the Romans. For this reason, he returned to the Peloponnese, but he subsequently joined Scipio Aemilianus in North Africa at some point after the Carthaginians decided to fight rather than submit to Rome's final demand (Polyb. 36.3.9; 36.4.6; 36.5.6-9; 36.7; 36.11.1-4). Polybius was in North Africa with Scipio Aemilianus probably throughout the entire course of the Third Punic War, fought in the years 149-146 (Polyb. 36.8.6 and pp. 133-5 below; 38.19; 38.21; App. *Pun.* 132; Amm. Marc. 24.2.16-17; Oros. 5.3.3). After the fall of Carthage, he travelled by ship along the Atlantic coast of Africa and the Iberian peninsula.⁷ In 146/5, Polybius was engaged in the affairs of his own country in the aftermath of the Achaean War. At this time, he persuaded Mummius and the Ten Commissioners to spare the statues and honorary decrees of Philopoemen (Polyb. 39.3). Before leaving Greece in the summer of 145, the Ten Commissioners asked Polybius to visit the cities of the Achaean League with a mandate to interpret the provisions of the constitutions now imposed on them by Rome. While carrying out this charge, he also established regulations for inter-city jurisdiction within Achaea (Polyb. 39.5; Paus. 8.30.9). When he visited Rome later in 145, the Romans expressed their approval of his work (Polyb. 39.8.1). In Cicero's *De Re Publica* (1.34), the character Laelius declares that Scipio Aemilianus had very often discussed the organization of the state with Panaetius in the company of Polybius, a statement suggesting that Polybius subsequently visited Rome several times.⁸ At some point during the reign of Ptolemy VIII (145-116), he travelled to Egypt (Polyb. 34.14). He may have accompanied Scipio Aemilianus during the siege of Numantia in 134-133, when Scipio formed a troop of five hundred clients and friends (App. *Hisp.* 365). At any rate,

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Polybius wrote an account of the Numantine War, fought in the years 143-133 (Cic. *Fam.* 5.12.2).⁹ He must have spent most of his time after 145 working on the *Histories*. A reference to the *Via Domitia*, built in 118, indicates that he was still alive and working on his project at that time (Polyb. 3.39.8).¹⁰ A late classical source (Pseudo-Lucian *Macr.* 22) asserts that he died at the age of eighty-two as a result of injuries sustained when he fell from his horse upon returning to Megalopolis from his estates in the country.

Chronology of the *Histories*

Polybius described the growth of Roman power in the Mediterranean world in the period 264-145 BC. He began writing the *Histories* after he came to Rome in 167. His original plan envisaged two introductory books, covering the period 264-220, followed by the main body of his project, a narrative tracing the growth of Roman power in the years 220-168, from the eve of the Second Punic War to the defeat of Perseus in the Third Macedonian War and the abolition of the Antigonid monarchy (1.1-5; 3.1-3). Probably the *Histories*, as originally conceived by Polybius, were intended to end with what is now Book 29 (bringing the narrative down to 169/8), followed by an index volume. At any rate, the expanded version of his work (the form in which the extant portions of the *Histories* have come down to us) concluded with an index volume (Book 40), of which no fragments are preserved. This volume included an outline of dates, contents and structure describing the *Histories* as a whole (Polyb. 39.8.8).¹¹ By the year 150, Polybius had written the first fifteen books, bringing his account down to the year 203/2 and the end of the Second Punic War. When he resumed writing after 145, he completed his original design, covering the period 220-168, in twenty-nine books. The fall of Carthage and the destruction of Corinth suggested to Polybius a striking terminus for a continuation of the *Histories* that he had already contemplated for a long time, probably from a point soon after the inception of his project in 167. Having finished his original project, he now extended the *Histories* beyond the year 168 to the year 145, so as to include the Roman wars against Andrisus, Carthage and Achaea. Thus he wrote what are now Books 30-39, followed by an index volume (Book 40). In the course of writing the extension of the *Histories*, Polybius added some passages to Books 1-29 (e.g. 3.4-5; 3.32; 3.36.1-39.1; 3.39.8; 3.57-59; 10.11.4). Additions to various parts of the work appear to have been made even after the expanded version of the *Histories* was substantially complete (e.g. 2.37-71, originally a separate essay written by Polybius in the period 168-150, and 39.5.4-6, composed by a posthumous editor).¹²

Although Polybius substantially completed his great *opus* in its expanded form (Polyb. 39.8), it is not clear when he ceased to compose or to revise. Since the latest datable detail in the extant portion of the *Histories* is a reference to the *Via Domitia*, built in 118 (3.39.8), Polybius was

definitely still revising at that time, and could still have been working on the extension of his project.¹³

The great complexity and bulk of the *Histories* (forty books in all, compared to nine for Herodotus and eight for Thucydides) would have required the inflexible determination of a disciplined author dedicated to offering his regular quota to Clio under the malignant watch of Atropos (cf. Polyb. 3.5.7). Walbank argues that Polybius completed Books 1-15 by the year 150, Books 16-29 in the period 145-129, and Books 30-9 after 129.¹⁴ On the assumption that the ancient author's subsidiary interests were fairly evenly distributed throughout the process of composition, analysis of Polybius' rates of production affords a remarkable corroboration of Walbank's chronology, which is based on the contents of the books. Polybius wrote the first fifteen books during the seventeen years he spent as a detainee at Rome (167-150). This implies a rate of 1.13 years per book. At this pace, Polybius would have completed Books 16-29 (i.e. the next fourteen books) in about sixteen years (1.13×14), that is, by the year 129 (145-16). Similarly, he would have written Books 30-40 (i.e. the last eleven books) in about twelve years (1.13×11), that is, by the year 117 (129-12). As it happens, a terminal date of around 117 would allow an interval of a year or so for news about the construction of the *Via Domitia* to reach Polybius in the Peloponnese (3.39.8). Thus all the references in the *Histories* to events and situations later than 146 could have been written while Polybius was still composing.¹⁵ To conclude, it is quite possible that the *Histories* were substantially completed by the author around 117 BC, shortly before his death.¹⁶

The Romans' view of Polybius

In Cicero's *De Re Publica* (1.34), Laelius declares that Scipio Aemilianus had very often discussed the organization of the state with Panaetius and Polybius, two Greeks who were certainly very expert in political theory (*duobus Graecis vel peritissimis rerum civilium*). In the same dialogue, Scipio cites 'our friend Polybius' (*Polybium nostrum*) on the length of Numa's reign (2.27). Later he observes that 'our friend Polybius' (*Polybius noster hospes*) found Roman institutions wanting only in regard to the education of the young (4.3). In the *De Officiis* (3.113), Cicero calls Polybius 'a particularly fine author' (*Polybius, bonus auctor in primis*). In the weeks preceding the battle of Pharsalus, Brutus wrote a summary of Polybius (Plut. *Brut.* 4.8; Suda, s. v. Brutus). Livy (30.45.5) called Polybius 'an author who deserves great respect' (*Polybius, haudquaquam spernendus auctor*) and (33.10.10) 'an author who is reliable for all aspects of Roman history, especially for events that occurred in Greece' (*Polybium secuti sumus, non incertum auctorem cum omnium Romanarum rerum tum praecipue in Graecia gestarum*). Velleius Paterculus (1.13.3) considered Polybius a man of outstanding talent (*Polybium Panaetiumque, praecl-*

lentes ingenio viros). Vergil's sympathetic portrait of Arcadian Evander, who explains the origins, monuments, customs and religious observances of Pallanteum, the prototype of Rome, to Aeneas, the incipient Roman, may owe something to the Roman ethnology of Arcadian Polybius, who counted Romans among his readers.¹⁷ The favourable treatment of Polybius by Latin authors indicates that the Romans considered him a friend and supporter of the *imperium Romanum*. On the other hand, it would be interesting to know why Scylax of Halicarnassus, a friend of the Stoic philosopher Panaetius (Cic. *Div.* 2.88), composed a refutation of Polybius, entitled *Antigraphê pros tèn Polybiou historian* (Suda, s.v. Skylax Karyandeus, most likely a mistake for Skylax Halikarnasseus). At any rate, his distinguished predecessor and fellow-citizen Herodotus was no eulogist of imperial ambition.

Polybius' judgement on Roman imperialism

Modern scholars have sometimes maintained that Polybius essentially viewed Roman power unfavourably. Binyamin Shimron, for instance, observes that the Achaean historian believed less powerful states should cooperate prudently with the Romans. For this reason, he dispassionately explained their methods and the reasons for their success, and exhibited the errors of their adversaries. But fundamentally he resented Roman rule and was resolved to expose the greed and injustice of Rome.¹⁸ Fergus Millar believes that Polybius took 'an increasingly distant and hostile view of Roman domination'.¹⁹

Most scholars, however, believe that Polybius (at least in the end) took a favourable view of Roman power. Some emphasize his perception of the need to cooperate with Rome. According to Theodor Mommsen, for instance, Polybius was the first Greek of note to recognize the superiority of Rome in the sphere of politics as a fact to which the Greeks were bound to submit. In the *Histories*, therefore, he advocated a policy of close adherence to Rome.²⁰ Domenico Musti argues that Polybius always believed less powerful states should cooperate prudently with Rome in order to preserve their independence and dignity, avoiding the extremes of military conflict and abject servility. Although he expressed a mixed opinion of Roman imperialism, he was never fundamentally hostile to Rome.²¹ Arthur Eckstein maintains that Polybius himself, as a leader of the Achaean League, observed a policy of prudent cooperation with Rome.²² Throughout the *Histories*, Polybius consistently held that less powerful states should cooperate prudently with Rome in order to ensure their own survival and to preserve as much independence and dignity as possible, avoiding armed conflict or degrading subservience. For this reason, he regularly denounced states that engaged in ruinous wars against Rome.²³ Although he disapproved on moral grounds of certain Roman policies and actions, he did not fundamentally condemn Roman domination.²⁴

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Other scholars emphasize social-economic factors. Fustel de Coulanges maintained that Polybius consistently supported Roman domination of Greece. As a public figure active in the political and military affairs of the Achaean League, he cooperated with the Romans against Perseus during the Third Macedonian War. Throughout the *Histories*, he expressed hostility towards democracy and social reform, but praised the conservative constitution of the Romans, whom he regarded as the only power that could be relied on to preserve the political and economic domination of the wealthy classes in Greece. He therefore welcomed the intervention of Rome in Greek affairs.²⁵ Gaetano De Sanctis maintained that Polybius accepted the Roman conquest of the Hellenistic east and defended Roman policies. Although he knew that a Roman victory would spell the end of Greek freedom, Polybius supported Rome in the Third Macedonian War, initially as a political leader and later as an historian. He did so because he opposed democracy and social measures designed to help the poor, threats against which the Romans in his view offered the best guarantee. He was a coward, a traitor, a malicious accuser of the Achaean nationalist party, a well-rewarded admirer and apologist of Rome.²⁶ Peter Green observes that Polybius himself collaborated with the Romans and that, in the *Histories*, he condemned the politicians who led Achaea into a disastrous war against a vastly stronger opponent. He supported Roman domination of Greece, and the institution of conservative regimes in Achaea after 146, in part because these things were advantageous for the propertied classes.²⁷

Some scholars believe that Polybius became mentally assimilated by Rome. According to Marcello Gigante, Polybius identified himself with the Romans and emphasized their moral, political and military superiority as well as the inevitability of their rule over the world. Rejecting the Greek ideal of democracy, he embraced the theory of the mixed constitution, and failed to discern the role of Hellenism in a world dominated by Rome.²⁸ Michel Dubuisson, who maintains that Polybius' language and thought were influenced by his knowledge of Latin, argues that the historian as a result became thoroughly imbued with Roman attitudes, including a propensity to hold the other side responsible for the wars fought by Rome. Polybius served Roman interests through personal collaboration and a generally favourable assessment of Roman policy.²⁹

Arnaldo Momigliano cited a combination of factors. In his view Polybius, who collaborated with Rome, never criticized Roman expansionism in principle because he considered it natural. He described Roman domination as beneficial to the conquered because, as an opponent of social reform, he viewed the Romans as champions of the established order.³⁰ He contended that the Greek states should avoid ruinous military confrontation with Rome.³¹

The most complex account of Polybius' attitude towards Rome is that of F.W. Walbank, who argues that the Achaean historian evolved from

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cautious opposition to cynical detachment and finally to strong support. Prior to 167, when he played an important role (170-168) as a political leader of the Achaean League at the time of the Third Macedonian War, Polybius was cautiously opposed to Rome. During the years of his Roman exile (167-150), however, he became cynical and detached with regard to Roman policy, though he did express some criticism of Rome. Thus cynical detachment, accompanied by an element of criticism, may be discerned in Books 1-15, covering the years 264-202 and written during the period 167-150. Such criticism of Rome did not, however, imply condemnation. Finally, after the events of 149-146, Polybius became strongly identified with the ruling power. This attitude appears in Books 16-39, covering the years 202-145 and written after 146. However, traces of cynical detachment along with criticism of Rome persist even in this portion of the *Histories*, particularly in Books 16-33, dealing with the years 202-152, and most of all in Books 30-3, covering the years 168-152. Traces of this earlier attitude are found in Books 16-33 because those volumes were based on notes made by Polybius during the period of his internment at Rome. Although written after 146, these later books therefore incorporate vestiges of the outlook characteristic of that earlier time. It is only in Books 35-9, covering the years 152-145, that the author's strong support of Rome and close identification with the ruling power become predominant (Book 34, a geographical excursus, is not relevant for this question).³²

This account of Polybius' attitude has been questioned by other scholars. Arthur Eckstein, for instance, maintains that Polybius, as a leader of the Achaean League at the time of the Third Macedonian War, engaged in prudent cooperation with Rome, not cautious opposition.³³ Furthermore, he implicitly rejects the notion that Polybius passed from cynical detachment in Books 1-15 to strong support and close identification in Books 16-39, and that elements of cynical detachment resurfaced in this later portion of the *Histories*, especially Books 30-3. Eckstein maintains that the Achaean historian consistently expressed the same opinion throughout the *Histories*. He always believed that less powerful states should cooperate prudently with Rome, avoiding military conflict or abject servility. This stance rules out the idea that Polybius was ever cynically detached. Conversely, the historian's doctrine betrays a fundamental concern for the welfare of subject states. This orientation precludes the notion that Polybius ever became closely identified with the ruling power.³⁴ Moreover, Polybius throughout the *Histories* earnestly disapproved on moral grounds of certain Roman policies and actions. Criticism of this kind rules out both cynical detachment and strong identification.³⁵

Jean-Louis Ferrary rejects Walbank's view that Books 30-3 in particular are dominated by hostility and cynicism with regard to Roman policy. He argues, on the contrary, that these volumes are on balance favourable to Rome. Although the Achaean historian did sometimes criticize Rome in these books, on other occasions he took a positive view of Roman policy, or

criticized not Rome but foreign states whose errors were exploited by the Romans to their own advantage, or explained that the Romans made unjust decisions because they were deceived by foreign leaders. Moreover, Polybius' account of the entire period 168-145, presented in Books 30-9, is in general favourable to Rome, for the ancient historian believed that Roman policy on the whole continued to exhibit moderation and beneficence after the battle of Pydna. Thus his entire account is essentially favourable towards the ruling power, and in the *Histories* Polybius never manifested an attitude of cynical detachment towards Rome. Furthermore, the complex (but essentially favourable) attitude towards Rome discerned in Books 30-3 represents Polybius' thinking at the actual time of composition, that is, in the years after 146. Therefore it should not be supposed that his outlook radically changed after 149-146, or that elements of an incompatible earlier attitude intruded in Books 30-3, written after 146.³⁶ Other scholars have rejected Walbank's interpretation on grounds similar to those invoked by Eckstein and Ferrary.³⁷

Whether they believe that Polybius' view of Roman domination was essentially favourable or hostile, scholars often observe that the Achaean historian evinced a certain intellectual distance from Rome. In other words, he never became closely identified intellectually with the ruling power. Among those who think Polybius was fundamentally hostile to Rome, Binyamin Shimron notes that the ancient historian's primary concern was always the welfare of the Greeks; that he believed they should preserve their independence whenever possible; that he expressed criticism of Roman conduct.³⁸ Fergus Millar argues that Polybius' perspective was that of a citizen of a classical or Hellenistic city or league, and that he expressed reservations about Roman policy.³⁹

Among the scholars who believe that Polybius judged Rome favourably, Fustel de Coulanges maintained that the ancient historian was inspired to accept Roman intervention not by primary attachment to the ruling power but by a desire to preserve the dominant position of the Greek upper classes. Thus he never felt a complete emotional and intellectual identity with Rome.⁴⁰

Gennaro Sasso observed that, although he admired Rome, Polybius did not hesitate to criticize unjust Roman policies. According to Sasso, the Achaean historian in his heart would have preferred to live in a world that had not been unified under Roman supremacy; he admired Greek virtues that the Romans in his view did not possess.⁴¹

Hansulrich Labuske argues that Polybius reflected the views of the Greek upper class. Thus he recognized that Rome could best preserve the existing social and political order. Moreover, he explained the Romans' success in rational terms as the legitimate result of their political organization; he assessed their domination objectively as something inevitable and irresistible. On the other hand, he criticized negative aspects of Roman policy. He also condemned the servility of certain Greek leaders

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towards the Romans and regretted the loss of Greek independence. Finally, he explained how, one day, Roman power would collapse through the natural decay of the mixed constitution that had made it possible.⁴²

Karl-Ernst Petzold notes that, during the Third Macedonian War, Polybius realized the Greeks had to cooperate with Rome (28.3; 28.6.1-7.1; 28.12.1-2). However, the ancient historian condemned Callicrates for impairing Achaean sovereignty vis-à-vis Rome (24.8-10), and preferred Philopoemen's policy of protesting illegal Roman demands to the ready compliance of Aristaenus (24.11-13). Moreover, in his survey of Achaean history (2.37-71), an early composition added to the *Histories* (in Petzold's view) when Polybius extended his narrative beyond 168, the author contrasted Roman domination, based on military and economic strength, with the Achaean League, which relied instead on ethical principles for its earliest expansion.⁴³

Arnaldo Momigliano judged that Polybius never accepted Roman supremacy wholeheartedly, did not capitulate morally or intellectually to the ruling power, did not become their agent. He wrote as a Greek striving to moderate Roman domination over his own people, and to secure the position of the Greek propertied classes. He expressed implicit reservations about Roman treatment of Carthage (in 149) and Corinth (in 146).⁴⁴

Although Domenico Musti believes that Polybius wrote from a Roman perspective, he maintains that the ancient historian's loyalty to the Achaean political ideal indicates a strong mental reservation.⁴⁵ Polybius, in his view, always held critical reservations about Roman policy, including Roman treatment of Carthage in 149. In the face of Roman encroachment, he espoused the ideal of Greek autonomy, and did not welcome the expansion of Roman power over Greece.⁴⁶

Arthur Eckstein argues that, in supporting collaboration with Rome, Polybius demonstrates not a primary loyalty to the ruling power, but rather a concern for the interests of weaker states.⁴⁷ According to Peter Green, Polybius expressed misgivings about Roman treatment of Carthage in 149. Furthermore, it was because of the ruinous consequences that ensued for the Greeks that he condemned the nationalists who led Achaea into a disastrous war against Rome. In addition, Polybius accepted Roman domination of Greece in part because he welcomed Rome's support of political and social conservatism. Moreover, he analyzed the Roman constitution according to Greek habits of thought, attempting to relate it to the categories described by Plato and Aristotle. Thus his understanding of Rome was primarily that of a Greek.⁴⁸

Jean-Louis Ferrary argues that Polybius believed less powerful states should strive to preserve a measure of independence in relation to Rome, a view expressed even in books written after 146 (e.g. 24.8-13). Thus Polybius rejoiced in the discomfiture (32.6.3-9) and death (32.5.1-3) of the extreme pro-Roman politicians who controlled the various Greek states after the battle of Pydna until the late 160s and early 150s. Moreover, he

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advised the Romans to observe moderation in their treatment of subjects, representing this virtue as a fundamental condition for the preservation of imperial rule. In these ways, he showed concern for the interests of weaker nations. Furthermore, in Ferrary's view, since Polybius thought that Roman policy continued to be moderate and beneficent after 168, he would not have fully agreed with the critics of Rome whose opinions are recorded at 36.9.5-8, where the Romans are accused of practising despotic ruthlessness in the years 168-149. Nevertheless, the historian felt reservations about Roman policy regarding Carthage in 149, for he believed that imperial states should behave moderately towards subjects (10.36), and admitted that the Carthaginians at least had slight grounds for resisting when the Romans ordered them to abandon their city (38.1.5 with 36.5.4-5). Similarly, Polybius understood *deditio* to imply unconditional surrender (20.9.11-12; 36.4.1-3). Thus he would not have fully agreed with the critics of Rome whose views are recorded at 36.9.9-11, where the Romans are accused of employing devious stratagems of dubious moral character against the Carthaginians in 149. Nevertheless, he felt reservations about how the Romans prepared the way for their final demand, the abandonment of Carthage, for he disapproved of using deceptive or treacherous manoeuvres against enemies (13.3-5). Furthermore, Polybius supported the conservative constitutions imposed on the Achaean cities by Rome after 146, because these granted effective control to the upper classes, thus securing the established social and political order that he wanted to defend.⁴⁹

Finally, even F.W. Walbank, who believes that Polybius became closely identified with Rome after 146, writes that, 'despite his commitment to Scipio and to Rome, however, Polybius remained primarily an Achaean. Both in his life and in his writing he never wavered in one criterion – what he regarded as the best policy for Achaea In the early years of the Roman alliance he favoured Philopoemen's policy – collaboration within strict limits and no giving away of freedom before it became absolutely necessary'⁵⁰

This study seeks to demonstrate that Polybius on balance viewed Roman domination favourably. Recognizing the necessity of prudent cooperation, he also discerned merits in the ruling power that justified supporting Rome. These merits included Roman protection of the Greek upper classes. A number of other factors will be examined, most importantly, Polybius' admiration of imperial rule in general (an outlook shared by most intellectuals writing during the Hellenistic period), his conviction that the Romans almost always justified their wars in an acceptable manner, his belief that other manifestations of their expansionary drive could usually be justified or excused, and his view that Roman domination in all periods was on balance moderate and beneficent. On these points, therefore, the present analysis is influenced most of all by Fustel de Coulanges, Eckstein and Ferrary. I also accept the view, shared by many

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scholars, that behind Polybius' support of Rome lay a certain intellectual distance. As earlier authors have pointed out, Polybius felt a primary attachment to Greece and the Greek upper classes, he sometimes criticized Rome, and he speculated on the eventual downfall of Roman power. This study will also examine a number of other factors, including Polybius' rational defence of Rome, his own intimations (probably inadvertent but nonetheless revealing) that the Romans were barbarians, his references to them as agents of Fortune, portrayed as a purposive divinity, and his own authorial ambitions.

Polybius' conception of Roman imperialism

Polybius defined the Roman *arkhê* as Rome's power to enforce obedience to her will, a power that, by 168 BC, extended over nearly the entire inhabited world. Thus he understood the Roman dominion as power exercised over other lands and nations regardless of their formal status in relation to the ruling people. Moreover, he believed that the Romans deliberately sought to achieve such power.⁵¹ Furthermore, his conception of the Roman *arkhê* corresponds essentially to the way in which Romans of the second and first centuries BC usually understood the *imperium* they wielded over foreign lands and peoples.⁵² This conception of Roman dominion is also compatible with a common understanding among modern scholars, who often use the term 'imperialism' in a broad sense to denote the political and economic domination exercised over weaker states by stronger ones for their own advantage. It is therefore legitimate to conclude that Polybius, the Romans and contemporary scholars are all describing a single type of political relation in its different manifestations.⁵³

Polybius alludes in general terms to the motives of imperial expansion. For instance, he states at 3.4.9-11 that ruling powers should not regard victory and the subjection of all peoples as their final goal, for all human activity aims at the resulting pleasures (*hêdeôn*), morally good effects (*kalôn*), or advantages (*sympherontôn*). However, Polybius did not articulate any theory of imperialism. That is to say, the *Histories* contain no general statement explaining the motives of Roman domination.⁵⁴ Nevertheless, occasional remarks do indicate that, in his view, the Romans in specific cases extended their power in order to obtain political or economic advantages.

In 264 BC, for instance, they crossed to Sicily in pursuit of an expansionary drive. According to Polybius, they acted to guarantee the security of Italy from Carthaginian expansionism and to create an opportunity for individuals to acquire large amounts of booty (1.6.3; 1.10.5-11.3; 1.12.7). The Romans fought a war against Queen Teuta of Illyria after the assassination of one of the ambassadors they had sent to her court to demand the cessation of piratical attacks on Italian shipping. According to Polybius, when Teuta defiantly refused to stop this practice, the ambassador

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had threatened that the Romans would attack the Illyrians in order to protect Italian traders (2.8.1-3; 2.8.6-11).

In 164/3, the brothers Ptolemy VI and Ptolemy VIII divided their ancestral kingdom, the elder taking Egypt and Cyprus, the younger Cyrene. However, when Ptolemy VIII appeared in Rome the following year to ask for Cyprus, the senate ruled that he should have the island, and took various measures to bring about that result (Polyb. 31.10; 31.17-20; 33.11). Through such means, explains Polybius, the Romans effectively increased and built up their own power by exploiting the mistakes of others. The senate, he declares, acted in accordance with Roman self-interest, for, discerning the greatness of the Egyptian kingdom, they sought to prevent a strong ruler from becoming unduly ambitious (31.10.6-8).

Antiochus IV of Syria (175-164) died in 164/3 (Polyb. 31.9). At this point Demetrius, son of the previous king, Seleucus IV (187-175), asked the senate to release him from detention as a hostage and allow him to return home to assume the Seleucid throne. The senate, however, rejected the young prince's appeal, deciding instead to keep Demetrius at Rome and to support the surviving child of Antiochus IV, who was still a boy (31.2.1-11). This policy was upheld when Demetrius renewed his request in the following year (31.11). According to Polybius, the senate decided to support the child Antiochus V because they viewed Demetrius, now in the prime of life, with suspicion, and judged that the youthful incapacity of the boy who had succeeded to the throne better suited their own interests (31.2.7; 31.11.10-12). That the senate had judged correctly soon became evident, explains Polybius, when they appointed a three-man commission charged with visiting Syria and taking various measures intended to weaken the Seleucid kingdom militarily and in general, as the senate directed. The envoys were instructed to take such action because the senate expected no one to oppose their orders, seeing that the king was a boy and the leading officials were pleased that the throne had not been awarded to Demetrius, as they had anticipated (31.2.8-12). These examples show that Polybius believed the Romans extended their power for political and economic reasons, that they acted to secure material gain and to prevent other states from challenging them. In this respect, therefore, his explanation of the Roman *arkhê* resembles the conclusions of many contemporary scholars who write about imperialism.

Modern scholars often maintain that imperialism can benefit weaker states by creating or restoring order, itself the basis for peace, prosperity and other advantages.⁵⁵ Polybius would have accepted this view. He observes, for instance, that Roman domination procured many advantages for the Greeks (27.10.3). In other passages, he explains in greater detail how Roman imperialism benefitted both the ruling power and her subjects. By engaging in the First Illyrian War, for example, the Romans contributed to the formation and growth of their own power (2.2.1-2). They sent military forces across the Adriatic in order to protect Italian shipping

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from the piratical attacks of the Illyrians (2.8.1-3; 2.8.6-11). At the same time, however, their intervention delivered the Greeks from great fear, seeing that the Illyrians were the common enemies of all (2.12.6). The Romans entered upon the Second Punic War with the intention of pursuing universal empire (1.3.7-10). Once they had defeated the Carthaginians, they believed that they had achieved the greatest step towards the realization of that aim. They were therefore emboldened to grasp the rest and to cross with an army into Greece and Asia (1.3.6). Thus, according to Polybius, the Romans fought the Second Macedonian War in order to continue their quest for universal dominion. However, as a result of their victory over Philip V, they genuinely liberated Greece (18.44.1-4; 18.45.1-8; 18.46.5-15). The Romans subsequently fought against Antiochus III in pursuit of the same goal of universal dominion (1.3.6). Thus, after they had expelled the king from continental Greece, they formed the ambition of defeating him and gaining control of Asia Minor (21.4.4-5). Having vanquished Antiochus, they suppressed the Galatians, thus achieving undisputed mastery of Asia. This defeat of the Galatians, however, proved beneficial to the Greeks who lived west of the Taurus range, for the Romans freed them from fear of the barbarians and from the lawless conduct of the Galatians (3.3.5). Finally, the defeat of Perseus in the Third Macedonian War marked the complete realization of universal empire (1.1.5; 3.1.9; 3.3.7-9). But the victory of Rome simultaneously brought enormous benefits for the Macedonians themselves (36.17.13).

To sum up, although Polybius did not articulate a theory of imperialism, he understood the Roman *arkhê* as a form of domination exercised by a strong country over less powerful states for its own political and economic advantage, a form of domination that might, however, confer benefits on subjects. Thus his conception of Roman dominion is compatible with modern notions of imperialism. It is therefore appropriate to call the Roman *arkhê* of Polybius an empire, and the process by which it was created, expanded and preserved, imperialism.⁵⁶

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Part I

The Attitude of Intellectuals to Imperial Domination in the Hellenistic Period

The first three chapters of this book examine the attitude of Greek intellectuals (and a few non-Greeks) to the phenomenon of imperial domination. What did philosophers, poets, prophetic writers and historians think of imperial rule in principle, and how did they judge particular ruling nations? It will be argued that, with rare exceptions, these intellectuals, active between the late third and the early first century BC, accepted imperial domination as a normal feature of the international structure. This period, which includes the lifespan of Polybius, represents a meaningful portion of political and intellectual history. Beginning with Philinus' study of Rome's initial overseas expansion during the First Punic War, it ends with Posidonius' survey of the Mediterranean world, which culminated with the reaffirmation of Roman supremacy as a result of victory in the First Mithridatic War.

Philosophers debated whether imperial rule could be defended on the basis of morality or expediency, and the historian Posidonius (himself a Stoic philosopher) maintained that it could be justified on the basis of morality. Poets, prophetic writers and historians admired or defended one or another of the important ruling powers of the Hellenistic age, especially Rome, Carthage and the Ptolemies.

It is therefore evident that Polybius wrote in an intellectual environment disposed, for the most part, to accept imperial dominion as a normal feature of the international scene, an intellectual environment in which authors usually admired or defended Rome or some other imperialist nation. These intellectuals often evinced respect for the order achieved, or the benefits conferred, by the ruling power. Thus their response to imperial rule also suggests that they maintained a certain intellectual distance from the dominant nation. In Part Two of this work, it will be argued that Polybius admired imperial rule in general, that he admired and defended Roman domination, but preserved a certain intellectual independence of the ruling power. It will therefore emerge that in fundamental ways he resembled the intellectuals of his age in his attitude towards imperial dominion.

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Greek Philosophers and Roman Imperialism

In the middle of the second century BC, Greek philosophers became concerned with the problem of Roman imperialism. The point of departure for discussion of their work is Book 3 of Cicero's *De Re Publica*, in which the characters Lucius Furius Philus and Gaius Laelius express opposing views about the role of justice in the conduct of government and international relations. Furius Philus divides the concept of justice into two categories. Natural (or true) justice, established by God, respects the rights of all (*suum cuique reddere*). Because it is absolute and concerned with the rights of others, it is unsuitable as the basis of government and international relations. On the other hand, civil justice (equivalent to prudent self-interest), determined by utility, aims at the advantage of particular individuals, groups or communities through the establishment of convention or the pursuit of self-aggrandizement. Relative and expedient, it is the only practicable basis for the conduct of government and international affairs. All empires, including that of Rome, are founded on self-interest rather than natural justice (Cic. *Rep.* 3.8-29; cf. Lact. *Div. Inst.* 5.16.13).

Laelius, on the contrary, acknowledges only one justice, the essential basis of all social relations. Established by God, it is consistent with nature and right reason, unchanging, eternal, universal, and concerned with the rights of all. Without it, no human society can exist. Nature confers dominion on what is best, for the advantage of what is inferior. Therefore imperialism is just when subordination benefits certain classes of people, and this is indeed the case when the wicked are prevented from doing wrong and when conquered nations will enjoy better conditions than they do before they are conquered. However, imperialism is unjust when it is imposed on nations capable of exercising independence. The beneficent aim of imperialism requires dominant states to rule their subjects as a father commands his children, not as a master controls his slaves. Roman rule satisfies these conditions. The Romans have created a universal empire by defending their allies. They have fought just wars, undertaken out of self-defence or loyalty to others, or in retaliation for injuries suffered, and declared in due form. Although the Roman empire is still for the most part founded on justice, it may come to be based on force. If that happens, subjects who until now have obeyed voluntarily will be con-

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strained only through terror, and the survival of Rome itself may be threatened (Cic. *Rep.* 3.33-41).

The arguments of Furius Philus and Laelius reflect a debate carried on among intellectuals in Greece during the second century BC. Evidence from the *De Re Publica* indicates that Cicero based the speech of Furius Philus on arguments employed by the philosopher Carneades.¹ In 155 BC this scholar, head of the Academy, visited Rome in the company of Diogenes, leader of the Stoa, and Critolaus, head of the Peripatetic school. These men had been sent as ambassadors by the city of Athens to petition the senate to cancel a fine imposed on the community as a result of arbitration rendered by Sicyon at the behest of Rome. This penalty had been assessed against the Athenians for plundering the neighbouring city of Oropus. While in Rome, Carneades gave two public lectures. In the first he maintained that government and international affairs must be founded on justice; in the second he argued that self-interest must be the guiding principle in these domains.² The speech of Furius Philus, therefore, is based on Carneades' second lecture. Since the philosopher himself did not publish anything, Cicero probably derived information about his treatment of justice and self-interest from the writings of Clitomachus, student of Carneades and his successor as head of the Academy. However, Clitomachus probably reported, not the text of the lectures delivered by his teacher at Rome, but a summary of the arguments employed by Carneades over a period of time as he examined the question of justice and self-interest.³ Cicero may nevertheless have assumed that the material found in Clitomachus corresponded essentially to the text of the lectures given by Carneades at Rome.

The problem of what source was used by Cicero for the speech of Laelius has occasioned much debate. What survives of *De Re Publica*, Book 3, does not explicitly trace this speech to the arguments of Carneades or, indeed, to any authority. The speech of Laelius in fact shows evidence of various philosophical influences, especially those of Plato, Aristotle and the Stoics. Most importantly, Laelius' justification of imperialism (Cic. *Rep.* 3.38-9) can be traced ultimately to Aristotle's defence of slavery and imperialism, and to his discussion of the various forms of power. According to Aristotle, slavery is justified when master and slave are designed by nature to occupy their respective stations. Although the slave benefits from subordination to his master, slavery is practised primarily in the interest of the master. Moreover the philosopher, who associates imperial rule (*hê despōtikê*) with the master-slave relationship, maintains that it is justified when ruling power and subject people are designed by nature to occupy their respective positions. Since Aristotle treats imperial rule as akin to the master-slave relationship, he presumably holds that, although it benefits the subject people, it aims primarily at the interest of the ruling power. Aristotle, however, also refers to a form of imperial leadership that he calls hegemony (*hê hêgemonia*), which he deems justified when it aims

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at the advantage of the governed (*tôn arkhomenôn*), and he distinguishes hegemony from imperial rule (*hê despoteia*). Similarly, the rule exercised by a man over his family and by a magistrate over his fellow-citizens aims primarily at the interest of the ruled. Thus Laelius' defence of imperialism combines two elements of Aristotle's thought, namely, the natural subordination of subject people to ruling power (imperial rule), and the exercise of leadership in the interest of the governed (hegemony). Laelius therefore elevates imperial rule above the level of the master-slave relationship, associating it (unlike Aristotle) with patriarchal authority (which, according to the philosopher, operates primarily in the interest of the ruled). In addition to ideas drawn from Greek philosophy, Cicero also included examples drawn from Roman history and experience in the speeches of Furius Philus and Laelius. Because the speech of Laelius reflects various elements, scholars have disagreed on the question of the source on which it is based. Some writers believe that Cicero used a Stoic model (Panaetius or Posidonius), while others maintain that he consulted principally the works of Plato and Aristotle. It is sometimes thought that he derived the arguments of Laelius from Carneades' defence of natural justice.⁴

Cicero was directly acquainted with the dialogues of Plato and the writings of the major Stoic authors.⁵ He also knew some of the Aristotelian works extant today, which were coming into wider circulation during the first century BC, and some of the popular writings, now lost, which included a dialogue in four books entitled *On Justice* (mentioned at *Rep.* 3.12). It is, however, uncertain to what extent his knowledge of Aristotle was based on direct consultation of the original works.⁶ He was, moreover, personally connected with contemporary philosophers of the Academic, Peripatetic, Stoic and Epicurean schools.⁷ Therefore, it would have been possible for Cicero to compose arguments for the speech of Laelius by directly consulting relevant works written by Plato, Aristotle and the Stoics, and by using information derived from personal contact with scholars of his acquaintance.

Cicero, moreover, had a strong incentive to study the philosophers at first hand, for he would have wanted to deploy the most effective arguments possible in favour of natural justice, the position that he supported. The defence of natural justice in the *De Re Publica* follows the case for self-interest, exactly as in Plato's *Republic*. Thus Cicero emphasized the case for natural justice by reversing the order of the speeches given by Carneades at Rome, presumably retained in Clitomachus' recapitulation of Carneades' scholastic arguments. Both Greek scholars represent the method of Academic scepticism, which treated the case for and against some proposition, in this instance, the belief that natural justice must govern social relations. The emphatic position accorded the case for natural justice in the *De Re Publica* therefore demanded particular care on the part of Cicero. Since he knew his philosophical classics and had special reasons to exploit them in this context, it is very likely that he consulted

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relevant works of Plato, Aristotle and the major Stoic authors when he composed the speech of Laelius defending justice.

Nevertheless, he probably also used the arguments of Carneades as reported by Clitomachus. In the first place, the variety of philosophical influences observed in the speech of Laelius is consistent with the practice of Carneades, who is said to have gathered all the arguments made in defence of justice. Although he gave particular attention to Plato and Aristotle, he also included the Stoics (Cic. *Rep.* 3.9-13).⁸ Second, the collection of arguments marshalled by the Academic philosopher would have provided a convenient starting-point for Cicero. That he used ancillary material in his philosophical writing is evident from the fact that, in composing Book 3 of the *De Officiis*, Cicero read the *Peri tou kathêkontos* of Posidonius along with a summary of the chief points (Cic. *Att.* 16.11.4; 16.14.3-4; *Off.* 1.159; 3.8). Third, Lactantius (*Div. Inst.* 5.14.5) states that Carneades in his first lecture assembled all the arguments made in favour of justice (Cic. *Rep.* 3.9). Since this information was derived from the *De Re Publica*, it appears that Cicero himself, perhaps in the introduction to Book 3, described the procedure followed by Carneades in his lectures on justice. Thus Cicero had Carneades' arguments in defence of justice *sous la main* when he composed Book 3 of the *De Re Publica*. It is therefore likely that Cicero, in composing the speech of Laelius, not only consulted the writings of Plato, Aristotle and the Stoics, but also used the collection of arguments in favour of natural justice assembled by Carneades and transmitted by Clitomachus.

Although the speech of Laelius was probably based on Carneades' defence of justice as well as direct consultation of Plato, Aristotle and the Stoics, Cicero avoided ascribing the statements of Laelius to the Academic philosopher. This is because Carneades had merely assembled arguments derived from the same prestigious authors. On the other hand, he attributed the arguments of Furius Philus to Carneades because they originated mainly with the sophists and their literary incarnations, figures such as Thrasymachus, Glaucon and Adeimantus, who appear in Plato's *Republic*, and Callicles, a character in the *Gorgias*. The nameless host and their literary spokesmen could be subsumed without offence under the name of the Academic philosopher, who trained their weapons upon the chief representatives of the elite schools.

Did Cicero himself construct the defence of imperialism that he assigns to Laelius in *Rep.* 3.38-9, or did he find it in one of his sources? Laelius justifies imperialism based on the beneficent rule of superior over inferior, a dispensation decreed by nature for the advantage of the inferior. In another passage, he warns about the danger of basing imperial rule on force and terror instead of justice, explaining that subjects will in that case cease to obey voluntarily (Cic. *Rep.* 41). The same ideas constitute an important theme within the *Histories* of the Stoic philosopher Posidonius, to be considered in detail below.⁹ Thus Cicero did not himself devise the

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justification of imperialism assigned to Laelius. He found this argument in the *Histories* and may have discussed it with the author himself. There is, however, good reason to think that Posidonius adopted a theory elaborated by an earlier Stoic philosopher, Panaetius, and that Cicero's treatment of imperialism in the speech of Laelius may be traced to both of these scholars.¹⁰

Laelius' justification of imperialism, which is based ultimately on Aristotle's defence of slavery and imperialism, appears in a Stoic framework within the *De Re Publica*, for here the rule of superior over inferior is ascribed to natural law, itself derived from God, equated with right reason, and described as absolute and universal. Elements of Aristotle's thought are modified in such a way as to reflect the Stoic emphasis on the domination of reason over passion, and the psychological dualism implied by Laelius' description of the soul and its parts is consistent with the doctrine of Panaetius.¹¹

As noted above, Laelius' justification of imperialism goes back ultimately to Aristotle's theory of slavery and imperialism. The connection of imperialism with slavery was also characteristic of Stoicism, for Diogenes Laertius (7.121-2) says that the Stoics considered subordination without possession (i.e. imperialism) as a type of slavery. Furthermore, according to Diogenes Laertius (loc. cit.), the Stoics distinguished four kinds of slavery: the moral type, subordination without possession (imperialism), subordination with possession (ordinary slavery), and despotism (this last category resembles the first). Of these, the moral type implies a distinction between persons who are superior (i.e. wise) and inferior (i.e. unwise). Only the superior may exercise authority over their community. Similarly, according to D.L. 7.124, the Stoics maintained that friendship exists only among the superior (i.e. the virtuous), never among the inferior (i.e. the non-virtuous). Thus the Stoic doctrines of moral slavery and of friendship involve a classification of persons as superior and inferior. Laelius' defence of imperialism involves the extension to subordination without possession (imperialism) of a distinction between superior and inferior that is explicitly applied to slavery of the moral type. Finally, D.L. 7.121-2 shows that the Stoics accepted imperialism (subordination without possession) and ordinary slavery (subordination with possession). Thus Laelius' defence of imperialism, which is based on a justification of slavery and divides human beings into a superior and an inferior category, may be viewed as consistent with Stoic thinking.

Laelius' defence of imperialism can with good reason be traced more specifically to Panaetius. As noted above, the psychological dualism implied by this theory is consistent with the views of the Stoic philosopher. Furthermore, Panaetius admired Plato and Aristotle, in the light of whose works he modified the doctrines of his own school (Cic. *Fin.* 4.79). A defence of imperialism based on Aristotle's justification of slavery and imperialism would be consistent with this tendency.¹² In addition, unlike

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the old Stoics, who treated the state in a purely theoretical fashion, Panaetius wrote on this subject in a manner adapted for ordinary use by peoples and states (Cic. *Leg.* 3.14). A defence of imperialism would be consistent with this practical bent.¹³ Moreover, in *Off.* 2.21-9, broadly based on the *Peri tou kathêkontos* of Panaetius, Cicero maintains that imperialist nations should treat their subjects with justice and moderation, while caring for their interests (cf. 2.75).¹⁴ He condemns resort to the force and severity employed by masters against their slaves. This emphasis on beneficent rule coincides with the exposition of Laelius in Cic. *Rep.* 3.38-9. Also, Panaetius was on close terms with Scipio Aemilianus, conqueror of Carthage and Numantia, whom he accompanied on the eastern embassy of 140-139 BC, and with whom he discussed political matters. Thus Panaetius was connected with members of the highest political circles at Rome, and could be expected to take an interest in the political issues confronting them.¹⁵ Finally, to judge from the *De Officiis* of Cicero, Panaetius' work *Peri tou kathêkontos*, which considered action in terms of morality and expediency, included discussion of government and international affairs. Thus the justification of imperialism found in the speech of Laelius was probably formulated by Panaetius in that treatise, written about 140 BC.¹⁶

Panaetius' book may be seen in part as a reply to the arguments Carneades had cited in favour of basing government and international affairs on expediency. Carneades, moreover, had put forward the case for both justice and expediency, which he presented as separate but complementary principles. In his *Peri tou kathêkontos*, however, Panaetius maintained that conduct should be based on justice rather than expediency, but he argued that what is just is at the same time expedient, though apparent contradictions arise when, of two alternative courses of action, one merely appears to be just or expedient. Thus Panaetius would have held that government and international affairs must be based on justice, itself compatible with true self-interest.¹⁷

The *Peri tou kathêkontos* may also be viewed in part as a refutation of the Greek historian Agatharchides of Cnidus, author of a work entitled *On the Erythraean Sea*, which was written substantially during the reign of Ptolemy VI (180-145 BC). Agatharchides believed that the expansionism of the powerful and sophisticated Hellenistic kingdoms (and Rome) was consistent neither with justice nor with expediency. The imperialism of these states was immoral because it arose from wicked impulses and produced evil results; it was inexpedient because it brought grief to the perpetrators. Expansionism, moreover, subverted the rule of nature, for it corrupted native populations brought under the influence or control of the Hellenistic kingdoms. Although considered less advanced, these peoples actually surpassed the Greeks in their compliance with natural law, and therefore enjoyed a happier way of life. For them, contact with the Hellenistic world was not beneficial but harmful. Thus Agatharchides

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condemned imperialism as fundamentally unjust and inexpedient.¹⁸ On the contrary, the arguments of Laelius, which represent Panaetius, insist that imperialism of the proper kind is indeed just, expedient, beneficial to subjects, and consistent with natural law. Finally, it would have been possible for Carneades, who died in 129/8 BC, at some point to include Panaetius' defence of imperialism in his collection of arguments supporting justice, and thus Cicero could have learned of it not only in the *Peri tou kathêkontos* of Panaetius but also in Clitomachus' summary of Carneades' teaching.¹⁹

To sum up, the opposing arguments assembled by Carneades (reflected in the speeches of Furius Philus and Laelius) indicate that, in the middle and latter half of the second century BC, Greek intellectuals were debating the proper foundation of government and international relations, including imperialism. Carneades argued the case for both natural justice and expediency. In his work *On the Erythraean Sea*, Agatharchides attacked imperialism as both unjust and inexpedient. Panaetius advocated imperialism based on justice and therefore consistent with true self-interest. His defence of imperialism was probably formulated in the *Peri tou kathêkontos* of c. 140 BC and used by Carneades in support of natural justice.

The defence of imperialism formulated by Panaetius, although inspired by Aristotelian and Stoic ideas, was probably also influenced by the concept underlying the title *koinoi euergetai*, commonly bestowed upon Rome by the Greeks in the second and first centuries BC. As Ferrary observes, this title both expresses the Greeks' recognition of universal Roman supremacy and emphasizes the principle on which that supremacy had to be founded in order to be accepted by the Greeks, that is, an exchange of benefactions and obedient gratitude.²⁰

The next question to be considered is the place of Rome within the debate on natural justice and expediency. In Cic. *Rep.* 3.22, Furius Philus declares that the expansion of Roman power resulted from pursuit of self-interest rather than observance of justice. According to Lact. *Div. Inst.* 5.16.4 (Cic. *Rep.* 3.12), Carneades in his refutation of justice pointed specifically to the Romans as an example of an imperialist state that acts in pursuit of self-interest contrary to the requirements of justice. From these passages, it might be inferred that Carneades himself used the specific example of Rome when he lectured there in 155 BC, but this conclusion is by no means certain.

In the first place, since Lactantius had limited knowledge of Greek literature, he is unlikely to have consulted the writings of Clitomachus in order to study the arguments of Carneades. What he knew of this philosopher was derived from the *De Re Publica* of Cicero.²¹ In *Div. Inst.* 5.14.3, for instance, Lactantius declares that readers unacquainted with the oratorical skills of Carneades may learn about the Academic philosopher through the praise bestowed on him by Cicero, evidently in the *De Re Publica* (cf. *Div. Inst.* 5.14.4-5). Moreover, he states that Carneades'

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refutation of justice is reproduced in the speech of Furius Philus (*Div. Inst.* 5.14.5 = Cic. *Rep.* 3.9; cf. *Div. Inst.* 5.16.13; 5.17.14). Thus Lactantius knew Carneades' arguments against justice from the speech of Furius Philus in the *De Re Publica*, and when he refers to a statement of the Academic philosopher in *Div. Inst.* 5.16.4, he is in fact reporting a statement ascribed to Furius Philus, a character in Cicero's dialogue, whose speech he assumes to be an accurate version of Carneades' arguments. Thus we are in fact dealing with two statements of Furius Philus, a character in a Ciceronian dialogue, whose arguments in general are derived from Carneades.

Secondly, Cicero learned about the arguments of Carneades from the writings of Clitomachus, who did not transmit the text of his teacher's Roman lectures, but rather summarized the scholastic work of Carneades. Thus, if the observations of Furius Philus about the self-interest of imperialist states such as Rome do in fact go back to the Academic philosopher, it does not follow that Carneades necessarily mentioned Rome in his lecture of 155 BC, though he may have done so on other occasions.

Finally, and most importantly, since Cicero employed details from Roman history and experience to make the *De Re Publica* more relevant to his audience, we cannot be sure that the references to Rome in Cic. *Rep.* 3.22, in Lact. *Div. Inst.* 5.16.4 (Cic. *Rep.* 3.12) or elsewhere in the speeches of Furius Philus and Laelius originated with Carneades himself. Thus it is not certain that Carneades, in his treatment of justice, at any time referred explicitly to Roman domination.²² But even if he never did, it is impossible to imagine that the dominant power was absent from his thoughts. The same must be true of Panaetius. The historian Agatharchides certainly commented on Rome. In their treatment of imperialism, justice and self-interest, Carneades and Panaetius, like Agatharchides, took into account the question of Roman domination.

Carneades argued the case for both justice and self-interest as the proper foundation for the rule of one people over another. In the process, he certainly drew attention to considerations that might seem hostile to imperialism. Nevertheless, he cannot be viewed as an enemy of Rome.²³ Since the sceptical Academy denied the possibility of certain knowledge, Carneades did not set out to reach a definite conclusion about imperialism. By arguing both sides of the question, he engaged in a philosophical exercise inspired by Socratic inquiry, the aim of which was to determine whether arguments made in support of either position were valid or not, and in this way to discover probable truth. Indeed Lactantius, who derived his information from the *De Re Publica*, declares that Carneades put forward arguments in favour of justice, not because he thought they were valid, but in order to refute them (Lact. *Div. Inst.* 5.14.5 = Cic. *Rep.* 3.9). Conversely, the philosopher refuted those arguments, not because he thought that justice should be disparaged, but in order to show that the arguments proposed in its defence were unsound (Lact. *Epit.* 50.5-8 = Cic.

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Rep. 3.11; Lact. *Div. Inst.* 5.16.2-4 = Cic. *Rep.* 3.12). Carneades did not really believe that the just man is a fool, but he put forward that argument in order to defend the chief principle of the sceptical Academy, which maintained that nothing can be known (Lact. *Div. Inst.* 5.17.9). Finally, Lactantius says that Carneades made antithetical speeches for and against justice in accordance with his habit of refuting those who made any positive assertions (*Div. Inst.* 5.14.3-4). This statement is consistent with a passage in Cic. *De Or.* 3.80, in which Lucius Licinius Crassus implies that Carneades refuted all positive assertions. Cicero could have learned about the epistemological stance of Carneades in the writings of Clitomachus, or reached these conclusions from his broader knowledge of the sceptical Academy. What Cicero says about the methods of Carneades demonstrates that the philosopher argued for and against the justice of imperialism in order to test the cogency of assertions made in favour of both natural justice and expediency.²⁴

Furthermore, in his exploration of imperialism, justice and self-interest, Carneades put forward two contrasting ways of justifying the domination exercised by one nation over another. Both approaches derived imperialism from nature, one claiming that natural law decrees the rule of superior over inferior for the benefit of the latter, the other maintaining that nature leads all men and other living beings to seek their own advantage (Cic. *Rep.* 3.12; 3.39). Thus Carneades' attack on justice did not imply rejection of imperialism.

Moreover, although his arguments in support of justice and expediency included statements about how empires like that of Rome actually work, Carneades was not attempting primarily to ascertain whether the dominion of Rome or any other great power was in fact based on justice or expediency. His fundamental objective was to explore the question of which principle constitutes the proper basis for imperialism. His antithetical speeches examined opposing courses available to imperialist states in their exercise of power, with the suggestion that they might be complementary.

On a more practical level, it must also be remembered that Carneades came to Rome in 155 BC as one of three ambassadors selected by the city of Athens to petition the senate for the cancellation of a large fine. In these circumstances, it is inconceivable that he would irresponsibly jeopardise the interests of the city he represented by attacking the arbiters of her fate. Indeed, Carneades himself was well received in Rome, and the delegation of which he was a member obtained a substantial reduction of the fine.²⁵ Moreover, the Academy remained favourably disposed towards Rome in subsequent years, down to the time of the First Mithridatic War.²⁶ Thus it is unlikely that Carneades was at any time genuinely hostile to Rome.

Although the sceptical Academy denied the possibility of certain knowledge, at least from the time of Carneades it admitted judgements based on probability. It is not recorded whether Carneades reached a tentative

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verdict on the question of imperialism, justice and self-interest, but at least two Roman authors were inclined to view him as an exponent of natural justice. An unidentified speaker in Book 3 of Cicero's *De Re Publica*, who intervenes after the speech of Furius Philus, declares that he is uncertain whether Carneades actually endorsed the case for self-interest, but hopes he did not (Cic. *Rep.* 3.30). In the first century AD, Quintilian (*Inst.* 12.1.35) observed that although his defence and refutation of justice were equally convincing, Carneades was not personally unjust. Thus neither Cicero nor Quintilian convicted the philosopher of genuinely espousing self-interest as the basis of society and international relations. On the contrary, both were more disposed to enlist him on the side of natural justice, and thus to believe that he would tend to derive the Roman empire from that source. To judge from the attitude of these authors, the Romans did not consider Carneades an enemy.²⁷

The debate concerning the proper foundation of imperialism emerged in the generation that followed the Roman victory at Pydna and the fall of the Macedonian monarchy, events that signalled for Polybius the unrivalled dominion of Rome (1.1.5). The advocates of justice and self-interest alike were realists who accepted the fact of Roman supremacy, but differed significantly in their approach to the problem. Panaetius (represented by Laelius) proposed not a categorical but a conditional defence of imperialism, for he declared such dominion to be just only when a superior nation rules in a beneficent fashion over an inferior one that is incapable of independence (Cic. *Rep.* 3.38-39). Panaetius, although conceding the right of an imperialist power to rule, did not advocate ruthless exploitation of subject states. Thus he adopted a more constructive and optimistic response aimed at mitigating the consequences of imperialism for subject peoples. On the contrary, those who derived imperial rule from self-interest (represented by Furius Philus) expected less powerful states to regard their situation in a spirit of cynical resignation. These thinkers adopted a more passive and pessimistic view, for they accepted exploitation and arbitrary rule as the inevitable lot of subject peoples. In the first case, subject nations could make claims on the ruling power; in the second, they could not. In the long term, the defence of imperialism based on justice prevailed among Greek historians and intellectuals, who remained profoundly attached to their own nation and culture despite their political subjection to Rome.²⁸

The growth of Roman power in the Hellenistic east gave rise to animated discussion along lines that may be traced to the fifth century BC, when Herodotus and Thucydides reflected on imperialism in the context of Athenian power. Agatharchides, like Herodotus, condemned imperialism as both unjust to its victims and ruinous to those who pursue it, and therefore as contrary both to morality and to expediency. Thucydides praised imperial domination as an instrument of progress and civilization beneficial to subject people and ruling power alike. This may be seen in his

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discussion of the Minoan thalassocracy (1.2-19). Thus imperialism, although necessarily based on the subjection of the weak to the strong, may prove advantageous to both parties. On the other hand, the historian recognized that imperial states could justify their policy by reference to narrow self-interest. Thus he reports that the Athenian representatives who addressed the assembly of the Peloponnesian League on the eve of the great war maintained that the Greeks themselves had voluntarily asked the Athenians to lead them against Persia, and were treated fairly by the ruling power. The Athenian spokesmen, however, conceded that, with the passage of time, considerations of honour, self-interest and fear for their own security had compelled the Athenians to expand and to retain their empire (1.73-8). In the second year of the Peloponnesian War, Pericles more bluntly described the Athenian empire as a kind of tyranny which, although acquired unjustly, could not be relinquished without danger (2.60-5); prior to the outbreak of the conflict, the Spartans had demanded that the Athenians liberate the Hellenes (1.139). To cite an extreme case, the Melian debate shows how powerful states such as Athens could defend aggressive expansionism by appealing to man's immemorial pursuit of ruthless self-interest (5.84-116). Thus Thucydides acknowledged that imperial rule could be defended on the basis of justice or expediency, but he emphasized the prevalence of expediency in the conduct of states. The historian himself justified imperialism on the basis of self-interest tempered by moderation. Thus he accepted the reasoning of Pericles, who advocated a prudent continuation of the Peloponnesian War because the self-interest of Athens demanded it (2.60-5). But by exposing the ruthless aggression of the Athenians at Melos (5.84-116), and relating this episode immediately before his account of the Sicilian disaster (Books 6-7), the historian illustrated the danger of unrestrained self-aggrandizement. Carneades, like Thucydides, showed that imperialism could be defended on the basis of either justice or expediency. Although other philosophers seem to have treated these principles as mutually exclusive, Carneades like Thucydides viewed imperial rule as a complex phenomenon admitting several complementary modes of justification. Finally, Panaetius held that imperial rule can be properly defended only on the basis of justice, a principle consistent with true expediency.²⁹

Appendix: The date of the *Peri tou kathêkontos* of Panaetius

According to Cic. *De Or.* 1.45-7, the celebrated Roman orator Lucius Licinius Crassus (consul 95 BC) attended lectures in Athens at the end of his quaestorship, which he served in the province of Asia (cf. Cic. *De Or.* 2.365; 3.75). The latest probable date for the quaestorship of Crassus, as determined by his *cursus honorum*, is 109 BC (*MRR* 1.546). He was present in Athens in the fall, at the time of the Eleusinian Mysteries, that

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is, in September-October, and he attended lectures given by Clitomachus, who died in the Athenian year 110/09 (Dorandi, 1991a: 11-16; Görler, 1994: 899-904), that is, before June-July of 109 BC (cf. Samuel, 1972: 57-64). Thus Crassus could not have held the quaestorship later than 110 (cf. *MRR* 3.118). In *De Or.* 1.45, Crassus declares that he heard the most eminent philosophers of the Academy, the Peripatos and the Stoa. Since he does not include Panaetius in this group, it appears that the latter was already dead before the fall of 110 (see van Straaten, 1946: 23-5; Garbarino, 1973: 2.387-90; Ferrary, 1988: 395-400; Steinmetz, 1994: 646-7; Dyck, 1996: 21-3). Pohlenz, 1934: 125-6, maintained that Panaetius might have been alive, but in retirement, at the time of Crassus' visit. A further observation, however, confirms the impression that Panaetius was already dead. In his list of the philosophers whom he heard, Crassus states that Mnesarchus, the student of Panaetius, was then in his prime. He also mentions Diodorus, the student of Critolaus, as well as Charmadas, Clitomachus, Aeschines and Metrodorus, all students of Carneades. Carneades died in 129/8 (Dorandi, 1991a: 11-16; Görler, 1994: 851-2). Cicero (*Sen.* 23), moreover, implies that Diogenes, one of Carneades' colleagues on the embassy sent to Rome in 155 BC, was already dead by the time of the dramatic date of the *De Senectute*, which is set in the late 150s (apparently the year 150 is meant, but Cicero's chronology in *Sen.* 18-19 is confused). Dorandi, 1999: 41, suggests that Diogenes died c. 140 BC. At any rate, if both Carneades and Diogenes were dead by 129/8, it is likely that Critolaus as well, the third member of the embassy, had fulfilled his mortal term by the year 110 (on Critolaus see *DPA* 2, no. C 219 [Critolaos de Phasélis]). It therefore appears that Crassus heard the students of Panaetius, Critolaus and Carneades rather than the distinguished philosophers themselves because these scholars were no longer alive when he visited Athens in the fall of the year 110. Since we are told that Panaetius died thirty years after completing his treatise *Peri tou kathékontos* (Cic. *Off.* 3.8), that work must have appeared by 140.

Poets, Prophecies and Roman Imperialism

Poets and prophetic writers of the second and early first centuries BC reacted in different ways to the expansion of Roman power in the Hellenistic world. Some glorified Rome, celebrating her greatness or recounting the benefits she conferred on the Greeks, while others condemned the cruelty, aggression, rapacity and oppressiveness of the western power. But in general these authors accepted imperial rule as a normal feature of the international structure.

Among the earliest of the poets to express a positive view of Rome was Alcaeus of Messene, who composed an epigram praising T. Quinctius Flaminius for liberating Greece at the end of the Second Macedonian War (*Anth. Plan.* 5). Another epigram, cited by Plutarch (*Flam.* 9.1-4), takes the form of an epitaph commemorating the Macedonian soldiers slain by the Aetolians and the Romans at the battle of Cynoscephalae (lines 1-4). The poem concludes with mockery of Philip V, who belied his proud spirit by running away, more nimble (*elaphroteron*) in flight than swift deer (*elaphôn*) (lines 5-6).

Plutarch observes that the Aetolians immodestly claimed credit for the defeat of Philip at Cynoscephalae, and are named before the Romans as victors in lines 3-4 of the epigram. Finally he declares that, although the true victim of Alcaeus was the king of Macedonia, who responded with a parody of the first two lines, Flaminius took great offence when the poem became popular among the Greeks.

These observations might be taken to imply that Alcaeus deliberately slighted the Romans in this poem. Such an interpretation, however, would overlook the fact that the precedence of the Aetolians in line 3 is conditioned by the metre, and that the appearance of the Romans at the end of this line allowed the poet to devote all of line 4 to emphatic mention of Flaminius and the vast land of Italy. Moreover, Plutarch's account may be taken to suggest that Flaminius was annoyed not by the poem itself but by the Aetolians and others who exploited it for their own ends. Perhaps the displeasure of the Romans accounts for the omission of lines 3-4 in some texts (see *Anth. Pal.* 7.247). On closer analysis, then, it is unlikely that Alcaeus intended to support Aetolian propaganda. In this poem as well as *Anth. Plan.* 5, Alcaeus expressed a positive view of Rome.¹

The *Alexandra*, ascribed to the poet Lycophron, takes the form of

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prophecies uttered by the Trojan princess Cassandra, which are reported by a slave to her father Priam.² In lines 1226-30, Cassandra declares that the Romans, descendants of the Trojans, will exalt the glory of their vanquished race by obtaining the sceptre and sole dominion of land and sea. Later, foreseeing the violent clashes of east and west, the princess predicts imperialist struggles in the Greek world. These are destined to be composed by Alexander the Great, who will conquer the Persians and subject them to the rule of a Macedonian king (lines 1435-45). In the sixth generation after Alexander (she continues), a man of Trojan race (apparently a Roman) will do battle against the king of Macedonia on land and sea. Coming to terms with this ruler, he will achieve glory and carry off the most honourable spoils (lines 1446-50). The sixth generation of Macedonian kings refers to Philip V, who was defeated by T. Quinctius Flaminius at the battle of Cynoscephalae.³

If the *Alexandra* is substantially the work of Lycophron the scholar and tragic poet, who wrote at Alexandria during the reign of Ptolemy II Philadelphus (283-246 BC), the lines referring to Rome's sole dominion over land and sea (1226-30) and (apparently) to the victory of Flaminius over Philip V (1446-50) must be interpolations dating from a later period, probably the years immediately following the Second Macedonian War (200-196 BC). In that case, an early Hellenistic poem celebrating the pacification of the world by Alexander (and thereby alluding to the ambitions of the Ptolemies) was converted into a prediction of Roman supremacy. However, there exist strong reasons to think that the *Alexandra* as a whole was composed by another poet writing in the early second century BC under a pseudonym.⁴ In either case, the lines in question reflect the gratitude felt by the Ptolemaic court towards the Romans, who had humbled their enemy Philip V.⁵

In this long poem, Cassandra professes that Alexander will terminate the mutual destruction caused by imperialist struggles in the Greek world, and bring to a final conclusion the long sequence of violent episodes confronting east and west (lines 1435-45). The following lines, whether interpolated or integral (1446-50), which celebrate the paramount dominion of Rome and the defeat of Macedonia, tacitly transfer from Alexander to Rome the credit for bringing definitive peace to a world ravaged by secular conflict. It is significant that the Roman victor does not crush the Macedonian king, but enters into an accord with him. Thus the last confrontation between east and west ends in reconciliation.

The two controversial passages discussed above represent the victory of Rome in the Second Macedonian War as an historical turning-point. This judgement was shared by other oracular versifiers of the period. Thus Pausanias (7.8.7-9) records a Sibylline oracle predicting that, of two Macedonian kings named Philip, the earlier (Philip II) would establish rulers over cities and peoples, whereas the later (Philip V), conquered by men of the west (i.e. the Romans) and of the east (i.e. Attalus I of

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Pergamum), would obliterate the renown of his country. A slightly different version of this prophecy occurs in Appian *Mac.* 2. Plutarch (*Mor.* 399c-d) reports a Sibylline oracle foretelling the defeat of Philip V by the Romans after the emergence of a new island in the vicinity of Thera. According to Justin (*Epit.* 30.4.1-4), the same geological phenomenon gave rise to oracles presaging the destruction of the ancient Greek and Macedonian empire by that of Rome.⁶ The importance of Philip's defeat in the Second Macedonian War is also reflected in the two epigrams by Alcaeus of Messene discussed earlier. Thus it is not surprising that, in lines 1226-30 and 1446-50 of the *Alexandra*, the defeat of Philip V marks the inauguration of a new hegemony in the Hellenistic world.⁷

At the beginning of the Roman-Syrian War, Chalcis opened its gates to Antiochus III (Livy 35.51.6-7). After the battle of Thermopylae (191 BC), Flamininus persuaded the consul Acilius Glabrio to spare the city (Plut. *Flam.* 16.1-4). In gratitude, the people of Chalcis honoured Flamininus with an annual festival, which included the singing of a hymn in praise of Zeus, the Goddess Roma, Flamininus the Saviour, and the Fidelity of Rome (Plut. *Flam.* 16.5-7).⁸

In her *Hymn to Rome*, Melinno of Lesbos celebrates the military victories and enduring power of the imperial city. She praises the Goddess Roma, warlike mistress, to whom alone Destiny has given the royal honour of unbroken rule, who securely controls land and sea and the cities of men, whose empire alone will resist the alterations of Time, who alone bears great warriors as the cultivated earth produces grain. The poet's emphasis on the enduring power and invincibility of Rome suggests a date of composition following the defeat of Perseus and the abolition of the Macedonian monarchy.⁹

In 128/7 BC, Limenius of Athens composed a hymn to Apollo, which was performed at the celebration of the Pythais in that year and inscribed on the south wall of the Athenian treasury at Delphi. The poem ends with a prayer to Apollo, Artemis and Leto, who are implored to preserve Athens and Delphi, and to increase with ageless power the spear-crowned dominion of the Romans, that it may be flourishing and victorious.¹⁰

A *Periêgêsis* dedicated to a King Nicomedes of Bithynia, probably the third ruler of that name, is the work of an author commonly designated Pseudo-Scymnus. Nicomedes III reigned from 127 to 94 BC, and the *Periêgêsis* may be dated more closely to the years 127 to 120 (or 110) BC.¹¹ This geographical poem is written in iambic trimeter. In verses dealing with Italy, the author celebrates Rome, 'a city with a name to match her power and the universal star of the entire world' (lines 231-5). The latter phrase (*astron ti koinon tês holês oikoumenês*, line 233) recalls similar epithets bestowed on Corinth in an epigram of Polystratus (*Anth. Pal.* 7.297), to be discussed later, and in an unattributed verse cited by Diodorus (32.27.1). We may also note the epithet describing Colophon that appears in an anonymous poem of the *Greek Anthology* (*Anth. Plan.* 295).

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The poem of Polystratus laments the Roman destruction of Corinth, which is described as the 'star of Hellas' (*Hellados astron*). Diodorus, writing about the same event, quotes an iambic line from the poets of earlier times, who had glorified the city now obliterated by the Romans with the phrase, 'Corinth, illustrious star of Hellas' (*Korinthos astron ouk asêmon Hellados*). The anonymous epigram of the *Greek Anthology* speaks of Colophon, the 'star of luxurious Ionia' (*trypherês astron Iêoniês*). Clearly the author of the *Periêgêsis* meant to praise Rome. The laudatory tribute of the *Periêgêsis* goes beyond the simple formula by declaring the unique and universal brilliance and power of Rome. First of all, Rome is the star, not of a single country or nation, but of the entire world. Furthermore, the epithet 'universal star' (*astron koinon*) echoes the appellation 'common benefactors' (*hoi koinoi euergetai*), applied to the Romans by Greeks in the second and first centuries BC to express their acknowledgement of Rome as paramount ruler and benefactor.¹² Thus the author of the *Periêgêsis* celebrated Rome as the unrivalled ornament, patron and mistress of the entire world. Another indication of his favourable attitude is the fact that he linked Rome with Greek origins. In lines 226-35, the poet refers to Latinus, ruler of the Latins, as the son of Odysseus and Circe, and to Auson, ruler of the Ausonians, as the son of the same hero and Calypso. Amidst these peoples, he adds, there is Rome.

Other poets and prophetic writers expressed hostility to Rome. Writing in the second century AD, Phlegon of Tralles, a freedman of the emperor Hadrian, included in his work *On Marvels* a series of tales hostile to Rome, which he ascribed to a Peripatetic philosopher called Antisthenes (*FGrHist* 257 F. 36, III).¹³ In the first narrative, a Syrian cavalry officer killed at the battle of Thermopylae (191 BC) rises from the dead and prophesies that Zeus, angered by the victory of the Romans and their spoliation of the fallen, will send a great army against Italy to punish them and to end their domination (sections 3-4). According to the second story, when the Romans consulted the Delphic oracle about this apparition, the Pythia warned them against further military action in Europe, threatening as the penalty for disobedience the devastation of Italy and the impoverishment of the Roman army on their return home (sections 4-6). The third tale is set at Naupactus. In a state of inspiration, a Roman general named Publius (who brings to mind Scipio Africanus) predicts that, after the Romans have defeated Antiochus III and plundered Asia (190-188 BC), the land of Italy and Sicily will be devastated and enslaved by a king (or kings) marching from Asia at the head of a great army (sections 6-10). After Publius is devoured by a wolf, the unconsumed head prophesies that Greece and Italy will be afflicted by a great war. In Greece, Roman soldiers will be slain and the cities demolished; the wealth, children and wives of the Romans will be carried off to Asia (sections 11-14).

These stories appear to have originated in Aetolia and Asia, mainly during the early second century BC, following the Roman-Syrian War

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(191-188 BC). Antisthenes, whom Phlegon identifies as his source, is not the Rhodian historian and politician of the late third and early second centuries mentioned by Polybius (16.14). Probably he was a compiler writing in the early first century BC, at the time of the First Mithridatic War. Since he was a Peripatetic philosopher who collected anti-Roman prophecies, one is reminded of Athenion, Peripatetic philosopher, tyrant of Athens and enemy of Rome, who assured his fellow citizens that oracles from all places predicted the universal empire of Mithridates (Posidonius, F. 253. 213 b-c E-K). Indeed, the time of the First Mithridatic War abounded in such pronouncements. Apocalyptic omens and prophecies were reported in Rome, Italy and the Greek world, presaging upheaval in human affairs, and Mithridates himself circulated oracles proclaiming the inauguration of a new era distinguished by his rule.¹⁴ This period therefore seems particularly suitable for a Greek writer who collected prophecies announcing the downfall of Roman power. It may therefore be suggested that the miraculous tales transmitted by Antisthenes, created originally at the time of the Roman-Syrian War, found new relevance when Mithridates challenged Rome, and that Antisthenes circulated them in the interest of the king, whom he regarded as a liberator. Some support for this chronology may be found at the end of the third tale. Here we are informed that the unconsumed head of Publius foretold the death of Roman soldiers in Greece. Finally, we are told (contrary to the revelations of Publius) that the Romans immediately departed for their homes (and thus did not continue fighting against Antiochus III and his Aetolian allies). The last statement may suggest the work of a compiler whose thoughts strayed from Rome's conflict with Antiochus and the Aetolians to the time of the First Mithridatic War, when he expected to witness the speedy departure of the Romans from Greece.¹⁵

The corpus of *Oracula Sibyllina*, consisting of twelve books of Greek verses, has been assembled by modern scholars from two ancient collections. The first of these (comprising Books 1-8) was completed in the sixth century AD, the second (composed of Books 11-14, preceded by two books consisting of material drawn from Books 4, 6, 7 and 8 of the other collection) in the seventh century AD. The individual prophecies, composed over a long period of time (from the third century BC to the seventh century AD), were gradually collected and formed into books.¹⁶ Although most of the oracles are of Jewish and Christian origin, some were created by Hellenistic Greeks.¹⁷

Of particular relevance to Roman domination during the second century BC are certain passages in Books 3 and 4, both predominantly of Jewish origin. The prophecies of Book 3 range in date from the middle of the second century BC to the late first century AD. The earliest parts of Book 3 (lines 97-349, 484-829) were composed in the middle of the second century BC, probably during the latter part of the reign of Ptolemy VI (around 163-145 BC) and somewhat later. This portion of the text includes

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a prediction about the collapse of the oppressive domination of Rome (lines 175-95). Three passages concern the Achaean War. The first (lines 484-8) foretells the destruction of Carthage, Sicyon and Corinth. The second (lines 520-37) predicts that the Greeks will be slain, plundered, enslaved, mistreated and terrified by an exceedingly barbarous folk. The third passage (lines 638-46) declares that a barbarous empire will attack the Greeks for the sake of plunder, leaving their unburied corpses to be devoured by birds and wild animals.¹⁸

Book 4 includes oracles from the Hellenistic period down to the second half of the second century BC, as well as later material. The latest datable events are the destruction of the temple at Jerusalem by Titus (lines 115-18, 125-7) and the eruption of Mount Vesuvius (lines 130-6).¹⁹

Lines 47-101 contain a series of prophecies concerning the rise and fall of four great empires (Assyria, Media, Persia, Macedonia) spanning a total of ten 'generations'. This portion of the text appears to represent an oracle composed soon after Alexander's conquest of the East. Appended to it is a prophecy that Macedonian rule will be followed by Roman domination (lines 102-6). References to the destruction of Corinth and Carthage suggest that the addition was made in the latter half of the second century BC.

Although attached to the sequence of four great kingdoms, Roman rule is not assigned a separate rank within the numerical series of empires or generations. Thus the Sibyllist who added Rome to the series treated the western power as a continuation of the fourth kingdom and the tenth generation. At any rate, *Or. Sib.* 2.15-19, composed in the late first century BC or the early first century AD, foretells the destruction of Rome in the tenth generation.

Or. Sib. 4.47-106 involves the notion of four great empires succeeded by a Messianic kingdom. Rome, too, as an appendage of the fourth empire, is therefore destined to perish. Comparison of the *Sibylline Oracles* with five other Near Eastern texts of the Hellenistic period will make this clear. The texts to be considered are the late Avestan *Bahman Yasht*, the *Babylonian Dynastic Prophecy*, the book of *Daniel*, 1 *Enoch*, and a fragmentary work appearing among the Dead Sea Scrolls, known to scholars as *The Four Kingdoms*.

The pattern of four successive kingdoms or periods occurs in the Pahlavi *Bahman Yasht*. In a dream Zarathustra sees a tree with four branches, each representing one of the religious periods composing the millennium of Zarathustra. These four eras are superseded by the advent of a saviour prince (*Bahman Yasht* 1.1-5; 7.1-9.24).

In its present form, the *Bahman Yasht* is an epitome dating from the early Islamic period (ninth or tenth century AD), but it is based on material drawn from several Pahlavi sources of the Sassanian period (c. AD 224-579). Those sources, no longer extant, were Middle Persian zands, that is, Pahlavi translations of sacred texts originally composed in the

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Avestan language, augmented by commentaries. The epitome also contains details that modernize the material found in the Sassanian works. The latter in turn were based on earlier traditions, including (it seems) a late Avestan *Bahman Yasht*, no longer extant, composed in the late fourth century BC. In the late Avestan *Bahman Yasht*, of which 1.1-5 appears to be a faithful representative, the fourth era may have corresponded to the oppressive rule of Alexander the Great and the Macedonians over the Persian empire, a misfortune destined to be terminated by a saviour prince.²⁰

A fragmentary Babylonian cuneiform text, known to scholars as the *Babylonian Dynastic Prophecy*, which dates from the time of Alexander and the early Seleucids, purports to foretell the rise and fall of four great empires, those of Assyria, Babylonia, Persia and Macedonia. The tablet bearing this text originally had six columns of writing. Parts of four columns are preserved. Columns 1, 2 and 5 deal with the four empires down to the time of Alexander the Great, author of misfortune for the Babylonians. According to lines 9-23 of column 5, after Alexander defeats Darius III, king of Persia (apparently at the battle of Issus), the Macedonians will be vanquished by Darius, who (in his role as king of Babylon) will inaugurate a time of happiness and prosperity for the people of Babylonia. In column 6 occurs a prophecy that Macedonian rule will be extinguished at the end of a series of three kings, the last of whom appears to be Seleucus I. Since Alexander in fact defeated Darius at the battle of Gaugamela, effectively ending his rule, the prediction occurring at the end of column 5 (on the ultimate triumph of Darius) is probably a genuine but unfulfilled prophecy forming the original conclusion of the text. As the anticipated defeat of Alexander did not occur, the *Babylonian Dynastic Prophecy* was later expanded so as to predict the fall of the Seleucid dynasty. The additional material represents another genuine (but unfulfilled) prophecy. Thus the fourth kingdom, in the earlier form of the *Babylonian Dynastic Prophecy*, ended with the defeat of Alexander and the restoration of Darius III, a saviour king. The editor responsible for inserting the final prophecies added no reference to a saviour king, and without embarrassment left the earlier predictions unchanged.²¹

Apart from those sections transmitted only in the Greek version, the book of *Daniel*, in its present form, was edited during the persecution of Judaism by Antiochus IV of Syria in the years 167-164 BC. It consists of elements composed at different times and assembled to form a larger work. The book of *Daniel* contains the theme of four successive kingdoms (Babylonia, Media, Persia and Macedonia), the last of them destined to be swept away by the eternal reign of God through the agency of a heavenly saviour, the archangel Michael.²²

The theme of four periods is also attested in 1 *Enoch*, a pseudepigraphical work of the Old Testament. This book is a collection of independent writings assembled to form a larger work. Part Four of 1 *Enoch* (*The Book*

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of *Dreams*) was composed between 164 and 160 BC (1 *Enoch* 83-90). It divides Jewish history from the destruction of the temple until the Macabaeian revolt into four periods, each one the subject of prophecy (1 *Enoch* 89.68-90.19). The last period, marked by the persecution of Judaism under Antiochus IV, would be a time of great destruction. Finally, the archangel Michael would come to the aid of the Jewish nation, and the kingdom of God would be established (1 *Enoch* 90.20-42). Part Five of 1 *Enoch* (*The Epistle of Enoch*) was composed before 167 BC (1 *Enoch* 91-107). It contains a prophecy called *The Apocalypse of Weeks*, in which Jewish history is divided into ten units called 'weeks' (1 *Enoch* 91.12-17; 93.1-10).²³

In its fragmentary state, another relevant text illustrates only the pattern of four kingdoms. The Aramaic prophecy of *The Four Kingdoms*, which belongs to the category of para-Danielic literature, appears among the fragments of the Dead Sea Scrolls (4 Q 552-3). The manuscript fragments of this text are dated around the beginning of the first century AD. In this prophecy, an unidentified figure resembling Daniel has a vision in which he beholds four trees, each symbolizing a great kingdom. Only the first of these is clearly identified (Babylon-Persia). The second kingdom, which rules over sea and ports, appears to be Macedonia.²⁴

These six texts form a group. All six feature the pattern of four kingdoms or periods. In five of them, the fourth kingdom or period is a time of great evil and suffering, including foreign conquest (*Bahman Yasht*, *Babylonian Dynastic Prophecy*, *Daniel*, 1 *Enoch*, *Or. Sib.*). In four texts, the final kingdom or period is abolished by a saviour (*Bahman Yasht*, *Babylonian Dynastic Prophecy*, *Daniel*, 1 *Enoch*). In three of them, the four kingdoms are associated with ten 'generations'. Thus in the *Bahman Yasht* the fourth period begins at the end of ten centuries, and in the *Sibylline Oracles* the fourth kingdom occurs in the tenth generation, while in two separate parts of 1 *Enoch* different spans of Jewish history are divided respectively into four periods or into ten units called 'weeks'. In two texts, the four kingdoms or periods are associated with metals (*Bahman Yasht*, *Daniel*).

In addition to thematic links among these texts, an Iranian connection is evident in four of them. The *Bahman Yasht* is certainly of Persian origin. Both the *Bahman Yasht* and *Daniel* associate the four kingdoms with metals. In the *Bahman Yasht*, these are gold, silver, steel and 'intermixed iron', representing the four branches of a tree, while *Daniel* specifies gold, silver, bronze, and iron as well as iron mixed with clay, which correspond to parts of a colossal statue. The iron mixed with clay of Daniel's fourth kingdom appears to represent the Jewish prophet's interpretation of the obscure 'intermixed iron' of the Iranian tradition. The dependence of *Daniel* as well as *Or. Sib.* 4.47-106 on the Iranian tradition is indicated by the appearance of Media as the second kingdom in both works. The Median empire, which had never included Palestine, was of no direct significance from a purely Jewish perspective, but the Medes occupied a

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central place in world history in the eyes of the Persians, who had once been subject to them. Thus *Daniel* and the *Sibylline Oracles* (unlike the *Babylonian Dynastic Prophecy*) copied without modification an Iranian pattern that was not fully relevant to their own experience. Finally, the vision of the four trees in the para-Danielic work *The Four Kingdoms* recalls the dream of Zarathustra, who in the *Bahman Yasht* (1.1-5) sees a tree with four branches. The fact that only the *Bahman Yasht* exhibits all five themes examined above, and that three of the other texts certainly demonstrate Persian influence, suggests that all five are ultimately inspired by the Iranian tradition as represented by the *Bahman Yasht* or a similar composition.²⁵

Although *Or. Sib.* 4.47-106 does not refer explicitly to a Messianic figure, two other passages in Book 4 suggest that the Sibyllist did have divine intervention in mind. The first, *Or. Sib.* 4.145-8, contains a prophecy about chastisement to be inflicted upon the avaricious Romans by oppressed Asiatics amidst a surfeit of warfare. The second, *Or. Sib.* 4.173-92, describes an eschatological conflagration, perhaps associated originally with the oracle of the four kingdoms ending with Macedonia (*Or. Sib.* 4.47-101), but in its present context disclosing the fate ordained for Rome. Moreover, there occurs in *Or. Sib.* 3.75-92 an allusion to the pattern of four kingdoms associated with metals. This passage, originating probably in the first century BC, predicts the subjection of the entire world to the rule of a widow, who will cast gold, silver, bronze and iron into the sea, at which point God will abolish the universe and time, and divine judgement will ensue. The allusion from Book 3 and the two passages cited from Book 4 suggest that, in 4.47-106, the Sibyllist tacitly referred to the pattern of four kingdoms or periods ending in divine intervention. These observations support the argument based on comparison of *Or. Sib.* 4.47-106 with five other Near Eastern texts. In this prophecy Rome, as an appendage of the fourth kingdom, faces destruction at the hands of God.

To sum up, *Or. Sib.* 4.47-106 belongs to a group of Near Eastern texts of Hellenistic date featuring a succession of four kingdoms or periods, of which the last is overthrown by a divinely appointed saviour. The *Sibylline Oracles* may be taken to imply that Roman domination will so perish.²⁶

The four texts that refer explicitly to the coming of a saviour (*Bahman Yasht*, *Babylonian Dynastic Prophecy*, *Daniel*, 1 *Enoch*), along with *Or. Sib.* 4.47-106, which implies divine intervention, insist on the finality of the fourth kingdom. This point acquires special significance when these writings are compared with Hesiod's myth of the five races (*Op.* 106-201). Hesiod borrowed the motif of deteriorating ages ultimately from the ancient Near Eastern tradition, which provides many literary examples of a pattern involving a sequence of degenerating ages ended through the intervention of a saviour. In Near Eastern literature, however, the degenerating ages are neither fixed at the canonical number of four nor associated with metals of decreasing value until the Hellenistic period (see

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Bahman Yasht, *Daniel*, *Or. Sib.* 3.75-92). Therefore these motifs were probably elaborated by Hesiod (or some predecessor), who (adapting a Near Eastern image) described his four deteriorating ages in terms of metals of decreasing value (gold, silver, bronze, iron). Hesiod further modified the Near Eastern pattern by inserting the Greek heroic age between the third and fourth of the deteriorating ages. Finally, Hesiod omitted any reference to a saviour who abolishes the evils of the last era and inaugurates better conditions. He accepted the notion that a better time would succeed the final period, the age of iron, but in his poem this change is not effected by a saviour. Thus he superimposed upon a pattern of steady decline the notion of improvement occurring within a purely human framework.²⁷

As argued above, the *Bahman Yasht* or a similar composition directly or indirectly inspired all later versions of the four kingdoms appearing in the works of Near Eastern literature examined here. The Persians had been in close contact with the Greek world for over two centuries before the conquest of Asia by Alexander. As a result of these contacts, the Iranian tradition absorbed congenial elements of Greek thought. From Hesiod's myth of the five races the Persians adopted the idea of four deteriorating ages described in terms of metals of decreasing value. From Herodotus (1.95, 130, 184) and Ctesias (*FGrHist* 688 F. 5) they borrowed the concept of a succession of kingdoms or empires. Herodotus and Ctesias had listed the great empires as those of Assyria, Media and Persia. Adapting this model, the Persians defined four religious periods, the last of them perhaps corresponding to the rule of Alexander and the Macedonians. However, they had no interest in the concept of a heroic age interrupting the pattern of decline, they preserved the intervention of a saviour at the end of the last age, and they rejected the notion of improvement that is not connected with a saviour. Thus the *Bahman Yasht* essentially follows the familiar Near Eastern pattern of steady decline culminating in the intervention of a saviour.

In the *Bahman Yasht*, the sequence of four deteriorating ages poses no internal contradiction, for three religious periods are followed (it seems) by the Macedonian conquest, the last and worst of the four ages. Thus the Persians skilfully adapted for their own use two Greek patterns, namely, the succession of empires and the four deteriorating ages. On the contrary, the other Near Eastern texts were usually less successful when they followed the Persian example. Like the *Bahman Yasht*, they all accepted the Hesiodic canon of four deteriorating ages, and one of them (*Daniel*) also adopted the theme of corresponding metals. Unlike the *Bahman Yasht*, however, most of them systematically equated the four ages with particular empires, a procedure that usually resulted in difficulties. The series Assyria, Media, Persia, Macedonia (which reflects an early Iranian outlook) appears in *Or. Sib.* 4.47-101, while other works (*Babylonian Dynastic Prophecy*, *Daniel*, *The Four Kingdoms*) introduce variations determined by

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the environment in which those texts were created. In the *Babylonian Dynastic Prophecy*, Babylon is the second kingdom, and therefore not the best. In *Daniel*, the Babylonians (who destroyed the Temple) precede the Persians (who allowed its reconstruction), and in the *Sibylline Oracles* the Persians appear third, after the Assyrians and Medes, who were not benefactors of the Jews. In *The Four Kingdoms*, Babylon and Persia seem to be fused into a single empire. These infelicities occur because the authors adapted from the Iranian tradition a Greek motif (the succession of kingdoms) in a form not easily integrated into the pattern of four deteriorating ages.²⁸ Nevertheless, the *Sibylline Oracles* and the other Near Eastern texts followed the Iranian tradition in rejecting any semblance of Hesiod's heroic age, and in emphasizing the finality of the fourth kingdom, which is overthrown by God or his appointed saviour.

Although Books 3 and 4 of the *Oracula Sibyllina* were compiled by Jewish writers, they are relevant to the attitudes of contemporary Greeks. In the first place, both volumes were directed to Gentiles as well as Hellenized Jews. The Sibyllist, who encouraged pagans to renounce a life of sin and invited them to join with the Jews in God's kingdom, aimed at converting them (*Or. Sib.* 3.545-600, 624-34, 702-40, 762-6). Moreover, the oldest parts of Book 3 as well as certain parts of Book 4 demonstrate an interest on the part of Jews in finding common ground with the Greeks. This tendency is especially evident in the representation of Ptolemy VI as a Messianic figure (*Or. Sib.* 3.191-3, 314-18, 604-10, 652-6), and in the sympathy expressed for the Greeks defeated by Rome in the Achaean War (*Or. Sib.* 3.520-37, 638-46; 4.102-6). Book 3 includes an oracle referring to the destruction wrought by Sulla in the Greek East (3.470-3). Although incorporated within the *Sibylline Oracles* by a Jewish compiler, this prophecy may have originated among the Greeks of Asia Minor, who at the end of the First Mithridatic War felt the heavy hand of the victorious general.²⁹ By including this oracle, the Jewish Sibyllist expressed solidarity with the Greek victims of Roman oppression. Thus the anti-Roman prophecies of Books 3 and 4 are likely in some measure to reflect attitudes shared by Greeks and Jews of the eastern Mediterranean. Several oracles predict the collapse of the oppressive domination of Rome (3.175-95, 350-80; 4.145-8, 173-92). Such prophecies would find acceptance among many Greeks. They were included in part because they would appeal to a Greek audience.³⁰

To conclude this survey of poets and prophetic authors who wrote unfavourably of Rome, we may consider two Greek poets of the second century BC. An epigram written by Polystratus laments the destruction of Corinth and the slaughter of her population by Mummius (*Anth. Pal.* 7.297). The poet's sympathy for the vanquished city is evident in his description of Corinth as the 'star of Hellas' (*Hellados astron*), and in his reference to her unmourned dead. Although Polystratus represents the catastrophe as a penalty for the destruction of Troy by the Homeric

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Achaean, it might be felt that the interval of a thousand years separating crime and punishment suggests in the fate of Corinth the gratuitous savagery of Rome more than the inexorable execution of impartial justice.³¹

Two epigrams by Antipater of Sidon express sympathy for Corinth. One (*Anth. Pal.* 7.493) imitates a funerary inscription. The fictitious deceased are a mother and daughter who have committed suicide rather than endure enslavement by the Romans at the end of the Achaean War. The second (*Anth. Pal.* 9.151) expresses outrage at the devastation of the city and the massacre of her people.³²

Underlying the reactions to Roman hegemony expressed by poets and prophetic writers, one usually discerns a fundamental acceptance of imperialism. Many writers, of course, praised Roman domination, but even those who rejected it did not in principle always condemn the subjugation and control of weaker states by great powers. Polystratus and Antipater certainly protested the destruction and carnage inflicted by the Romans at Corinth, but we do not know whether they denounced imperialism in general. At any rate, the fact that Antipater wrote verses complimentary to Philip V (*Anth. Pal.* 6.115) and to the house of Ptolemy VI (*Anth. Pal.* 7.241) suggests that he took a positive view of the Macedonian and Ptolemaic empires. Moreover, both Antisthenes and even the *Sibylline Oracles* (e.g. 3.191-3), although clearly hostile to Roman domination, enthusiastically predicted that it would be replaced by the sovereignty of an eastern ruler. Thus poets and prophetic writers of the second and the early first centuries envisaged no alternative to a world order based on the dominion of great imperialist states.³³

Appendix: The *Periêgêsis* of Pseudo-Scymnus

The *Periêgêsis* was dedicated to a king Nicomedes of Bithynia (lines 1-15). Of the four Bithynian rulers who bore that name, Nicomedes I (c. 279-255 BC) is too early, for the author refers to Attalus II of Pergamum, who ruled from 159 to 138 (*Per.* 45-9). Furthermore, he states that an Athenian scholar (i.e. Apollodorus) wrote a chronicle in iambic trimeter, covering events and notable persons from the capture of Troy (1184/3) to the year 145/4, which he dedicated to Attalus II (*FGrHist* 244); Pseudo-Scymnus implies that this chronicle has inspired him to draft his own composition in the same metrical form (lines 16-49). Since Apollodorus dedicated his chronicle to Attalus II (*Per.* 45-9), it was completed between 144 and 138. The *Periêgêsis*, therefore, was written after 144 BC and was dedicated to either Nicomedes II (149-127), Nicomedes III (127-94) or Nicomedes IV (94-74).

Although he incorrectly treated Nicomedes II and Nicomedes III as one person, Müller (*GGM* 1.lxxvii-lxxviii) argued convincingly that the *Periêgêsis* could not have been dedicated to the King Nicomedes (actually

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Nicomedes II) who killed his father Prusias II. The author of the *Periêgêsis* says that Apollo helped the father of Nicomedes to set aright the affairs of the kingdom (lines 55-60). A work dedicated to Nicomedes II would not contain such a statement about Prusias II, who had been overthrown and put to death by his son, Nicomedes II. Thus the ruler honoured by the *Periêgêsis* must be either Nicomedes III or Nicomedes IV.

Furthermore, since the writer does not know the extension to 120/19 (*FGrHist* 244 F. 53) or to 110/09 (*FGrHist* 244 F. 56) of Apollodorus' chronicle, the *Periêgêsis* must have been written before 120 or 110 (on the extension of the chronicle see Jacoby, 1902: 8-19, 387-9; Bianchetti, 1990: 25-6; Marcotte, 2000: 9-10). This conclusion rests on the following considerations. The author of the *Periêgêsis* read widely on his subject (lines 109-27), travelled extensively (lines 128-36), and implies that Apollodorus' work became popular all over the Hellenic world (lines 45-9). Therefore, he would have used the extension of the chronicle had it been available before he completed the *Periêgêsis*. Thus the geographical poem of Pseudo-Scymnus, written after 127 and before 120 or 110, was dedicated to Nicomedes III. It could be said of Nicomedes II, father of this king, that he set aright the affairs of his kingdom with the help of Apollo, for Nicomedes II secured the throne of Bithynia after his own father, Prusias II, had attempted to assassinate him (Diod. 32.21; App. *Mith.* 9-22; Zonar. 9.28.1; Just. *Epit.* 34.4; see Gruen, 1984: 114, 589-90; Sherwin-White, 1984: 38-9). Further arguments supporting the context 127-120 or 110 may be found in Boshnakov, 2004: 70-8.

Pseudo-Scymnus declares that Apollodorus wrote for the kings of Pergamum, whose glory lives forever, even after their death (*Per.* 16-18). According to Bianchetti, 1990: 23-35, this statement implies that Pseudo-Scymnus wrote after the death of Attalus II (to whom the chronicle had been dedicated) but before the demise of Attalus III (whose unsavoury character would have prevented Pseudo-Scymnus from including him in a general glorification of the Attalid dynasty after his death). She therefore dates the *Periêgêsis* in the reign of Attalus III (137-133). The second of these deductions seems unpersuasive to me, for it may be supposed that Pseudo-Scymnus, writing after the extinction of the Attalid house, could view the work of Apollodorus as honouring the Pergamene dynasty as a whole. A retrospective judgement of this kind need not be concerned with the defects of a particular king. In any case, Attalus III was not the object of universal reprobation depicted in the literary sources (see Hopp, 1977: 107-20). Moreover, Pseudo-Scymnus might have been inclined to speak well of the entire house because Nicomedes II, the father of his patron, had secured the throne of Bithynia with the help of Attalus II.

In *Per.* 50-4, Pseudo-Scymnus writes that, of contemporary kings, only Nicomedes exhibits royal excellence. While (as Bianchetti thinks) his statement could imply a contrast between Nicomedes II and Attalus III if the context is the period 137-133, it can also imply a contrast between

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Nicomedes III and other kings (e.g. Ptolemy VIII) if the context is the period 127-120 (or 110), when the Attalid dynasty no longer existed.

According to Jacoby, 1902: 15-16, *Per.* 21 (*syneskholakôs de polun Aristarkhôi khronon*), referring to Apollodorus, is adapted from a similar phrase (*hikanon t'Aristarkhôi syneskholakôs khronon*) appearing in the extension of Apollodorus' chronicle and referring to one Melanthius of Rhodes (*FGrHist* 244 F. 58). Thus he concluded that Pseudo-Scymnus wrote c. 100 BC, after the appearance of the extension. Boshnakov, 2004: 25-7, rejects this reasoning on the grounds that Pseudo-Scymnus himself might have created the phrase concerning Apollodorus. Indeed, Marcotte, 2000: 42-3, suggests that *Per.* 21 is itself echoed in Apollodorus' phrase referring to Melanthius. It may also be suggested that *Per.* 21 was adapted from a similar expression used by Apollodorus to describe himself in the preface of the earlier portion of his chronicle (cf. *FGrHist* 244 T. 4). Thus a compelling argument does not seem to exist for placing the *Periêgêsis* before 133 or after 120 (or 110) BC.

Historians and Roman Imperialism

Between the late third and the early first century BC, a succession of Greek and Roman historians described the origins and development of Roman expansion outside Italy. Although the focus here is on the Greek historians, several Roman authors will be considered because their work was known to Greek historians such as Polybius, and contributed to their interpretation of events. Moreover, histories written in Greek by Romans were intended to mould public opinion in the Hellenic world. Some Roman authors are therefore relevant in a survey of the Greek reaction to Roman imperialism, and some account will be taken of them. While the Roman authors justified the foreign policy of their country and the extension of Roman power over other nations, Greek historians were divided on these questions. An early group, who dealt with the First and Second Punic Wars, composed histories favourable to Carthage, while writers of a later time usually adopted a more positive view of Rome, expressing attitudes that ranged from qualified acceptance to fulsome panegyric. Thus the great majority of these authors viewed imperial rule as the normal basis of international order. Although written by a Jew, 1 *Maccabees* is included in the later group of Greek writers because the translation of his work into their language might have had some influence on opinion within Hellenic circles. With the exception of 1 *Maccabees*, all the historians to be discussed here are preserved only in fragments.

The Roman historians

Quintus Fabius Pictor, the first Roman historian, was a senator belonging to a noble family, and a relative of Quintus Fabius Maximus Cunctator. He composed in Greek an account of Roman affairs, from the mythological origins until his own times, at least to the early years of the Second Punic War. Fabius Pictor fought in the Ligurian War of 238-233 BC (Pliny *HN* 10.71) and in the Gallic War of 225-222 BC (Eutrop. *Brev.* 3.5; Oros. 4.13.6). In 216 BC, he was sent to Delphi to consult the oracle of Apollo (Livy 22.57.4; 23.11.1-7). Polybius (1.14.1-9; 1.15.12) says that Fabius Pictor displayed excessive partisanship for Rome in his account of the First Punic War. The same author (Polyb. 3.6.1-2; 3.8.1-9.5) observes that Fabius Pictor blamed Carthage for the Second Punic War, tracing its cause to Hannibal's attack on Saguntum and, more fundamentally, to the ambition and lust for power of Hasdrubal, the previous Carthaginian governor

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of Spain, whose policy Hannibal admired. Emulating his example, Hannibal started a war against Rome on his own initiative, contrary to the wishes of the Carthaginian state and its most prominent leaders.¹

Marcus Porcius Cato wrote the *Origines*, which treated the history of Rome from its legendary beginnings until the year 149 BC. He was the first Roman historian to write in Latin.² Since Cato recorded at least two of his orations (*Pro Rhodiensibus*, *Contra Servium Galbam*) in the *Origines*, where he praised his own exploits (HRR 1², F. 92), he probably recorded other speeches there as well.³ For this reason, there is likely to be a close correspondence between the ideas expressed in the orations and in the historical work.

In the *Origines*, Cato defended the Romans on moral grounds for going to war against other nations by demonstrating that the latter were responsible for those conflicts. Thus the Punic wars, in his view, resulted from a series of treaty violations committed by the Carthaginians.⁴ The same accusation appears in Cato's speech *De Bello Carthaginiensi*, where he denounced the enemy as people who had often broken their treaties.⁵ In this speech of 149 BC, Cato also maintained that the Romans should declare war on Carthage in order to prevent an attack on themselves and to eliminate a Punic threat to Roman domination.⁶

Cato also believed that it was in general advantageous for Rome to exercise power over other nations. In the final year of the Third Macedonian War, the Rhodians offered to mediate between Rome and Perseus with a view to ending the conflict. After the defeat of the king, some Roman leaders advocated war against Rhodes.⁷ In his speech *Pro Rhodiensibus*, delivered in 167 BC, Cato urged the senate to reject their proposal. The text of his oration, although circulated separately, was also included within the *Origines* (Livy 45.25.2-3; Gellius NA 6.3.7). Cato argued that since the Rhodians, afraid of becoming subject to the sole dominion of Rome, had acted to protect their own interests, they could not be blamed for what they had done.⁸ Thus Cato believed that the policy of Rhodes should be interpreted as a response to a problem of competing interests. The expansion of Roman power, while advantageous for Rome, was disadvantageous for Rhodes. A passage from Gellius' discussion of the *Pro Rhodiensibus* confirms that Cato represented the exercise of power by Rome over other nations as something advantageous for his own country. According to Gellius (NA 6.3.47), Cato maintained that if the Rhodians were pardoned, the greatness of the Roman people would be preserved. Since he expressed concern about protecting Roman power, he must have considered it a valuable asset. Cato's approval of Roman expansion is also expressed in the speech *Dierum Dictarum de Consulatu Suo*, delivered in 191 or 190 BC. On this occasion, he defended his conduct of the war against recalcitrant tribes in Spain during his consulship of 195 BC, boasting that he had captured more towns in that country than the number of days he had spent there.⁹

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Although in general terms Cato supported Roman imperialism, he believed that the expansion of Roman power should be subject to certain limitations. In the *Pro Rhodiensibus*, he argued that a declaration of war on Rhodes should be avoided because such action would be neither proportional to the offence nor consistent with Roman interests. The elation inspired by success leads men to commit dangerous errors of judgement (*HRR* 1², F. 95a); the Rhodians, who had never assisted Perseus officially, had proposed mediation with the sole aim of protecting their own interests (F. 95b); the Romans would forfeit the advantages derived from a strong friendship with Rhodes (F. 95c); the mere wish to do wrong is not punishable (F. 95d-f); the arrogance of the Rhodians is of no importance (F. 95g); the Romans would lose the salutary restraint inspired by a rival (*ORF*³, no. 8, F. 170).¹⁰ Thus in the *Pro Rhodiensibus* Cato opposed a declaration of war because on this occasion such a measure would have been contrary to morality and self-interest.¹¹

Most of our fragments of the *Pro Rhodiensibus* are cited by Gellius in his commentary on the oration (*NA* 6.3.1-55). The same author provides additional information about the speech. At *NA* 6.3.47 and 52, he states in general terms that Cato declared clemency towards Rhodes as conducive to the public advantage, and condemned severity as harmful to the Roman state. These observations further illustrate how Cato connected Roman policy and expediency. Other observations show in more detail how Cato linked the expansion of Roman power with morality, another prominent theme in the fragments. Gellius (*NA* 6.3.7) notes that, in his speech *Pro Rhodiensibus*, Cato defended 'excellent and most faithful allies, whose wealth not a few of the leading men, being hostile to them, were eager to plunder and possess'. This statement represents another of Cato's arguments against the proposal to declare war on Rhodes. Gellius refers to the same point at *NA* 6.3.52, where he states that the orator promiscuously deployed every line of reasoning to defend the Rhodians: '... now he commends them as meritorious in the highest degree; now he exculpates them as if innocent; now he urges that their property and wealth should not become the object of pursuit' Cato's argument may be connected with Livy's statement (45.25.2) that the men who had served in Macedonia as consuls, praetors or legates were very hostile to Rhodes, and supported a declaration of war (Livy's phrase *qui ... gesserant in Macedonia bellum* excludes Aemilius Paullus, who was still overseas). Thus, in the *Pro Rhodiensibus*, Cato maintained that it was morally wrong to fight a war for the purpose of enriching prominent and powerful men.

Underlying his objection to such conduct was his disapproval of Roman commanders who enriched themselves and their associates in warfare at the expense of the rank and file and of the state. This concern appears in several of his speeches. In *Dierum Dictarum de Consulatu Suo*, Cato declared that he had distributed silver to his soldiers because it was better for many Romans to return home with silver than for a few to come back

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with gold (*ORF*⁸, no. 8, F. 55). In 189 BC, Cato gave evidence against Manius Acilius Glabrio, consul of 191 BC, who was being prosecuted on the charge of retaining part of the booty captured from Antiochus III, in this way defrauding the Roman treasury (Livy 37.57.9-58.2; *ORF*⁸, no. 8, F. 66).¹² In his speech *De Sumptu Suo* of 164 BC, Cato refuted accusations of corruption and prodigality, insisting that he had never divided booty among a few friends, robbing those who had actually seized it from the enemy, and had never divided among his attendants and friends money intended for the wine distribution, making them rich to the detriment of the state (*ORF*⁸, no. 8, F. 173).¹³ In an undated oration entitled *De Praeda Militibus Dividenda*, he complained about the impunity enjoyed by those who robbed the community (*ORF*⁸, no. 8, F. 224-6).¹⁴

Objections of this kind, however, do not imply that Cato pronounced a sweeping censure of Roman policy. Although many Roman wars proved lucrative, and generals enjoyed considerable latitude in the treatment of spoils, it is unlikely that Cato often condemned Roman wars on such grounds.¹⁵ In view of his penchant for taxing Rome's enemies with responsibility for armed conflict, and his fundamental acceptance of Roman expansionism, in most cases he must have maintained that his own country fought for legitimate reasons and reaped the legitimate rewards of victory. He must have limited his censure to specific occasions and to individual commanders who indulged in avaricious conduct.

In several speeches, Cato insisted on the obligation to observe moderation both in the actual conduct of warfare and in the exercise of power. In 149 BC, he supported a political attack on Servius Sulpicius Galba for violating his pledge and committing atrocities against his Lusitanian foes. His speech *Contra Servium Galbam pro Direptis Lusitanis*, included within the *Origines*, emphasized the obligation of Rome to treat enemies with moderation.¹⁶ A similar point occurs in his speech *De Sumptu Suo*. Here Cato explained that he had never oppressed provincials. He had never used the money of the allies to advance his career; he had never imposed prefects on the towns of the allies to plunder their property and children; he had never granted a travel order by which his friends might obtain large sums of money from provincials (*ORF*⁸, no. 8, F. 173). In the speech *De Macedonia Liberanda* of 167 BC, Cato argued against a proposal to annex the former kingdom on the grounds that Rome could not defend the country (*ORF*⁸, no. 8, F. 162).

To sum up, Cato usually maintained that the Romans were justified on moral grounds in going to war against other peoples because the latter were responsible for those conflicts. In his view, exercising power over other nations was in general advantageous for Rome. To defeat the enemy and to expand Roman domination were praiseworthy accomplishments. However, he believed that the Romans should not fight wars unless such action could be justified on moral and practical grounds. Moreover, both in the actual conduct of warfare and in the exercise of power, the Romans

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should behave with moderation, a course dictated by morality and expediency. The *Origines* and the speeches are consistent in their emphasis on the importance of these factors in Rome's dealings with other nations. Cato opposed specific policies and actions but accepted Roman expansionism in general.¹⁷

Greek historians favourable to Carthage

Philinus of Agrigentum wrote a history of the First Punic War.¹⁸ According to Polybius, he showed undue partiality for Carthage, a fault that led to inadvertent error and inconsistency. For example, in his account of the fighting that occurred at Messana during the earliest phase of the war, Philinus reported that the Syracusans and Carthaginians inflicted heavy losses on the Romans. Polybius, who says that Philinus represented Rome's enemies as victorious in this stage of the conflict, maintains that the historian proceeded to contradict himself by reporting that they immediately abandoned their siege of Messana, withdrawing their forces from the open country and declining to engage in battle with the Romans (Polyb. 1.14-15).

Polybius (3.26) also maintains that Philinus wrongly accused the Romans of violating a treaty with Carthage by sending troops to Messana in 264 BC. According to Philinus, such an agreement had prohibited the Romans from intervening militarily in Sicily. Polybius denies that such a treaty ever existed, explaining that he has discussed this matter in some detail because many people have been led astray by Philinus' account. In this passage, Polybius refers to a promise he had made in the introductory books of the *Histories* to treat in detail other mistakes committed by Philinus as a result of his partiality for Carthage (cf. 1.15.12). In Polybius' view, it was this bias that led Philinus to report the alleged treaty.

Despite the views of Polybius, the credibility of Philinus can be vindicated on both counts. Diodorus and Dio Cassius say that the Romans encountered difficulties in the early stages of the fighting at Messana.¹⁹ These authors represent a tradition unfavourable to Rome. Diodorus certainly used Philinus as the basis of his account of the First Punic War, and Dio's treatment of this subject may also reflect the work of that historian.²⁰ What Polybius reports at 1.15.1-2 about Philinus' account of initial reverses sustained by the Romans is consistent with the information provided by Diodorus and Dio. It therefore appears that Philinus, unlike Polybius (1.11.6-12.4), emphasized the initial successes of Hiero and his Punic allies. But the notion that Philinus represented the Syracusans and Carthaginians as victorious in the fighting at Messana, which Polybius introduces at 1.15.3-11, must be the conclusion that he himself draws from Philinus' emphasis on the initial successes of Rome's enemies, noted at 1.15.1-2. Although Philinus' concern to record the valour of Rome's opponents lends some colour to the inference of Polybius, it is

unlikely that Philinus actually maintained that the Syracusans and Carthaginians prevailed in the fighting at Messana. It is more likely that Polybius overstated the case. Thus Philinus did not contradict himself in explaining that the Romans, after suffering some initial reverses, ultimately prevailed before Messana.

There are also good reasons to accept as genuine the treaty reported by Philinus, and to believe that the Romans and Carthaginians disagreed about whether it was still valid in 264 BC. The chief evidence for the authenticity of this agreement is the fact that Livy (9.43.26) reports the renewal of a treaty between Rome and Carthage in 306, and the treaty of 279 between the same parties implies that, prior to its adoption, the Romans had been debarred from military intervention in Sicily, the Carthaginians in Italy (Polyb. 3.25.3).²¹ We may therefore conclude that Philinus produced a work of intellectual integrity sympathetic to the Carthaginians, one that emphasized their achievements and justified their cause. At the same time, he exposed the transgressions of the Romans, which for him included the violation of a treaty still in effect, as well as the conclusion of an alliance with the treacherous Mamertines (Polyb. 3.26; Diod. 23.1). Although he contested the first charge, Polybius himself acknowledged the justice of the second indictment.²²

Silenus, Sosylus and Chaereas wrote histories of the Second Punic War.²³ Silenus and Sosylus, who were both on close terms with Hannibal, accompanied his forces on campaign, and Sosylus was Hannibal's teacher of Greek (*FGrHist* 176 T. 1).

Silenus of Cale Acte in Sicily represented Hannibal as a general of incomparable ability who enjoyed divine protection as he carried out the designs of the gods. The historian related a dream of the Punic general in which Jupiter ordered him to invade Italy, appointing a divine guide to accompany him on his march (*FGrHist* 175 F. 2). Thus Polybius must have included Silenus among the unnamed historians whom he criticized for stating that a god or hero conducted Hannibal across the Alps, and for exaggerating his merits (Polyb. 3.47.6-48.12). In this dream, Hannibal beheld the devastation of Italy, but not the destruction of Rome. In this way, Silenus reconciled the divine origin of Hannibal's enterprise with the ultimate victory of his enemies. Silenus recorded another dream of Hannibal, in which Juno warned him not to remove a solid golden column from her temple at Lacinium (*FGrHist* 175 F. 2).²⁴ This story may be taken to suggest both the special solicitude of the goddess for Hannibal and the readiness of the latter to heed divine admonition.²⁵

Sosylus of Sparta (*FGrHist* 176 F. 1) described a naval battle fought between the Romans and the Carthaginians during the Second Punic War. This battle may probably be identified with the engagement that occurred in the mouth of the Ebro river in 217 BC, known from the accounts of Polybius (3.95.1-96.6) and Livy (22.19.1-20.2). Although Polybius praised the Massaliotes for assisting the Romans during the Second Punic War

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and later (a fact not mentioned by Livy), regarding this particular battle both Polybius and Livy refer only to reconnaissance carried out by two Massaliote ships before the actual fighting began. They ascribe the victory of the Roman side specifically to the efforts of the Romans themselves, and give no indication that the Carthaginians initially posed a serious threat.²⁶ Sosylus, on the contrary, describes the participation of the Massalioes in the battle itself. He attributes the entire credit for the success of the Roman side to the leadership, courage, intelligence and tactics of the Massalioes, and his account implies that the Carthaginians might have won had it not been for the outstanding service of the Massalioes.

By emphasizing the contribution of the Massalioes and awarding all the credit for the victory of the Roman side to them, Sosylus displayed a measure of bias against Rome. This feature of his account, however, must be balanced by two observations. In the first place, if it is indeed the Carthaginians whom Sosylus rebukes for doing nothing worthy of their country and their ancestors in the naval battle, his work can by no means be described as uncritical of Carthage.²⁷ Moreover, one may discern in his enthusiastic commendation of the Massalioes the pride taken by a Greek in the skill and achievements of his fellow Greeks, even those who supported Rome in the conflict. On the basis of this passage, one cannot conclude that Sosylus' history of the Second Punic War demonstrated complete partiality towards Carthage or extreme hostility towards Rome.

According to Polybius, furthermore, Sosylus and Chaereas maintained that, after Hannibal captured Saguntum, the Romans debated whether they should go to war against Carthage, and he says that both historians reported speeches made for and against that course of action. Polybius rejects the alleged debate and speeches as absurd inventions. In the first place, the Romans had one year earlier signified their intention to declare war if the Carthaginians invaded Saguntine territory (cf. Polyb. 3.15.5, 12). Therefore, after the city had been captured by force, there could be no possibility of debate. Moreover, according to Polybius, both Sosylus and Chaereas offered a sensational description of the gloomy mood pervading the senate at this time. They reported how fathers introduced their sons of twelve years and over into the House, and they declared contrary to common sense that the young men sagaciously revealed nothing of the confidential proceedings to any of their relatives. Polybius therefore dismissed their accounts as implausible fabrications, the inane material of barber shop chatter (Polyb. 3.20.1-5).²⁸

In this instance, Polybius in my view unjustly impugned the general credibility of Sosylus and Chaereas. On the question of a debate concerning war against Carthage, their account is corroborated by Dio Cassius (Dio Cass. 13, frag. 55; cf. Zonar. 8.22.1-4). The agreement of Sosylus, Chaereas and Dio on this subject points to a common tradition perhaps based ultimately on a single witness. Since Polybius found nothing about such a debate in his principal sources, Fabius Pictor and Silenus, these

may be excluded from consideration. An attractive possibility, however, is Lucius Cincius Alimentus, a Roman senator captured during the Second Punic War who wrote a history of Rome, in Greek, from its mythological origins until his own times.²⁹ Livy (21.38.2-5) cites a fragment from this work dealing with the first year of the Second Punic War (*HRR* 1², F. 7). During his captivity Cincius may have come into personal contact with Sosylus, who accompanied the forces of Hannibal. As a Roman senator who knew Greek, he could have provided Sosylus with information about political events at Rome on the eve of the Second Punic War. Alternatively, both Sosylus and Chaereas could have read Cincius' published history, which was written in their own language. Moreover, in composing his account of the Second Punic War, Dio followed Coelius Antipater and later Roman annalists, such as Valerius Antias and Claudius Quadrigarius.³⁰ The work of Cincius might have been consulted by Coelius Antipater or the later Roman annalists, as it was by Livy (*HRR* 1², F. 7) and Dionysius of Halicarnassus (*HRR* 1², F. 3-6). Therefore Cincius' report about a debate could have reached Dio through one of these Latin authors. Thus what is found in Sosylus, Chaereas and Dio on this subject could rest on excellent authority.³¹

Accordingly, Polybius' attempt to refute Sosylus and Chaereas is not persuasive. He rejected their accounts solely on the basis of historical probability and stylistic criteria, without citing new evidence for his view. To maintain that the Romans could not have hesitated to declare war in 218 because they had issued a clear ultimatum one year earlier makes no allowance for any change of attitude or circumstances in the intervening period, nor can Sosylus be dismissed as a worthless melodramatic raconteur. Against the derogatory view of Polybius may be set the competent military narrative of *FGrHist* 176 F. 1 as well as the favourable estimate of Diodorus (26.4) and Cornelius Nepos (*Hann.* 13.3), for whom Sosylus was an important authority on the Second Punic War. On balance, Sosylus and Chaereas are more likely to be right than Polybius.³²

In reporting a senatorial debate on the question of war against Carthage, Sosylus and Chaereas were not necessarily hostile to Rome, nor does Polybius claim that they were. The most one can say is that they did not believe the Romans displayed the inflexible resolve that Polybius later ascribed to them. To conclude, Sosylus appears to have written an estimable history that was somewhat unfavourable to Rome, but did not completely avoid criticism of Carthage.³³

A Greek papyrus (*PRyl.* 3, no. 491) dated to around the middle of the second century BC contains a fragmentary account of the abortive peace negotiations undertaken by Rome and Carthage in 203-202 BC. The succinct narrative appears to be the summary of an earlier work, whose author remains unknown.³⁴ This account of the peace negotiations differs significantly from the versions given by other historians.³⁵ First of all, there is no room on the papyrus for any mention of three events reported

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by other sources before the return to North Africa of the Roman and Punic ambassadors who swore the oaths of ratification at Rome. These events are the seizure of Roman transport vessels by the Carthaginians, the dispatch of envoys by Scipio Africanus to protest this action at Carthage, and the Punic attack on those envoys. Furthermore, the papyrus does not record the assertion, made by other sources, that the Punic ambassadors returned from Rome to North Africa in the company of their Roman counterparts, and were graciously released by Scipio despite the offences committed by their compatriots. Instead, the text implies that the Punic ambassadors returned directly from Rome to Carthage. Finally, the papyrus declares that the Carthaginians at this point formally renounced the peace treaty they had concluded with Rome, and that hostilities were resumed only after the armies of both sides had been informed of that decision. The other historians do not report this detail. According to them, hostilities were resumed after the Carthaginians attacked Scipio's envoys. It is therefore evident that the papyrus gives an account favourable to Carthage, while the other sources defend Rome. That the tradition favourable to Rome is the more credible emerges from the consideration that, if the version of events appearing in the papyrus had been true, the pro-Roman tradition would have had no reason to invent Punic violations of the truce, for the renunciation of the peace treaty by a faithless enemy would in itself have sufficed to justify the resumption of warfare by the Romans. At any rate Polybius, whose account belongs to the pro-Roman tradition, probably knew and despised the version of events represented by the papyrus. The writer of that condensed narrative may be one of those unnamed contemporary historians derided by Polybius as vain scribblers who compress their sketches of the Hannibalic War onto three or four sheets, and claim to have written universal history even though they provide less detail than officials who, on public authority, record occasional events on walls (5.33).³⁶

Greek historians favourable or hostile to Rome

A proxeny decree voted by the city of Delphi about 157/6 BC honours Aristotheos, son of Nikotheos, citizen of Troezen and historian. According to this decree, Aristotheos recited portions of an historical work at Delphi, where he also delivered eulogies of the Romans, the common benefactors of the Greeks. Perhaps these activities occurred during a festival administered by the Delphic Amphictyony, for instance, the Soteria. This possibility is suggested by a scornful remark of Cato the Elder, who ridiculed the Roman senator Aulus Postumius Albinus for writing a history of Rome in Greek and then apologizing in the preface for his imperfect mastery of Greek language and literary method. Why, asked Cato, did Postumius apologize for his defective skills when he had not been compelled to write

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in Greek? After all, the council of the Delphic Amphictyony was not ordering him to write a history (Polyb. 39.1.4-9)! Although it may be doubted that the Amphictyonic council could actually order anyone to produce a history, Cato's barb may reflect a practice of inviting prose authors to recite from their works at the Delphic festivals. Since the Amphictyony assiduously proclaimed its loyalty to Rome in the years following the battle of Pydna, the recitation delivered by Aristotheos, undoubtedly favourable to the dominant power, supported the aims of that organization.³⁷

The decree honouring Aristotheos was inscribed on the base of an equestrian statue commemorating an Achaean statesman called Aristaenus of Dyme, dedicated by the Achaean League in the sanctuary of Apollo.³⁸ The recording on the statue base of several proxeny decrees, none earlier than about 157/6 BC, indicates that the equestrian statue was dedicated before that date.³⁹ On balance, it is unlikely that the Achaean statesman honoured at Delphi is the famous Aristaenus, a prominent leader of the Achaean League who was *stratêgos* several times in the period 200-185. He is more likely to have been a distinct but lesser figure. On the assumption of minor scribal errors, this Aristaenus of Dyme, son of Timocades, honoured with an equestrian statue at Delphi, can be identified with Aristaenus the Achaean, son of Damocades (*sic*), honoured with a proxeny decree at Cretan Aptera, and with Aristaenetus (*sic*) of Dyme, hipparch of the Achaean League in 208/7. If this identification is correct, the inscription of a proxeny decree for Aristotheos on the base of the statue celebrating Aristaenus of Dyme connects the historian with a patriot from an earlier generation. By choosing this location to display his own honours, Aristotheos perhaps intended to suggest that his good will towards Rome was consistent with devotion to the Achaean League.⁴⁰

Zenodotus of Troezen wrote on the myths and legends of early Rome and Italy.⁴¹ According to him, various Italic peoples, including the Romans themselves, were connected by race or culture with the Greeks. Thus Prainestos, the eponymous hero of Praeneste, was the grandson of Odysseus (*FGrHist* 821 F. 1), and Romulus gave to his son by Hersilia the name Aollios, referring to the gathering of the people by Romulus (*FGrHist* 821 F. 2). Since Zenodotus derived the name Aollios from the Greek verb *aollizô*, which means 'to gather together', he implies in this story that Romulus spoke and privileged the Greek language. Thus he appears to have anticipated Dionysius of Halicarnassus in ascribing Greek origins (or, at the very least, Hellenic culture) to the early Romans and other Italic peoples.⁴²

Two Roman historians of the mid-second century, Cato the Elder and Gaius Acilius, referred to the Greek origins or culture of their own people and other nations of Italy. Cato worked on the *Origines* until his death in 149 BC (*HRR* 1², F. 106, 108, 109), while the history of Acilius appears to have been completed in 141 (*Livy Per.* 53). In his *Periêgêsis*, a geographical

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poem written in the period 127-120 (or 110), an unknown Greek author (Pseudo-Scymnus) associated the Romans with the Latins and Ausonians, whose rulers, Latinus and Auson, are described as sons of Odysseus. Perhaps Cato adopted earlier traditions about Greek origins with the intention of suggesting that the Romans surpassed their forbears, while Acilius, by connecting Rome with the Greeks, sought to proclaim the worthiness of his nation to exercise power over Greek cities and kingdoms.⁴³ It may be supposed that Pseudo-Scymnus and Zenodotus, as Greeks, employed the same conceit to palliate the fact of Roman domination by portraying the ruling power as the representative of Hellenic civilization. The work of Zenodotus, which cannot be dated closely, could belong to the middle of the second century BC, when his compatriot Aristotheos of Troezen as well as Cato the Elder and Acilius were writing, or somewhat later, around the time when Pseudo-Scymnus composed the *Periêgêsis*. Connecting the Romans with the Greeks would be relevant when the consolidation of Roman power in the Hellenistic east after the fall of the Antigonid monarchy focused attention on relations between the ruling power and subject nations.⁴⁴ Zenodotus' book probably offered a sympathetic treatment of Italic and Roman civilization.⁴⁵

Agatharchides of Cnidus, a lower-ranking member of the Ptolemaic court, historian, geographer and Peripatetic philosopher, wrote a history of the regions bordering on the Red Sea, the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean.⁴⁶ This work, *On the Erythraean Sea*, of which substantial fragments survive, was completed probably after 145 BC.⁴⁷ Diodorus and Photius preserve the substance of a passage about the Sabaeans and their wealth. Diodorus, who follows the account of Agatharchides, relates that for many years the Sabaeans maintained their prosperity undisturbed because they were very remote from those who, impelled by greed, regarded the wealth of others as a windfall accruing to themselves.⁴⁸ According to Photius, Agatharchides observed that, if the Sabaeans had not lived very far from those who directed their military forces against every region, those who now enjoyed their own prizes of war would have become the stewards of other people's property, for indolence cannot preserve liberty for a long time.⁴⁹ Although both Diodorus and Photius ascribe to Agatharchides a comment on the aggressive and acquisitive policy of Rome, Diodorus presents a more trenchant version of the original statement, while Photius reports more accurately what Agatharchides himself wrote. Diodorus generally recasts the wording of his sources, imparting to his prose a uniformity of style, whereas Photius usually adheres closely to the original diction of the works excerpted in the *Bibliotheca*.⁵⁰ Moreover, Diodorus emphasizes certain ideas which are important to him by adding moralizing comments not found in his sources. For example, he expresses criticism of Rome throughout his own *Bibliotheca*. Indeed, at 5.38.3 he makes a statement about the avarice of Rome that resembles what he writes in his treatment of the Sabaeans.⁵¹ The

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more caustic tone of Diodorus is therefore likely to represent his own intensification of Agatharchides' criticism. Although Diodorus modified the wording of his source, it is nevertheless clear that Agatharchides made a negative observation about Roman conduct.

Although condemnation of Rome was not a dominant theme of *On the Erythraean Sea*, the author's observations about the western power are consistent with his unfavourable assessment of the Hellenistic kingdoms. Agatharchides denounced the avarice, competitiveness and aggressive spirit of the Hellenistic Greeks, which resulted in foreign wars and led to the most ruthless oppression of their own subjects by the tyrannical government of the Ptolemies. Unlike the Greeks, the native populations who inhabited the region of the Erythraean Sea, content to procure the simple necessities of life, were innocent of greed, contentious rivalry and the impulse to harm their neighbours. As a result, they avoided the calamities that afflict aggressors. These virtuous peoples had nothing of value to gain from contact with the Hellenistic world, which could only corrupt them.⁵²

Thus Agatharchides regarded imperialist expansion as a fundamentally immoral practice driven by wicked impulses and producing evil results. He also considered this policy to be imprudent, for in his view states which adopted it harmed themselves as well as their neighbours. This is evident, not only from his statement about the security enjoyed by non-aggressive native peoples, but also from a speech appearing in Book 1 of *On the Erythraean Sea*. Here an elderly counsellor explains to a youthful king of Egypt the dangers of pursuing an expansionary policy against the Ethiopians, reminding him of the disasters suffered by the Medes, Assyrians and Persians, Alexander, Cassander and Lysimachus.⁵³ For Agatharchides, as for Herodotus, imperialist expansion is both morally wrong and ultimately harmful to those who practise it.

The author of 1 *Maccabees* was a Jew writing towards the end of the second or at the beginning of the first century BC, around the years 103-90. He produced a history of the Maccabees and the Jewish state, and their relations with the Seleucid empire, from the accession of Antiochus IV (175 BC) to the death of Simon (134 BC). The original text, composed in Hebrew, was soon rendered into Greek. Today only the Greek translation is extant, forming part of the Septuagint.⁵⁴ This work, written for a Jewish audience, and hostile to the Greeks, provides valuable evidence about how another literate people of the eastern Mediterranean reacted to Roman power.⁵⁵

Of special interest is the account provided by 1 *Macc.* 8.1-16 of the treaty made by Judas Maccabaeus with Rome in 161 BC.⁵⁶ In the estimation of Judas, the Romans were a great power who readily granted their friendship to all who approached them, and showed loyalty to their friends. Powerful in war, they had subdued the Gauls, compelling them to pay tribute; they had conquered Spain, taking control of the gold and silver

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mines; they had defeated and imposed tribute on the kings who had attacked them, such as Philip and Perseus of Macedonia and Antiochus the Great of Asia; they had taken away the most important provinces of Antiochus, assigning them to Eumenes of Pergamum. They had ruthlessly suppressed the mainland Greeks who rose up against them.⁵⁷ They had destroyed and enslaved all other hostile kingdoms and islands. All who had heard of the Romans feared them. They established and deposed kings at their pleasure. Not one of them, however, put on a diadem or wore purple. Their senators deliberated every day concerning public order. The Romans obeyed their consul without jealousy.

The author of 1 *Macc.* took a definite stand in the controversy dividing the Jews of his time regarding the legitimacy of their Hasmonean rulers. Like the author of 2 *Macc.*, a slightly later work, he defended their claims.⁵⁸ As a supporter of the Maccabaeen dynasty, he approved of Judas' decision to approach the Romans, describing from his own knowledge the reflections that he believed had moved the first of the Maccabees to take that step. The historian's support for Jewish independence under Hasmonean rule disposed him to admire the Romans and their treatment of the Greeks, the enemies of his people. Although he emphasized the fearful harshness of the Romans, his judgement of them is on balance favourable. The Romans are generous and loyal to their friends; their leaders are modest and dedicated to public service; the people are united and respectful of authority. The author of 1 *Macc.* admires the Roman conquest of Cisalpine Gaul and of Spain. He justifies the Roman wars against Philip, Perseus and Antiochus on the grounds that those kings had attacked Rome. He excuses the severity of the Romans towards the Greeks of the mainland and of the kingdoms and islands by observing that the latter were rebellious or hostile. Moreover, as J.A. Goldstein has noted, the author of 1 *Macc.* appears to suggest that Jews and Romans shared some admirable characteristics. Thus his favourable description of Rome may have served not only to support the Hasmoneans and to cultivate the good will of the Romans but also to enhance the dignity of his own people.⁵⁹

The author of 1 *Macc.* viewed Rome as a republic rather than a monarchy. This is likely to be significant, for the Jewish *Sibyline Oracles*, generally hostile to Rome, represented the western power as the eschatological fourth kingdom whose fall would presage the advent of the Messianic age. In this way, the writer distanced himself from contemporary Jewish versifiers who predicted and yearned for the destruction of Roman power.⁶⁰

Posidonius of Rhodes (c. 135-51 BC) composed a history of the Roman empire and the Mediterranean world.⁶¹ Written probably during the years 85-60 BC, his work covered the period from 146/5, where Polybius ended, to about 86/5.⁶² Posidonius, a Stoic philosopher, followed his teacher Panaetius in defending imperialism as a rule of nature whereby superior nations govern inferior ones for the advantage of the latter. Thus imperi-

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alism is justified when the dominant power governs with paternal care for the benefit of its subjects.⁶³

This conception of political authority and imperial rule can be traced in the *Histories* of Posidonius. The beneficent guidance of society is idealized in his description of the Golden Age, when virtuous rulers governed for the advantage of their subjects, employing suasion and instruction rather than force, and regarding the exercise of authority as a duty rather than a royal perquisite. As a result, no one challenged them or engaged in wrongdoing (Posidonius, F. 284.5 E-K).⁶⁴ In historical times many nations, unable to govern themselves because of their intellectual weakness, voluntarily enter the service of more intelligent peoples, who supply their needs. For example, the Mariandynoi entrusted themselves to the Heracleotes on condition that the latter provide their necessities (Posidonius, F. 60 E-K).⁶⁵ The city of Chersonesus in the Crimea, previously independent, invited the rule of Mithridates VI in order to secure his protection against the Scythians. Posidonius notes that Chersonesus remained subject to the rulers of the Bosporus (that is, to Mithridates VI and Pharnaces II, ruler of the Bosporan kingdom from 63 to 47 BC) until the present time. He implies that the city remained loyal because the kings fulfilled their responsibilities towards it (Posidonius, F. 263 E-K).⁶⁶ Powerful leaders may benefit those subject to their authority by accepting the guidance of philosophers, as did Scipio Aemilianus when he undertook a diplomatic mission to the eastern Mediterranean (Posidonius, F. 254 E-K).⁶⁷ These passages demonstrate that Posidonius regarded beneficence as a moral obligation and a practical necessity for political leaders and imperialist powers.

Conversely, the historian maintained that neglect of this responsibility undermines the legitimacy and power of any ruler. In his view, deteriorating standards of conduct jeopardized Roman dominion in the years following the destruction of Carthage in 146 BC. For example, he observed that, until the time of Scipio Aemilianus, the Romans practised moderation. Scipio himself was attended by only five slaves during his embassy to the eastern Mediterranean (Posidonius, F. 265 E-K; cf. T. 6 E-K).⁶⁸ This passage has political implications involving the quality of Roman rule, for in approving the modest size of Scipio's servile train, Posidonius suggests that later generations of Roman leaders were less concerned to limit the burden of hospitality imposed on allies.

Furthermore, Posidonius attributes a rebellion in the province of Sicily to Roman moral failure. A fragment of the *Histories* demonstrates how the cruelty and extravagance of Damophilus, a wealthy Siceliot landowner, supplied the final provocation that ignited the First Sicilian Slave War, which occurred about 139 to 132 BC (Posidonius, F. 59 E-K). The close verbal correspondence between that fragment and a passage of Diodorus (34/35.2.34) suggests that the latter used Posidonius for his entire account of the first rebellion (Diod. 34/35.2; 34/35.8-11).⁶⁹ Although Diodorus,

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following Posidonius, described the role of Damophilus in provoking the rebellion (Diod. 34/35.2.10-15, 34-40), he attributed the First Sicilian Slave War more fundamentally to the odious parsimony of the great landowners, most of them Roman *equites*, and to the craven refusal of Roman governors to curb these members of the equestrian order, which (he says) controlled the extortion court at Rome (Diod. 34/35.2.1-3, 27-32).⁷⁰ Thus it is likely that Posidonius himself ascribed the revolt to the moral decline of the Roman upper class and their mistreatment of subject populations.

Diodorus explained the Second Sicilian Slave War in similar terms. At 36.3, he wrote about Publius Licinius Nerva, governor of Sicily in 104 BC, who set free over eight hundred slaves in accordance with a senatorial decree ordaining that no citizen of an allied state might be held as a slave in a Roman province. At this point, the men of high rank prevailed upon the governor to desist from enforcement of the decree. Licinius complied with their demand, either seduced by their bribes or courting their favour. His capitulation led to the outbreak of the second rebellion. Once again, mistreatment of the provincial population by members of the Roman upper class (apparently equestrians) and the unwillingness of the governor to resist them endangered Roman rule. The fundamental causes of both slave revolts as given by Diodorus are therefore identical. This suggests that in both cases he followed the account of Posidonius.⁷¹

Diodorus cited the same faults to explain Roman difficulties in Asia. He described the administration of Quintus Mucius Scaevola and his legate Publius Rutilius Rufus (98-97 BC), men of integrity who eradicated the extortion and corruption that had prevailed in the province of Asia, and dispelled the hatred of Rome engendered by these abuses (Diod. 37.3.5; 37.4-6).⁷² In particular, Mucius Scaevola instituted strict rules concerning official expenses, and put a stop to the unjust exactions of the tax collectors. Diodorus deplores the oppressive confederacy of governors and publicans, which had prospered because the collectors of the public revenues, as members of the equestrian order, controlled the extortion court at Rome. The last point, as well as Diodorus' emphasis on the moral failure of equestrians and governors, suggest once again that he is using the *Histories* of Posidonius.

According to Diod. 37.8, a governor of Sicily called Leukios Asyllios (probably a Lucius Sempronius Asellio, in office about 96 BC), assisted by his legate Gaios Longos (apparently a Gaius Sempronius Longus) and an equestrian residing in Sicily named Poplios (Publius), both men of excellent character, restored the prosperity of the island.⁷³ This he accomplished by ensuring the sound administration of justice, protecting the weak, and redressing private and public wrongs, matters evidently neglected by his predecessors. Diodorus compares Asellio to Mucius Scaevola in his selection of excellent advisors, and his account of both governors emphasizes the benefits they conferred on provincials as well as

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the injustices the latter had suffered under previous administrators. Diodorus' reference to protection of the weak and to the correction of wrongs seems to involve the problem of Roman tribute and the proceedings of equestrians who farmed the public revenues. In this case as well, therefore, it appears that Diodorus cites misconduct on the part of equestrians and the compliance of ineffectual governors as causes of danger for Roman rule. His comparison of Asellio to Mucius Scaevola, and his emphasis on problems arising from the collusion of equestrians and earlier governors, point once again to Posidonius as the source of Diodorus. In all four cases, a consistent view is presented regarding the origin of problems endangering Roman rule.

The Posidonian fragments relating to the Golden Age, the Mariandynoi, Chersonesus and the value of philosophical guidance are consistent with the texts (both fragments of Posidonius and Diodoran passages based on him) demonstrating the consequences for Rome of mistreating subjects. Together, these fragments and texts indicate that Posidonius regarded beneficent treatment of subjects as a moral duty and a practical necessity for imperialist states.

In particular, the second group of texts shows that Posidonius traced a connection between moral decline and mistreatment of subjects in the years following the destruction of Carthage, and that, in his view, these defects caused serious problems for Roman rule, such as revolts, hatred of Rome and impoverishment of the provinces. Thus the narrative of Diodorus (representing Posidonius) appears to illustrate the fulfillment of the predictions made by Scipio Nasica in a biographical section of the *Bibliotheca* (Diod. 34/35.33.3-6). In opposition to Cato the Elder, Scipio Nasica maintained that the senate should not order the destruction of Carthage. He predicted that, if the Romans took that step, they would cease to govern their subjects with moderation, and that misrule would cause hatred and revolts. Diodorus observes that the predictions of Scipio Nasica were amply fulfilled. Oppression of subjects as well as the resulting hatred and revolts are in fact represented in the second group of texts discussed above. It is therefore reasonable to conclude that the Diodoran passages containing the prediction as well as its fulfillment are based on the account of Posidonius, who viewed the destruction of Carthage as a turning-point in the evolution of Roman imperialism.⁷⁴

Two further considerations link Scipio Nasica's warning (Diod. 34/35.33.3-6) with Posidonius. First, Scipio Nasica predicted that the destruction of Carthage would produce internal discord among the Romans, which in turn would imperil their capacity to rule other peoples. Divisions of this kind are indeed found in the second group of texts, especially in Diod. 34/35.2.1-3, 36.3, and 37.5, where governors of Sicily and Asia are said to have cooperated with the equestrians in order to avoid prosecution before juries controlled by members of that order. In each case, discord between senators and equestrians worked to the detriment of

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subjects, whose reaction threatened the continuity of Roman rule. Thus the danger posed by internal discord, predicted by Scipio Nasica in Diod. 34/35.33.3-6, is illustrated in narrative passages of the same historian belonging to the second group of texts discussed above, which represent Posidonius.

Secondly, Diodorus' treatment of Scipio Nasica's warning occurs in a discussion of Publius Cornelius Scipio Nasica Serapio, consul of 111 BC, and his famous ancestors (Diod. 34/35.33.1-8). It is known from F. 256 E-K (on the lineage of the Iunii Bruti) and F. 261 E-K (concerning the Marcelli) that Posidonius was interested in the family history of the Roman nobility. The passage from Diodorus also shows evidence of a conservative orientation characteristic of Posidonius.⁷⁵ Thus the discussion appearing in Diod. 34/35.33.1-8 exhibits important features of Posidonius' *Histories*. To sum up, Diod. 34/35.33.3-6 probably represents Posidonius. This passage is consistent with other texts (fragments of Posidonius and Diodoran passages based on him) in representing beneficent treatment of subjects as a moral duty and a practical necessity for imperialist states.⁷⁶

The doctrine of Panaetius and Posidonius on the obligations of imperialist states became an important feature of political thought in the late first century BC, when a succession of Greek and Roman authors who accepted Roman rule counselled benevolent treatment of subjects. These writers include Philodemus, Cicero, Sallust, Diodorus, Nicolaus of Damascus, Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Pompeius Trogus and Livy. That doctrine achieved its most splendid expression in the memorable verses of the noble Mantuan, for whom imperial rule based on peace, justice and mercy was the true vocation of Rome.⁷⁷

Posidonius' account of moral decline and mistreatment of subjects does not imply absolute condemnation of Rome. On the contrary, the historian sought to promote the success of Roman rule by citing examples of righteous conduct and by warning against self-destructive abuses of power. Despite the negative aspects of Roman domination that he records, Posidonius in the final analysis supported Rome.⁷⁸ Thus he condemned the servile rebellions that erupted in Sicily, Rome, Attica, Delos and Pergamum during the 130s BC (Diod. 34/35.2; 34/35.8-11). He justified the campaigns of Marius against the Cimbri and their allies as measures taken in defence of Rome (Posidonius, F. 272 E-K). He represented Mithridates as the party ultimately responsible for the conflict between Rome and Pontus (Posidonius, F. 263 E-K). He expressed contempt for Athenion, who persuaded the Athenians to support Mithridates against Rome, comparing the public behaviour of the plausible swindler unfavourably with that of prominent Roman visitors, and deriding his gullible constituency under the scornful title of Cecropids (Posidonius, F. 253 E-K).⁷⁹ His personal connections with prominent Romans are also significant. Pompey asked for Posidonius' advice before undertaking his campaign against the pirates (Strabo 11.1.6, C 492) and visited the philosopher at the end of the

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Third Mithridatic War (Cic. *Tusc.* 2.61; Pliny *HN* 7.112). Cicero asked Posidonius (without success) to embellish the account of his own consulship that he himself had written in Greek (Cic. *Att.* 2.1.2).

Although Posidonius supported the Romans, he neither idealized nor pronounced a definitive endorsement of their rule.⁸⁰ By proposing a moral and a practical basis for Roman domination, and by warning against defects that threatened its survival, Posidonius expressed a qualified acceptance of Rome. In his view, humanitarian treatment of subjects was the criterion by which Roman rule could be justified, and the means by which it could be perpetuated.⁸¹ Thus his doctrine incorporates the utilitarian approach of Thucydides, who believed that imperial domination could be an instrument of progress and civilization, and therefore an arrangement beneficial to subjects and ruling power alike (1.2-19), but recognized the dangers facing a great power when it engages in ruthless pursuit of self-interest (5.84-116).⁸² In his meditation on Roman power, the philosophical historian promoted a lofty ideal without eulogizing imperfect reality.⁸³

With one exception, the historians surveyed here supported Rome or Carthage, accepting the hegemony of one or the other. Their stance therefore implies a fundamental approval of imperial dominion. Most likely their approval depended on the fulfilment of certain conditions. At any rate, Cato and Posidonius maintained that imperial rule must be consistent with morality and expediency. Agatharchides alone condemned such dominion as inherently immoral and inexpedient. His view on this question, illustrated by observations on the contemporary world and by an admonitory list of chastened sinners reaching back to the Assyrians, Medes and Persians, marks Agatharchides as a solitary disciple of the unfashionable Herodotus, who composed a meditation for posterity and not, as Thucydides (1.21.1; 1.22.4) unfairly implies, a captivating performance intended for the transitory gratification of uncritical minds.⁸⁴

Part II

Polybius' Attitude to Roman Domination

In Chapters 4 to 9, it will be demonstrated that Polybius, like most intellectuals of his time, admired imperial rule in general. Unlike the philosophers and the philosopher-historian Posidonius, however, he did not attempt to justify this phenomenon, for he accepted it as intrinsically noble. Similarly, Cato the Elder in all likelihood saw no need to justify imperial rule, which in pragmatic fashion he acknowledged as advantageous to the dominant power.

On balance Polybius admired Roman domination, just as most intellectuals of his time admired the imperial dominion of some great power. Thus the poets Alcaeus, Pseudo-Lycophron, Melinno and Limenius as well as oracular versifiers, the *Oracula Sibyllina* and the author of the *Periêgêsis* celebrated the victories, power and dominion of Rome. Cato gloried in the military exploits he had achieved in Spain. The author of 1 *Macc.* admired Roman expansion and power.

Polybius believed that the Romans deliberately aimed at universal empire, achieving their goal by the year 168. Similarly Pseudo-Lycophron, writing after the Second Macedonian War, portrayed Roman dominion as unchallenged. Oracles originating in the same period depicted Rome as the imperial successor of Macedonia. Melinno, who wrote probably after the Third Macedonian War, viewed Roman power as unrivalled. Cato believed that Rome achieved sole dominion in the eastern Mediterranean as a result of that conflict. Portions of the *Oracula Sibyllina* composed in the decades following that conflict, although hostile to the Romans, nevertheless represented them as the paramount world power. In the years after 145, Agatharchides completed a history critical of imperial expansion. He described Rome as a power ready to intervene militarily throughout the known world. In the last quarter of the second century BC, the author of the *Periêgêsis* depicted Roman power as unrivalled. Finally, the author of 1 *Macc.*, who wrote in the early first century BC, viewed Rome as the unique and irresistible world power, and the history of Posidonius, composed in the first half of that century, assumed the central importance of Rome.

For a number of reasons, moreover, Polybius held that Roman actions could be defended. In his view, wars initiated by Rome, although motivated fundamentally by an expansionary drive, were usually justified through morally acceptable pretexts, that is, stated reasons that do not constitute the real motives but are nevertheless based on fact and serve

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as acceptable justifications for action. Moreover, other forms of Roman intervention could be defended or at least excused. Similarly, in their histories Fabius Pictor, Cato the Elder, Aristotheos and Posidonius defended Roman policy, while Philinus, Silenus, Sosylus, Chaereas and the author of *P.Ryl.* 3, no. 491, supported Carthage. Cato, who believed that the Romans should be able to justify their wars on the basis of morality and self-interest, probably thought that they usually succeeded in doing so. The author of 1 *Macc.* believed that Rome fought wars in self-defence.

Furthermore, Polybius believed that Roman domination was predominantly moderate and beneficent. This attitude he shared with some of his contemporaries. Thus Alcaeus had praised the Romans for liberating Greece after the Second Macedonian War, Pseudo-Lycophron for bringing peace to the Mediterranean world on the same occasion. Moreover, Pseudo-Lycophron ascribes this peace to reconciliation effected between Rome and Macedonia, not to utter conquest or humiliation of the erstwhile enemy. The hymn sung at Chalcis at the annual festival honouring Flamininus praised the fidelity of Rome, a quality that is also lauded in 1 *Maccabees*, where the Romans are described as loyal to their friends. In his history, Aristotheos probably described the Romans as benefactors of the Greeks. Cato and Posidonius asserted that the Romans should observe moderation in their treatment of subject peoples; Posidonius declared that their rule should also be beneficial to those nations.

On the other hand, Polybius maintained a certain intellectual distance from Rome. This may be seen in his rational defence of Roman supremacy, his occasional criticism of Rome, his concern for the well-being of subject states (especially Greeks), his conservative political convictions, his own authorial objectives, his intimations that the Romans were barbarians, his references to them as the agents of Fortune, conceived as an entity invested with the qualities of a purposive divinity, and his speculation on the eventual downfall of Roman power. Similarly, the poets Alcaeus and Pseudo-Lycophron as well as the Chalcidian hymn honouring Flamininus, the author of 1 *Maccabees* and (probably) the historian Aristotheos praised Rome in the light of benefits received or anticipated. Cato and Posidonius objected when Roman rule departed from the principles of moderation and beneficence. In addition, Sosylus occasionally criticized Punic military efforts. The *Oracula Sibyllina* portrayed the Romans as barbarians (though of course these prophecies were not supportive of the ruling power). Melinno depicted Roman rule as the gift of Destiny.

But few of the poets or historians who wrote favourably of Rome contemplated the eventual collapse of Roman supremacy. On the contrary Pseudo-Lycophron, Melinno and Limenius allude to the notion of Rome's eternal dominion. Polybius, although convinced that Roman power would prevail indefinitely, eschewed this vain conceit. In sober fashion he predicted that a chain of circumstances producing internal conflict would one day cause the downfall of Roman imperial rule. These circumstances

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(prosperity, greed, and ambition among the ruling class), already making inroads after the Romans began to engage in a sequence of eastern wars (200-168 BC), became more evident after the defeat of Perseus (168 BC), and even more pronounced after the Third Punic War (149-146 BC). Cato as well noted the prevalence of indulgence and greed among members of the senatorial class before and after 168. Polybius' continuator Posidonius, who offered a less peremptory vision of the future, nevertheless warned how internal conflict might undermine Roman dominion. Moreover, both of these writers asserted the crucial importance of moderation and beneficence for the perpetuation of imperial rule. Thus Polybius and Posidonius sought to preserve Roman domination in a form tolerable to subject peoples.

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Polybius on Legitimate Expansion

Polybius composed the *Histories* in an intellectual environment largely favourable towards Rome, and strongly inclined to accept imperialism. Many poets and historians praised or justified Roman domination, while opponents often supported or hoped for the intervention of another great power. The philosophers argued that imperial rule could be defended on the basis of morality or expediency or both. Thus most of these authors, whether or not they supported Rome, accepted imperialism as a fundamental principle governing international order. Among the intellectuals, Agatharchides alone condemned imperialism as both unjust and inexpedient. As a result, he denounced both the Romans and the Hellenistic empires for their policy of subjugating other peoples.

Polybius' attitude to imperialist expansion

Polybius considered imperialist expansion in principle to be a noble objective, and regarded as virtuous the men who achieved it. Thus he cited as a cause of the Persian expedition planned by Philip the Great the king's perception of the greatness (*to megethos*) and splendour (*to kallos*) of the anticipated prizes (3.6.12). He defended Philip against the defamatory misrepresentations of the historian Theopompus, asserting that one cannot praise too highly the qualities of the king and his courtiers, who elevated the humble Macedonian realm into a highly renowned and very great imperial power (*endoxotatên kai megistên ... arkhên*) (8.10.5-6). According to Polybius, the accomplishments of Alexander confirmed the reputation for excellence (*aretê*) enjoyed by Philip and his friends. After acquiring great resources, Alexander and his associates constantly demonstrated lofty moral qualities, such as magnanimity (*megalopsykhia*), self-restraint (*sophrosynê*) and courage (*tolmê*). The successors of Alexander, who contended for rule over most of the world, caused their glory (*doxa*) to be recorded in many accounts (8.10.7-11).

In Polybius' view, an attempt to establish dominion over other states might be laudable even if it proved unsuccessful. At the end of the Peloponnesian War, for instance, the Athenians were compelled by Sparta to dismantle their walls. Although they suffered defeat, one would not censure them for having disputed the hegemony of Greece with Sparta. On the contrary, one would blame the Spartans for acting too harshly after their victory (38.2.5-7). After the Spartans were defeated by Thebes at the

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battle of Leuctra, they relinquished their hegemony over the Greeks. Their failure involved no disgrace, however, because they had striven for the finest objectives (*tôn kallistôn*) (38.2.8-9). Prior to the Achaean War, the Greek states had often met with failure in the course of their struggles to attain dominance, but rarely did they incur reproach because of bad judgement (38.3.5-7).

Polybius declared that Lycurgus gave the Spartans a constitution superbly adapted for the purpose of maintaining their internal harmony, their territory and their freedom, but neglected to make provisions to foster their imperial ambitions. The lawgiver, says Polybius, ought to have devised some means of eliminating their expansionary impulses, for the Spartan constitution was not designed to realize such aims (6.48-9). If, he continues, it is maintained that self-defence is the proper goal of any constitution, we must agree that the Spartan system is unsurpassed (6.50.1-2). On the contrary, 'if someone aspires to greater things (*meizonôn*), and considers it finer (*kallion*) and more glorious (*semnoteron*) than that to lead, rule and control many peoples, and to be regarded and obeyed by all, it must be conceded that, in this respect, the Spartan constitution is defective, while that of Rome is superior and endowed with a more effective structure' (6.50.3-4). That Polybius himself considered imperial dominion to be the finer and more glorious ambition is evident from his laudatory comments on the achievements of Athens, Sparta, Philip and Alexander, and from the fact that he explicitly ranked imperial rule among the greater things. This conclusion is confirmed by what he says about the earliest expansion of Rome. At 1.6.3-7.13, he briefly outlines Roman expansion in the years following the capture of the city by the Gauls until the eve of the First Punic War. Subsequently, at 1.12.7, he states that persons who wish to survey the present-day supremacy of Rome must consider how and when the Romans began their advance towards a better state (*epi to beltion*) during that period. Thus Polybius greatly admired imperial rule.

Polybius does, to be sure, condemn imperial expansion in certain cases. For example, he censures the extreme ambition, lust for power and covetousness that induced the Spartans to wage war against the Messenians for the purpose of enslaving them (6.48.8-49.2), and to conclude the Peace of Antalcidas with Persia, betraying the Greek cities of Asia Minor to the old adversary for the sake of the money they needed in order to maintain their own domination of Greece (6.49.3-5). He denounced as evil-doing (*kakia*) the seizure of the Cadmeia by Phoebidas in 382, and the decision of the Spartans to fine the perpetrator while maintaining a garrison there (4.27.3-4). By the terms of the Peace of Antalcidas, he observes, the Spartans proclaimed that they recognized the Greek cities as free and autonomous, but they did not withdraw their governors (*harmostai*) from the communities under their control (4.27.5). They drove the Mantineians, their own friends and allies, from their homes and dissolved their city into

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several units (in 385), behaviour involving folly (*anoiai*) and wrongdoing (*meta kakias*) (4.27.6-7). Polybius condemned Philip V and Antiochus III for their concerted efforts to dismember the Ptolemaic empire (3.2.8; 15.20; 16.1.8-9). The kings, he observed, did not even put forward a slender pretext (*prophasin*) for their shameful conduct (*tês aiskhynês*: 15.20.3), motivated by boundless greed (*hyperballousês pleonexias*: 15.20.4). Furthermore, Polybius disliked Macedonian imperialism in Greece when it threatened the independence of Achaea (2.41.9-10; 2.43.7-10; 2.44.3-6; 2.62.3; 4.1.5; 4.76.1-2; 38.3.3-4).¹

Polybius objected to these instances of imperialist expansion because they involved actions that he considered reprehensible, such as the enslavement of Greeks by Greeks, the betrayal of Greeks to barbarians, treachery, hypocrisy, excessive harshness, expansion unjustified by any pretext, and the political subordination of the Achaean League to Macedonia. Judgements of this sort qualify, but do not contradict, Polybius' general admiration of imperial dominion.

Polybius' general attitude to the Roman empire

Polybius' general statements about the Roman empire relate essentially to its importance as an historical phenomenon. The universal empire of Rome is an unexpected development (1.1.4; 1.2.1; 8.2.3), an unprecedented (1.1.5; 1.2.2-7; 1.3.3-5; 1.4.5; 6.2.3; 8.2.4; 39.8.7) and astonishing (1.4.1) achievement, the teleological accomplishment of a transcendental Fortune that has unified events in different parts of the world, directing them towards a single end, namely, the subjection of the entire world to Roman rule (1.4.1-2; 1.4.4-5; 8.2.3-4; cf. 1.3.3-4). The dominion of Rome is irresistible for people of the present age, and beyond the capacity of future generations to equal (1.2.7). The growth of Roman domination is the most excellent, profitable and important object of study for intelligent political leaders (1.1.6; 1.4.4; 6.2.3; 39.8.7).² These observations, which might in themselves appear ambiguous, imply admiration for Rome when interpreted in the light of Polybius' general approbation of imperialism. That his view of Roman power was indeed favourable emerges from 31.22.8, where he says that Romans most of all will read the *Histories* because his work contains the most illustrious (*tas epiphanestatas*) and the greatest (*tas pleistas*) of their achievements (*praxeis*).

The aggressive character of Roman imperialism

Polybius viewed the Roman empire as the intended result of an aggressive drive. After the capture of their city by the Gauls, the Romans (he declares) made a peace treaty with the enemy, recovered their country, and made so to speak a beginning of expansion (*labontes hoion arkhên tês synauxêseôs*). Then (he says) the Romans fought wars against their neighbours, estab-

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lishing dominion over the Latins, Etruscans and Samnites, and defeating the Gauls in many battles. Here the adverb *hoion* alludes to the inadvertency of the first expansionary step, but Polybius' further comments indicate deliberate action (1.6.3-6). During the Pyrrhic War (he continues), the Romans moved for the first time against the rest of Italy, fighting for those regions as if these already belonged to them (1.6.6). After expelling Pyrrhus from Italy, they subdued the peoples who had sided with the king. By now they had made subject to themselves all nations of Italy except the Gauls (1.6.7-8). Thus Polybius considered the growth of Roman power in Italy between the Gallic sack (386) and the punishment of the Campanian mercenaries at Rhegium (270) to be the result of deliberate expansion achieved largely through warfare.

Aggressive and acquisitive motives also appear in his account of some later wars by which Roman domination was expanded. In 264 BC, for example, the Romans decided to help the Mamertines of Messana in part because they realized that failure to intervene would permit the Carthaginians to establish control of that city, and consequently of Syracuse and the rest of Sicily, a prospect threatening to Italy (Polyb. 1.10.5-8). However, another important consideration influencing their decision was the expectation that a war fought in Sicily would produce substantial private gain for individuals (1.11.2).³ Moreover, at 1.12.7 Polybius declares that understanding the contemporary domination of Rome depends on knowing when and how the Romans, after securing control of Italy, undertook to seize power abroad (*tois ektos epikheirein epebalonto pragmasin*). These passages show that, in Polybius' view, the Romans crossed into Sicily with the intention of obtaining booty and expanding their power beyond the Italian peninsula.

According to him, the immediate goals of the Romans were to secure Messana against the Carthaginians and to acquire booty. With the capture of Agrigentum in 262, both aims had been achieved. The Romans, he observes, now expanded their original objectives, aspiring to drive the Carthaginians from Sicily as a whole, and to increase their own power enormously (1.19.15-20.2). From this time onwards, the First Punic War became essentially a conflict fought over control of Sicily. This expansion of Roman objectives influenced Polybius' general conception of the conflict, which he frequently calls 'the war fought over Sicily' (1.13.2; 1.63.4; 2.20.10; 3.21.2; 3.27.1; 3.32.7; 15.6.6; 15.8.1).

Polybius also ascribed aggressive motives to Rome in his discussion of the origins of the Second Punic War. By 226, the Romans wanted to intervene in Spain because they observed that the Punic commander Hasdrubal had established a powerful empire in that country (Polyb. 2.13.3). Their own inactivity, whether due to insouciance (2.13.4) or the expectation of a Gallic invasion (2.22.9), had enabled the Carthaginians to build up great power in Spain. The Romans did not, however, dare to make demands or to fight against Carthage at that time because they expected

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a Gallic invasion. Therefore they conciliated Hasdrubal by concluding the Ebro treaty with him, and gave their immediate attention to the Gauls, thus neglecting their interests in Spain (2.13.5-7; 2.22.9-11).

According to Polybius (3.6.3), Hannibal's attack on Saguntum and his crossing of the river Ebro, events of 218 BC, constituted the first overt actions of the Second Punic War. The historian explains that, in both cases, the Carthaginians violated a treaty sworn between themselves and Rome, but in the final analysis he traces the real origin of the conflict to Roman aggression.

The Saguntines, he says, continually sent messages to Rome about Punic activity in Spain, fearing for their own safety and wishing to inform the Romans about the success of Carthaginian projects there. Although the Romans had often paid no attention to them, in 220/19 they sent envoys to investigate what was happening (Polyb. 3.15.1-2). On this occasion, the Romans implored Hannibal not to attack Saguntum, an ally under their protection, or to cross the Ebro, an action prohibited by the treaty concluded with Hasdrubal (3.15.5; 3.29.1-10). They warned that Rome would declare war on Carthage if Hannibal attacked Saguntum (3.20.2; cf. 3.15.12).

Both before and after Hannibal attacked Saguntum, the Carthaginians acknowledged that the city was a Roman ally (Polyb. 3.14.10; 3.15.8; 3.21.5). However, when Roman ambassadors visited Carthage after the fall of Saguntum, the Punic authorities argued that Hannibal's action against the city was permissible. Although they conceded that the Lutatius treaty of 241 BC, concluded at the end of the First Punic War, had guaranteed the security of Roman and Carthaginian allies from attack by either side, they maintained that Saguntum was not protected under this agreement because it only covered existing allies, and Saguntum was not an ally of Rome when the treaty was made (Polyb. 3.21.3-5). Polybius himself indicates that the alliance between Rome and Saguntum was established after 241 (3.21.5; 3.29.4-10) and before the death of Hamilcar, the father of Hannibal, who served as Punic commander in Spain between 238 and 229 BC (3.14.10; 3.30.1-2). But, on the question of Saguntum and the Lutatius treaty, Polybius accepted the Roman view, according to which the agreement of 241 protected both existing and later allies (3.29.4-10; 3.30.3; cf. 15.17.3). The historian, therefore, believed that Hannibal's attack on Saguntum constituted a violation of the Lutatius treaty (Polyb. 3.30.3).

As noted above, in 226 BC, the Romans concluded a treaty with Hasdrubal, the successor of Hamilcar as Punic commander in Spain. This accord, which (according to Polybius) was silent with regard to the rest of Spain, stipulated that the Carthaginians should not cross the Ebro under arms (2.13.5-7; 2.22.9-11). However, when Roman ambassadors visited Carthage after the fall of Saguntum, the Punic authorities asserted that the Ebro treaty was not a valid agreement (Polyb. 3.21.1-2). Polybius, once

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again, accepted the Roman view, and argued that the accord was indeed valid (3.29.1-3). Thus he concluded that Hannibal's (later) crossing of the Ebro constituted a violation of the treaty made between Rome and Hasdrubal. Moreover, since (according to Polybius) the Ebro treaty was silent about the rest of Spain, in the historian's opinion that accord had no bearing on the status of Saguntum, located south of the river, and therefore did not affect the protection afforded the city under the Lutatius treaty.

Thus Polybius agreed with the Romans that the actions of Hannibal violated two treaties. He did not, however, believe those actions were the true causes of the Second Punic War. On the contrary, he regarded them as the beginnings of the conflict, which (he thought) had been determined by other considerations (Polyb. 3.6-12). These, of course, included the Carthaginians' desire to avenge the defeat they had sustained in the First Punic War (Polyb. 2.36.4-7; 3.9.6-9; 3.10.7-12.4; 3.13.1-2). However, the true causes (according to Polybius) also included the aggression and injustice of the Romans, who for no valid reason had in 237 compelled the Carthaginians to cede the island of Sardinia to them and pay additional tribute (Polyb. 1.88.8-12; 3.10.1-5; 3.13.1-2; 3.15.10-11; 3.27.7-8; 3.28.1-4; 3.30.4). Thus Polybius believed that the Carthaginians initiated the Second Punic War in part because of the aggression and injustice inflicted on them by Rome at the end of the earlier conflict.

Finally, Polybius describes the Second Punic War as 'the war fought over Spain' (15.6.6; 15.8.1). When the Roman envoys who visited Hannibal in the winter of 220/19 perceived that Rome would have to fight against Carthage, they were concerned that Hannibal would attack Saguntum and cross the Ebro (Polyb. 3.15.1-12). This, to be sure, indicates defensive thinking on the part of Rome. However, Polybius also notes that the envoys expected the fighting to occur in Spain, with Saguntum as the Roman base of operations (3.15.13). Saguntum was located south of the Ebro, in the Carthaginian sphere of influence. Thus the Romans, in Polybius' view, already believed that the imminent conflict would involve a struggle for control of Punic Spain. Their defensive thinking, according to him, was therefore already linked with the prospect of expansion. To sum up, Polybius believed that earlier Roman aggression contributed to the outbreak of the Second Punic War, and that, on the eve of hostilities, the Romans already anticipated further expansion in Spain to the detriment of Carthage.

The Romans, according to Polybius, also demonstrated an aggressive policy towards the Gauls. In 226, they made a treaty with Hasdrubal because they wanted to concentrate on the Gallic invasion they believed to be imminent. By meeting the Gauls in battle, they hoped not only to guarantee the security of their own country but also to complete their subjugation of Italy (Polyb. 2.13.5-7; cf. 1.6.7-8). Thus here as well Polybius believed that the Romans combined defensive motives with thoughts of expansion. He also maintained that they widened their initial objectives

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during the course of this conflict. In 232, the tribune Gaius Flaminius had carried a bill providing for distribution to individual settlers of public land in Picenum, captured earlier from the Gauls. According to Polybius, it was this measure that provoked the Gallic invasion of Italy in 225, for Roman settlement of the region convinced the Gauls that the conquerors aimed no longer at exercising hegemony over them, but at effecting their complete expulsion and extermination (2.21.7-9). Polybius explicitly ascribes this goal to the Romans following their victory of 225. According to him, success in repelling the Gallic invasion inspired the Romans to aim at the complete expulsion of the Gauls from the Po Valley. In the next year, therefore, they sent both consuls with large forces against the enemy (2.31.7-10).

Thus, on several occasions, Polybius maintains that the Romans expanded their objectives after achieving initial success in warfare. This pattern has already been observed in the historian's account of the First Punic War, in which the Romans aimed at conquering all of Sicily after the capture of Agrigentum, and in the Gallic War, in which the Romans envisaged the complete occupation of the Po Valley after defeating the invaders. The same pattern may be observed in the Roman war against Antiochus III. As early as 196, the Romans had forbidden the king to occupy any part of Europe (Polyb. 18.47.2; 18.50.8-9; cf. Livy 34.58.1-3; 35.16.11-12). At the beginning of the war that broke out several years later, the Romans intended merely to expel the king from Greece (Polyb. 3.3.3-4; 3.7.1-3). By 190, however, after that goal had been realized, they wished to defeat Antiochus and to establish control of Asia Minor (Polyb. 21.4.4-5). In Polybius' view, therefore, the Romans deliberately sought to dominate other countries, continually expanding their aims as success followed upon success. This process led to the pursuit of universal empire.

The Roman goal of universal empire

According to Polybius, the Romans made the entire world (*oikoumenē*) subject to themselves after achieving control of Italy (6.50.6). The realization of universal empire, therefore, occurred after 270, the year marking the end of the Pyrrhic War and its immediate consequences. At 3.1-3, the process is dated more precisely in the period between the Hannibalic War and the destruction of the Macedonian monarchy (220-168), and in several passages it is said to be complete at the end of that period (Polyb. 1.1.5; 1.2.7; 3.3.9; 3.4.2-3).

When did the Romans first conceive the ambition of universal empire? Three passages indicate that, according to Polybius, the project already existed as a conscious aim by the year 202. After defeating the Carthaginians in the Hannibalic War, the Romans believed that they had taken the chief and greatest step in their scheme of universal aggression (1.3.6); at

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the battle of Zama, the Romans fought for universal empire (15.9.2); before the fighting started, Scipio Africanus told his troops that, if successful, they would secure world-wide empire for Rome (15.10.2). Two other passages trace the ambition of universal empire well before 202. At 9.10.11, the historian discerns that objective as existing in 211, at 8.1.3 in 213. Another passage (1.3.7-10) implies that Polybius traced the emergence of the Roman project no later than the time of the Hannibalic War (220-202). Here Polybius declares that Rome and Carthage were contending for world empire during that conflict (1.3.7). Further comments suggest that he placed the formulation of this goal even earlier. Since the rivals were not well known to the Greeks, it was essential (he says) for him to narrate events of the earlier period (i.e. 264-220), and to indicate the purpose (*apo poiias protheseôs*) and power (*dynameôs*) that induced them to undertake such vast enterprises (i.e. the struggles of the First Punic War). Therefore he prefixed to his history two introductory books, so that no one reading the main body of his work (covering the years 220-145) might need to ask what considerations (*poiiois diabouliais*) or sources of power (*poiiais dynamesi*) and material resources (*khorêgiais*) enabled the Romans to embark upon the undertakings through which they became masters of every land and sea, but rather so that it might be obvious that they had very good reasons for initiating their project and for attaining universal rule and power (1.3.7-10). Thus Polybius maintains that the factors leading the Romans to pursue world dominion during the Second Punic War may be traced to the events and achievements of the earlier conflict. Therefore he supposed that the Romans formulated their design of world power some time after 241, when they must have realized that they could succeed in attaining such a goal. This conclusion agrees with another passage (1.63.9), in which Polybius says that the Romans deliberately undertook their project of universal dominion as a logical result (*eikotôs*) of the scale of their efforts during the First Punic War.

A single passage appears to contradict this chronology. At 3.2.6, Polybius says that the Romans conceived their design of universal aggression (*ennoian skhein tês tôn holôn epibolês*) after defeating Carthage in the Hannibalic War, and thus after 202. This passage stands alone against the rest of the evidence, which all points to an earlier date. Unless Polybius' statement at 3.2.6 is merely the result of carelessness, it may be an inaccurate version of what the author had said at 1.3.6. There Polybius divided the accomplishment of the Roman goal into two phases. After defeating Carthage in the Hannibalic War, the Romans believed that they had taken the chief and greatest step towards the realization of their design for universal rule. Then for the first time they reached out for the rest, crossing with military forces into Greece and Asia. At 3.2.6, therefore, Polybius may be referring inaccurately to the decision of the Romans to complete their grand design.⁴

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Pretexts and imperial expansion

Polybius expressed no fundamental objection to the expansionary ambitions of Rome. Although he acknowledged that Roman expansion involved an aggressive drive, he considered imperial rule in general terms to be a noble and praiseworthy goal, and he admired Roman power. He maintained that imperialist states that wish to increase their power through warfare must be able to justify their policy, and he believed that the Romans usually satisfied this requirement.

In fragment 99 B-W, Polybius wrote: 'For the Romans took great care not manifestly to begin an unjust attack (*tou mē katarkhontes phainesthai kheirôn adikôn*), or to commit aggression against their neighbours (*tas kheiras epiballein tois pelas*) when undertaking wars, but rather always to appear to enter upon wars (*all' aei dokein ... embainein eis tous polemous*) in self-defence and under compulsion.' At first sight, this passage seems to contrast appearance with reality. It appears to assert that the Romans took great care merely to avoid openly committing injustice or aggression, while in fact doing so under the guise of self-defence. Closer analysis, however, will show that this is not the case.

To say that the Romans take great care not manifestly to begin an unjust attack could, of course, mean that they do this very thing covertly; but it could also mean simply that they do not openly begin an unjust attack. That the second alternative applies here is confirmed by the next phrase, which states plainly that the Romans take great care not to commit aggression against their neighbours when undertaking wars. Finally, the last phrase need not imply that the Romans give a false impression of entering wars in self-defence. The verb *phainomai* (meaning to seem or appear) is followed by two constructions. With the infinitive, it signifies that something appears to be the case, but may not be; with the participle, it means that something is manifestly the case. But the verb *dokeō* (also meaning to seem or appear), which is followed by the infinitive, does not necessarily imply doubt regarding the validity of a perception. Although it may indeed mean that something appears to be the case but may not be, it can also mean that something appears to be – and actually is – true. Therefore the last phrase of F. 99 B-W could mean that the Romans merely seem to enter wars in self-defence, but in fact do so for aggressive reasons; but it could also mean that the Romans appear to enter wars in self-defence, and actually do so. The second phrase, stating that the Romans took great care not to commit aggression against their neighbours, supports the latter alternative. Thus F. 99 B-W means that the Romans took great care not to commit injustice and aggression, but to make people see that they were in fact acting in self-defence.

Polybius analyzed the origin of wars in terms of a beginning (*arkhē*), pretext (*aphormē*, *prophasis*) and cause (*aitia*). A beginning is the first overt step in the execution of a design already decided upon; a pretext is

the stated reason for adopting that design; a cause is the judgement or opinion that actually determines the adoption of the design (Polyb. 3.6.1-7.3).⁵ Since Polybius believed that the Romans deliberately sought to subdue other nations, he must have considered their expansionary impulse to be the true cause of most wars initiated by them. In such cases, therefore, the veridical appearance of self-defence that Polybius talks about in F. 99 B-W must depend on a pretext.

The contrast between pretext and cause that is merely implied in F. 99 B-W is more clearly stated in F. 212 B-W, which reads: 'Fortune, dragging the pretext (*tên prophasin*) as it were onto the stage, laid bare the true purposes (*tas alêtheis epinoias*).' This fragment emphasizes that a pretext is quite distinct from a true cause.

An example drawn from Polybius' account of the Third Punic War illustrates how pretexts function. At 36.2, the historian observes that the Roman senate had decided some time ago to fight a war against Carthage, but were looking for (and eventually agreed that they had found) a suitable opportunity (*kairon ... epitêdeion*) and a decent pretext (*prophasin euskhêmona*) to offer the world at large (*pros tous ektos*). Since the Romans had already decided to fight a war against Carthage, obviously their pretext (*prophasis*) could not be identical with the true motive for their resolve. Polybius identified the true reasons (*aitiai*) for the Roman attack on Carthage in a passage that has not survived (cf. 3.5.5). According to Polyb. 36.2, the function of a pretext is to create the veridical appearance of justice. The historian notes that the Romans paid much attention to the question of pretexts, and rightly so (*kalôs phronountes*), for when the inception of a war appears to be just (*dikaia men einai dokousa*), important advantages accrue, but when it appears to be indecorous (*askhêmôn*) and thoughtless (*phaulê*), the opposite occurs. Thus the pretext described in this passage has the same function as that implied in F. 99 B-W. Although it is not the true reason for a decision, it is the means by which the Romans create a truthful appearance of justice. A decent pretext is the element that allows an imperialist state to engage in expansion while truthfully maintaining that it is acting justly and in self-defence.⁶

Another occasion on which Polybius commends the Romans for valuing the approval of the world at large (*tês tôn ektos synkatatheseôs*) occurs in F. 23 B-W. On this point, declares the historian, the Romans showed prudence (*tês ... euboulías*), while those who paid no attention to such approval committed folly (*tês anoías*) in supposing that their own resources were sufficient for success. This fragment therefore complements 36.2 in providing more detail about the practical advantages conferred by pretexts.

Polybius' observations about the Roman campaign of 157/6 against the Dalmatians illustrate how pretexts should be used. The senate, he relates, decided to attack that nation chiefly in order to maintain the martial spirit of their own population, and to terrify the Dalmatians, in this way compelling them to obey Roman orders; these were the true reasons (*aitiai*) for

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their decision. However, the Romans explained to the world at large (*tois ... ektos*) that they had resolved to wage war against the Dalmatians because that refractory people mistreated the Roman ambassadors who visited them (Polyb. 32.13). The latter declaration represents the Roman pretext. Although it was not the true motive (*aitia*) for the Roman decision, this pretext was based on fact, and would in itself have justified a declaration of war if it had been the true motive.

That a pretext must be based on actual circumstances is evident from what Polybius says about alleged reasons that are not firmly grounded in reality. The Aetolians, for instance, declared contrary to reason and truth that they were fighting against Rome in order to liberate Greece (3.7.3). When Roman envoys addressed him prior to the outbreak of the Second Punic War, Hannibal maintained that he would intervene at Saguntum in order to protect the interests of the population, some of whose leaders the Romans (he maintained) had unjustly put to death. At the same time he sent a message to Carthage asking for instructions, because (as he claimed) the Saguntines, relying on their alliance with Rome, were injuring certain subjects of Carthage (3.15.4-8). Polybius criticized Hannibal for citing these unreasonable pretexts (*prophaseis alogous*) and inventing a non-existent cause (*tên d'oukh hyparkhousan* [sc. *aitian*]), thereby neglecting his duty because he was filled with irrationality (*alogias*) and violent anger (*thymou biaiou*). Hannibal ought rather to have cited the true reasons (*tais ... alêthinais aitiais*) for his decision, namely, the unjust extortion by Rome of Sardinia and additional tribute after the First Punic War. By citing a non-existent cause (cf. 3.30.1-2), he appeared to begin (*katarkhein edokei*) the war without reason or justice (3.15.9-11). Thus Polybius maintained that since Hannibal had no decent pretext, he should have cited the true reasons for his plans. By invoking ludicrous pretexts, he created the false impression that he was acting without reason or justice, whereas by citing the true reasons he would have demonstrated the justice of his cause.

To sum up, although a pretext (*prophasis*) is not the true reason for any decision, its function is to establish a veridical appearance of justice. For this reason, it must be a reasonable explanation, an acceptable justification, based on facts. Thus a pretext is an explanation that would in itself justify a decision if it actually were the true reason (*aitia*). It is therefore the duty of every statesman or government preparing to initiate a war to cite decent pretexts.

Polybius considered unjust any war initiated without a decent pretext. Thus he explicitly describes as unjust the extortion by Rome of Sardinia and additional tribute a few years after the end of the First Punic War, a robbery inflicted on Carthage under threat of a new war (3.15.10-11; 3.28.1-4; 3.30.4). The key text is 3.28.1-4, where he says that the Romans had no reasonable (*eulogos*) pretext (*prophasis*) or cause (*aitia*) for threatening to declare war, but implausibly alleged in support of their action an

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issue that the two sides had already resolved. It is not the expansionary impulse of the Romans in itself, but their failure or inability to cite a decent pretext, that led Polybius to censure Roman policy in this case. He acknowledged without demur that Roman power was based on an aggressive drive, and this is the only occasion on which he is known to have censured Rome for using war (or the threat of war) to expand her dominion.⁷

For the same reasons, Polybius condemned the attack made by Philip V and Antiochus III against the Ptolemaic empire after 203/2 (3.2.8; 15.20). He described the conduct of the kings as an instance of wrongdoing and aggression (*tas kheiras epibaltein*) (3.2.8), as shameful, unrestrained and beastly (15.20.3), impious, savage and avaricious (15.20.4), and contrary to law (15.20.6). The historian notes that the aggressors did not even put forward a slender pretext (*brakheian ... prophasin*) for their shameful deed (15.20.3).⁸ Similarly, at 15.22-3, Polybius described the capture and plunder of Cius and the enslavement of its population by Philip V in 203/2. In so doing, the king (he says) acted unjustly (*adikôs*, 15.22.3), engaging in conduct of which he ought to have been ashamed (*aiskhynesthai*, 15.23.5), and taking measures against Cius without any pretext (*oudemias prophaseôs engignomenês*), when that city was allied with and administered by the Aetolians, with whom Philip himself had made peace and towards whom he was making friendly overtures (15.23.8-9). Thus an imperialist state cannot legitimately engage in a policy of expansion unless this can be defended on the basis of a decent pretext. Since Polybius usually judges states and political leaders and their decisions about international affairs by traditional moral standards, his doctrine of pretexts is consistent with his general outlook.⁹

The moral dimension of this doctrine is, however, limited in several ways. Pretexts, for instance, could be discarded or saved for future use, and other states could be manoeuvred into furnishing suitable pretexts for a Roman attack, or driven into taking the first overt step in a war against Rome. Polybius' tolerance of such manipulation represents a concession to imperialism. Several examples will demonstrate how the historian's flexibility accommodates the expansionist power.

During the Third Macedonian War Cotys, king of the Odrysian Thracians, had cooperated with Perseus and sent his son to Macedonia as a hostage. The Romans captured the king's son along with the children of Perseus. In 167, after their victory against Macedonia, they restored Cotys' son to his father because they thought that perpetuation of their difference with the latter would serve no purpose, and because they wanted to secure his friendship (Polyb. 30.17). This passage implies that the Romans might well have chosen to save the Macedonian alliance of Cotys as a pretext for subsequent action against him, had that course seemed appropriate to them. When a pretext can be saved or abandoned depending on circumstances, the moral force of a pretext that is actually used may appear somewhat diminished.

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The Romans chose to reserve a pretext for future use when they dealt with an embassy from Demetrius I, king of Syria, which addressed the senate in 160/59 (Polyb. 32.2.1-3.13). The envoys of Demetrius offered to surrender the man who had murdered the Roman legate Gnaeus Octavius in Syria (cf. Polyb. 31.2.9-11; 31.8.4-8; 31.11.1; 31.12.3-4). By refusing to accept custody of the offender, the senate retained the accusation unimpaired so that they might have the opportunity to use the charges whenever they wished (Polyb. 32.2.3; 32.3.11-12). Several years earlier (in 163/2), when the government of Antiochus V disclaimed responsibility for the murder of Octavius, the senate had been unwilling to make a decision or to express its view on these matters, presumably for the same reason (Polyb. 31.11.1-3). When a pretext can be reserved for future use, the moral earnestness of one that is actually employed may be questioned.

Other states, moreover, could be manoeuvred into furnishing suitable pretexts for retaliation. In 170/69, for instance, Quintus Marcius Philippus, commander of the Roman forces operating against Perseus, suggested to a Rhodian envoy that his government should engage in mediation aimed at ending the Third Macedonian War. According to Polybius, Philippus wished to induce the Rhodians to intervene so that they might give the Romans a reasonable pretext (*aphormas eulogous*) for treating them as they wished. Polybius reached this conclusion by observing that the Romans later punished the Rhodians for offering such intervention (28.17.4-9; cf. 29.10-11; 29.19; 30.4-5; 30.21; 30.23; 30.31).

Thus, although pretexts did provide justification for Roman wars and other hostile measures, the manner in which they were created and used often diminished their moral force. Accordingly, Polybius' doctrine of pretexts, despite some connection with morality, was a legalistic formula that placed few serious obstacles in the path of an imperialist state bent on expanding its power.

Finally, as Peter Derow has shown, the Romans sometimes drove opponents to take the first overt step in a war against them.¹⁰ In such cases, Polybius' scheme of beginnings, pretexts and causes would be applied to the actions and motives of Rome's enemies. But, to his credit, the historian's treatment of the origins and causes of the Second Punic War (considered above) shows that, on these occasions, he might explain how the unjust behaviour of the Romans contributed to an enemy's decision to start a war against them.

International relations, morality and self-interest

The Romans often intervened within the affairs of other states, through means other than warfare, in a manner intended to increase their own power. Since he admired imperialism in general terms, Polybius could not object in principle to such conduct. Thus, when foreign states gave the Romans valid cause for retaliation, he considered acceptable intervention

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calculated to serve Roman interests. Occasionally, however, Polybius expressed criticism of Roman policy, for he observed that certain decisions or manoeuvres were unjust. On the other hand, in such cases he often censured not only the conduct of the Romans but also the imprudence of foreign governments and leaders whose mistakes weakened their own countries in relation to Rome. Moreover, he sometimes explained that the Romans were misled by their own good intentions or deceived by foreign leaders. Since his criticism of unjust Roman decisions is usually balanced or tempered by extenuating observations, it does not signify categorical hostility to Roman expansionism.¹¹

Before reviewing a number of cases, it will be useful first to consider the meaning of the words *pragmatikos* (adjective) and *pragmatikôs* (adverb) in passages of the *Histories* where Polybius refers to policies, decisions and actions of governments and leaders. These words sometimes have a pejorative connotation, implying resort to craft and deceit (e.g. 30.27.2). Sometimes they have a neutral sense, indicating the generation of consequences (e.g. 29.5.2). Most often, however, they express commendation, denoting possession of good qualities such as intelligence and effectiveness (e.g. 1.9.6; 1.35.5; 2.13.1; 2.43.9; 3.116.7; 7.12.2; 23.5.5; 30.5.6; 36.1.7; 36.5.1; 38.21.2). At 36.9, Polybius records four points of view expressed by Greeks concerning the Roman policy of relocating the population of Carthage in 149 BC, after the Romans had declared war and the Carthaginians had surrendered. Some observers agreed with the Romans, maintaining that they had deliberated prudently (*phronimôs*) and effectively (*pragmatikôs*) regarding their dominion, for to secure the imperial rule of their own country by eliminating a rival was the act of intelligent and far-seeing men (36.9.3-4). Here too the adverb *pragmatikôs* has a favourable connotation, for it appears in a defence of Roman policy and accompanies an adverb bearing a decidedly positive sense (*phronimôs*). The generally positive meaning of the adverb *pragmatikôs* and the corresponding adjective will be relevant to the interpretation of two passages to be studied below.¹²

A survey of cases may begin with occasions on which foreign leaders gave the Romans valid cause to intervene against them. In these instances, Polybius did not criticize the Romans for their policy. When Attalus, brother of Eumenes II of Pergamum, came to Rome in the spring of 168/7, the Romans welcomed him with great kindness, for they were estranged from the king because of the suspicious negotiations he had carried on with Perseus during the Third Macedonian War (cf. Polyb. 29.4.8-9.13) and wanted to ruin the Pergamene kingdom. To that end, they hoped to partition the realm, thus creating hostility between the brothers and rendering them incapable of warding off the Galatians. In private, certain leading senators therefore invited Attalus to abandon the mission he had undertaken on behalf of his brother (a request for diplomatic aid against the Galatians) and to address the senate on his own account. They

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indicated that the senate wished to create a separate kingdom for him. By these proposals the Romans aroused the ambitions of the prince, who nearly succumbed and ruined the interests of the Attalids and the whole kingdom. However, Eumenes' physician Stratius, albeit with difficulty, managed to deter him from acting on his foolish impulse. Attalus, therefore, avoided mentioning a division of the kingdom. Their strategy having failed, the senate appointed an envoy to confer with the Galatians. Judging from what happened later (cf. Polyb. 30.19; Livy 45.34.10-14), Polybius inferred that the envoy was instructed to work against the interests of Pergamum. There is no criticism of Rome in this episode (Polyb. 30.1.1-3.8). On the other hand, there is implied criticism of both Eumenes, who had given the Romans cause for retaliation, and of Attalus, whose unreflecting ambition nearly resulted in a disastrous division of the kingdom. In the *Histories*, Polybius consistently maintained that less powerful states should cooperate prudently with Rome, while seeking to preserve as much dignity and national autonomy as possible. Thus he took a negative view of leaders who unwisely provoked the retaliation of Rome, or who thoughtlessly solicited Roman support or intervention of a kind liable to weaken their own states in relation to Rome.¹³

In the winter of 167/6, Eumenes himself visited Italy in order to seek diplomatic aid against the Galatians. The Romans were now at variance with him for the reasons already stated. The senate, therefore, caused Eumenes to leave Italy by declaring that no audiences would be granted to kings. By treating Eumenes in this way, the Romans avoided the embarrassment of contradicting the highly favourable opinion they had earlier expressed about him if they said what they really thought, or the prospect of sacrificing the truth and their own national interest (*to tēi patriidi sympheron*) if they gave him a kind reply out of concern for what foreigners would think (Polyb. 30.19.1-10). Another useful result (*heteron ti pragmatikon*) followed upon this decision. It was obvious to the Romans that the allies of the king would be humiliated because of his ill-treatment, and that the Galatians would be doubly encouraged to fight a war against him (Polyb. 30.19.11-13). Thus Polybius explains that, by refusing to meet Eumenes, the Romans not only avoided problems for themselves but also caused trouble for the king, results that served effectively to advance their own interests. Polybius was favourably impressed by the effectiveness of Roman strategy. He did not criticize the Romans on this account, for the king had imprudently given them valid cause for retaliation, a grave error in the eyes of Polybius, as already noted.

Prusias II of Bithynia had not only pressed false accusations himself against Eumenes II but had also instigated the Galatians, Selge and many other cities in Asia to do the same (cf. Polyb. 30.30, referring to 165/4). Eumenes had therefore sent his brothers Attalus and Athenaeus to refute those charges. When the princes appeared before the senate in 164/3, that body judged that the Pergamenes had adequately defended themselves

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against all their accusers. Finally, having disposed of the charges, the princes returned to Asia laden with honours. However, since the senate continued to harbour suspicion regarding Eumenes, they sent Gaius Sulpicius Gallus and Manius Sergius on a mission to the eastern Mediterranean. Their mandate included observing the situation in Greece and, most importantly, investigating thoroughly the activities of Antiochus IV and Eumenes II in order to discover whether they were forming some scheme for common action against the Romans (Polyb. 31.1.2-8).

Polybius does not criticize the Romans for their abiding suspicion of Eumenes, or for their plan to observe his proceedings. He does, however, fault Sulpicius Gallus for the way in which he carried out his assignment. In addition to his other errors (*alogêmatôn*), Sulpicius posted notices in the most important cities, ordering all those who wanted to bring accusations against Eumenes to present themselves at Sardis on a certain date. When he arrived there himself, he occupied the gymnasium, where for ten days he listened to the accusers, allowing any kind of foul and abusive language to be used against the king, and dwelling on every fact and accusation like a man deranged in mind who gloried in his quarrel with Eumenes. Finally, Polybius explains why he disapproved of Sulpicius' behaviour. The more harshly the Romans appeared to deal with the king, the more the Greeks became attached to him, for men by nature always bestow their favour on one who is in distress (31.6). Thus Polybius found nothing fundamentally wrong with Roman policy, which involved investigation of Eumenes' actions. This procedure was justified, in his view, because the king had given the Romans cause to doubt his loyalty. Instead, the historian criticized Sulpicius for pursuing his mission imprudently, in such a way as to increase support for a king distrusted by Rome.

In other cases Polybius does criticize Roman policy, but his criticism is usually balanced by extenuating factors. In 181/0, for instance, a group of prominent men was sent to Rome by the Achaean League with instructions to explain why the Achaeans were unwilling to comply with a Roman demand concerning Spartan exiles. Among these envoys was Callicrates. Instead of stating the just claims (*ta dikaiâ*) of the Achaeans, based on the need to uphold their laws and constitution, he did the opposite, for he brought up another instance in which the Achaean League had refused to follow Roman policy, and he urged the senate to secure obedience to their will in Greece by supporting those politicians who favoured unhesitating acceptance of Roman decisions. Believing that the advice of Callicrates would promote their interests (*ti tôn autêi sympherontôn*), the senate began to intervene more actively within the Greek states by supporting political figures who would accept Roman instructions without question and appeal to Roman authority both rightly (*kai dikaiôs*) and wrongly (<*kai adikôs*>), while humbling their opponents, men who strove to maintain some measure of national independence, leaders described by Polybius as 'those who worked for the best' (*tous ... kata to beltiston*

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histamenous). As a result, the Achaeans lost the measure of equality they had until then enjoyed in their relations with Rome. Polybius blames Callicrates for initiating this deterioration (*tês epi to kheiron ... metabolês*) in the stature of the Achaean League, and for bringing great calamities (*megalôn kakôn*) upon all the Greeks, especially the Achaeans (Polyb. 24.8-10).

In his treatment of Callicrates, Polybius criticized Rome on two counts. First of all, he must have considered unjust the Roman demand regarding the Spartan exiles, for he favoured the opponents of that policy, the Achaean leaders who defended national sovereignty, politicians whom he called 'the men who worked for the best'. Thus he agreed with the arguments of Lycortas (his own father), a nationalist who maintained that compliance with Roman demands would involve a violation of the laws and constitution of the Achaean League. But Polybius did not respond to these unfair demands by expressing categorical censure of Rome. On the contrary, he accepted Lycortas' argument that the Romans did their duty in supporting the victims of injustice, but would withdraw their demands if the undesirable consequences of their decision were pointed out to them. Indeed, at 24.10.11-12 Polybius in his own voice states that the Romans, acting from noble motives, try to help all victims of misfortune who appeal to them, but that, if they are reminded of the claims of justice (*tôn dikaiôn*), they usually withdraw and correct themselves as far as possible. Thus the historian believed that when the Romans made unfair decisions affecting less powerful states, their judgement was sometimes based on the good intention of helping the afflicted, while overlooking the broader implications of the issue. In such cases, therefore, he thought that the appropriate response on the part of weaker states was not condemnation of Rome but polite remonstrance, which usually resulted in a reversal of the offending policy.

Secondly, Polybius found objectionable the policy of intervention adopted by the Romans in Greece as a result of Callicrates' advice. This is evident from his support of the nationalist party in Achaea, leaders described by Polybius as 'those who worked for the best', men whose discomfiture in his view caused a deterioration in the stature of the Achaean League and ultimately brought calamities upon all the Greeks, especially the Achaeans. Two factors, however, serve to limit Polybius' criticism of this Roman policy. In the first place, the historian suggests that the Romans, misled by the arguments of Callicrates, were mistaken about their true national interest, for their policy caused them in time to have an abundance of sycophants in Greece, but to be short of true friends (24.10.5; cf. 30.13.2-4). Furthermore, it was Callicrates, himself a Greek, who had encouraged the Romans to intervene more aggressively within the Greek states in order to procure ready obedience to their demands. Polybius, who believed that less powerful states should strive to preserve as much independence as possible, thought that Callicrates unnecessarily

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fostered the political subordination of Achaea and all of Greece to Roman domination. Thus, although he considered this Roman policy unwholesome, his criticism of Rome is tempered by the imputation of error, and his strongest condemnation is reserved for the Achaean leader who imprudently proposed that course of action.

In 167/6, Prusias II of Bithynia addressed the Roman senate. According to Polybius, he exhibited a disgusting servility, but for that very reason received a kind answer (30.18). The account of Polybius implies that the senate intended by this means to reward and encourage submissiveness, but did so at the cost of its own dignity, for the contemptible spectacle afforded by Prusias deserved reprobation. However, this guarded criticism of Rome is greatly surpassed by the historian's outright condemnation of the king, who unnecessarily humiliated himself and his realm.

Later in that year, the Athenians sent an embassy to Rome. Their envoys asked the senate to grant Delos, Lemnos and Haliartus to Athens. Although he excused the Athenians for seeking possession of the two islands, Polybius condemned their request for Haliartus, a gesture he considered unworthy of any Greek state, especially Athens. Delos and Lemnos, he adds, caused the Athenians a great deal of trouble, and their control of Haliartus brought them more in the way of reproach than of profit. Polybius, obviously disapproving of their decision, observes that the Romans nevertheless (*plên*) gave these places to Athens. But the burden of his censure in this affair falls upon the Athenians, who originated the shameful and unprofitable request (Polyb. 30.20).

Antiochus IV died in the winter of 164/3. Demetrius, nephew of the late king, had served as a hostage in Rome, initially on behalf of his father Seleucus IV (king from 187 to 175), and later on behalf of his uncle Antiochus IV (who reigned from 175 to 164). After the death of the latter, Demetrius asked the senate to establish him on the throne of the Syrian kingdom, to which (he said) he had a better claim than the sons of Antiochus. For a long time Demetrius was thought to be detained unjustly (*para to dikaion*), for after the death of his father and the succession of Antiochus IV, he should not (it was held) serve as hostage for the sons of Antiochus. All members of the House were inclined in their hearts to support Demetrius. The senate, however, decided to keep him in Rome and to recognize Antiochus V, the infant son of the previous king. They did so because they viewed Demetrius with suspicion, for he was in the prime of life, and they believed that the youth and weakness of Antiochus V better served their own interests (*mallon ... sympherein tois spheterois pragmasi*). Therefore the senate dispatched an embassy to the Seleucid kingdom to arrange matters as they themselves wished. They expected no opposition, for the king was a child and the leading men were pleased that the throne had not been given to Demetrius. In carrying out the instructions of the senate, the Roman envoys took various measures calculated to weaken the kingdom (Polyb. 31.2.1-11).

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In the following year (163/2), Demetrius once again addressed the senate, asking that body at least to absolve him of his obligations as a hostage. His young friend Apollonius had convinced him that the senate would agree to do so, for they had unreasonably (*alogôs*) deprived him of the Seleucid throne, and it was unnatural (*atopon*) for Demetrius to serve as hostage for the sons of Antiochus IV. The senate, however, persisted in their original view. This was only reasonable (*eikos*), for on the previous occasion they had decided to maintain the rule of the boy Antiochus V, not because the arguments of Demetrius were unjust (*ou dia to mê legein ta dikaia ton Dêmêtrion*), but because this policy suited their own interests (*dia to sympherein tois spheterois pragmasi*). Since the whole situation remained unchanged, it was reasonable (*eikos*) that the decision of the senate should continue to be based on the same policy (Polyb. 31.11.4-12).

According to Polybius, therefore, the Romans acted in their own interest and contrary to justice by recognizing Antiochus V instead of Demetrius. However, this criticism of Rome is tempered by Polybius' explanation of why the Romans thought that the appointment of Antiochus V better served their own interests. The senate at this point desired to weaken the Seleucid kingdom. If they recognized Antiochus V, an ineffectual boy, they could count on the self-serving acquiescence of the officials who administered the kingdom on his behalf. Thus the imprudence of the Seleucid officials themselves encouraged the Romans to decide unfairly about the succession and the request of Demetrius.

In 164/3, Ptolemy VI and his younger brother, Ptolemy VIII, divided the Egyptian kingdom, which included Cyrene and Cyprus (Polyb. 31.2.14). The following year the younger Ptolemy, who ruled over Cyrene, asked the senate to add Cyprus to his portion (31.10.1-3). Two Roman senators, who supported the elder Ptolemy, argued that the recent division of the kingdom was generous to the king's younger brother, who had indeed been quite pleased to accept the arrangement (31.10.4-5). The senate, however, wanted to divide the kingdom effectively (*pragmatikôs*). Therefore, in accordance with Roman interests (*epi tõi spheterôi sympheronti*), they assented to the request of Ptolemy VIII, in this way forestalling the emergence of an ambitious ruler in a powerful kingdom (i.e. a united realm embracing Egypt, Cyrene and Cyprus) (31.10.6, 8-10). Despite Roman diplomatic support, the younger brother in fact never acquired Cyprus during the lifetime of Ptolemy VI, who successfully defended the island (Polyb. 31.17-20; 33.11; Diod. 31.33). Polybius, however, wanted to explain through this example how the Romans exploited opportunities to weaken states that might pose some kind of threat to themselves. According to him, the Romans now (i.e. after 168) frequently made decisions of this kind, thus increasing and building up their own power effectively (*pragmatikôs*) by exploiting the mistakes of others, while pleasing and appearing to confer a benefit on (*dokountes euergetein*) those who were committing errors (31.10.7). Thus Polybius suggests that the Roman

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decision regarding Cyprus was unjust because the earlier division of the Egyptian kingdom had been fair. Indeed, at 39.7.5 he praises the elder Ptolemy for sparing his brother's life at that time. However, the historian's criticism of Rome is balanced by the fact that he not only admired the effectiveness of Roman policy but also blamed Ptolemy VIII for thoughtlessly invoking Roman intervention, a mistake that proved harmful to the interests of the Egyptian kingdom.

A few years before 162/1 Massinissa, king of Numidia, had seized control of the open country in a region of North Africa called Emporia, which had previously belonged to Carthage, but he had failed to capture the cities. Following the partial success of the king, both sides had frequently appealed to the senate concerning Emporia. The Romans, according to Polybius, consistently decided against the Carthaginians, not on the merit of their claims (*tois dikaios*) but because they thought that a judgement of this kind suited their own interests (*sympherein sphisi*). In fact, some years earlier, Massinissa had asked Carthage for permission to pass through Emporia, thus acknowledging that it did not belong to him. In the end, the Carthaginians were compelled because of the adverse Roman judgements not only to surrender the cities and the territory but also to pay five hundred talents to Massinissa (Polyb. 31.21). The fact that Polybius' criticism of Rome on this occasion is not accompanied by extenuating observations suggests that, when such observations are made in other cases, the criticism should be taken seriously even though it is qualified.

Ariarathes, whose Cappadocian kingdom had been seized by Orophernes, came to Rome in 158/7, where he met privately with a number of senators. The envoys of his enemies Orophernes and Demetrius I of Syria also appeared in Rome. The most prominent of these were Diogenes, who represented Orophernes, and Miltiades, sent by Demetrius. These men made a better impression than Ariarathes in their private interviews, for they were emboldened to say anything and to counter every kind of argument without any regard for the truth, and their statements were not subject to scrutiny, since there was no one to defend the truth. Therefore their affairs appeared to be going as they wished, as falsehood easily prevailed (Polyb. 32.10). This passage implies that Polybius thought the Romans unjustly favoured Orophernes and his ally Demetrius against Ariarathes because they were deceived by the envoys. Thus Polybius' guarded criticism of the Romans is tempered by his belief that they were misled by foreign leaders.

In 154/3 Heracleides, a former royal secretary under Antiochus IV, appeared in Rome with Alexander Balas, claimant to the throne of Syria, then occupied by Demetrius I. Polybius observes that Heracleides prolonged his stay in Rome, engaging in deception and villainy while concocting designs involving the senate (33.15.1-2). Both claimant and courtier addressed the House in the following year. Alexander, posing as

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the son of Antiochus IV, asked the senate to help him obtain the kingdom, or at least permit him to return to Syria and attain his ancestral throne with the assistance of others. Then Heracleides made a long speech, praising Antiochus IV and accusing Demetrius. Finally he maintained that the senate must, in accordance with justice (*kata to dikaion*), allow the return of the young man, who was (he asserted) the natural son of Antiochus IV. Moderate senators disapproved of these representations, for they understood the construction of the plot and loathed Heracleides. The majority, however, seduced by the charlatan, were persuaded to support a decree permitting Alexander to return to his ancestral kingdom, and allowing others to assist him (Polyb. 33.18.6-14). Thus Polybius believed that the Romans were acting contrary to justice by encouraging Alexander Balas against Demetrius, but his criticism is mitigated by the fact that he ascribed the senate's policy to the deception practised by Heracleides.

Conclusions

To sum up, Polybius admired imperialism, especially Roman domination. He acknowledged without demur that imperialist expansion is based on an aggressive impulse. Thus he believed that the Romans deliberately sought to control other states, and ultimately the entire Mediterranean world. Their aggressive drive, in his view, imparted to their wars the goal of conquest, and inspired them to widen their objectives during the course of a conflict. According to Polybius, however, the expansion of Rome was almost always governed by scrupulous attention to the matter of pretexts. Although the Romans, in his view, fought wars in reality to extend their dominion, they usually justified their action on the basis of a convincing pretext, that is, an explanation which, although not the true reason for initiating armed conflict, nevertheless corresponds to facts, and would in itself justify such action if it actually were the true reason. In Polybius' view, a state that wishes to increase its power by initiating a war must cite a convincing pretext, for this is the only way in which it can justify a declaration of war and the resulting expansion of its dominion. The historian, however, was aware that the Romans could manipulate pretexts in various ways, or drive opponents to initiate a conflict. Proceedings of this kind diminish the moral value of pretexts. The Romans also increased their power through decisions about foreign policy that did not involve military action. Since he admired imperialist expansion, he expressed no fundamental objection to such methods. He did, however, believe that the foreign policy of an imperialist state should be just, for he sometimes noted explicitly, or clearly implied, that Roman decisions were unjust. But in such cases he often criticized not only the Romans but also foreign governments and leaders who thoughtlessly damaged the interests of their own states by weakening their position in relation to Rome. Moreover, he occasionally explained that the Romans made unjust decisions because

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they were misled by their own good intentions or deceived by foreign leaders. Observations of this kind moderate Polybius' criticism of Rome.

Thus, although Polybius believed that imperialist states must cite convincing pretexts for declaring war, and should observe justice in their foreign policy, his doctrine permitted considerable latitude for powerful nations who wished to expand their dominion through warfare and other means. Thus he accepted and accommodated Roman domination, legitimizing military action on the basis of flexible moral standards, and excusing unjust policies when they arose from error or deception, or exploited the unwise behaviour of foreign leaders who thoughtlessly damaged the interests of their own states. As a result, Polybius rarely expressed unqualified censure of the Romans for their wars or foreign policy. He sometimes criticized but did not in general terms condemn Rome.

Polybius on the Acquisition, Expansion and Preservation of Imperial Rule

Polybius divides imperial rule into the three stages of acquisition, expansion and preservation. Although no single passage contains a reference to all three stages, the evidence from the historian's detailed account indicates that he does conceptualize the evolution of imperial rule in terms of these categories. At each stage, success in his opinion depends on good qualities such as moderation and beneficence. His views on this matter are systematic and consistent.

Acquisition, expansion and preservation of imperial rule

Hiero II acquired (*ktêsthai*) rule over Syracuse and the allies by avoiding all injury to citizens. He preserved (*diaphylaxai*) it in the same way, through being most beneficent (*euergetikôtatos*) towards the Greeks (Polyb. 7.8.1-8).

During the Second Punic War, the Carthaginians lost their empire in Spain because they failed to understand that one acquires (*ktasthai*, *kataktasthai*) and preserves (*têrein*, *phylattein*) imperial rule in the same way, that is, through beneficence (*eu poiountes*), not by acting arrogantly (*hyperêphanôs*), by doing wrong (*kakôs poiein*) or by ruling despotically (*despotikôs arkhein*). Because the Punic commanders in Spain had engaged in mutual quarrels stirred up by the avarice (*pleonexian*) and despotism (*philarkhia*) characteristic of their nation, their Spanish subjects revolted and supported Rome (Polyb. 9.11; 10.35.6-36.7). Similar abuses had caused their allies in North Africa to revolt during the Mercenary War (Polyb. 1.71-2).

Alexander, who intended to cross into Asia, destroyed Thebes in the belief that, by punishing this city, he could keep the Greeks under guard through fear (*tôi phobôi*). However, everyone pitied the Thebans on account of the unjust and cruel treatment they suffered, and no one justified this action of the king (Polyb. 38.2.13-3.2).

Philip II, who first expanded (*auxêsas*) the Macedonian kingdom, obtained the willing submission and cooperation of the Athenians through the moderation (*epieikeia*, *metriotês*), benevolence (*philanthrôpia*), kindness (*eugnômosynê*), lenience (*praiotês*), nobility (*kalokagathia*), intelligence

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(*ankhinoia*) and magnanimity (*megalopsykhia*) that he displayed after the battle of Chaeronea, when he granted funeral honours to the Athenian dead and released Athenian prisoners without ransom (Polyb. 5.10.1-5; cf. 22.16.1-2).¹

Other passages can be cited to illustrate the qualities Polybius believed should be observed or avoided in the expansion of imperial rule. After the battle of Chaeronea, for instance, Philip II intervened in the Peloponnese, helping to guarantee the security and freedom of the entire population, and to recover land taken by the Spartans from various cities (including Megalopolis). As a result, the leaders of the Peloponnesian communities had good cause to summon the king to defend their rights, and to collaborate with him in the pursuit of honour and glory (Polyb. 18.14.5-8). Polybius observes that, during the Cleomenic War, the people of Megalopolis were well disposed to the Macedonian royal house on account of the benefactions (*euergesiôn*) conferred by Philip II (2.48.1-3). Similarly, because he provided military assistance to the Achaean League against Cleomenes III of Sparta, and on account of his entire policy (*kata tèn holèn hairesin*) and nobility (*kalokagathian*), Antigonos Doson inspired good expectations of himself among all the Greeks (Polyb. 2.70.7). Moreover, because this king treated the Spartans with great generosity after defeating Cleomenes, refraining from injuring them (*kakôs poiëin*), and conferring the greatest benefits (*megistôn agathôn*) on them, he was regarded as their benefactor (*euergetês*) at the time and as their preserver (*sôtêr*) after his death, and received undying honour and glory not only among the Spartans but also among all the Greeks (Polyb. 5.9.8-10). At the beginning of his reign, Philip V bestowed numerous benefits (*agathôn*) on the Greeks, and was therefore loved by all on account of his beneficent policy (*dia to tês hairesêôs euergetikon*) (Polyb. 7.11.7-8).

On the contrary, by destroying the Aetolian sanctuary at Thermon during the Social War (in 219/8), Philip V demonstrated neither lenience (*praiotêta*) nor magnanimity (*megalopsykhia*) nor nobility (*kalokagathia*) nor justice (*tois dikaiois*). He played the part of a tyrant (*tyrannon*), who by doing evil (*kakôs poiounta*) rules arbitrarily (*despozein*) over men against their will and through fear (*tôi phobôi*), hating his subjects and being hated by them. He did not conduct himself like a king, who by benefitting all (*eu poiounta*) rules and leads willing subjects through benefaction (*euergesian*) and benevolence (*philanthrôpia*). His behaviour gave evidence of impiety (*asêbêmata*), indecency (*atopon*), brutality (*aselgeia*), and lawlessness (*paranomía*). Consequently, on this occasion he lost an opportunity to conciliate the Aetolians, and in time he acquired a bad reputation. For in warfare it is legitimate to seize and destroy forts, harbours, cities, men, ships, crops and other such things, which have military value, but it is wrong to damage temples, religious objects and any things of this kind, which have no military significance.

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Good men should not make war on evildoers for the sake of destroying and exterminating them, but in order to correct their errors. They should not destroy guiltless objects along with the offenders, but should rather preserve and spare wrongdoers as well as the innocent (Polyb. 5.9.1-7; 5.10.9-12.4). Two other passages depict the same image of the deteriorated Philip. At 7.13.7, Polybius declares that Philip's treacherous conduct (*paraspondein*) at Messene (in 216/5 or 215/4), where he planned to capture the citadel, initiated his transformation from a king into a tyrant (*tyrannos*). With special reference to Philip's treacherous behaviour (*paraspondêma*) at Thasos, which he seized in 203/2, Polybius observes that kings, at the beginning of their reign, generally proclaim freedom to all and address their adherents as friends and allies, but that once they have gained their ends, they treat those who trusted them not as allies but despotically (*despotikôs*) (15.24.4-6).

Polybius believed that, through his actions at Thermon, Messene and Thasos, Philip V imperilled the success of his expansionary designs. In the passages discussed above, the historian maintained that a policy based on moderation and beneficence allows an imperialist nation to expand its influence by winning the good opinion and voluntary cooperation of other states. Philip himself, he declares, had originally pursued such a course (7.11.7-8). But at 7.14.3 he observes that the king, in following the advice of Demetrius of Pharos and destroying the sanctuary at Thermon, departed from his own policy (*tês spheteras proaireseôs*) by showing himself to be an implacable and bitter foe. Here Polybius implies that Philip subverted his own imperialist designs by abandoning the correct policy to which he had formerly adhered. This is evident from the passage that follows (7.14.4-5), where Polybius says that, because he had originally wronged (*adikêsas*) or harmed (*lypêsas*) no one on Crete, all the islanders obeyed the king, who enjoyed the good will of all the Greeks; conversely, Philip's brutal policy at Messene (in 216/5 or 215/4), where he incited a violent political conflict, cost him the good will of the allies and the trust of the other Greeks. Similarly, at 7.11.9-11, Polybius says that the king had initially pursued a noble policy (*proairesis kalokagathikê*) and had observed good faith (*pistis*). The practical value of such principles (he adds) is evident from that fact that, by respecting them, Philip peacefully united all of Crete under his own presidency. On the contrary, the king's intervention at Messene, which marked a total change of policy (*antikeimenên proairesin*), induced others to change their opinion of him, and caused him to meet with totally different results in his undertakings. Moreover, by destroying the sanctuary at Thermon, Philip lost an opportunity to conciliate the Aetolians (5.11.7-12.4). This passage may be linked with 23.15, where Polybius condemns belligerents for destroying trees and buildings in addition to annual crops, on the grounds that the perpetrators make their enemies savage and render permanent the anger felt against themselves by people who have

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committed but a single offence. In addition, the historian observes that when Philip attacked Messene in 214/3, he was mistaken to expect that his victims would never be angry or hate him (8.8.1-2). Finally, the king's treacherous conduct (*paraspondêma*) at Thasos jeopardized the progress of his designs for world empire by exhibiting his untrustworthiness to everyone (15.24).²

Polybius pronounced a similar judgement on the Romans, whom he criticized for removing works of art from Syracuse after they recovered the city in 212/1, during the Second Punic War. Perhaps (he maintains) it was reasonable for them to take the gold and silver, since it was impossible for them to aim at universal dominion without weakening others and strengthening themselves. However (he continues), it was feasible for the Romans to leave behind everything that did not contribute to such strength, and to avoid arousing the envy, pity and anger of the original owners and other peoples, and thus to enhance the reputation of their own country through dignified conduct (*semnotêti*) and magnanimity (*megalo-psykhiai*) (Polyb. 9.10).

Finally, it may be observed that the *Histories* of Polybius as a whole imply two (rather than three) major phases in the evolution of Roman power. According to Polybius, Roman domination was complete by the year 168 (1.1.5; 1.2.7; 3.3.9; 3.4.2-3). Thus the period down to 168 may be regarded as a phase combining acquisition and expansion (stages of imperial evolution that are often distinguished in the detailed narrative). The subsequent period down to 145 may therefore be viewed as a phase characterized by preservation. Indeed, Polybius divides Roman imperialism essentially into such phases when he reports opinions expressed among the Greeks about the Roman plan to relocate the Carthaginians in 149 (36.9). While some observers (he declares) believed that the Romans acted intelligently in confirming (*to ... bebaiôsai*) imperial rule for their own country by destroying Carthage (36.9.3-4), others asserted disapprovingly that the Romans had not acquired (*katektêsthai*) an empire as a result of their current policy, which exhibited the features of despotism (*philarchhian*) and irremediable harshness (*anêkestôs kai bareôs bebouleusthai*). Hitherto (i.e. until 168) the Romans had fought against all their enemies until they were victorious and their opponents conceded that they must obey them, but they abandoned this practice when they abolished the Macedonian monarchy and ordered the destruction of Carthage (36.9.5-8). Clearly in this passage the stages of acquisition (identified by the verb *katektêsthai*) and expansion (implied by the reference to defeated enemies who conceded their obligation to obey) are treated as a single phase.

**The consistency of Roman policy down to
168 BC (beneficence)**

Polybius believed that the Romans generally observed good principles during the evolution of their universal empire down to the year 168. A survey of his judgement on this point may begin with passages illustrating the beneficent character of Roman intervention.

In 263, Hiero II made an alliance with the Romans, placing himself under their protection. As a result, he earned their support and was able to rule Syracuse in security (Polyb. 1.16.9-11).

During the First Illyrian War, several Greek cities and native tribes accepted Roman protection. Subsequently the Romans placed most of Illyria under the rule of a client prince, Demetrius of Pharos. The Illyrian queen Teuta, confined to the exiguous remnant of her former domain, made a treaty on terms dictated by Rome (Polyb. 2.11.1-12.3). This treaty severely limited Illyrian naval activity, an issue of great concern to the Greeks (2.12.3). The Roman general Postumius sent envoys to the Aetolian and Achaean Leagues to explain the causes and the results of the Roman war against the Illyrians (2.12.4). This mission created a favourable impression, for the Romans had relieved the Greeks of considerable apprehension, seeing that the Illyrians were the common enemies of them all (2.12.5-6).

In establishing Demetrius of Pharos as the principal ruler of Illyria, the Romans had conferred benefits (*euergetēmata*) on him. Later, when they acted to suppress him (in 219), they stopped him from plundering the Greek cities of Illyria and many islands of the Cyclades (Polyb. 3.16).

After the battle of Cynoscephalae, the Roman general Flamininus refused to depose Philip V. To remove the king, he maintained, would be contrary to the interest (*tou sympherontos*) of the Greeks, for such a measure would result in the destruction of the Macedonian kingdom and the exposure of the Greeks to the lawless violence of the Thracians and Galatians (Polyb. 18.37).

After the Romans defeated Philip V in the Second Macedonian War, the senate issued a decree to supplement the peace treaty made with the king. The decree ordered Philip to liberate the Greek cities subject to him, and proclaimed free all the Greeks of Europe and Asia (Polyb. 18.44.1-4). According to Polybius, all the mainland Greeks received this decree with confidence and satisfaction except the Aetolians, who complained that Roman policy implied a change of masters in the Greek peninsula, not liberation (18.45.1-6). Although convinced that the Second Macedonian War had resulted in an extension of Roman power (1.3.6; 3.3.2; 24.10.9; 24.11.3), Polybius nevertheless criticized the animadversions of the Aetolians, censuring them for their tediously intemperate misrepresentations (18.45.7-8).

Polybius' reaction to Aetolian complaints demonstrates that, in some

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sense, he accepted as genuine the Roman liberation of the Greeks. Further observations will confirm this conclusion. The Aetolians, for instance, pointed out that the senatorial decree required Philip to set free the Asiatic cities, but to surrender the European cities to the Romans (Polyb. 18.45.3-6; cf. 18.44.3-4). Polybius replies to this charge by explaining that the senate had given Flamininus and the ten commissioners discretion to decide about the European cities in the light of the threat posed by Antiochus III, who for a long time had wished to intervene in Greek affairs (18.45.7-12).

Polybius' admiration of Roman policy is also evident in his treatment of the Isthmian declaration of 196, when Flamininus ordered a herald to proclaim the freedom of all states in the Greek peninsula formerly allied or subject to Philip V (18.46.5). This proclamation, greeted initially with extraordinary applause, was repeated to the unbelievable approbation of the audience. The crowd (continues Polybius), almost ecstatic with gratitude, mobbed Flamininus (18.46.6-12). Although their expression of gratitude appeared to be excessive, it was far less than what the magnitude of the event deserved, for the Romans had taken great trouble to liberate the Greeks (18.46.13-15).

That Polybius believed the liberation of Greece to be genuine emerges as well from his discussion of the origins of the Syrian War. The crossing of Antiochus III into Greece with military forces marked for Polybius the beginning of the conflict. The Aetolians, who had invited the king to intervene, explained that they and Antiochus wished to liberate the Greeks. Polybius treated this explanation not as the genuine motive of the Aetolians for embarking on a war against Rome, but as a pretext, and one that he contemptuously dismissed as an unreasonable and false claim (3.7.3). The fact that Polybius considered the Aetolian claim unreasonable as well as false indicates that, in his view, no intelligent observer could believe Greece needed to be liberated. Thus he maintained that Greece had already been liberated by the Romans.

As noted above, Polybius declares that Antiochus had for a long time wished to intervene in Greek affairs (18.45.11). In 196, after the proclamation of Greek freedom, Flamininus and the ten commissioners forbade the king to cross into Europe with an army, for no Greeks were now under attack or subject to anyone (Polyb. 18.47.2). These statements, taken in conjunction with what precedes, imply that Polybius believed the Romans eventually fought against Antiochus in order to preserve the freedom of the Greeks proclaimed at the end of the Second Macedonian War, a freedom that he himself in some sense regarded as genuine. That he simultaneously believed the Romans had extended their power by defeating Philip V certainly poses an interesting problem. Perhaps the withdrawal of the continental Greeks from Antigonid domination and their protection from Seleucid ambitions were so gratifying to Polybius that a negative conception of freedom, one that he shared with the Ro-

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mans, momentarily prevailed over his awareness of the broader historical movement described in the *Histories*.

Further examples illustrate the benefits conferred by Rome on the Greeks. In 190/89, an Aetolian embassy asked the senate to ratify the terms of peace that the consul Marcus Fulvius Nobilior had offered them (Polyb. 21.29.1-31.5). Leon, an Athenian ambassador who accompanied the Aetolians, spoke on their behalf. In his address to the senate, he conceded that, although they had received many benefits (*eu peponthotas*) from the Romans, the Aetolians had shown ingratitude by kindling a war between Rome and Antiochus III (21.31.6-7). After the Aetolians accepted Roman supremacy by virtue of a peace treaty (Polyb. 21.32; cf. Livy 38.11), they were prevented from engaging in their habitual practice of robbing and plundering other states (Polyb. 30.11.1-3).

In the same year, the consul Gnaeus Manlius Vulso led a campaign against the Galatians in Asia Minor (Polyb. 21.33-9). At 3.3.5, Polybius remarks that the Romans on this occasion suppressed the insolence of the Galatians and freed the peoples who lived west of the Taurus mountains from fear of the barbarians and their lawless violence.

Polybius regarded the imperialism of Rome as generally beneficial to the Greeks in the period down to 171 BC. At the beginning of the Third Macedonian War, the Greek multitudes sympathized with Perseus (he explains) because they had forgotten the troubles (*dyskolôn*) inflicted on the Greeks by the royal house of Macedonia as well as the advantages (*sympherontôn*) conferred on them by the Roman empire. They had failed, moreover, to ponder the consequences that would follow a Macedonian victory, namely, the attainment of overwhelming supremacy by one man and the subjection of the Greeks to the rule of an absolute monarch. Since the Greeks fell victim to the common human tendency to favour the weaker side in a contest, a failing that is easily corrected through remonstrance, one should not (he pleads) unfairly reproach them with ingratitude (*eis akharistian*) on account of the inclination they showed at that time (27.9-10). Thus, in excusing their behaviour, Polybius implies that the Greeks actually had reason to be grateful to Rome for benefits conferred on them, and could easily have been induced to remember this fact.

After 203/2, Antiochus III and Philip V conspired to partition the Ptolemaic empire. Polybius censured their design as utterly immoral (3.2.8; 15.20.1-4). He noted with satisfaction that Fortune, operating through the Romans, punished both kings as they deserved. What these rulers had planned unjustly to do to others, Fortune justly and fittingly did to them (15.20.5-6). Both Antiochus and Philip, defeated by Rome, were prevented from coveting what belonged to others. Moreover, they were forced to pay tribute and submitted to Roman orders (15.20.7). This outcome, the first instalment of divine retribution, was followed in the next generation by more complete chastisement and redress. Fortune (Polybius declares), restoring the Ptolemaic kingdom, punished the em-

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pires (*tas dynasteias*) and the successors (*tous diadokhous*) of Antiochus and Philip. One dynasty she utterly destroyed, the other she engulfed in nearly the same calamity (15.20.8). Here the historian refers to the abolition of the Antigonid monarchy after the defeat of Perseus in the Third Macedonian War (cf. 29.20-1), and to the humiliating withdrawal from Egypt forced upon Antiochus IV by the Romans in 168 (cf. 29.27). However, Perseus and Antiochus IV paid not only for the transgressions of their fathers but also for their own offences. This emerges from 15.20.5, where Polybius describes the fate of Antiochus III and Philip V as an excellent example for the correction of their successors, a statement implying that the historian viewed the reverses of Antiochus IV and Perseus in part as punishment for their own aggression (cf. 22.18; 29.26). Thus, in a passage imbued with the moral vision of the tragic stage, Polybius depicts the Romans as avenging spirits of divine justice who chastise wrongdoing among the nations.

After the defeat of Perseus, the Romans bestowed many great advantages (*philanthrôpiai*) on the Macedonians. With the abolition of the monarchy, they were released from the burden of royal edicts and taxes, exchanged servitude for liberty, and escaped the political strife and mutual slaughter infesting their cities (36.17.13). Delivered from absolute monarchy (27.10.2), they adopted representative democracy (31.2.12). By intervening against Antiochus IV, the Romans saved the Ptolemaic kingdom (29.27.11; cf. 15.20.8). Thus Polybius believed that Roman policy was on the whole beneficent during the period down to 168 BC.

The consistency of Roman policy down to 168 BC (moderation)

After his victory over Hannibal at the battle of Zama (202 BC), Scipio Africanus told the Punic ambassadors that, mindful of the instability of Fortune, the Romans had decided to treat the Carthaginians with lenience (*praiôs*) and to handle the situation with magnanimity (*megalopsykhôs*). Thereupon he read out the proposed terms of peace, dividing the clauses into two groups, those exhibiting benevolence (*ta philanthrôpa*), and those of the opposite character, which they must endure (Polyb. 15.17.3-18.8). The terms of peace were soon reported in Carthage by the ambassadors. When one of the Carthaginian senators was about to oppose acceptance of these conditions in the assembly, Hannibal dragged him down from the speaker's platform, defending his action on the grounds that every Carthaginian should be grateful for such generous terms (*philanthropôn*), and calling upon the assembly to accept them. This body, believing that Hannibal had spoken intelligently (*phronimôs*) and appropriately for the situation (*tois kairois oikeiôs*), voted to accept Scipio's conditions, and the Carthaginian senate dispatched ambassadors to conclude an agreement on the proposed terms (15.19). By representing the concord of Romans and

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Carthaginians regarding Scipio's terms, Polybius suggests that he shared their judgement.

After the battle of Cynoscephalae (197 BC), Flaminius refused to depose Philip V, as the Aetolians wanted him to do. The Romans, he explained, never eliminated an enemy after fighting him for the first time. For instance, when they defeated the Carthaginians in the Hannibalic War, they took no irremediable measure (*ouden anêkeston*) against them. He said that he had never thought of fighting against Philip without the possibility of reconciliation. Good men, he declared, should be moderate (*metrious*), gentle (*praeis*) and benevolent (*philanthrôpous*) when victorious (Polyb. 18.37).

After the Romans defeated Antiochus III at the battle of Magnesia (190 BC), envoys sent to Scipio Africanus by the king asked the Romans to use their success gently (*praiôs*) and magnanimously (*megalopsykhôs*) (Polyb. 21.16.7). Scipio replied that, since the Romans never became more severe (*baryterous*) after a victory, the terms of peace would be the same as those proposed earlier (Polyb. 21.17.1-2).

When the Romans had captured Perseus at the end of the Third Macedonian War (168 BC), Aemilius Paullus urged the members of his advisory council not to boast immoderately in times of success, or to adopt any arrogant (*hyperêphanon*) or irreparable (*anêkeston*) measure against anyone, but to be moderate (*metrion*) (Polyb. 29.20.1-3).

The qualities recommended by the three Roman commanders correspond to those approved by Polybius himself in connection with the acquisition and expansion of imperial rule. Moreover, he must have believed that their declarations fairly described their actual conduct of affairs, which exhibited their pursuit of an admirable policy. Carthage was indeed allowed to survive after the Second Punic War, Flaminius in fact did not remove Philip V from his throne, nor did Scipio Africanus impose harder terms of peace on Antiochus III, and Polybius dissociated Aemilius Paullus from the arrest and deportation of Greek politicians carried out at the end of the Third Macedonian War (30.13). Furthermore, the historian admired Flaminius (18.34), Scipio Africanus (23.14) and Aemilius Paulus (18.35.1-8). Finally, Polybius himself, in his account of the Roman war against Perseus, asserts that it was characteristic of the Romans to appear as moderate as possible (*hôs metriotatous*) (27.8.8). Thus Polybius represents Roman policy as generally moderate in the period down to 168 BC.

The consistency of Roman policy from 168 to 145 BC (beneficence and moderation)

At 30.11.1-3, referring to the year 168/7, Polybius remarks that the Aetolians, who habitually derived their living from robbery and other forms of lawless behaviour, supplied their needs by plundering the Greeks until they were prevented from doing so as a result of Roman domination.

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After the Third Macedonian War, in 167/6, the Romans allowed Cotys, king of the Odrysian Thracians, to recover his son, whom they had captured. By this gesture they wished to demonstrate their lenience (*praiotêta*) and magnanimity (*megalopsykhian*) (Polyb. 30.17).

Charops had dominated political life in Epirus since the end of the Third Macedonian War, managing affairs in a savage and lawless fashion. In 160/59 he appeared at Rome, wishing (says Polybius) to obtain the senate's approval of his criminal conduct. The Romans, however, gave a very fine example of their own policy, for both Marcus Aemilius Lepidus, the *princeps senatus*, and Lucius Aemilius Paullus, when they learned what Charops had done in Epirus, barred the man from their houses. When this became known, the Greeks resident at Rome became filled with joy, noting with satisfaction the Romans' hatred of iniquity. When Charops appeared before the senate, that body neither granted his request nor gave him a definite answer, but stated that they would instruct ambassadors to inquire into what had happened (Polyb. 32.5-6; cf. 30.13).

After defeating Perseus in the Third Macedonian War, the Romans abolished the Antigonid monarchy and divided Macedonia into four federal republics.³ Polybius considered these arrangements most advantageous for the Macedonians (27.10.2; 31.2.12; 36.17.13). Nevertheless (he observes), the population in 149-148 fought valiantly for Andriscus, an adventurer who endeavoured to re-unite the country and to re-assert its national independence. They supported this odious character (says Polybius) even though he exiled, tortured and killed a large number of Macedonians. Such inexplicable behaviour (he concludes) can only be the result of heaven-sent infatuation or the wrath of the gods (36.17.12-16). Thus Polybius, who took a favourable view of Roman arrangements in Macedonia, must have considered the suppression of Andriscus by Rome as a benefit conferred on a demented population.

It is true that Polybius offers a rather dismal account of Macedonian political life in the period after 168. By 164/3, serious political disputes had broken out (31.2.12). The following year, the councillors of Phacus were assassinated by a certain Damasippus (31.17.2). These troubles must have persisted over the next decade, for in 152/1 the Macedonians asked Scipio Aemilianus to resolve their quarrels. Although he asserted that a sojourn in Macedonia would be safer and more closely connected with the responsibilities of his family (his biological father was Aemilius Paullus), Scipio volunteered for service in Spain (35.4). Polybius, however, ascribed these disturbed conditions not to any flaw in Roman policy but to the unsophisticated nature of the backward Macedonians, who were unaccustomed to living under representative democracy (31.2.12).

Although he regarded the fate of the Achaeans and other Greeks who fought against Rome in 146 as a disaster (38.1), Polybius maintained that the rapid victory of Rome in this conflict was a blessing to the Greeks. At 38.17-18, he describes how Diaeus, after the victory of Metellus at Scar-

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pheia and the death of Critolaus, persecuted those Achaean leaders who advocated an appeal to Roman clemency. In view of the general folly and madness that prevailed among the Achaean leadership at this time, Polybius gratefully concludes that some kind of Fortune, wishing to save the Achaeans, in the last resort devised the speedy fall and easy defeat of the Greeks. As a result, the anger of the Romans was not kindled further, Roman forces were not transferred from North Africa to Greece, and the leading men in Achaea did not have an opportunity to commit atrocities against their own people.

Although he wrote with pity about the capture of Corinth (39.2), and refused to accept any gifts from the property of Diaeus, which the quaestor had been instructed to sell (39.4), Polybius believed that Mummius managed the general settlement of Greek affairs at the end of the Achaean War with moderation (*enkratôs*), integrity (*katharôs*) and lenience (*praiôs*), and that whenever he appeared to deviate from what was proper, he acted not on his own initiative but on that of his associates. This was especially evident in the case of the Chalcidian cavalrymen, whom he put to death. Thus, when he toured the cities, he was deservedly received with honours and gratitude in every community (Polyb. 39.6). At the request of Polybius, Mummius and the ten commissioners allowed the statues and honorary decrees of Philopoemen to remain in place, and even restored certain statues of Achaeus (eponymous ancestor of the Achaeans), Aratus and Philopoemen that had already been sent to Acarnania for shipment to Italy (Polyb. 39.3).

Polybius declares that the Carthaginians were utterly exterminated (*ardên aphanisthentes*) as a result of the Third Punic War (38.1.6). He did not, however, believe that the Romans had originally intended to treat them with this measure of severity. This is clear from 3.5.5, where he says that the Romans attacked the Carthaginians, having planned initially to relocate them and later, on the contrary, to destroy them utterly (*ardên autous exanastêsai*), for reasons to be identified in a subsequent portion of the *Histories*. The circumstances leading to this change of objective are known from the historical record. After the Romans declared war on Carthage in 150/49, Punic envoys formally surrendered the city. First of all, the Romans demanded that the Carthaginians provide three hundred hostages; later they instructed them to hand over all their weapons; finally they ordered them to abandon their chief city, which the Romans had resolved to destroy, and to move the population to a new site located some distance from the sea. The Carthaginians obeyed the first two commands, but decided to resist militarily when confronted with the last order (Polyb. 36.2.1-7.5; cf. App. *Pun.* 338-441). Polybius therefore implies that the Romans desired initially to deal with Carthage in a comparatively lenient fashion, and resorted to more severe measures only after their adversaries had chosen to resist.

The initial policy of Rome conforms to the principle enunciated by

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Polybius at 5.11.5. In this passage, the historian censures the outrages committed by Philip V against the Aetolians at Thermon, declaring that good men should not go to war against wrongdoers for the purpose of destroying and exterminating them, but in order to correct their errors; they should not destroy guiltless objects along with the offenders, but should rather preserve and spare together with the innocent those who appear to commit wrong. Although modern observers are likely to consider extremely harsh the Roman policy of relocating the Carthaginians, Polybius (I believe) would have thought it comparatively mild. The historian was inclined to pronounce callously unsympathetic judgements about the fate of individuals, cities and nations, dismissing as relatively light measures that from a modern perspective might be viewed as quite severe. For instance, concerning the punishment inflicted by the Achaean League on the people of Mantinea, who massacred an Achaean garrison after the League had forgiven their defection to Cleomenes III, Polybius declares that for this crime the Mantineans suffered nothing more grievous than the plunder of their property and the sale of the free population into slavery (2.56-8). Aristomachus, the former tyrant of Argos, had voluntarily relinquished power and caused his city to join the Achaean League, of which he himself was elected *stratêgos*. Subsequently, however, he brought Argos over to the side of Cleomenes and committed atrocities against innocent citizens whom he accused of cooperating with Aratus in his failed attempt to retake the city. According to Polybius, the historian Phylarchus was quite wrong to deplore the execution of Aristomachus by Antigonos Doson and Aratus. Even if it were true that Aristomachus was racked to death, as Phylarchus says, he deserved even worse. The man (says Polybius) ought to have been led around the Peloponnese and tortured as a spectacle, but despite his crimes he endured no suffering except to be drowned in the sea (2.59-60; cf. 2.44.6; 2.52.1-2).

Thus Polybius believed that the Romans at first had genuinely pursued a comparatively lenient objective regarding Carthage, and adopted more severe measures only when constrained by the Punic reaction. In making this distinction, the historian appears to condone the severity of Rome's final policy. Here Polybius reflects the view expressed at 27.8.8-9, where he declares that although it was a traditional practice among the Romans to appear as moderate as possible (*hôs metriôtatous*) in times of success, and although everyone would agree that such conduct is morally right (*kalon*), one may reasonably doubt whether it is always possible to act in this way.

Moreover, a contrast drawn in two passages from Book 38 of the *Histories* suggests that Polybius did not regard the destruction of Carthage by Scipio Aemilianus as reprehensible. The historian describes how the Punic general Hasdrubal begged his Roman counterpart for mercy in the final hours of the siege. Pointing to Hasdrubal, who had with pompous words already spurned generous terms of surrender (cf. 38.8.2-

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9), Scipio exhorted the members of his entourage to learn from the case of the Punic general, which (he declared) shows that a man should never say or do anything arrogant (*hyperêphanon*), because Fortune is apt to make an example of thoughtless men (38.20.1-3). Here Scipio implies that his adversary acted arrogantly because he did not recall the mutability of Fortune, and therefore suffered humiliation when he met with reversal at her hands. According to Polybius, reversals of Fortune elude the calculations of men, but it lies in their power, through prudent restraint, to avoid disgrace at the time of their fall. Scipio himself did not behave like Hasdrubal, for as Carthage perished, he meditated on the instability of Fortune and the possible ruin of his own city, a gesture that marks him as a great man (38.21.1-3). Since the Roman general recalled the mutability of Fortune, Polybius (it seems) believed that he committed no arrogant act when he destroyed Carthage, and that if the power of Rome should be overthrown, she would suffer no humiliation on account of Scipio's conduct. Indeed, by recalling the instability of Fortune in his moment of triumph, Scipio Aemilianus followed the example of his grandfather by adoption, Scipio Africanus, and of his biological father, Aemilius Paullus, both of whom remembered the mutability of Fortune and observed moderation in the season of prosperity. Scipio Africanus granted lenient terms to Carthage after the battle of Zama (Polyb. 15.17.3-18.8), and Aemilius Paullus recalled the need for restraint when he vanquished Perseus in the Third Macedonian War (Polyb. 29.20). By associating Scipio Aemilianus with Scipio Africanus and Aemilius Paullus in this way, Polybius implies that Scipio Aemilianus himself committed no arrogant act when he destroyed Carthage.⁴

Although Polybius considered the Roman policy of relocating the Carthaginians relatively lenient, he nevertheless felt certain reservations about it. When the Carthaginians surrendered in 150/49, the Romans ordered them to furnish three hundred hostages and to obey the future commands of the consuls. The Punic envoys who had negotiated the surrender immediately returned to Carthage, where they reported on these proceedings. They themselves wondered what the commands of the consuls would be, while the Carthaginians felt great anxiety and perplexity because the Romans had not explicitly referred to the city itself (Polyb. 36.3-4). At this point, a Punic statesman named Mago the Bruttian argued that the Carthaginians had been given two occasions to decide about themselves and their country, namely, the time when they surrendered to Rome and the present moment. Since they had already surrendered, it was plain that they must now carry out the entire body of Roman orders (*pan to parangellomenon*) unless it was absolutely arrogant (*teleôs hyperêphanon*) and contrary to expectation (*para tèn prosdokian*). In the latter case, they must in turn decide whether to accept the prospect of warfare in their own territory and to suffer whatever dreadful consequences this might bring or, because they feared a Roman attack, to obey the entire body of orders

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willingly. As all were inclined to obey Roman commands because of the impending war and the uncertainty of future events, they decided to send the hostages demanded by Rome (Polyb. 36.5.1-6).

This passage gives some indication of Polybius' reservations about the Roman policy of relocating the Carthaginians. Since Polybius says that the Carthaginians decided to obey Roman commands because they feared war, he implies that, in keeping with the argument of Mago, they had first determined that the body of Roman orders was indeed (at least potentially) arrogant and contrary to expectation. This conclusion is consistent with two other passages. First, when the Punic envoys returned from Rome in 149, they themselves (as noted earlier) wondered what the commands of the consuls would be, while the Carthaginians felt great anxiety and perplexity because the senate had made no explicit reference to the city itself (Polyb. 36.4.6-9). This statement implies that the Carthaginians feared the Romans might issue some arrogant and unexpected command pertaining to their city. Second, Polybius notes that, even after they had furnished the hostages and surrendered their weapons, the Carthaginians had absolutely no idea what the final Roman orders would be (36.7.1-2). Thus he allows that the Carthaginians themselves, soon after the surrender of the city in 149, judged the body of Roman commands to be (at least potentially) arrogant and contrary to expectation because they feared that some arrogant and unexpected command might ensue.

In some measure the historian himself sympathized with this judgement, for he conceded that there were at least some very slight grounds (*topon eskhaton*) for defending the decision of the Carthaginians to resist militarily when the Romans demanded relocation of the city, even though they had already surrendered the hostages and weapons (38.1.5). Thus the final Roman order, in Polybius' view, afforded a modicum of justification for Punic resistance.

The fact that Polybius conceded the Carthaginians had at least some very slight grounds for resisting even after they had surrendered the hostages and weapons is significant. Mago the Bruttian had affirmed that the second and last opportunity for Carthage to choose between war and obedience was the present moment, that is, the interval between the return of the Punic envoys and making a decision about sending the hostages demanded by Rome.⁵ Polybius must have agreed with this proposition, for he admired the speech of Mago, which he described (at 36.5.1) as manly (*andrôdesi*) and effective (*pragmatikois*), and he was prepared to admit only that the Carthaginians had very slight grounds for deciding to resist when they actually did, at such a late hour, after they had already surrendered hostages and arms. Thus his willingness to concede this much, even though the Carthaginians now laboured under grave disadvantages, underlines his reservations about Rome's final order.

Polybius' view about Rome's treatment of Carthage is therefore complex. On the one hand, he distinguishes a comparatively mild initial policy

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of relocation from the final one of extermination; he implies that the final objective was dictated by Punic resistance; and he does not regard the final outcome as reprehensible. On the other hand, he thought that the final Roman order in some small measure justified Punic resistance. Thus he appears implicitly (and cautiously) to allow that the policy of relocation might be thought arrogant. In general, however, he considered Roman policy in the period 168-145 beneficent and moderate.

Four Greek views about the Roman policy of relocating the Carthaginians (Polyb. 36.9)

It will now be useful to consider Polybius' report of four views expressed by Greeks about the Roman plan to destroy the city of Carthage and to relocate the population (36.9).⁶ These views are arranged in two pairs of opposing statements. In each pair, one statement supports Roman policy, while the other condemns it. The statements are arranged chiasmatically, so that those supporting Rome begin and end the discussion. The four views presented by Polybius at 36.9 all pertain to the final Roman order of 149, which called upon the Carthaginians to abandon their city so that the Romans might destroy it, and to relocate the population inland (cf. Polyb. 36.7; App. *Pun.* 349, 355, 377-438). The four statements may be summarized as follows:

First statement (36.9.3-4)

The Romans acted intelligently (*phronimôs*) and effectively (*pragmatikôs*) regarding their empire (*dynasteia*). Securing dominion (*arkhê*) for their own country by destroying a rival for supremacy (*hêgemonia*) was the mark of intelligent (*noun ekhontôn*) and far-sighted (*makron blepontôn*) men.

Second statement (36.9.5-8)

The policy of Rome marked a radical change in the way the Romans treated enemies. The Romans were gradually embracing despotism (*philarchhian*) of the kind exhibited by Athens and Sparta in the classical period. Although they were proceeding more slowly, they would come to the same end. For (*gar*) previously the Romans had made war on all nations until, victory achieved, their opponents agreed to obey them. But in their treatment of Perseus, the Romans had displayed the prologue of their new policy, as they uprooted the Macedonian kingdom. This policy they had now perfected in reaching their decision about the Carthaginians. Although the latter had committed no irreparable offence (*anêkestou*), the Romans adopted an irreparable and harsh resolution (*anêkestôs kai bareôs bebouleusthai*) concerning them, even though the Carthaginians had agreed to obey every Roman command (cf. Polyb. 36.3.9-6.7).

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Third statement (36.9.9-11)

On the whole, the Romans were a civilized people especially proud of fighting wars in a straightforward and honourable manner, avoiding nocturnal attacks and ambushes, disapproving of any action conducted through deceit and trickery, and supposing that only direct and open battles were appropriate for them. In their treatment of Carthage, however, the Romans employed those methods at every stage, offering certain terms and concealing others, until they had deprived their opponents of all hope of receiving aid from allies (this refers to the final Roman command, revealed only after the Carthaginians had surrendered their weapons). Such behaviour, more characteristic of a tyrant's intrigue than the civilized policy typical of Rome, resembled impiety and treachery.

Fourth statement (36.9.12-17)

The Romans were not guilty of impiety or treachery, for they proceeded as they did only after the Carthaginians had surrendered. They were therefore entitled to treat Carthage as they thought best. Their actions could not be considered morally wrong under any heading. The Romans committed no impiety, for they did not offend against the gods, their parents, or the dead. They committed no treachery, for they broke no oaths or treaties. They committed no injustice, for they did not violate any laws or customs or their own integrity. On the contrary, the action they took against Carthage was correct. The Carthaginians had willingly conceded unlimited discretion to Rome by surrendering. Therefore the Romans legitimately imposed their final order, and when the Carthaginians failed to obey it, they rightly used force against them.

Polybius' reaction to the four statements

Scholars have often debated whether Polybius himself agreed with any of these statements. Gelzer, for instance, maintained that the historian concurred with the first and fourth against the second and third. His conclusions were based on the belief that Diod. 32.2 and 4, passages advocating ruthlessness in defence of imperial rule, are derived from Polybius and represent his later views. According to Gelzer, Polybius conceded that Rome adopted harsh and treacherous methods against Carthage, and considered this policy effective.⁷ Petzold argued that Polybius accepted the views expressed in the second and third statements, for elsewhere in the *Histories* he castigated harshness and sharp practice in terms that closely resemble what is said about Rome in these passages.⁸ Walbank declares that Polybius agreed with the statements supporting Rome. Several considerations lead him to this conclusion. The first is the chiasmic arrangement of the four statements and the prominent position

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assigned to the arguments favouring Rome, which begin and end the debate. Second, Polybius allotted more space to the first and fourth statements combined. In the Teubner text, the four statements occupy eight, fifteen, fifteen and twenty-eight lines, respectively. Third, Polybius accompanied Scipio Aemilianus to North Africa; he was highly critical of Rome's enemies in books 36-9; in this part of the *Histories* he took the view that Rome, as an imperialist state, acted prudently in defending her interests by any means, however ruthless.⁹ Ferrary argues that Polybius on balance agreed with the first and fourth statements, for he accepted the right of the Romans as an imperial power to defend their interests, and he adopted the Roman interpretation of *deditio* (in the final analysis) as unconditional surrender. Polybius' acceptance of the first and fourth statements does not, however, imply that he supported ruthless pursuit of self-interest by Rome, for he did not believe that the Romans pursued a ruthless policy towards other states in the period after 168, and he never advocated ruthlessness. On the other hand, by citing the arguments represented by statements two and three, Polybius expressed reservations about the methods employed by Rome against Carthage.¹⁰

In my view, the position of Ferrary is the correct one. That Polybius agreed with the fourth statement in opposition to the third is indeed evident from his understanding of *deditio*. Nations that surrender to Rome, he says, place their persons, their territory, and everything in it, cities included, at the disposal of Rome (36.4.1-3; cf. 20.9-10). The Carthaginians surrendered in full knowledge of these implications (36.3.7-9; 36.4.4). They agreed to provide hostages and to obey the subsequent orders of the consuls (36.4.6-9; 36.5.6; 36.11.3). Moreover, when the initial commands of the senate were being discussed at Carthage, Mago the Bruttian argued that, since they had already surrendered, the Carthaginians should now obey the entire body of Roman orders unless they determined this to be outrageous and unexpected. If they took the latter view, they should then deliberate whether to comply with every demand or to face the consequences of war (36.5.1-5). Thus Mago advised the Carthaginians either to obey all demands or to accept responsibility for the consequences of resisting the Romans. Polybius himself admired Mago's speech, for he called it manly (*andrôdesi*) and effective (*pragmatikois*) (36.5.1). Thus the historian accepted the Roman view of *deditio* as unconditional surrender; he must have believed that the Romans were entitled to make their final demand and to use force when the Carthaginians would not obey; in his view, responsibility for the final destruction of Carthage lay not with the Romans but with their adversaries. This is consistent with the position taken in the fourth statement.¹¹

Polybius, in my view, also agreed with the first statement over the second. The latter maintains that Roman policy after 168, culminating in the final order given to the Carthaginians, was despotic and harsh, and portended the collapse of Roman power. Polybius certainly did believe that

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harsh treatment of subjects endangered the continuity of imperial rule. However, as we have already noted, he thought that Roman policy after 168 continued for the most part to be beneficent and moderate. Moreover, he regarded the final order given to the Carthaginians as comparatively lenient, although he did express reservations on this point. Furthermore, Polybius himself (38.2.5-9) did not believe that the Athenian and Spartan empires (as the second statement charges) collapsed because of despotism (*philarkhia*) manifested in harsh treatment of subjects. Therefore he would not have agreed with the second statement. According to the first statement, in ordering the Carthaginians to relocate, the Romans took intelligent and effective measures to preserve their power. Since Polybius admired imperial rule while acknowledging its aggressive element, he would be disposed to approve of intelligent and effective measures undertaken to defend such authority. That he judged the final order given to the Carthaginians as intelligent and effective is suggested by his view of that measure as comparatively lenient. Thus I believe that Polybius would have agreed with the first statement.

Although Polybius accepted the first and fourth statements, his judgement on this issue was complex. With Ferrary, I believe that the historian's reservations are reflected in the second and third statements. As noted above, Polybius himself suggests that the final order given by Rome to the Carthaginians might be considered somewhat harsh (38.1.5). The second statement draws attention to this problem.

Similarly, Polybius disapproved of using deceit in warfare and international relations.¹² At 13.3, for instance, he condemned the treacherous methods (*kakopragmosynên*) of Philip V in political and military affairs. On the contrary, he praised the ancients, who not only avoided resorting to deceitful artifice (*kakomêkhanein*) against friends for the purpose of increasing their own power, but even refused to conquer their enemies through fraud (*di' apatês*), because they considered victory glorious (*lampron*) and secure only when a state defeated its opponents, and induced them to admit defeat, by fighting in a straightforward manner. Therefore they engaged in regular combat, in wars that were properly declared and in battles of which they gave clear notice. Traces of the old style of warfare survive among the Romans, for after formally declaring war, they engage in conventional fighting and seldom use ambushes. Some persons maintain that treachery (*kakopragmosynên*) is necessary for practical purposes (*pros ton pragmatikon tropon*), but fondness for such conduct (declares Polybius) is nowadays too common among leaders in their management of political and military affairs. A similar statement appears in F. 19 B-W, where Polybius observes that, in ancient times, single combat was conducted among the Romans in good faith (*apo tou kratistou*), but that in his own day many contrivances (*hodoi*) have been devised.

Polybius condemned Philip V for the treachery (*paraspondêma*) he committed at Thasos in 203/2. Although the king had accepted the surren-

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der of the city upon terms, once admitted within the walls he enslaved the inhabitants (Polyb. 15.24.1-3). After the democrats had seized power at Messene in a civil conflict encouraged by Philip, the king wanted to capture the citadel. In order to expedite his plan, he told the magistrates that he wished to visit the citadel and sacrifice to Zeus. Polybius condemned the move contemplated (though ultimately rejected) by Philip as treacherous (*paraspondesai*) and a violation of faith (*pistin*) (7.10-14).

Several passages from Livy's account of the Third Macedonian War may be considered here, for they are based on the *Histories* of Polybius and contain details that closely resemble what the Achaean historian says at 13.3.¹³ According to Livy, in 172, prior to the formal declaration of war by Rome against Macedonia, the legates Quintus Marcius Philippus and Aulus Atilius Serranus made a truce with Perseus, encouraging him to send ambassadors to Rome to discuss peace. They did this so that the Romans might gain time to complete their preparations for war (Livy 42.38.8-43.3). Having made various arrangements in Greece, the legates returned to Rome (Livy 42.44.8). When they reached the city, they reported on their mission, boasting about how they had deceived Perseus by granting him a truce and holding out hopes of peace. In this way, they had ensured that the king would take no further military steps, while the Romans might complete their own preparations against him (Livy 42.47.1-3). Although most senators approved of what the legates had done, the older members, mindful of ancient practice, felt such conduct to be uncharacteristic of Rome. Their ancestors (they said) had not waged war through ambushes, nocturnal battles, pretended retreat or unexpected return, or in such a way that they took pride in craftiness (*astu*) rather than true courage. They were accustomed to make formal declarations of war and to give clear notice of their intention to fight a battle. In observing good faith (*fide*), they had nothing to do with the craftiness (*versutiarum*) of the Carthaginians or the cunning (*calliditatis*) of the Greeks, among whom it was more honourable to deceive (*fallere*) the enemy than to defeat him by force. Nowadays more is sometimes gained by deceit (*dolo*) than by courage, but a man's spirit is beaten conclusively only when he is forced to acknowledge that he has been defeated in regular combat and in legitimate war (Livy 42.47.4-8). The older senators, Livy comments, disliked the new and overly cunning (*callida*) policy, but that part of the senate prevailed who cared more for expediency (*utilis*) than honour (*honesti*) (Livy 42.47.9).¹⁴

Thus Polybius would agree with the proponents of the third statement in condemning treachery and praising the Romans for their generally straightforward conduct in warfare. On the other hand, the historian clearly accepted the final order given by Rome to the Carthaginians as technically correct. But it was in fact by revealing their commands in stages that the Romans induced the Carthaginians to surrender hostages and to give up their weapons before demanding the relocation of their

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adversaries. As the third statement reflects on this strategy, it suggests that Polybius felt reservations about the Romans' departure from straightforward methods of diplomacy and warfare.

The nuanced judgement of Polybius concerning the final order given by Rome to the Carthaginians is not unique in the *Histories*. In his discussion of Rome's appropriation of Syracusan artistic treasures during the Second Punic War, he observes that, on the question of whether this action was morally right and advantageous for the Romans, there would be much to say in favour of either position, but he concludes that the stronger argument supports the view that Rome's conduct was morally wrong on that occasion, and that such behaviour is still morally wrong (9.10.2-3). It is therefore not surprising that Polybius would deliver a complex judgement regarding a controversial aspect of the Third Punic War.

To sum up, Polybius believed Rome's final order to be comparatively lenient. He therefore agreed with the first statement, which described it as an intelligent and effective means of protecting Roman domination. Since he accepted the Roman interpretation of *deditio* as tantamount to unconditional surrender, he agreed with the fourth statement, which pronounced the final order to be legitimate and in no way contrary to morality; he also agreed that the final resort to force was justifiable. On the other hand, by reporting the second and third statements, the historian expressed reservations about the severity and deviousness of Roman policy. But on balance, he viewed the final Roman order as politically effective and technically correct.

Polybius and two fragments of Diodorus (32.2 and 4)

As Polybius often does in his detailed narrative, Diodorus of Sicily divides imperial rule into three stages. At 32.2, he says that those who wish to obtain (*peripoiêsasthai*) dominion over others acquire (*ktôntai*) it through courage (*andreiai*) and intelligence (*synesei*). To extend it widely (*pros auxêsin de megalên*), they act with moderation (*epieikeiai*) and benevolence (*philanthrôpiai*). They secure (*asphalizontai*) it through fear (*phobôi*) and terror (*kataplêxei*). You may find proof for these statements (he adds) by considering empires established in ancient times as well as Roman domination, which arose later.

According to Diod. 32.4, Philip II succeeded to the throne of Macedonia when the country was in thrall to the Illyrians. He recovered (*anektêsato*) his kingdom by courage in arms (*tois hoplois*) and through intelligence (*ankhinoiai*) as a military commander, and made it the greatest power in Europe by treating conquered peoples with moderation (*epieikôs*). After defeating the Athenians, his rivals for dominion, in a famous battle, he took great care in attending to the funeral honours of his fallen enemies who had been left unburied. He released without ransom the prisoners,

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over two thousand in number, letting them return to their own country. As a result, those who had contended with Philip for domination through force of arms willingly relinquished their rule over the Greeks because of the moderation (*epieikeian*) shown them, and by a single act of benevolence (*philanthrôpias*) the man who had not been able to achieve rule through many struggles and dangers obtained dominion over Greece from his enemies with their consent. Finally, he assured the permanence (*paramonên*) of his dominion through fear (*phobôi*), having destroyed the populous city of Olynthus. Similarly, his son Alexander, having captured Thebes, by the destruction of that city deterred from revolt the Athenians and Spartans, who were starting to rebel. By treating the prisoners in his Persian campaigns with great moderation (*epieikestata*), he made the inhabitants of Asia enthusiastic supporters of his rule, not only through his courage (*andreiai*) but also through his celebrated kindness (*hêmerotêti*). In more recent times the Romans, having struggled for universal empire, established (*synestêsanto*) it through courage in arms (*dia tês tôn hoplôn andreias*). They expanded it enormously (*pros auxêsin de megistên êgagon*) by treating conquered peoples with great moderation (*epieikestata*). So far did they refrain from inflicting cruelty (*ômotêtos*) and revenge (*timorias*) on their subjects that they seemed to treat them not as enemies but as benefactors and friends. Although vanquished nations expected to suffer the most severe punishment because they were enemies, the victorious Romans left others no possibility of surpassing them in moderation (*epieikeias*). For with some the Romans shared their citizenship, to others they granted the right of intermarriage, and to certain states they restored independence, holding against none a grudge more bitter than was necessary. Because of their extraordinary humanity (*hêmerotêtos*) kings, cities and, in a word, the nations of the earth, embraced Roman rule. But the Romans, who exercised dominion over almost the entire world, secured (*êsphalisanto*) it through fear (*phobôi*) and the destruction of the most famous cities. For they demolished Corinth, uprooted the Macedonians (Perseus for example), obliterated Carthage as well as the Celtiberian city of Numantia, and struck many peoples with terror (*kateplêxanto*).

These fragments of Diodorus appear in two different sets of excerpts, both of which belong to a collection known as the *Excerpta Constantiniana*, made in the tenth century AD. The first (32.2) occurs in the *Excerpta de Sententiis*, the second (32.4) in the *Excerpta de Virtutibus et Vitiis*. The two fragments are doublets, for the second treats in detail the thesis briefly stated in the first.

The position of Diod. 32.2 within the *Excerpta de Sententiis* permits identification of the historical context to which both fragments belong within Book 32 of Diodorus. The fragment preceding Diod. 32.2 in the *Excerpta de Sententiis* concerns the Punic-Numidian War of 151/0 and the first of three Carthaginian embassies that visited Rome later in the same

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year (Diod. 32.1), while the next fragment deals with the second and third embassies (Diod. 32.3).¹⁵ Thus Diod. 32.2 and 4 belong to the historian's account of the year 151/0; they are connected with the Punic-Numidian War and the Carthaginian embassies that visited Rome in the same year; and they represent a passage that occurred in the narrative rather than the prologue of Book 32.¹⁶

The connection of the fragments with this context suggests that they form part of a discussion about how the Romans ought to deal with Carthage in view of recent events. The Romans had decided as early as 153/2 that the city ought to be destroyed, but postponed declaring war and executing their plan until 150/49, when they decided that they had a good pretext. The basis for their pretext was the Punic-Numidian conflict, which represented a violation by Carthage of the peace treaty that ended the Second Punic War (cf. Polyb. 15.18.4; 36.9.16). It was in order to maintain this grievance that the senate persistently refused to give a clear answer to the Punic embassies that visited Rome in 151/0 with offers to make amends for having engaged in armed conflict with Numidia (Polyb. 36.2; Plut. *Cat. Mai.* 26-7; App. *Pun.* 310-46).¹⁷ Thus discussion of how the Romans should deal with Carthage would be relevant in a context following the first Punic embassy, because the senate's refusal on that occasion to allow reparations was based on a desire to maintain their plan to declare war and destroy the city. The Diodoran fragments formed part of such a discussion.

The two fragments of Diodorus advocate the use of fear and terror as proven methods of defending imperial rule, and assert that the Romans adopted such means after 168. The question now arises whether Diod. 32.2 and 4 originate with Polybius and represent his views. I shall argue that the fragments are based on a passage of the *Histories*, but do not represent the views of Polybius himself.

In addressing the relationship between Polybius and the fragments of Diodorus, scholars have sometimes denied that the latter are based on a passage from the *Histories*.¹⁸ Several factors, in my view, lead to the opposite conclusion. First, the principal source of Diodorus in Book 32 was Polybius.¹⁹ Second, the division of imperial rule into the three stages of acquisition, expansion and preservation discerned in the fragments corresponds exactly to the analysis often found in Polybius' detailed narrative. Third, some of the qualities associated by Diodorus with the three stages are identical with or equivalent to those mentioned by Polybius, even though specific qualities are not always associated with the same stages by the two authors. The most important qualities mentioned by both historians are intelligence (*ankhinoia*), moderation (*epieikeia*) and benevolence (*philanthrôpia*). Sometimes Diodorus employs synonyms corresponding to terms occurring in Polybius. We may note, for instance, the term *synesis* (intelligence, corresponding to *ankhinoia*), and *hêmerotês* (kindness, corresponding to *eugnômosynê*). Fourth, in citing Philip and

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Alexander of Macedonia as examples of imperial rule, the fragments of Diodorus recall Polybius' interest in these kings (Polyb. 5.10.1-8). Moreover, what we find in Diod. 32.4.1-2 concerning the expansion of Philip's power agrees substantially with Polyb. 5.10.1-5. These observations suggest that Diod. 32.2 and 4 were based on a passage in the *Histories*.²⁰

Scholars have sometimes maintained that the fragments of Diodorus are based on a passage in the *Histories* and represent the views of Polybius. They believe that Polybius judged Roman policy after 168 to be based on fear and terror, and argue that, by the time he described events of the years 168 to 146, Polybius' views had changed, that he now accepted fear and terror as effective means of preserving imperial dominion, and thought that the Romans were right to employ such methods.²¹

In my view, Diod. 32.2 and 4 cannot represent the views of Polybius himself. In the first place, the thesis expounded in the fragments of Diodorus disagrees in fundamental ways from what Polybius says about the three stages of imperialism. The fragments of Diodorus assert that imperialist nations acquire (*ktasthai*, *anaktasthai*, *synistasthai*) power through courage in arms (*andreia*, *hopla*, *hê tôn hoplôn andreia*) and intelligence (*synesis*, *ankhinoia*), expand it (*auxêsis*) through moderation (*epieikeia*), benevolence (*philanthrôpia*) and kindness (*hêmerotês*), and secure it (*asphalizesthai*, achieve *paramonê*) through fear (*phobos*) and terror (*kataplêxis*).

A synthesis of the relevant texts of Polybius (discussed above) produces the following outline. Imperialist nations acquire (*ktasthai*, *kataktasthai*) power by benefaction (being *euergetikôtatoi*, *eu poiein*), expand (*auxanein*) it through moderation (*epieikeia*, *metriotês*), benevolence (*philanthrôpia*), kindness (*eugnômosynê*), lenience (*praiotês*), nobility of character (*kalokagathia*), intelligence (*ankhinoia*), magnanimity (*megalopsykhia*), beneficence (conferring *agatha*, pursuing to *euergetikon*, *eu poiein*, *euergesia*), justice (observing *ta dikaia*), and dignified behaviour (*semnotês*), not through fear (*phobos*), and secure (*diaphylattein*, *têrein*, *phylattein*, *bebaïoun*) it by the same means employed to acquire it.

It will be noted that, although the stages of imperialism are identical in both authors, the only one at which there is substantial agreement on appropriate qualities is that of expansion. While Polybius advocates benefaction at the stage of acquisition, the fragments of Diodorus recommend courage and intelligence demonstrated in the military sphere. Even more important is their disagreement at the stage of preservation. While Polybius once again advocates benefaction, the fragments of Diodorus recommend fear and terror. Moreover, Polybius' own comments on the destruction of Thebes by Alexander (38.2.13-3.2) indicate that his views on the best way to preserve imperial rule had not changed by the time he described events of the years 168 to 146. Finally, in Books 30-9, Polybius described Roman policy of the period after 168 on balance as moderate and beneficent, whereas the fragments of Diodorus assert that it was based on

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fear and terror. Thus we may discern substantial disagreement between the views of Polybius and what is found in Diod. 32.2 and 4. The fragments of Diodorus, therefore, cannot represent the views of Polybius himself.

The present analysis appears to produce contradictory results, for it is argued that the fragments of Diodorus are based on a passage in the *Histories*, but do not represent the views of Polybius. This difficulty, in my opinion, cannot be resolved by denying that the fragments are based on Polybius, or by supposing that the Achaean historian endorsed the views expressed in Diod. 32.2 and 4. The solution, I suggest, may be found in identifying as Diodorus' source a speech or statement reported by Polybius. This theory will accord with the observed facts: Diodorus' general reliance on Polybius in Book 32 of the *Bibliotheca*; the Polybian qualities of the fragments; the disagreements between the latter and Polybius' own views as attested in the *Histories*. It may be inferred that the speech reported by Polybius was connected with his account of the first Punic embassy that visited Rome in 151/0, after the conclusion of the war between Carthage and Numidia, when the senate was seeking an opportunity to declare war against Carthage and to destroy the city. Thus the oration formed part of a debate on the question of whether an imperialist power seeking to guarantee its dominion ought to adopt a policy based on fear and terror, and was presumably accompanied by a speech advocating the opposite view. The conceptual structure of the speech, as well as the inclusion of examples drawn from the conduct of Philip and Alexander and references to Rome in the third person, indicate that the Polybian speech represented by Diod. 32.2 and 4 recorded the views of Greek observers. The oration brings to mind the four statements reported by Polybius (36.9) concerning the final command given to the Carthaginians by Rome after the Punic surrender of 150/149. The fact that Polybius explored fundamental issues of Roman foreign policy by presenting the views of Greek observers, as seen in 36.9, makes it likely that the Polybian material underlying Diod. 32.2 and 4 was a similar set of passages from Book 35 of the *Histories*.

It is significant that Diodorus himself as well as Polybius disagreed with a fundamental point made in the fragments. Diodorus often asserts that imperial nations acquire dominion by practising restraint and benevolence, and lose it by engaging in ruthless oppression.²² Although he relied on earlier historians, his work includes an important personal element in the form of opinions expressed throughout the *Bibliotheca*. The repetition of these ideas in different parts of his work indicates that he is recording his own convictions.²³ We may therefore conclude that Diodorus himself believed that imperial rule is endangered by oppression of subjects, and that he rejected the policy of fear and terror advocated in the fragments as an effective means of preserving dominion. Since the fragments cannot represent the views of Diodorus, they must reflect a speech or statement that the Siciliote historian (like Polybius) included within his narrative of the year 151/0.²⁴

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The speech represented by the fragments, and probably the corresponding passage in the *Histories*, took the form of direct quotation. Since both Diodorus and Polybius sometimes recorded speeches in *oratio recta*, the use of direct quotation in this case would be consistent with the practice of both authors.²⁵

Now we may consider three possible objections to the argument that Diod. 32.2 and 4 are derived from a speech reported by Polybius under the year 151/0. First, some scholars maintain that the organization of the argument in the fragments is too inept to represent material borrowed from Polybius.²⁶ The historical examples cited in Diod. 32.4 (it is pointed out) do not illustrate a strictly chronological progression through the sequential stages of acquisition, expansion and preservation of imperial rule during the reigns of Philip and Alexander. In the case of Philip, the stage of acquisition, identified with succession and early rule (359-358), is followed by expansion, illustrated by the king's victory at the battle of Chaeronea and the generosity he showed the Athenians on that occasion (338). Finally comes preservation of imperial rule, exemplified in the destruction of Olynthus (348). Thus, while the three stages of imperialism are reported in what appears to be the standard sequence (cf. Diod. 32.2), the historical examples illustrating them do not occur in strict chronological order. In the case of Alexander, the stage of preservation, illustrated by the destruction of Thebes (335), is followed by expansion, exemplified in the Persian campaigns and the conquest of Asia (334-331). This time, while the historical examples occur in chronological order, the stages of imperialism are not reported in what appears to be the standard sequence.

In my view, these observations by no means suggest ineptitude on the part of Diodorus' source. The idea that acquisition, expansion and preservation (in that order) represent a standard sequence in the stages of imperialism is merely an inference drawn from Diod. 32.2, a short fragment in which the excerptor very briefly summarized a passage in the *Bibliotheca*, of which Diod 32.4 provides a more detailed account. Thus the sequence preservation-expansion, cited there in the case of Alexander, is no less standard than the sequence acquisition-expansion-preservation, applied in the case of Philip. It is true that, had Diodorus' source described Macedonian imperialism in the reign of Philip according to the sequence acquisition-preservation-expansion, the historical examples would actually follow in chronological order (as they do in the case of Alexander). But surely it is unjustified to treat such a minor infelicity as a sign of ineptitude unworthy of Polybius.²⁷ In any case, one might trace it to the original speaker, for Polybius emphasized that historians must accurately record the most important elements of speeches.²⁸ In fact, some orations reported in the *Histories* do contain minor flaws. For instance, that of Lyciscus the Acarnanian, delivered at Sparta in 211/0, contains a few historical inaccuracies and departures from chronological order (9.32-9).²⁹ Thus the

organization of the argument in Diod. 32.2 and 4 does not rule out Polybius as the source of Diodorus.

A second possible objection is based on details that might appear to be anachronistic in a speech reported under the year 151/0. According to Diod. 32.4.5, the Romans destroyed Corinth (146), uprooted the Macedonians (168), and extinguished the cities of Carthage (146) and Numantia (133). Apart from the reference to Macedonia, how could such statements have occurred in a speech made in the year 151/0?

The solution for this difficulty, I suggest, may be found by considering a passage (3.29) in which Polybius reports how the Romans answered arguments made by the Carthaginians before the outbreak of the Second Punic War. When a Roman embassy visited Carthage in the spring of 218, the authorities there maintained that Hannibal's attack on Saguntum and a (contemplated) crossing of the river Ebro in Spain involved no violation of treaties (Polyb. 3.20.6-21.5). According to Polybius, on this occasion the Romans absolutely refused to discuss the Punic justification (3.21.6-8). At 3.29, however, he cites counter-arguments that were made by them many years later. Pointing out that he has already reported the arguments presented by the Carthaginians at the time (*ta ... tote rhêthenta*), he declares his intention to state what is being said now (*ta ... legomena*) by the Romans. The latter, he explains, did not reply at the time of the embassy (*tote*), for they were angry at the loss of Saguntum, but the arguments he will report at this point in the *Histories* are often invoked now (*legetai*) by many people among them (3.29.1). In view of this procedure, it may be suggested that, in his account of the first Punic embassy that visited Rome in 151/0 Polybius, wishing to evaluate the Roman plan to declare war and destroy Carthage, composed several speeches, one of which (that represented by Diod. 32.2 and 4) espoused the view that imperialist nations effectively secure their power through fear and terror; that the speech represented by the fragments conveys arguments made some time after 146, in the light of subsequent events; and that Polybius adopted this procedure because he wished to demonstrate how Roman policy on the eve of the Third Punic War affected public opinion in later years, when the passage of time afforded some perspective.

Finally, there is the reference to the destruction of Numantia at Diod. 32.4.5. Since Polybius rarely mentions events later than the formal termination of the *Histories* (146/5), it may be argued that he is unlikely to have referred to the destruction of Numantia; in that case, Diod. 32.2 and 4, representing a passage in the *Bibliotheca* which mentioned that event, are unlikely to be derived from Polybius.³⁰

There are two ways of meeting this objection. First, we may observe that Polybius does in fact occasionally refer to events later than 146/5, some of them even later than 133.³¹ He himself, therefore, might have included a reference to the destruction of Numantia in his text. Second, in his account of the Roman destruction of Corinth (32.27.1), Diodorus inserted a com-

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ment about the refounding of the city by Julius Caesar. Thus the Siciliote historian might have added the example of Numantia to what he found in his source.³²

It may therefore be maintained that Diod. 32.2 and 4 are based on a speech or statement reported by Polybius under the year 151/0; that the speech or statement represented the views of Greek observers who commented on the appropriate way for the Romans to deal with Carthage in that context; and that it illustrated one of the positions current in the Greek world in the years after 146.³³ The oration does not correspond to the views of Polybius himself about the best means of preserving imperial rule or about the character of Roman policy after 168.³⁴

Summary

To summarize the results of this and the preceding chapter, Books 30-3 of the *Histories*, covering the years 167-152, contain observations critical of Rome, in which Polybius states or implies that the Romans pursued their national interests in a manner contrary to justice. Such observations also occur in Books 1-29, though less frequently, and a *soupeçon* of compunction may be found even in Books 35-9. Conversely, while Books 1-29 and 35-9 present a generally favourable view of Roman policy as beneficent and moderate, even Books 30-3 contain positive judgements of this kind. Moreover, Polybius believed that the Romans in all periods usually employed honourable pretexts when they declared war against other states. Thus it may be said that, in the *Histories* as a whole, Polybius' judgement of Roman policy is on balance favourable, and that he discerned no radical change in the period after 168 BC. Thus, on the question of how Polybius judged Roman policy, I share the view of Ferrary, who maintains that, although the historian expressed some reservations and criticism at different points in the *Histories*, Polybius believed that the Romans generally treated other nations with moderation and beneficence at all stages of their imperial evolution.³⁵

Polybius on the Enemies of Rome

This chapter will examine how Polybius judged the enemies of Rome. In particular, the historian appears to express contradictory views about those who fought against the Romans. While in Books 36-9 he is uncompromisingly hostile to Rome's adversaries, elsewhere censure alternates with more favourable observations. It will be argued that this contrast arises not from any fundamental change in outlook on the part of the author but from his perception of the unquestioned supremacy achieved by the Romans in world affairs after they had defeated King Perseus of Macedonia in 168 BC. Throughout the *Histories*, Polybius' judgement of Rome's enemies was based on his convictions about how other states could best pursue their own interests. Prior to the defeat of Perseus and the collapse of Macedonian power at the battle of Pydna, armed conflict against Rome might in some cases be a reasonable option, but after that time, such a policy would only bring destruction.

Polybius' denunciation of Rome's enemies in Books 36-9

Polybius vehemently reviled the leaders who brought Carthage, Macedonia and Achaea into conflict with Rome during the years 149-146. His censure, based ultimately on the fact that these men led their peoples into destructive wars against a much stronger opponent, is sometimes interpreted as evidence that Polybius identified himself closely with Rome.¹ Other studies, however, demonstrate that his condemnation reflects not primarily his own partisanship but rather his convictions about how other states should promote their interests. This question inevitably involved the issue of relations with Rome. According to Polybius, Roman domination was essentially complete by the year 168. He therefore maintained that all peoples must henceforth obey the ruling power (1.1.5; 1.2.7; 3.3.9; 3.4.2-3). Thus less powerful states should cooperate prudently with Rome, preserving as much independence and dignity as possible, and avoiding the extremes of military confrontation and abject subservience. Accordingly, Polybius believed those leaders who entered into armed conflict with Rome deserved censure for their failure to protect the interests of their own communities.²

Although the Carthaginians, Macedonians and Achaeans and their leaders, by engaging in destructive wars against Rome, all incurred the

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censure of Polybius, analysis of his observations and terminology will show that the historian judged the Carthaginians differently from the others.

Disaster and downfall: culpable error and the fate of Carthage, Macedonia and Achaea

In 38.1-3 and other passages, Polybius contrasts two sorts of calamity (*peripeteia*, *pathos*, *aklêria*), which he calls disaster (*atykhia*) and downfall (*symptôma*). Each sort is also denoted by a variety of nouns and verbs that are synonymous with, or closely related in meaning to, the two principal terms.

What happened to the Greeks in 146 was an instance of *atykhia* (38.1.1, 1.2, 1.6, 3.6, 3.9, 16.9) or *atykhêma* (3.5.6; 38.2.10). Their experience is described by the verb *atykhlein* (to suffer disaster) (38.1.3, 3.7, 3.8, 3.9, 16.9). These terms are contrasted with a second group of words (note especially 38.1.1-3, 1.6, 1.9, 2.9-10, 3.5-7, 16.8-9). What happened to Carthage in 146, or to the Greeks before that time, is called *symptôma* (38.1.6, 2.10). The calamities suffered by the Greeks before 146 are also termed *elattômata* (defeats) (38.1.2) or *symphorai* (misfortunes) (38.1.9, 3.7). Their experiences are described by the verb *ptaiein* (to fall) (38.1.2, 2.2, 2.9, 3.5, 16.8) and *sphallesthai* (to be overthrown) (38.3.5, 16.8).

The most important difference between the two varieties of calamity involves the question of error, reproach and shame. The clearest statement appears at 38.3.7, where Polybius says that only those states whose actions bring reproach (*oneidos*) because of bad judgement (*aboulia*) should be held to suffer disaster (*atykhlein*). At 38.16.8-9, where he contrasts those who suffer downfall (*esphallonto*, *eptaion*) and disaster (*êtykhêsan atykhian*), he says that the Achaeans suffered disaster (*êtykhêsan atykhian*) because of the bad judgement (*aboulia*) of their leaders and their own error (*agnoia*). At 38.1.3, Polybius says that the Greeks suffered disaster (*êtykhêkenai*) because of what they had done, adding at 38.1.5 that no one could excuse their errors (*tôn hêmartêmenôn*). The historian (38.3.9-13) attributed the disgraceful (*aiskhran*) and reproachable (*eponeidiston*) disaster (*atykhian*) of the Greeks to their own errors (*ham[artêmatôn]*), though he pleaded that a distinction should be made between the error (*êgnoêkenai*) and failure in duty (*parapepaikenai [tou kathêkontos]*) of the masses, and the error (*hêmart[êkenai]*) of those truly responsible for such great folly (*agnoias*).

In an early part of the *Histories* (2.7.1-3), Polybius makes essentially the same distinction between disaster and downfall, though his terminology in certain instances does not agree with his later usage. To meet with (*peripesein*) suffering unexpectedly is the fault (*enklêma*) not of those who suffer but of Fortune and of those who inflict the suffering. On the other hand, to involve oneself foolishly (*akritôs*) in the greatest misfortunes

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(*symphorais*) is the fault (*hamartêma*) of the sufferer. Thus, whereas those who fall (*tois ... ptaiousin*) because of Fortune meet with pity, forgiveness and help, those who fall (*tois ... [sc. ptaiousin]*) as a result of bad judgement (*aboulia*) meet with reproach (*oneidos*) and censure (*epitimêsis*).

Unlike disaster, therefore, a downfall is not the result of error, and the victims suffer no shame or reproach. A *symptôma* may occur when a state meets with failure in the pursuit of a noble objective. Intelligently (*emphronôs*) foreseeing how matters would turn out, the Athenians abandoned their country, which was captured and ravaged by Xerxes. Although the Athenians suffered a fall (*eptaisan*), in the end they earned the greatest glory (*eukleian*), not shame (*aiskhynên*) and reproach (*oneidos*), by joining their fellow Greeks in resisting the invader. Polybius calls their patriotic response a fine policy (*kalêi ... proairesei*) leading not only to the recovery of their own country but also to rivalry with Sparta for the hegemony of Greece (38.2.1-5).

Although the Athenians' bid for empire ended in failure and the dismantling of their walls, here the fault (*touglêmâ*) lay not with the Athenians because of their imperial ambitions, but with the Spartans because of their excessive harshness (38.2.6-7). The Spartans in turn had to surrender their empire after they were defeated by Thebes at the battle of Leuctra. But their failure (*eptaisan*) in the pursuit of the finest ambitions (*tôn kallistôn*) involved no shame (*aiskhron*) (38.2.8-9).

In other cases, a downfall is suffered by victims who do not deserve their fate or have done nothing to cause it. After the King's Peace, for instance, the Mantineans were forced by Sparta to dissolve their city into its constituent villages. In this case, everyone charged the Spartans, not the Mantineans, with bad judgement (*aboulia*) (38.2.11-12). Similarly, when Alexander the Great destroyed Thebes, everyone thought his action unjust (38.2.13-3.2). When Chalcis, Corinth and other cities were garrisoned by the kings of Macedonia because of their strategic value, everyone wanted to free them (38.3.3-4).

The two situations discussed above (downfall encountered in the pursuit of a noble objective or through unmerited treatment) are identified together at 38.16.8-9, where Polybius declares that, before 146, the Greeks suffered downfall (*esphallonto, eptaion*) when quarrelling about power or wronged by despots. A more detailed statement appears at 38.3.5-7, where the historian maintains that, generally speaking, before 146 the victims of downfall (*eptaion, esphallonto, symphorais*) in Greece were states disputing hegemony and power or wronged by despots and kings. Their actions brought them no reproach (*oneidos*) incurred through bad judgement (*aboulia*).

Finally, a *symptôma* may occur when a state encounters failure in the pursuit of a defensible aim. Whereas in 146 the Greeks had committed inexcusable errors (*hêmartêmenôn*) producing their disaster (*atykhiai*), the Carthaginians as victims of a downfall (*symptôma*) left grounds (al-

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though very slight) for defence (38.1.5-6). Thus Polybius concedes, however grudgingly, that the Carthaginians acted with some justification, not in culpable error.

At 38.1.4-8, the historian argues that the Greeks, although they had survived their disaster (*tas ... atykhias*), suffered something worse than the Carthaginians, who were completely obliterated. He gives two reasons for this judgement. In the first place, while the conduct of the Carthaginians could be defended at least on slight grounds, the errors of the Greeks could not be excused. Second, while the Carthaginians became insensible of their downfall (*symptômatôn*), the Greeks contemplated their own disaster (*tas hautôn atykhias*) and bequeathed their calamity (*tên aklêrian*) to their grandchildren. To live on while suffering punishment is worse than to perish in the actual struggle. Anyone who judges this question by the standard of right (*tou kathêkontos*) and good (*tou kalou*) will reach the same conclusion, but the standard of expediency (*to sympheron*) would lead one to adopt the opposite view.

Here Polybius means that anyone judging by the standard of expediency (i.e. physical survival) would decide that the Carthaginians suffered a worse fate than the Greeks. The historian himself, however, judged by the standard of right and good. In his view, because the Greeks (unlike the Carthaginians) committed inexcusable errors and lived on in full awareness of their disaster, it was the Greeks who suffered the worse fate. This passage illustrates the great importance that Polybius attached to the question of culpable error. States that suffer disaster (*atykhia*) because of this fault earn his condemnation, but he respects those who incur a downfall (*symptôma*) either through unexpected developments or as a result of a reasonable decision to pursue a noble or defensible objective.

In the following sections, it will be argued that Polybius censured the Carthaginians, Macedonians and Achaeans, and their leaders, because they engaged in destructive wars against Rome. As already noted, however, the historian made an important distinction among these states. Although in the final analysis all of them made a bad decision, only the Macedonians and Achaeans were guilty of culpable error. Therefore Polybius says that these nations suffered a disaster (*atykhia*), while the Carthaginians met with downfall (*symptôma*), the less grievous form of calamity according to his moral perspective.

Hasdrubal and the Carthaginians

Polybius (38.7-8; 38.20) portrays Hasdrubal as utterly contemptible. An incompetent politician and general, more brutal than a tyrant, impious, boastful, vain, stupid, base, pot-bellied, fat and red-faced, this *bon vivant* offered sumptuous banquets while the population of Carthage perished of starvation. He mistreated Roman prisoners and scornfully rejected a generous offer of personal safety extended to him by Scipio Aemilianus in

return for surrendering the city. In the end he played the coward, abandoning his wife and children, his soldiers and fellow-citizens, and forgetting his grandiloquent oath to perish in the flames of Carthage, as he begged for his life at the feet of the Roman general.

What incited the vehement censure of Polybius is the fact that Hasdrubal carried out the Punic decision to fight against the Romans, a decision that ended in extermination (Polyb. 38.1.6). Earlier Hasdrubal had commanded the Punic forces that fought against Massinissa in 150, ultimately suffering a terrible defeat (App. *Pun.* 316-37). When they learned of these events, the Romans enrolled an army. Fearing a Roman attack, the Carthaginians now condemned to death the Punic commanders involved in the recent conflict, among them Hasdrubal himself. Carthaginian envoys sent to Rome accused those commanders of responsibility for the war (App. *Pun.* 338-42). However, evading execution, Hasdrubal raised an army and encamped outside Carthage (App. *Pun.* 374). When the Romans declared war in 149, the Carthaginians surrendered in order to avoid attack, but later they decided to resist rather than comply with a Roman command to abandon their city and move inland (Polyb. 36.3-7; Diod. 32.6, 9; App. *Pun.* 347-441). At this time they reinstated Hasdrubal, whom they appointed general with responsibility for affairs outside the city (App. *Pun.* 439), a charge he carried out with some success (App. *Pun.* 479-83, 519-27, 596-604). When Scipio Aemilianus, as consul in 147, assumed command of Roman forces in Africa, Hasdrubal transferred his army to Carthage (App. *Pun.* 544), where he now assumed the supreme authority (App. *Pun.* 560-2; cf. 526-7). In the end, the man who led his people to annihilation begged the victorious Romans to spare his own life.

Since Polybius (38.1.6) described the fate suffered by the Carthaginians in 146 as a downfall (*symptōma*) rather than a disaster (*atykhia*), he did not attribute their calamity to culpable error. Indeed, he believed that their decision to resist could be defended on slender grounds (*topon eskhaton apologias*, 38.1.5). Thus he thought that the Punic calamity resulted from failure in the pursuit of a justifiable aim. This judgement rested on his conviction that the final Roman order could be viewed as harsh.³ Nevertheless, Polybius withheld the praise and sympathy he usually bestowed on victims of downfall. Thus his acknowledgement that the Punic calamity was not the product of culpable error is made grudgingly. This indicates that he felt reservations about the Carthaginians' decision to resist. His objections rested on two considerations. First, their decision to resist led to annihilation (38.1.6), an outcome that could have been avoided, for the Romans had originally wanted to impose the relatively mild policy of relocation (3.5.5).⁴ Second, the Carthaginians decided to resist only after they had surrendered hostages and weapons, at a moment that Polybius considered too late for embarking upon such a course with any prospect of success.⁵ Thus, in the final analysis, he

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disapproved of the Punic decision and vehemently condemned the disgraceful leader who carried it out.

Andriscus and the Macedonians

In 149, a certain Andriscus presented himself to the people of Macedonia as the successor of Perseus, their last king. Polybius describes him sarcastically as an impudent impostor. The 'false Philip' (*Pseudophilippos*), an airborne Philip (*aeropetês Philippos*), he reports, appeared in Macedonia, despising the inhabitants and even the Romans. There was no reasonable basis for his enterprise, as it was common knowledge that the real Philip had died two years after his father, King Perseus (36.10.1-3). During his short rule, this hateful man banished, tortured and murdered more Macedonians than all the legitimate kings put together (36.17.13-14).

Polybius' hostility towards Andriscus is based on the fact that the pretender inspired a decision to defect from Rome, which led to a crushing military defeat for the Macedonians. At 3.5.6, the historian states that the common disaster (*atykhêma*) of all Greece began with the renunciation by the Macedonians of their friendship with Rome and the withdrawal of the Spartans from the Achaean League. Similarly, at 38.3.8-9, the historian declares that, in 146, the Macedonians as well as the Greeks suffered a shameful and reprehensible disaster (*êtykhêsan atykhian aiskhran ... kai eponeidiston*). Since he considered their calamity a disaster (*atykhia*) rather than a downfall (*symptôma*), Polybius ascribed it to culpable error. Indeed, at 38.3.11-13, he says that the Macedonians suffered the same fate as the Achaeans and their Greek allies. Deprived of all good things, they received the rods and axes into their cities, experiencing great fear because of their excessive errors (*ham[artêmatôn]*).⁶

The error of the Macedonians was their decision to support Andriscus, who induced them to abandon their friendship with Rome. This mistake, bad enough in itself because it led to military defeat, was compounded by other factors. Although they had received many benefits from Rome after the defeat of Perseus (36.17.13; cf. 27.10.2; 31.2.12), the Macedonians embraced the cause of a leader who practised brutal repression (36.17.13). Ironically, although they had been defeated by Rome when fighting for Philip V and Perseus, both legitimate kings, they actually defeated the Romans when showing valour to defend the throne of a hateful pretender (36.17.14). Indeed, Polybius felt unable to explain in rational terms the whole episode of Andriscus' career. His appearance in Macedonia and his early successes appeared astonishing and incredible (36.10). The Macedonians' support for this man could only be regarded as a case of heaven-sent infatuation (*daimonoblabeian*) or the wrath of the gods (*mênin ek theôn*) (36.17.15). That Polybius held Andriscus especially to blame for the Macedonian disaster emerges from 38.3.11-13, where he declares that the Greeks and Macedonians suffered for their errors

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(*ham[artêmatôn]*), adding that it would be more accurate to say that although the masses were guilty of error (*êgnoêkenai*) and of failure to perform their duty (*parapepaikenai* [*tou kathêkontos*]), it was those truly responsible for this folly (*agnoias*) who committed an error (*hêmart[êkenai]*). Thus Polybius disapproved of the decision of the Macedonians to defect from Rome, and condemned the unworthy leader who inspired it.

Critolaus and Diaeus and the Achaeans

According to Polybius, the followers of Critolaus and Diaeus were the worst characters in each city, enemies of the gods, destroyers of the nation (38.10.8). Critolaus and Diaeus led the miserable Achaeans to adopt the course of folly (*agnoian*) they had already proposed. This was the natural result of the incompetence (*apeirian*) and bad character (*kakian*) of those who exercised power in Achaea (38.10.12-13; cf. 38.16.11-12; 38.17.8-10). After the death of Critolaus the population of Achaea, as if carried away by a fierce torrent, complied with the folly (*agnoiai*) and madness (*parakopêi*) of their leader Diaeus (38.16.2; cf. 38.18.8), who was also corrupt (38.18.4-5).

Polybius' hostility to Critolaus and Diaeus rests on the fact that they promoted a decision to fight a war against Rome, a decision that led to a crushing military defeat for the Achaeans and their Greek allies. In 148, Sparta seceded from the Achaean League (Paus. 7.12.3-8; Just. *Epit.* 34.1.2). Over the next two years, the Romans repeatedly forbade the League to employ force against the secessionists, warning that such action would be viewed as evidence of deepening hostility to Rome, from which grave consequences would ensue (38.9.4-8; 38.10.4-5; 38.11.2; 38.11.6; 38.12.2-3). In 146, however, Critolaus persuaded the Achaeans to vote for war, nominally against Sparta, but in fact against Rome (38.13.6).

Polybius described the resulting calamity as a disaster (*atykhia*). At 3.5.6, he states that the common disaster (*atykhêma*) of all Greece began with the renunciation by the Macedonians of their friendship with Rome and the withdrawal of the Spartans from the Achaean League. In his treatment of the Achaean War, Polybius refers repeatedly to the disaster (*atykhia*) suffered by the Greeks (38.1-3, *passim*; also see 38.11.1; 38.16.1; 38.16.9). He says that the Greeks suffered a shameful and reprehensible disaster (*êtykhêsan atykhian aiskhran ... kai eponeidiston*) (38.3.8-9). Deprived of all good things, the Achaeans and their allies received the rods and axes into their cities, experiencing great fear because of their excessive errors (*ham[artêmatôn]*) (38.3.11-13).

The final military defeat suffered by the Greeks was accompanied by other sufferings. After the death of Critolaus, his successor Diaeus ordered the cities of Achaea to liberate and arm 12,000 slaves. He imposed special financial levies and ordered a general mobilization of citizens. These

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measures caused confusion, disturbance and despondency (38.15). When their soldiers had been defeated by the Roman general Metellus in Phocis, the people of Patrae and other towns fell into a pitiful state. Some of them senselessly committed suicide, and others fled aimlessly from the cities through trackless country because they were terrorized by what was happening in the cities, where some people were delivering one another to the enemy as opponents of the Romans, and others were denouncing and accusing their neighbours, even though at present no one was asking them to do so, while still others were surrendering to the Romans, confessing their treachery and asking what punishment they must suffer, even though no one as yet was demanding any explanation of their conduct (38.16.4-6). The whole country was filled with a strange spell, under whose influence people threw themselves into wells and down cliffs (38.16.7). The Thebans abandoned their city in a body, leaving it entirely deserted (38.16.10). The Achaean League came close to total destruction at the hands of the Romans or its own leaders (38.17.7-12). After the war, the quaestor sold the property of Diaeus and those of his supporters who had been condemned (39.4.1-3). Mummius executed the cavalymen of Chalcis (39.6.4-5).

Since Polybius refers to the Achaean calamity as a disaster (*atykhia*), he ascribes it to reproachable error. Indeed, he repeatedly accuses Critolaus, Diaeus and their supporters of causing the Achaean disaster through error. Thus at 38.3.11-13, he declares that the Achaeans and their allies suffered for their errors (*ham[artêmatôn]*), but he adds that it would be more accurate to say that while the multitude were guilty of error (*êgnoêkenai*) and failure in duty (*paraepaikenai [tou kathêkontos]*), it was those truly responsible for this folly (*agnoias*) who committed an error (*hêmart[êkenai]*). Similarly, at 38.16.9, he says that the Greeks suffered disaster (*êtykhêsan atykhian*) because of the bad judgement (*aboulia*) of their leaders and their own error (*agnoian*). It will be observed that Polybius blamed the leaders in particular for the Achaean disaster.

Polybius identified a sequence of errors culminating in the Achaean decision to fight a war against Sparta in 146. In the autumn of 147, the senate sent Sextus Julius Caesar and other envoys to Achaea. Their mission was to urge the League to correct its foolish conduct (*tôn êgnoêmênôn*) and to impute this folly (*agnoian*) to those responsible for the error (*hamartias*) (38.9.1-5). The error in question was the Achaean attack on Sparta in 148-147 and the mistreatment of Roman envoys led by Lucius Aurelius Orestes, who had visited Achaea earlier in 147. These envoys had demanded that the League relinquish certain cities, including Sparta.⁷ Polybius goes on to argue that the Romans did not actually wish to dissolve the League, but merely wanted to alarm the Achaeans and to strike down their insolence and hostility (38.9.6-8). It is for this reason that he considered the mistreatment of the envoys by the Achaeans a mistake (cf. 38.10.1-2).

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When Sextus Julius Caesar and the other envoys came to the Peloponnese, they addressed a meeting of the Achaean League held at Aegium, where they exhorted the Achaeans not to persist in their erroneous course (*hamartias*) against Rome or Sparta. The prudent segment of the population (*to ... sôphronoun meros*), declares Polybius, welcomed this advice and paid great attention, conscious of what had been done and observing what happened to those who opposed the Romans. But the majority, although they had nothing to say against the justified statements of the Roman envoys, remained ill-disposed (*nosoun*) and perverse (*diephtharmenon*).⁸ Thereupon Diaeus and Critolaus and their supporters not only adopted devious tactics but also went competely wrong in their reasoning, for they thought that the Romans, fearing a war against Achaea on account of the conflicts in which they were simultaneously engaged in Africa and Spain, were therefore prepared to tolerate everything (i.e. even an Achaean war against Sparta) and to make any declaration (i.e. prohibition of such action, not to be taken seriously). Therefore Diaeus and Critolaus promised to seek a negotiated solution to the Spartan problem (insincerely, as we learn from 38.11.1-6). Subsequently they led their miserable nation to adopt the erroneous course (*agnoian*) they had been proposing for a long time (i.e. war against Sparta) (38.10.4-12; cf. 38.13.6). But it should have been clear to everyone that such a step would be followed by Roman military intervention, for (as noted above) the Romans had consistently warned the Achaeans about the consequences of attacking Sparta, and more intelligent observers certainly took this admonition seriously (38.10.6; 38.10.9-10).

When the Roman envoys came to Tegea, Critolaus refused to negotiate with the Spartans. Thereupon, the envoys returned to Italy, accusing Critolaus of error (*agnoian*) and madness (*manian*). During the winter, Critolaus toured the Achaean cities, accusing and misrepresenting the Romans. At the same time, he decreed various measures connected with debt, to be observed until the end of the war (i.e. the contemplated war against Sparta). By this means he secured credibility and persuaded the multitude to obey all his orders. As a result the masses, ensnared by the bait of immediate benefit and relief, could not foresee what would happen (38.11).

In the spring of 146, Quintus Caecilius Metellus, the Roman commander in Macedonia, heard about the confusion (*akrisian*) and disturbance (*tarakhên*) in the Peloponnese. Therefore he sent envoys who addressed a meeting of the Achaean League held at Corinth, asking the Achaeans not to proceed to more complete hostility against Rome. The majority of the assembly jeered at the envoys and expelled them from the meeting. Never before, complains Polybius, had so great a crowd of low-class working men gathered for a meeting of the Achaean League. All the cities, he continues, were in a snivelling state (*ekoryzôn*), especially Corinth. By using the verb *koryzaô*, Polybius implies ignorance or stupid-

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ity, the same charge hurled by Thrasyarchus against Socrates in the first book of Plato's *Republic*, where the sophist expresses contempt for his adversary (1.343a7-9). Critolaus, as if he had found a deranged audience who shared his fanaticism (*theatrou synenthousiōntos kai parestêkotos tais dianoiais*), succeeded in overcoming opposition and persuading the Achaeans to vote for war against Sparta, which implied war against Rome (38.12.1-13.7).

After the death of Critolaus, events deprived men of the power to observe and judge the whole situation, the very faculty that would have enabled them to see in advance that the entire population was being led towards certain destruction. And so, as if swept away by a violent torrent, they complied with the folly (*agnoiai*) and insanity (*parakopêi*) of Diaeus (38.16.1-3). At this time, the Greeks suffered a disaster (*êtykhêsan atykhian*) because of the bad judgement (*aboulia*) of their leaders and their own error (*agnoia*) (38.16.9).

Later some of the leading Achaeans implored Diaeus to accept the generous terms of peace offered by Metellus. However, the members of the special council (*hoi ... synedreusantes*) did not believe that the entire nation would be preserved, but thought those men were merely speaking for their personal advantage. Consequently they misunderstood the whole situation (*pantôn ... diêmarton*). Fully aware of what they had done, they were unable to believe that the Romans would show compassion (38.17).⁹

Commenting on Diaeus' persecution of his opponents, Polybius declares that the whole nation came close to ruin when such folly (*anoias*) and bad judgement (*akrisias*) afflicted everyone. Fortune, he opines, counteracted the folly (*anoia*), madness (*mania*) and error (*agnoias*) of the leaders by contriving the rapid defeat of the Greeks (38.18). Thus Polybius disapproved of the Achaean decision to fight against Rome, and censured the unreflecting leaders who advocated that course.

To sum up, Polybius censured the Carthaginians, Macedonians and Achaeans, and their leaders, because they engaged in destructive wars against Rome. The devastating results of these conflicts drew attention to the grave faults of the leaders who supported or inspired decisions to fight against Rome, thus failing in their duty to promote the best interests of their people. After the fall of the Macedonian monarchy, all of them ought to have realized that weaker nations must avoid armed conflict against the ruling power. Although the historian distinguished the case of the Carthaginians, who suffered a downfall, from that of the Macedonians and the Achaeans, who incurred a disaster, in the final analysis he believed that all of these peoples erred in fighting against the Romans. Moreover, he thought that the leaders of all these nations were alike. At 38.8.14-15, he declares that the men who led Greece and Carthage in the period 149-146 were very similar. That he included Macedonia with Greece in this context is suggested by his observation at 3.5.6 that the common disaster of all Greece began with decisions made by the Macedonians and

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Spartans. Thus Polybius implies that in each case the leaders were responsible for a course of action producing destructive results.

Polybius and Rome's enemies in Books 1-29

Throughout the *Histories*, Polybius takes the view that weaker states should cooperate prudently with Rome and avoid military conflict against the superior power. For this reason, he censures weaker states and their leaders for engaging in destructive wars against Rome. Such criticism is especially prominent in Books 36-9, for Polybius believed that Roman domination was virtually complete by the year 168, and that consequently all peoples must henceforth obey Rome. In Books 1-29, however, which describe the period before Roman power was complete, Polybius' judgement of Rome's opponents is more varied. We may begin with instances in which the historian condemns weaker states and their rulers for opposing Rome.

In 230 BC, Roman ambassadors visited the court of Teuta, queen of Illyria, to protest and demand an end to Illyrian piracy. Teuta responded with the unreasoning rage of a woman (*gynaikothymôs kalogistôs*). As a result, she brought upon herself a Roman attack (the First Illyrian War, 229-228), which resulted in defeat and crippling terms of peace (2.8-12). Demetrius of Pharos provoked a Roman attack (the Second Illyrian War, 219), which ended with his removal from power in Illyria. Polybius describes him as a man whose courage was thoughtless (*alogiston*) and entirely without judgement (*akriton*). The Romans, says Polybius, believed they would quickly correct the error (*agnoian*) of the Illyrians and chastise the rashness (*propeteian*) of Demetrius (3.16, 18-19). Hieronymus of Syracuse, unwilling to renew the treaty that existed between his city and Rome, entered into negotiations with Carthage because he thought the Romans would lose the Second Punic War (215). Polybius (7.2-5; 7.7.5) describes the king as an unstable (*akatastaton*), capricious (*eikaion*) and violent (*paranomón*) young man afflicted by madness (*manian*) and bad judgement (*akrisian*). As a result of Hieronymus' alliance with Carthage, Syracuse became involved in hostilities against Rome, which ended with the siege and capture of the city by Marcellus in 212 (Polyb. 8.37).¹⁰

Philip V of Macedonia challenged Rome during the Hannibalic War. He resolved upon this course in 217, when he learned that the Carthaginians had defeated Rome at the battle of Lake Trasimene. At this moment, his retainer Demetrius of Pharos advised him to end the Social War against Aetolia and devote himself to the conquest of Illyria and an expedition to Italy. The latter project, he declared, would constitute the first step in a bid for world dominion, and this was the time to act, since the Romans had been defeated. According to Polybius, Philip was now persuaded to embrace this design (5.101.6-102.1). During peace negotiations between the king and Aetolia, Agelaus of Naupactus, an Aetolian leader, urged Philip

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to make peace with his Greek adversaries and to fix his attention on the war in Italy, with a view to seeking world dominion and preventing the Romans or Carthaginians from gaining control of Greece. The words of Agelaus, says Polybius, confirmed the resolution that the king had already formed as a result of Demetrius' advice (5.104.1-105.1). Inspired by Demetrius, he viewed the settlement of affairs in Illyria as the prerequisite for an invasion of Italy. Therefore he soon engaged in a war against Scerdilaedus, the ruler of Illyria, who had committed aggression against Macedonia (5.108). In 216, Philip planned to attack Apollonia, a Greek city of Illyria allied to Rome (cf. 2.11.8), but suddenly abandoned his project because he wrongly assumed that the Roman fleet was approaching (5.109-10). The following year, the king made a treaty with Hannibal. According to this agreement, the Carthaginians bound themselves, if victorious, to make the Romans surrender their sphere of influence in Illyria (7.9), first acquired in 229-228 (2.11-12). By this time, Philip was clearly committed to conflict with Rome over control of Illyria. The result was the First Macedonian War, which broke out in 214 (cf. 7.13.1).

Polybius' disapproval of Philip's Illyrian project is implied in several ways. The first indication emerges from the historian's negative judgement of Demetrius, who inspired the king to embark on it. In his account of the Second Illyrian War, Polybius refers to the rashness (*propeteian*) of Demetrius (3.16.4), who attacked cities in Illyria subject to the Romans because he despised the latter, seeing that they were preoccupied with Carthage at the time (3.16.2-3). Polybius declares that Demetrius possessed a courage that was thoughtless (*alogiston*) and entirely devoid of judgement (*akriton*) (3.19.9). During the Social War (in 218), Demetrius urged Philip to destroy the Aetolian sanctuary at Thermon, even though such behaviour (Polybius maintains) damages the perpetrator (5.9-12). On this occasion, too, Polybius accuses him of rashness (*propetes*) and lack of judgement (*akriton*) (5.12.7). At Messene (in 215 or 214), Philip instigated a violent clash between democrats and conservatives on the advice of Demetrius. After the victory of the democrats, the king sacrificed on the acropolis of Messene. At this point, Demetrius advised Philip to seize that position, a course from which Aratus dissuaded him. Polybius denounced the first event as an enormous crime marking the transformation of Philip from a king into a tyrant, adding that the king's action caused him to lose the good will of his allies and the trust of the other Greeks, and to meet with failure in his undertakings. Regarding the acropolis, the historian praised Philip for heeding Aratus and preserving good faith with the Messenians, thereby doing a little to heal the damage caused by his earlier action (7.11-14). Finally, the unreasoning (*alogiston*) and totally undiscerning (*teleôs akriton*) courage of Demetrius brought about his death (in 214) in the course of a foolhardy (*eikêi*) and reckless (*parabolôs*) attack on Messene sanctioned by Philip (Polyb. 3.19.10-11).¹¹ Thus Demetrius, himself a man of poor judgement, consistently offered the king bad advice.

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Consequently, Polybius must have doubted the wisdom of the Illyrian project advocated by this bad counsellor.

The second indication that Polybius disapproved of Philip's Illyrian design emerges from a comparison between Demetrius and the king. Demetrius himself, underestimating the Romans because they were pre-occupied with Carthage, attacked certain cities in Illyria that were subject to them, but was soon expelled by his adversaries from his Illyrian domains (Polyb. 3.16, 18-19). Having learned nothing from his own experience, he now urged Philip to attack Illyria, invade Italy and seek world dominion, arguing that the king would succeed because the Romans had just been defeated by Hannibal (5.101.6-102.1). Although he thought that Philip might indeed have gained control of Illyria in 216, when the Romans were fully engaged with Carthage (5.109-10), a comparison with the experience of Demetrius may imply that Polybius felt some reservations about the king's enterprise.

A third indication may be found in Philip's understanding of Agelaus' advice. According to Polybius, the king was convinced by Demetrius to attack Illyria, invade Italy and seek universal empire (5.101.6-102.1), and his resolution was confirmed by the words of the Aetolian statesman, who exhorted him to observe carefully the war in Italy, with a view to seeking world dominion and preventing Rome or Carthage from gaining control of Greece (5.104.1-105.1). Thus Agelaus, like Demetrius, urged Philip to seek world dominion, but his advice was actually quite different from that of Demetrius. The latter, by urging the king to conquer Illyria and invade Italy, stressed the element of aggressive expansionism. Agelaus, however, by advising the king to observe carefully the progress of the Hannibalic War and to prevent Rome or Carthage from gaining control of Greece, emphasized defensive measures. He said nothing about an attack on Illyria and Italy. Moreover, while Demetrius advised Philip to embark immediately upon campaigns against Illyria and Italy in a bid for world empire, Agelaus urged the king first to observe the progress of the Hannibalic War, and only then to pursue world dominion. Thus, while Demetrius recommended immediate offensive action, Agelaus advised prior observation and subsequent defensive measures as a precondition for the pursuit of world dominion. Philip nevertheless understood Agelaus' words as corroboration of his own designs, which had been inspired by Demetrius. Thus Polybius appears to suggest that Philip, influenced by a bad advisor, was so confident of success that he misinterpreted the advice of a cautious statesman. The historian, therefore, had doubts about the wisdom of Philip's decision to attack Illyria, a decision that soon led to war between himself and the Romans.¹²

Polybius believed that Philip V planned the war against Rome that was eventually waged by his son Perseus (22.18). The historian dates the formulation of Philip's design in the year 186/5, tracing to this time the beginning of irremediable troubles for the royal house of Macedonia

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(22.18.1), which culminated in the abolition of the monarchy (22.18.8). Philip made these plans because of the anger he felt against the Romans, who encouraged various cities and peoples to complain against him, and who ordered him to relinquish certain places he had recently captured. For a few years, the king cautiously avoided direct conflict with Rome and took various measures designed to promote his aims; he employed his son Demetrius to defend his actions before the senate.¹³ In 183/2, however, he made a series of irrational decisions, inspired (says Polybius) by furies (*erinyes*), spirits of retribution (*poinas*) and avenging spirits (*prostropaious*) set beside him by the goddess Fortune, who wanted to punish him for his crimes. Tormented by these phantoms, he relocated political leaders from the principal maritime cities of Macedonia to the district of Emathia together with their whole families; he filled the cities with barbarians loyal to himself; and he put to death the children of Macedonians he had executed. Unable to reconcile his quarrelling sons Perseus and Demetrius, he was finally persuaded by the former to execute the latter, who appeared to enjoy too much influence and favour among the Romans (23.10-11; cf. 23.3.7-9). Regarding these events, Polybius observes that a dreadful beginning of troubles descended upon Philip and all of Macedonia at this time (23.10.1). Thus he believed that the king's plan to fight against Rome, itself ill-conceived, led eventually to irrational decisions hastening the end of the Macedonian kingdom.¹⁴

Thus, in Books 1-29, Polybius often condemned Rome's enemies for engaging in military conflict against the stronger power (or expressed reservations even when he thought they enjoyed some chance of succeeding). In some cases, however, he expressed admiration for the leaders of states that fought against Rome, or explained how they might have contended more effectively. Polybius observes, for instance, that Rome and Carthage were competing for world empire during the Second Punic War (1.3.7-10). Hannibal, he declares, aimed at destroying Roman power (2.14.2). Polybius considered Hannibal's actions noble, for at 23.14.12 he explains that he has discussed them in order to enhance the renown (*tês ... eukleias heneken*) of the deceased man, and to inspire later generations to perform fine deeds (*pros ta kala tôn ergôn*). All we have of that discussion is represented by 23.13, where Polybius emphasizes Hannibal's outstanding generalship, which enabled him successfully to employ a very large number of men who came from different nations and spoke different languages, and to secure their loyal collaboration in the pursuit of his goals (cf. 11.19.1-5). Hannibal, a most able commander (9.9.1-10; 10.33.1-7; 11.19.1-5; 23.13), would have defeated the Romans had he fought them last of all, after conquering other peoples (11.19.6-7). Thus Polybius appears to suggest that the Punic general, had he prevailed over Rome, would have created a harmonious multi-ethnic empire, something the historian would have admired, for he was very much impressed by the geographic diversity of Rome's achievement (1.2; 6.50.3-4).

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In addition, Polybius explains that Hannibal should have cited a more effective pretext for his contemplated attack on Saguntum (3.15.1-11), because proper attention to this matter has a significant bearing on the outcome of a war (cf. 36.2). The Punic general, however, harmed his own cause by overlooking this principle. Filled with irrationality (*alogias*) and violent passion (*thymou biaiou*), he cited unreasonable pretexts (*prophaseis alogous*) and a non-existing reason (*tên ... oukh hyparkhousan* [sc. *aitian*]), thus giving the impression that he was beginning a conflict against Rome without reason (*alogôs*) and unjustly (*adikôs*).¹⁵

Although he felt reservations about Philip V's plan to conquer Illyria, Polybius nevertheless explained how the king might have fought more effectively. While attacking Apollonia in 216, Philip suddenly abandoned his campaign because he mistakenly thought that the Roman fleet was approaching. In fact, however, the Romans had sent only ten ships. Had the king not fled, declares Polybius, he would have gained control of Illyria, for the Romans were fully engaged with Hannibal at this time (5.109-10).

According to Polybius, Philip V had aimed at world empire since the year 218/7 (5.101.10-102.1). At 15.24, he describes the treacherous conduct of the king at Thasos in 203/2. He judges irrational (*alogiston*) and insane (*manikon*) the action of Philip who, although pursuing the highest aims and hoping to rule the entire world, with prospects of success that were still unimpaired, demonstrated to everyone his treachery and faithlessness. Thus Polybius suggests that the king would have improved his chances of success by avoiding treachery at Thasos.

Antiochus III crossed into Greece with an army in the autumn of 192 for the avowed purpose of liberating the region (Polyb. 3.7.3; 20.8.1). At Chalcis, however, he married a beautiful young girl, with whom he spent the entire winter, thus neglecting the war (20.8.2-5). After the naval battle of Myonnesus (190 BC), in which a Seleucid fleet was repulsed with heavy losses, the king lingered at Sardis, wasting his opportunities and generally postponing action. When he learned that the Romans had crossed into Asia, he succumbed to depression and despair (21.13.1-2). Later Publius Scipio reminded the royal ambassador that Antiochus had not tried to prevent the Romans from crossing into Asia (21.15.8). Thus the king's behaviour during the war against Rome illustrates an observation made by Polybius in an earlier context. Antiochus (he had declared) seemed at first to be ambitious, daring and effective in carrying out his designs, but as he grew older he appeared much inferior to his former self and disappointed the expectations of others (15.37). Thus Polybius maintained that the king failed to show the necessary energy and resolve in his war against Rome.¹⁶

During the Third Macedonian War, King Perseus wished to undertake great projects, but he would not advance money to states, kings and political leaders. If he had done so, Polybius declares, either he would have achieved a complete victory and acquired overbearing power or, if de-

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feated, he would have caused many others to share his fate, results desirable from the Macedonian point of view, though Polybius himself would not have welcomed them (28.9.4-8; cf. 27.10). Eumenes II of Pergamum asked Perseus for two thousand talents in return for his neutrality and his services in negotiating an end to the war, but withdrew his offer when the Macedonian king refused to pay the whole amount demanded (29.5.1-9.6). Perseus (says Polybius) ought to have paid the money to Eumenes, for either the Pergamene king would have ended the conflict or Perseus would have brought the enmity of Rome upon him, as he could have made the arrangement public (29.9.7-12).

The king of Macedonia made the same mistake in his dealings with the Illyrian king Genthius (29.9.13). Although Perseus wished to form an alliance with the latter, he would not give him money (28.8.1-9.3). Eventually the two kings reached an agreement by which Perseus promised to hand over three hundred talents to Genthius (29.3.1-4.7). In the end, however, the Macedonian ruler sent only a derisory instalment of the stipulated sum and promptly ignored his obligations as soon as Genthius had compromised himself by taking unfriendly action against Rome (Liv. 44.27.8-12, based on Polybius).¹⁷ Finally, Perseus proved a coward at the battle of Pydna (Polyb. 29.17.3-19.1).¹⁸

The didactic purpose of the *Histories*

In the earlier part of his work, then, Polybius censured weaker states for engaging in military conflict against Rome, but in some instances he praised the leaders of states that adopted such a course or explained how they might have contended more effectively. In the latest books, however, the historian consistently condemned states that opposed the Romans in war. These characteristics of the *Histories* do not indicate any later shift in Polybius' fundamental attitude towards Rome, for he consistently maintained that weaker states must cooperate prudently with the ruling power in order to protect their own interests. Polybius reached different conclusions in the earlier and later parts of his work because the fall of the Macedonian kingdom marked for him a crucial transition in world history. After 168, when Roman power was virtually complete, all nations must obey Rome; but prior to that date, there were occasions on which certain states enjoyed some chance of prevailing over their western adversary in armed conflict. Thus Polybius invariably condemned states that fought against Rome after 168, for such a course could only lead to destruction; but he did not censure all of Rome's opponents in the earlier period because a number of them had some possibility of advancing their own interests through military action.

The historian wrote especially for the instruction of statesmen in political affairs.¹⁹ The theme of his work is the growth of Roman domination over the Mediterranean world, a process virtually complete by the year 168

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(1.1.5; 1.2.7; 3.3.9; 3.4.2-3), and a subject of supreme importance for all men of vital intelligence (1.1.5). He therefore stressed the question of relations with Rome, advocating prudent cooperation as the most sensible policy for weaker states. Consequently, he censured those who foolishly engaged in destructive wars against the superior power. As an historian, Polybius acknowledged a duty to judge states in accordance with the facts, not on the basis of partisanship, for history (he declares) cannot be instructive unless it is impartial.²⁰ He therefore judged states that fought against Rome on the basis of their relative strength within the international order. A major lesson of the *Histories* is that although before 168 certain nations (the Carthaginians, for instance) had some chance of prevailing over Rome in a military conflict, after that date such a course could only result in destructive failure. This lesson was of direct relevance to contemporaries, and future generations would be able to apply it in their own context.

Polybius also intended the *Histories* to serve as a guide in military affairs. He wrote in order to instruct leaders and generals who might in future be in a position to engage in armed conflict. He was therefore concerned to explain what principles and methods they should adopt.²¹ For this reason, he praised or criticized the conduct and decisions of leaders and generals in warfare. Once again, Polybius as an historian acknowledged a duty to judge rulers and commanders on the basis of the quality of their conduct and decisions, not in accordance with personal bias, for the purpose of history is to provide examples that others may emulate or avoid (9.9.9-10).²² Thus some of the non-Roman leaders and generals portrayed in the earlier part of the *Histories* merited praise because they afforded valuable examples for the instruction of later generations. It is for the same reason that Polybius sometimes explained how they might have fought more effectively.

Polybius' treatment of Rome's enemies evinces a certain intellectual distance from the ruling power on his part. Pausanias (8.37.2) relates that there was a sculptured relief of Polybius on the wall of the colonnade in the sanctuary of Persephone at Lycosoura, near Megalopolis. The relief bore an inscription declaring that Greece would not have been overthrown (*mê an sphalênai*) in the first place if she listened (*epeitheto*) to Polybius in all things, and that once she did go wrong (*hamartousêi*), help came through him alone. This honorary inscription alludes to the historian's didactic purpose and to his concern for the interests of less powerful states, already noted above. Thus Polybius' criticism of weaker states that engaged in military conflict against Rome did not arise fundamentally from attachment to the ruling power. His outlook is not that of a patriotic son or devoted follower of Rome, but rather that of a realistic foreigner concerned with the interests of nations obliged to deal with Rome, and of a disinterested preceptor advising future generations about international politics and warfare.²³ Thus, although Polybius concentrated firmly on the

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contemporary reality of Roman power, his mind also ranged far into the future, when her unrivalled dominion, receding from the arena of world affairs to the repository of historical record, would furnish examples for the instruction of men untouched by her approval or displeasure.

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When he explains his reasons for writing an extension of the *Histories* beyond the original terminus of 168 BC, Polybius declares that he was not only an eye-witness but also a participant and a principal actor in events connected with the 'time of disturbance and trouble' that ended in 146 (3.4.13). During this period, he assisted the Romans as military advisor and political agent. This activity, however, should not be viewed as evidence of simple partisanship.

The Third Punic War

In 149, after declaring war on Carthage, the Romans sent both consuls to Sicily. Punic envoys came to Rome, ignorant of these developments. Having learned the facts, they offered to surrender their city (Polyb. 36.3.9). From Sicily, before he knew about the Carthaginian surrender, the consul Manius Manilius wrote a letter to the Achaean League, asking that Polybius be sent forthwith to Lilybaeum, as the Roman state needed him. The League complied with the consul's request. Polybius accordingly set sail at the beginning of summer, believing that for many reasons he should obey the Romans (36.11.1-2). Meanwhile, the senate had accepted the surrender of the Carthaginians, instructing them to send three hundred hostages to Lilybaeum, and to follow the future orders of the consuls (36.4.6). The hostages were in due course conveyed to Rome by Quintus Fabius Maximus Aemilianus, the governor of Sicily and brother of Scipio Aemilianus (36.5.6-9). When Polybius reached Corcyra, he was shown a letter written by the consuls to the Corcyraeans, indicating that the Carthaginians had given hostages and were in all respects prepared to obey Rome. Believing the war to be over, and his services no longer needed, Polybius returned to the Peloponnese (36.11.3-4).

Two years later, the historian appears in Carthage as the confidant and military advisor of Scipio Aemilianus (consul in 147, proconsul in 146). In the autumn of 147, he was present during siege operations conducted in the harbour, when he recommended defensive measures that Scipio unwisely ignored (Polyb. 38.19).¹ In addition to providing military advice, Polybius took part in actual combat during the siege (Amm. Marc. 24.2.16-17).² He attended Scipio at the formal destruction of Carthage, when the Roman general expressed fears about the destiny of his own country (Polyb. 38.21; App. *Pun.* 132).

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These details show that Polybius was trusted and esteemed by prominent Romans, who relied on him to provide useful military assistance and personal support. But his cooperation with Rome did not arise exclusively from loyalty to the dominant power. The complexity of his motivation is apparent from what he himself declares at 36.11.1-2: when the Achaean League, at the request of the consul Manilius, resolved to send him to Sicily, Polybius complied because he thought it appropriate for many reasons to obey the Romans.

In the first place, the historian felt a sense of compulsion. At 3.4.3 he says that, after the abolition of the Macedonian monarchy, everyone conceded the necessity of obeying Roman orders. To refuse Manilius would have been unwise, both for himself and for the Achaean League, the recipient of the consul's formal request. Compliance, on the other hand, would be consistent with his view that less powerful states should cooperate with Rome while preserving as much of their dignity and independence as possible. Thus, although engaged in other projects when the summons from Manilius arrived, Polybius departed for Sicily, treating all his other business as *parerga*, that is, as secondary occupations (36.11.2).³

Furthermore, Polybius had personal reasons for going to Carthage. While detained in Rome during the years 167-150, he had formed an association with Scipio Aemilianus, the son of Aemilius Paullus, conqueror of Macedonia (31.23.1-25.1; 31.29.8). Polybius called this association friendship (*philia*), intimacy (*synêtheia*), intellectual accord (*hairesis*), companionship (*symperiphora*), alliance (*systasis*) (31.23.3-6), an affectionate bond of the kind that unites father and son or close relatives (31.25.1). However, the historian was keenly aware of the disparity in social status that divided him and Scipio, and of the privileges he owed to the good offices of the young Roman. Although pleased by the esteem that Scipio felt for him, Polybius was embarrassed by the high rank of the Corneli Scipiones and their wealth (31.24.11). During the years he spent in Italy as a political *détenu*, his fortunes had depended on the support of Scipio Aemilianus and his brother Quintus Fabius Maximus Aemilianus, who persuaded the praetor to let him stay in Rome (31.23.5). For these reasons, Polybius must have felt he was under obligation to Scipio. Indeed, he notes that, from the beginning of their association, he and Scipio continually gave each other practical evidence of their mutual esteem (31.23.7-25.1).⁴ It may therefore be supposed that Polybius gave proof of his esteem by assisting the Romans during the Third Punic War, in which his friend and patron Scipio served initially as military tribune (149-148) and later as consul and proconsul (147-146).⁵

The assistance Polybius gave to Scipio in North Africa extended beyond the strictly military sphere. At 36.8.2, the historian observes that, during the war, persons jealous of Scipio tried to disparage his achievements. Polybius, on the contrary, admired Scipio's moral qualities (18.35.1-36.1; 31.23-9) and military abilities (36.8.3-5; 36.8.7-8). Furthermore, at 36.8.6,

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Polybius justifies his practice of giving a more copious account of Scipio's deeds and relating all his statements in detail.⁶ This aspect of his work fulfils the promise that he made earlier (at 31.30.1-3) to discuss Scipio's achievements in public life. In the same passage (31.30.1-3), he explains that he has described Scipio's character at length (in 31.23-9) because he wants to secure credence for his account of the man's public career, to be provided in later books of the *Histories*. If made aware of Scipio's character, readers would not disbelieve an historical narrative of the remarkable events in which he was involved, nor would they attribute his glorious achievements to Fortune, in this way defrauding him of the credit he deserved. Thus, in the extension of the *Histories* (Books 31-9), Polybius set out to defend and praise Scipio. Accordingly, the fact that enemies were already attacking Scipio during the Third Punic War suggests that Polybius went to Carthage in part to defend and to enhance the reputation of his friend.

Some years after the Roman wars against Carthage and the Achaean League, Polybius extended his work beyond the original terminus of 168 to the year 145 BC. At this point, he clearly discerned the historical importance of the Third Punic War. Thus, at 3.4.13, in a later addition to the *Histories*, he refers to the magnitude of the events that occurred during this conflict. Similarly, at 36.1, he describes the war as a momentous event furnishing a grand theme and very ample material for historians. Although Polybius made these observations long after the Third Punic War, when he was writing the later books of the *Histories*, it may nevertheless be thought that the opening of the Roman campaign against Carthage inspired in his mind the idea that his generation was about to witness an historical turning-point marked by the extinction of Rome's only rival in the western Mediterranean. Therefore it was probably the inception of the Third Punic War that suggested to him a suitable ending-point for a continuation of the *Histories* that he already contemplated.⁷ This in turn suggests that Polybius would have wanted to be present in North Africa from the very beginning of hostilities. Furthermore, at 36.8.6, in his account of the first year of the conflict, Polybius declares that he has reported Scipio's actions more copiously and related all his statements in detail. This comment suggests that the historian was indeed present in North Africa, taking detailed notes, from the beginning of hostilities in 149. Personal observation of this kind, according to Polybius, was an essential part of an historian's work. Polybius, moreover, represented himself as a latter-day Odysseus who travelled widely and endured much hardship for the sake of obtaining historical information. In this way (as François Hartog reminds us) he also associated himself with the Greek tradition of geographical exploration.⁸ Thus it is also likely that he assisted the Romans against Carthage in order to obtain first-hand information about what he sensed would be a crucial conflict, and one that would provide a satisfactory conclusion for an extension of the *Histories*. To sum

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up, a sense of political necessity, personal obligation and historiographical vocation all contributed to Polybius' decision to accompany Scipio Aemilianus to North Africa.⁹

The Achaean War

In 146 BC, at the end of the Achaean War, Polybius returned to the Peloponnese, where he supported Roman policy, enjoyed considerable influence with the Romans, and played an important role in the political reorganization of his country. His overall judgement of Mummius, for instance, was favourable. At 39.6, he describes how the Roman general toured the cities of Achaëa in 145, honoured and deservedly thanked everywhere because he had behaved with restraint and integrity, and had settled Achaean affairs in a lenient manner. The occasions on which he was thought to have overlooked what was right were due not to his own initiative (declares Polybius) but to that of his associates. Polybius' influence with the Romans can be seen in the following incident. After the destruction of Corinth, when a certain Roman proposed that all statues of Philopoemen and monuments bearing decrees in his honour be demolished, Polybius interceded with Mummius and the ten commissioners, persuading them to reject the proposal and even to restore three statues (including one of Philopoemen) already transferred to Acarnania for shipment to Italy (Polyb. 39.3).

After the Achaean War, Mummius and the ten commissioners abolished democratic governments in the cities of Greece that had opposed Rome, replacing them with oligarchies in which tenure of political office (*tas arkhas*) was limited to men who possessed formal property qualifications (Paus. 7.16.9).¹⁰ The Romans asked Polybius to visit the cities of Achaëa in order to resolve questions on which people were divided, until they should grow accustomed to the constitution and the laws imposed by Rome. Thus his task was to interpret the new regulations and to settle disagreements arising from them (Polyb. 39.5.1-2).

Polybius fulfilled his task energetically. After a certain time, he induced the people to accept the constitution given to them by the Romans, ensuring that no doubt arose from the laws either in private or in public affairs on any matter (Polyb. 39.5.3). The posthumous editor of the *Histories* notes that the Achaeans of each city, thoroughly satisfied with the work of Polybius, did him great honour, both during his lifetime and after his death (Polyb. 39.5.4). Everything would have remained uncertain and filled with confusion, he continues, had Polybius not formulated the rules for inter-city jurisdiction (Polyb. 39.5.5).¹¹

After completing his assignment, Polybius visited Rome and returned to Achaëa, 'having accomplished, as it were, the culmination of my earlier political work, a worthy return for my loyalty to Rome' (Polyb. 39.8.1). This passage, which occurs in the epilogue of the *Histories*, probably refers to

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senatorial approval of the interpretations and rules made by Polybius. It demonstrates that the historian took great pride in his achievement, that he portrayed himself as a supporter of Roman policy, and that the Romans approved of his work. This self-portrait is reproduced in the public honours granted to Polybius in Achaëa (see n. 11 above). For instance, a sculptured relief of the historian seen by Pausanias in the agora of Megalopolis bore an inscription calling Polybius an ally (*symmakhos*) of Rome (Paus. 8.30.8).

Thus the Romans had confidence in Polybius. They accepted his advice on political matters and entrusted important responsibilities to him. Polybius in turn carried out his mission effectively. Proclaiming his loyalty to Rome, he supported Roman policy in both word and deed, and took pride in his accomplishment. It would, however, be mistaken to conclude that he had become totally identified with Rome, that he acted solely out of partisanship.

At 38.4.7, Polybius refers to his involvement in the affairs of his country at the end of the Achaean War. In times of danger, he explains, Greeks ought to assist their compatriots in every way. For instance, they should avert the anger of the conqueror, as he himself had done. This claim is reflected in the inscription that appeared on the sculptured relief seen by Pausanias at Megalopolis (already mentioned above), which also affirmed that Polybius ended the anger of the Romans towards the Greek nation (Paus. 8.30.8). Another sculptured relief of the historian, located in the colonnade of the Mistress at Lycosoura, bore an inscription stating that Polybius was the only source of help for the Greeks after their calamity in the Achaean War (Paus. 8.37.2). Thus the inscriptions seen by Pausanias and the *Histories* themselves ascribe the intervention of Polybius to patriotism.

The arguments used by Polybius to save the honours of Philopoemen provide further insight regarding the historian's patriotic motives. Polybius maintained that the Achaean leader had been a faithful ally and friend of the Romans. Although he had often resisted their demands, he went no further than explaining his position and trying to persuade them, in the end always yielding under duress (39.3.4-5; cf. 24.11-13). Polybius himself considered this to be the best way for less powerful states to manage their relations with Rome. In his view, prudent cooperation afforded the best chance of preserving dignity along with some measure of independence.¹² Thus, by persuading the Romans to respect the honours of Philopoemen, the historian not only saved the Achaeans from the undiscovering attack of a vindictive enemy, but also signalled a return to the principle of prudent cooperation with Rome, espoused in earlier times by Philopoemen. This in turn suggests how Polybius proposed to help the Achaeans and to avert the anger of Rome when he became concerned with the constitutions imposed by the Romans. Because the establishment of conservative regimes suited Rome, it would be prudent for the Achaeans

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to accept the new arrangements, and for Polybius to promote them. Only by persuading them to cooperate with Rome could Polybius help the Achaeans and avert the anger of the conqueror.

The new constitutions, however, also happened to coincide with his own political convictions. Polybius distrusted governments in which ordinary citizens had effective control, and detested all movements aimed at the redress of social inequity. According to him, in a true democracy the power of the common people must be limited, and effective control should be exercised by a wealthy elite.¹³

In describing the cyclical evolution of constitutions, Polybius treated democracy as one of the three legitimate forms (the others being kingship and aristocracy). He maintained that democracy eventually degenerates into mob rule, one of the three corrupt forms (the others being monarchy or tyranny and oligarchy) (6.3.5-4.10; 6.7.1-9.9; cf. 6.57.5-9). He regarded democracy as the best of the three legitimate forms of constitution (4.1.5; 6.57.9). He praised the Achaean League as a true democracy (*dēmokratia alêthinê*) based on equality (*isêgoria*) and freedom (*parrhêsia*) of speech (2.38.6).¹⁴ In several other passages, too, he used the term 'democracy' in its technical and narrower sense to designate government by the people as opposed to the rule of an individual or of a small elite.¹⁵ These texts might give the impression that he actually favoured effective rule by the people, democracy in the narrower sense of the term. But Polybius in fact detested genuine popular control. An excellent example of this attitude occurs in his account of the political situation in Achaea on the eve of the war against Rome. Polybius strongly disapproved of the sort of men who were becoming politically active and influential throughout the Achaean League at that time. Of the federal assembly that met at Corinth, he wrote indignantly that never before had such a crowd of low-class labourers (*plêthos ergastêriakôn kai banausôn anthrôpôn*) gathered together. Although the malady was worst at Corinth, he continues, all the Achaean cities were at that time suffering from the political equivalent of a running nose (*pasai men gar ekoryzôn hai poleis*) (38.12.5), a condition implying ignorance or stupidity of the sort rudely imputed to Socrates by Thrasy-machus in the first book of Plato's *Republic* (1.343a7-9).

Polybius' ideas about democracy are quite consistent. He only admired democracy of a limited kind. This conception of democracy is reflected in his frequent employment of the term in the broader sense of a republican form of government as opposed to kingship or tyranny, a usage for which parallels can be cited in other texts of the Hellenistic period.¹⁶ According to him, a constitution is not democratic when the entire citizen body (*pan plêthos*) may do whatever it wishes. A state is properly called a democracy when respect for the gods, parents, elders and laws is customary and habitual, and when issues are decided by a majority of citizens (6.4.4-5). Religion is an instrument by which the leaders of society should control the volatile masses, who are filled with lawless desires, irrational anger

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and violent passions (6.12.3-11; 6.56.6-12).¹⁷ Where respect for religion, family, custom and law is absent, it is mob rule (*okhlokratia*), the degenerate product of democracy, that prevails (6.4.6). Polybius praised Philopoemen, who played an active role in the political life of the Achaean League, a democratic state, for the most part without courting the favour of the multitude, but speaking his own mind (23.12.8-9). The fact that he praised democracy in Achaea indicates that Polybius viewed the League as a conservative state in which the masses were ordinarily restrained, a condition that was threatened when large numbers of workers presumed to exercise their democratic rights in the year 146.¹⁸

According to Polybius, in a democracy the populace must be restrained because there is a constant danger that they will convert the constitution into mob rule. Democracy is transformed into mob rule (*okhlokratia*) when the people turn to violence (*hybris*) and lawlessness (*paranomia*) (6.4.10). At 6.9.5-9, Polybius discusses the change in more detail. The populace in a democratic state, corrupted by ambitious members of the political elite, grow accustomed to living at the expense of others. Choosing a bold leader from their own class, they institute the rule of brawn (*kheirokratia*), in which they resort to massacre, banishment and redistribution of land. In this way, democracy is transformed into force (*bia*) and the rule of brawn (*kheirokratia*) until the multitude, rendered savage (*apotethêriômenon*), finds itself once again subject to the despotic rule of a monarch at the beginning of a new constitutional cycle.¹⁹

The populace also threaten the stability of the mixed constitution, which is composed of the best elements of kingship, aristocracy and democracy, co-existing in a state of balance (6.10.6-11; 6.11-18; 6.51.1-2). At 6.57.5-9, Polybius explains how this will happen (cf. 6.9.12-14; 6.51.3-8). That he was thinking specifically of Rome in this passage is evident from his reference to a state that has attained supremacy and unrivalled power (6.57.5). According to Polybius, the mixed constitution will collapse when the people, courted by ambitious members of the political class, and filled with conceit, are no longer willing to obey the leading men or to share power with them, but want most or all of the power for themselves. When this happens, the constitution will be called democratic, but in reality mob rule (*okhlokratia*), the worst type of government, will emerge (6.57.8-9).

The *Histories* describe several instances of conditions approaching mob rule. For example, the populace (*dêmos*) of fifth-century Athens, unwilling to obey their leaders, and rent by internal dissension, often brought disaster on the city. All decisions were taken by a crowd (*okhlos*) following its own impulse. As a result, the Athenians did not achieve lasting success, and whatever success they did attain was not due to the merits of their constitution (Polyb. 6.44).

Since the time of the mythical Lycurgus, the Spartans had enjoyed a mixed constitution, but after the battle of Leuctra (371 BC), and most clearly after the revolution of Cleomenes (235-222), their political system

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had deteriorated (Polyb. 4.81.12-14; 6.3.7-8; 6.51.1-2).²⁰ Several years after the defeat of Cleomenes by Antigonus Doson, king of Macedonia, Sparta was rent by civil strife in which three ephors who wished to support Aetolia against Macedonia in the Social War massacred their opponents (Polyb. 4.22-4, 220 BC). In the following year, the same men arranged the assassination of the new ephors and the expulsion of other persons who opposed making an alliance with the Aetolians. Loyal to Cleomenes, who died in 219, they only now secured the appointment of new kings to succeed him (Polyb. 4.34-5). Later in that year Chilon, wishing to supplant one of the recently appointed kings, attempted to continue the revolutionary social programme of Cleomenes. In order to win their support, he promised the multitude allotments and redistributions of land. After much bloodshed, however, his scheme failed (Polyb. 4.81.1-11). Polybius regarded Chilon's activity as part of a larger pattern of decline evident especially from the time of Cleomenes. The deterioration, which involved a host of troubles, civil conflicts, redistributions of land, expulsions, and the most bitter servitude, culminated in the tyranny of Nabis (207-192 BC) (Polyb. 4.81.12-14). Under his rule, the violence continued. Diodorus (27.1) reports that Nabis killed Pelops, the legitimate king of Sparta, and Polybius (13.6.3) states that he killed 'the rest', a phrase that probably refers to other members of the king's family.²¹ In addition, Nabis expelled and assassinated men distinguished by wealth or ancestry, redistributing their property to the most distinguished of those who remained, to his repugnant mercenaries, and to slaves (i.e. Helots) whom he liberated and married to the wives and daughters of their persecuted masters (Polyb. 13.6.3-10; 16.13.1). At Argos, he and his wife extorted valuables from the wealthy (Polyb. 18.17.1-5). Thus Polybius viewed the later constitution of Sparta as a kind of mob rule, in which a succession of popular leaders corrupted and gratified the multitude through violence and illegality.²²

The Arcadian city of Cynaetha, which belonged to the Achaean League, was captured by the Aetolians in 220 BC. For many years, the city had been gripped by serious and continual internal strife marked by frequent massacres, expulsions, seizures of property and redistributions of land committed by either side. The party that favoured revolution, although recently permitted to return to their homes, treacherously betrayed the city to the Aetolians (Polyb. 4.16.11-18.8).

In 216/5 or 215/4, a democratic regime was established in Messene. The most distinguished men were banished, and the persons to whom their property was allotted gained control of the new government (Polyb. 7.10-14 with 4.31.1-2 and 4.32.1).²³

At the end of the third century BC, Molpagoras of Cius, a demagogue (*dêmagôgikos*), courted the multitude and subjected the wealthy to the power of the mob (*hoi okhloi*). He killed some of his victims and banished others, confiscating their property and dividing it among the many. In this fashion, he soon acquired monarchic power (Polyb. 15.21).

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At 20.6.1-6, Polybius describes social and political conditions prevailing within the Boeotian League at the time of the war between Rome and Antiochus III of Syria. The Boeotians, who had enjoyed a brief season of glory and democracy in the time of Epaminondas and Pelopidas (371-362 BC), subsequently experienced a reversal of fortune (Polyb. 6.43; 8.35.6; 20.4-5). In the late third and early second centuries BC, the decadence of the League was evident in a protracted suspension of jurisdiction, the introduction of public relief for the poor, and the dissipation of private fortunes in a carnival of riotous self-indulgence. Corrupted by public support, the multitude elected to office men who would enable them to evade the legal consequences of their crimes and debts. The man who contributed the most to this state of affairs was Opheltas, who was continually devising some new scheme that appeared beneficial to the many for the moment, but was sure to ruin everyone later.

In his account of Boeotian affairs in the year 187/6, Polybius (22.4.1-3) states that some persons called for a final settlement of legal disputes that had for a long time been left unresolved because of the suspension of jurisdiction. Although the hopes of all who desired a revolution (*pasi tois kainotomein epiballomenois*) had been disappointed, these disaffected citizens (*hoi kakhektai*), being more numerous than the wealthy (*hoi euporoi*), nevertheless put up strong resistance, until a series of unforeseen events led to the victory of those who pursued the better course (*tois ta beltisth' hairoumenois*). Thus Polybius makes it clear that there was no revolution in Boeotia. There were no massacres, no banishments, no redistributions of land. Wealth, however, was tacitly transferred through the virtual immunity granted to criminals and debtors, through public assistance granted to the poor, and through the lavish expenditures of wealthy men who (Polybius implies) were more devoted to private enjoyment than to the welfare of their country.²⁴

From the end of the Third Macedonian War until his death in 160/59, Charops dominated political life in Epirus (cf. Polyb. 30.12; 30.13.4; 30.32.12). He murdered and assassinated some citizens, confiscating their property. Next he proscribed and exiled wealthy men and women, exploiting the resulting terror to strip them of their property. Finally he brought all the proscribed before the popular assembly at Phoenice. Terrorized and corrupted by Charops, the majority condemned all the accused to death, thus forcing them into exile. Charops was assisted in his outrages by his friends, the most debased and unprincipled men, who were attracted to his cause by the prospect of sharing in the theft of other people's property (Polyb. 32.5-6).

In 146 BC Critolaus, general of the Achaean League, instructed the city magistrates to suspend enforcement of regulations governing repayment of debt until the end of the contemplated war against Sparta (Polyb. 38.11.10).²⁵ Through this piece of demagogery (*démagogia*), he won the complete confidence and support of the multitude who, ensnared by imme-

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diate gratification and relief, could not foresee what would happen (38.11.11). Thus they failed to understand that Critolaus' plan to declare war on Sparta would involve the League in conflict with Rome (38.12.3; 38.13.6). Envoys sent by Quintus Caecilius Metellus addressed the federal assembly in the spring of 146, imploring the Achaeans not to declare war against Sparta (38.12.1-3). Critolaus rejected their advice, acting against the wishes of the federal magistrates (38.12.7) and resisting their attempt to restrain him (38.13.1).²⁶ Having stirred up the mob (*hoi okhloi*), he persuaded the Achaeans to declare war on Sparta and secured ratification of a constitutional change granting supreme authority to the general, the chief executive of the Achaean League. By this means, Critolaus acquired a sort of monarchic power. Polybius considered both measures illegal (38.13.6-7).²⁷

Even the Romans had taken their first step on the path leading to mob rule. When Gaius Flaminius distributed the *ager Gallicus* by allotment to the people in 232 BC, his demagogic programme (*dêmagôgia kai politeia*) began the perversion of the populace (*ho dêmos*) into a worse condition (Polyb. 2.21.7-8).²⁸ At 3.80.3, Polybius describes Flaminius as a demagogue (*dêmagôgon*) who curried favour with the mob (*okhlókopon*). It may be noted that the ancient historian, on the contrary, praised Scipio Aemilianus for not courting the masses (31.29.8-12). To sum up, all of these examples show that Polybius consistently opposed social reform and genuine popular control because they threatened to result in mob rule and revolution.

Finally, Polybius viewed popular control as a cause of political weakness. According to him, the best constitution is one that combines the finest elements of the three simple forms (kingship, aristocracy, democracy), a hybrid that we may call the mixed constitution (4.81.12; 6.3.7-8; 6.10-18). Underlying this doctrine, however, lies a tacit preference for aristocracy. This emerges from the way Polybius compares the political organization of Rome and Carthage at the time of the Second Punic War. Pointing out that the belligerents had reached different stages in the evolution of their mixed constitutions, he explains that at Rome, where the mixed constitution was at its prime, the senate, or the best men (*hoi aristoi*), had the decisive voice in public affairs. On the contrary, although the Carthaginian system had originally been well devised, the multitude (*to plêthos*) being sovereign in matters strictly pertaining to them, this was no longer the case. At Carthage, where the mixed constitution showed signs of decadence, the people (*ho dêmos*), or the many (*hoi polloi*), now exercised that prerogative. As a result, the Romans made better decisions about public affairs, and therefore eventually defeated Carthage (6.51). It was probably this assessment of the senate's relative position within the mixed constitution of Rome that led Polybius to say at 23.14.1 that Scipio Africanus pursued fame in an aristocratic state (*en aristokratikôi politeumati*).²⁹

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Thus Polybius supported the establishment of conservative regimes in the cities of Achaëa in part because he wanted to combat the increasing influence of the populace, a trend that he considered to be a cause of political weakness and the dangerous prelude to mob rule. The new constitutions, in his eyes, heralded a guarantee of democracy in the true sense, in which the people would be guided by their betters.

To sum up, by supporting the establishment of conservative governments in the cities of the Achaean League, Polybius certainly did collaborate with Rome, but his activity did not spring from simple dedication to the Roman cause. In the first place, he believed that prudent cooperation was the only sensible course for less powerful states such as Achaëa. The League would avoid further trouble by instituting the conservative regimes desired by Rome. Moreover, Polybius himself preferred limited democracy as the best means of preventing a slide into revolutionary conditions. That he did not act in the expectation of ignoble personal gain is evident in his refusal to accept as a gift from the ten commissioners a portion of the estate of Diaeus, which had been confiscated by the Romans and was about to be sold at auction by the quaestor, and from the fact that he begged his friends not to purchase any confiscated property offered for sale by that magistrate (Polyb. 39.4).

The historian was proud of his efforts to promote the constitution and laws imposed by the Romans, and of the crowning success he had achieved in these matters (Polyb. 39.5.1-3; 39.8.1). But a reflection that he makes in the last extant chapter of the *Histories* betrays his insecurity about the permanence of his work. Polybius begged all the gods to grant that he might spend the rest of his life in his present condition, that is, as a successful and respected statesman, because he realized that Fortune is apt to envy men, and is most powerful in that domain wherein a man thinks most of all that he is fortunate and successful (39.8.2). The entrenched disparity and unyielding parsimony advocated by Polybius served the interest of the class to which he belonged. *Sed Timor et Minae / scandunt eodem quo dominus, neque / decedit aerata triremi et / post equitem sedet atra Cura*. In the cycle of constitutions, democracy is followed by mob-rule, a parlous condition destined to overtake even the mixed constitution of Rome.³⁰

Appendix on Paus. 7.16.9

Evidence for the constitutions imposed by Rome after 146 BC appears in the following ancient texts: Bradeen, 1966: 326-9, no. 7; Rhodes, 1997: 70 (Argos, unpublished, B); *RDGE* 43; Polyb. 39.5.1-5; Paus. 7.16.9; 8.30.9; App. *Mith.* 151-2; Zonar. 9.31.6-7. These constitutions were imposed on the cities of Greece that had fought against the Romans during the Achaean War (see Accame, 1946: 1-22). Ferrary, 1988: 189-90, and Kallet-Marx, 1995b: 141-3 (cf. Kallet-Marx, 1995a: 47, 72-3) date *RDGE* 43 in 144/3 BC.

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After temporary dissolution, the Achaean League was reconstituted by the Romans in a reduced form (Polyb. 39.5.5; Paus. 7.16.9-10, with Schwertfeger, 1974: 27-63; Walbank, 1979: 734-5).

According to Paus. 7.16.9, the Romans abolished democracies (*dēmokratias*) in Greece and introduced property qualifications (*timēmatôn*) for tenure of public office (*tas arkhas*). Since he contrasted these two statements by using the particles *men* and *de*, Pausanias distinguished two forms of constitution, evidently democracy and oligarchy. It is sometimes denied that the Romans overthrew democratic regimes in Greece. Gruen, 1984: 525, for instance, observes that there is no evidence to confirm the statement of Pausanias regarding the introduction of property qualifications. Ferrary (1988: 194-209) as well as Kallet-Marx (1995a: 57-9, 65-76; 1995b: 132) argue that, since the introduction of formal property qualifications would have made no real difference in the accessibility of public office within the conservative cities of Achaea, such a measure would not have amounted to abolition of democracy in the broader sense of the term current in the second century BC; thus Pausanias overestimated its significance. Ferrary (1988: 194-209) and Lafond (1996: 171-6) maintain that abolition of democracy was an unwarranted inference arising from the author's hostility to Rome. Bernhardt, 1985: 221, argues that the constitutional changes described by Pausanias were only temporary, for the epigraphical record shows that after 146 the Achaean cities continued to be democratic in the broader sense of the term.

It is certainly true that, in the Hellenistic period, the term 'democracy' often denoted a republican form of government as opposed to monarchy or tyranny, and might thus refer to a broad range of constitutions, including aristocratic and oligarchic regimes. Polybius, for instance, often contrasted democracy with kingship and tyranny (see pp. 137-8 and n. 16 above). Moreover, he sometimes treated conservative states, notably the Achaean League itself, as democratic (see pp. 137-8 and n. 18 above). Thus, if Pausanias intended the democracies mentioned at 7.16.9 to be understood as democracies in the broader sense, the introduction of property qualifications might not seem important enough to justify his remark about the end of democracy in the cities of Achaea.

However, if Pausanias was speaking of democracy in the narrower sense, that measure would indeed justify his statement. In the first place, at Paus. 7.16.9 the term *arkhai* may include not only magistrates properly speaking but also members of the council (*boulê*). In Plato's *Apology*, for instance, Socrates (32a9-b1) declares that he has never held any other magistracy (*arkhên*), but has served as a member of the council (*ebouleusa*). In the *Politics*, Aristotle (5.1306b6-9; 6.1317b30-1; 6.1322b12-17; 6.1323a6-10) treats membership in the council (*boulê*) as a magistracy (*arkhê*), explaining that it is not the individual councillor (*bouleutês*) who is vested with office as magistrate (*arkhôn*) but the council (*boulê*) as a whole (3.1282a34-7). At 6.45.5, Polybius uses the word *arkhê* to denote the

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office held by the Spartan kings as well as that occupied by members of the *gerousia*. Secondly, according to Aristotle, property qualifications (*timēmata*) for tenure of office (*arkhai*) are a characteristic feature of oligarchy (*Pol.* 4.1292a39-b4; 4.1294b7-10; 5.1306b6-9; 6.1320b21-5). Thus the institution of formal property qualifications for magistrates properly speaking (and possibly councillors as well) in the cities of Achaea would signal a departure from democracy in the narrower sense.

Moreover, it should not be assumed that Pausanias' observation about the abolition of democracy was based exclusively on the institution of property qualifications. It is quite possible that he knew about a variety of measures which, taken as a whole, concentrated political power in the cities of Achaea within the highest levels of the social and economic elite. Roman intervention within other states may suggest what sort of changes could have been imposed in Greece after 146 in addition to property qualifications for tenure of public office.

When he reorganized the political institutions of the Thessalian cities in 194 BC, Flamininus, with a view to ending popular agitation, provided that councillors and jurymen should be chosen principally on the basis of a property requirement. By this means he ensured that the cities would be controlled by the class that preferred peace and security (*Livy* 34.51.3-6; cf. *RDGE* 9, lines 50-3, 63-4). As stipulated by the *Lex Pompeia*, in Bithynia-Pontus the *bouleutai* of each city, appointed for life by censors from the ranks of ex-magistrates and private citizens belonging to distinguished families, were subject to a formal property qualification. The *Lex Rupilia* for Sicily ordained the election of councillors under similar conditions, though the precise method of election is not known (see Sherwin-White, 1966: 643, 720; Macro, 1980: 661-2; De Ste-Croix, 1981: 300-17, 518-37; Quass, 1993: 382-4). While he was governor of Asia in 61-59 BC, Quintus Tullius Cicero ensured that the government of the Greek cities should be conducted by aristocrats (*Cic. QFr.* 1.1.25). In his speech *Pro Flacco*, delivered in 59 BC, Cicero implies that the upper classes had controlled the government of the Asiatic cities prior to the First Mithridatic War, though he suggests that the multitude could be blamed for stirring up the Greek cities against Rome (*Cic. Flac.* 58). Membership in the *boulê* of Temnos was held for life (*Cic. Flac.* 43). Aristotle (*Pol.* 6.1317b41-1318a3) implies that tenure of important offices (*arkhai*) for life is characteristic of oligarchy. It has already been observed that the institution of property qualifications for councillors would mark a transition from democracy in the narrower sense to oligarchy; the appointment of councillors for life would signify the same kind of change. Such measures, if imposed on the defeated cities of Greece after 146, would have indicated the end of democracy in the narrower sense of the term.

That the Romans did ordain the appointment of councillors for life after the Achaean War is suggested by a passage in Appian (*Mith.* 151-2). Describing the capture of Athens by Sulla in 86 BC, this author relates

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that the Roman general executed the tyrant Aristion and his bodyguard, as well as those who had held any magistracies under his rule or had done anything else contrary to the regulations prescribed for them after the Achaean War. He pardoned the others (Appian continues) and established for all of them laws that were substantially the same as those which had earlier been laid down for them by the Romans.

Appian, it may be noted, wrongly supposed that the Romans had given the Athenians a constitution after 146, for such regulations were imposed only on the Greeks who fought against Rome in the Achaean War (Accame, 1946: 1-22). Thus Appian's statement should be corrected to mean that Sulla punished those Athenians who had violated the earlier constitution of their city, and that he introduced or sanctioned regulations closely resembling the earlier arrangements (cf. Habicht, 1997: 314-15). It is, however, significant that the historian viewed the constitutional regulations made by Sulla for Athens after 86 as the restoration of an earlier constitution, incorrectly identified by Appian as regulations imposed by the Romans, for this error demonstrates that the Athenian constitution restored by Sulla was associated in his mind with those assigned by Rome to the defeated Greeks after 146. Thus Appian's statements may be taken to imply that the Athenian constitution of the late second and early first centuries, subsequently restored by Sulla, resembled the arrangements made for the cities that opposed Rome in the Achaean War.

What is known of the Athenian constitution before and after Sulla indicates a conservative regime (Habicht, 1997: 321-8). In the later second century (after 167), the Council of the Areopagus, consisting of ex-archons sitting for life, was an important body whose president, the Herald of the Areopagus, became one of the chief Athenian magistrates (Badian, 1976: 105-28; Tracy, 1979: 213-35; Tracy, 1982: 155-82; Habicht, 1997: 315-16). The conservative nature of this regime may be contrasted with new arrangements introduced at the time of the First Mithridatic War. It was perhaps under the tyrant Athenion (who preceded Aristion) that the *dêmos* of Athens adopted (with additions) a constitution proposed at an earlier stage by the Council of the Areopagus. The decree of the *dêmos* concerning this constitution refers to democracy as well as use of the lot and election for appointment to public office; it also includes provisions relating to use of the lot (see Oliver, 1980: 199-201; cf. *SEG* 49.128). Habicht, 1997: 320-1, regards the date and context of this decree as uncertain, though he does not cite the article of Oliver. At any rate, the reference to democracy and use of the lot suggests some kind of reaction to the conservative government of the later second century BC. After Sulla's intervention, the Council of the Areopagus was the dominant political body in Athens (Geagan, 1974: 51-6; Rawson, 1985b: 59-66; Habicht, 1997: 316-20).

Thus the Athenian constitution before and after Sulla featured a governing council consisting of ex-magistrates serving for life. Since Appian may be taken to imply that the Athenian constitution before and after

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Sulla resembled the regulations imposed on the defeated Greeks after the Achaean War, it appears likely that, after 146, the Romans prescribed for these cities councils composed of ex-magistrates sitting for life. To sum up, Pausanias' evidence about the institution of property qualifications for tenure of public office in itself indicates a transition from democracy in the narrower sense. If (as seems likely) the Romans extended these property requirements to councillors and decreed that the *bouleutai* should sit for life, such measures would confirm a change in the direction of oligarchy.

At this point, several difficulties may be addressed. First, Bernhardt, 1985: 221-2, maintains that, after 146, the Romans avoided converting the *boulai* of the subject Greek cities into councils based on life membership. In support of this view, he cites (p. 222 n. 615) two inscriptions demonstrating (he believes) that the *boulai* continued to function as annually elected bodies. In neither case, however, does this appear certain. *IG* 7.190, lines 29-30 (from Pagae, 65/4-57/6 BC; cf. *SEG* 50.480 and 1753), reports the beginning of a decree of the magistrates and councillors from all years and the assembly (*edoxe tois arkhouisi kai synedrois ek pantôn tôn eteôn kai tõi damôi*). According to A. Wilhelm, followed by Ferrary, this decree refers to former and current magistrates and councillors, a situation leading Ferrary (1987-1989: 212 and n. 59) to believe that membership in the council was held for life. While I agree that life membership is indicated here, I believe this conclusion must be based on a different interpretation of the text. A decree can be approved only by the magistrates currently in office and by the council and assembly as currently constituted. Therefore the phrase 'from all years' in this document can apply only to the councillors, and only if they are identified as those currently sitting, having been appointed for life in any year, and thus including all members, ranging from those with the greatest to the least seniority. *IG* 5.2.266, lines 41-2 (from Mantinea, 44/3 BC; cf. *SEG* 46.437), refers to a decree of the magistrates and councillors in the 103rd year (*kathôs edoxe tois arkhouisi kai synedrois tois en tõi tritôi hekatostôi etei*). In this case, the phrase 'in the 103rd year' dates the document with reference to the magistrates currently in office and to the council as currently constituted. Although the councillors might be a body of men chosen to constitute the *boulê* exclusively in the 103rd year (as Ferrary, 1987-1989: 212 and n. 58, as well as Bernhardt maintain), they could also be men appointed for life at different times who formed the council during the year in question. Thus, although categorical evidence for lifelong membership of the *boulê* is not available, the inscriptions cited by Bernhardt do not themselves prove the persistence of annually elected councils in the Greek cities brought under Roman supervision after 146.

Second, Bernhardt, 1985: 221, infers that the constitutional changes mentioned by Pausanias were merely temporary, because the epigraphical record demonstrates the persistence of institutions characteristic of democracy in the broader sense of the term. To this one may reply that the

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inscriptions (mainly decrees) refer merely to the existence of and to decisions taken by magistrates, councils and assemblies, without explaining their relative power, or providing details about the qualifications required of magistrates and councillors, or identifying the term for which the *bouleutai* served. Thus the formal elements of these constitutions may conceal changes that would be consistent with Pausanias' statement about the abolition of democracy in the narrower sense. Against the notion that the changes imposed by Rome after 146 were only temporary may also be set the evidence of *RDGE* 9, lines 50-3, 63-4, which shows that the arrangements made in Thessaly by Flamininus in 194 BC (Livy 34.51.3-6) were still in effect around 140. Even more revealing is the anxious prayer of Polybius, who at the end of the *Histories* begged the gods to assure the endurance of his political achievements in Achaea (39.8.2). Since Polybius finished his work around 117 BC, his *cri de coeur* indicates that the regulations prescribed by Rome after 146 were still valid some thirty years later. Thus the evidence at our disposal, on balance, points to a permanent abolition of democracy in the narrower sense.

At 7.16.9 Pausanias does, in my view, refer to democracy in this way. The term 'democracy' was still used in the narrower sense during the Hellenistic period (see p. 137 n. 15 above) and even during the early principate. Polybius, for instance, often treats democracy as a constitution under which the multitude rules, in contrast to a regime in which power is exercised by one or a few (see p. 137 and n. 15 above). Cicero does likewise in his treatise *De Re Publica*, where he outlines the six standard forms of constitution. These include democracy, which he calls *civitas popularis* (1.42-54; 1.65-9; 2.41-50; 3.43-8). In this work, he explains how radical democracy (described as a constitution under which power is exercised by the *multitudo* or by *plurimi*) was precluded at Rome by the weighted character of the centuriate assembly as contrived by Servius Tullius, who assigned control to the wealthy classes (2.39-40). He also observes that all Rhodians shared in the administration of their democratic state, which he calls *popularis res publica* (3.48; cf. Sall. *Ep. Caes.* 2.7.12). In an attack on classical Greek democracy and its contemporary offspring, he contrasted the strictly organized Roman assembly, restrained by the senate, with the unlimited freedom of the corresponding Greek bodies, where important decisions were made by an undifferentiated crowd of unreflecting, inconstant, ignorant, impressionable and easily corrupted workers (Cic. *Flac.* 15-19, 57-8; cf. *Sest.* 126-7). In his *Rhetorica* (ed. Sudhaus), the Epicurean philosopher Philodemus says (vol. 1, p. 375, col. 97, lines 3-7) that politicians want to plant their foot in the stupidest kind of state, democracy (*têi dêmokratiai*). Elsewhere (vol. 2, p. 39, col. 40, lines 5-9) he refers to the most effective leaders, whether of democracy (*dêmokratias*) or of monarchy (*monarkhias*) or of any kind of state whatsoever (*hêsdepote politeias*). In the early Julio-Claudian period, Strabo (1.1.18, C 10-11) refers to democracy (*dêmokratia*) as the form of

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government in which sovereignty (*hégemonia*) is exercised by the people (*ho dêmos*). In another passage (14.2.5, C 652), he notes that the Rhodians care for the people (*dêmokêdeis eisin*) but are not democratic (*ou dêmokratoumenoi*), a statement implying that power exercised by the people, not the government's solicitude for their welfare, is what distinguishes a state as democratic. Most importantly, Pausanias himself disapproved of democracy in the sense of genuine popular rule (see Habicht, 1985: 109-10; to the references given there add Paus. 1.8.3). He is especially critical of democracy at 4.35.5, where he discusses events in Epirus around 230 BC (see Musti, 1967: 183-4). Thus, at 7.16.9, Pausanias is probably referring to democracy in the narrower sense, and the evidence on balance indicates that he was right to conclude that the Romans did away with it. An ancient observer judging according to the doctrine of Aristotle would consider the new constitutions oligarchic.

Polybius, as we have noted, defined democracy as a regime based on effective rule by the people, and considered this to be the best of the three legitimate forms of government. On the other hand, he regarded true democracy as a limited form of popular rule in which the people are restrained by the upper classes. In other words, what he initially describes as democracy in the narrower sense turns out to be democracy in the broader sense of the term. In the extant fragments of the *Histories*, Polybius does not specify what form of constitution the Romans assigned to the subject cities of Greece after 146. In view of his dedicated efforts to promote the new arrangements, we may at any rate be assured of their conservative nature. The observations of Pausanias point in the same direction. We may therefore suppose that Polybius would have considered the new constitutions imposed by Rome after 146 to be true democracies based on limited popular rule.

Two final issues remain. Although, in my view, the events portrayed in *RDGE* 43 do involve social-economic problems, I am now persuaded by Robert Kallet-Marx (1995b: 143-53) that the letter of Quintus Fabius Maximus to the city of Dyme cannot be used as evidence of a social-democratic revolutionary movement aiming to redress the grievances of the poor or to overthrow a pro-Roman oligarchy. This document, therefore, does not prove that the constitution imposed on Dyme by the Romans was oligarchic. Second, in his impressive study of the decrees issued by Greek states, Rhodes (1997: 98) observes that, in the texts dated immediately after 146, there is no unambiguous evidence for the existence of assemblies in the cities that had opposed Rome. Thus he cautiously suggests that for a time there may have been none. But his comments on *SEG* 22.266, a decree of the assembly (*tôi damôi*) and council (*tois synedrois*) of Argos dated c. 100 BC, reveal his grounds for hesitation on this point (1997: 71). Thus the oligarchic nature of the constitutions imposed by Rome after 146, although evident in other ways, is not demonstrated by *RDGE* 43 or the documents collected by Rhodes.

Polybius, Rome, Barbarism and Fate

This chapter will deal with two questions on which it is difficult to identify Polybius' deepest convictions, namely, whether he considered the Romans barbarians, and whether he genuinely felt that the expansion of Roman dominion was guided by a superhuman force. The tentatively affirmative answers offered here to these questions will suggest that the historian evinced a certain intellectual distance from the ruling power.

Romans, Greeks and barbarians

As several recent studies have shown, Polybius represents the Romans alternately as civilized or uncivilized, as similar to Greeks or barbarians. He also reports occasions on which Greeks explicitly called the Romans barbarians (1.11.7 with 1.10.2; 5.104.1-11; 9.32.3-39.7; 11.4.1-6.8; 18.22.8). In one passage, moreover (12.4b.2-3), he implicitly calls the Romans barbarians in his own voice. Polybius' ambivalence on this point, as well as his willingness to cite the explicitly hostile statements of others, reflect the complexity of his views on Roman identity, which oscillate between the cultural responses of assimilation and alienation.¹

Three of the Polybian passages in which Greeks explicitly call the Romans barbarians occur in speeches (5.104.1-11: Agelaus; 9.32.3-39.7: Lyciscus; 11.4.1-6.8: Thrasycrates). Judgement on the veracity of these alleged statements depends on the historical accuracy of speeches in the *Histories*, a question on which scholars have disagreed.² Walbank and Sacks, for instance, believe that Polybian speeches are authentic.³ According to Pédech, while some speeches are genuine, others are invented.⁴ Champion and Marincola maintain that the speeches, although essentially authentic, may contain an element of invention.⁵ More specifically, while some scholars argue that the speeches of Agelaus, Lyciscus and Thrasycrates were invented by Polybius, others consider them genuine.⁶

Polybius emphasizes that speeches must be based on a judicious selection of arguments actually used by the speakers (see esp. 2.56.10; 12.25a-b; 12.25i.3-9; 36.1), though in my view he does indicate at 36.1 that he sometimes invented possible arguments (*tous enontas logous*) when this served a legitimate purpose. In this passage, he observes that most historians will report individual speeches, setting forth the possible arguments (*tous enontas logous*) that can be made on either side of the question, when they are dealing with a particularly important issue. He

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goes on to say that, as his own narrative demonstrates, he does not disapprove of this practice, but that he does not purpose to engage in it on every occasion, for it is the duty of historians, not to practise upon their readers, but to report the most opportune and effective arguments among those actually used by the speakers. This statement of the historian's fundamental duty, in my view, does not exclude the invention of possible arguments. Polybius, at the end of this passage, does not condemn the practice of inventing possible arguments, but merely explains why he has chosen to show restraint in Book 36.

On such invention we may also note 12.25i.3-9, where Polybius criticizes Timaeus of Tauromenium, historian of the western Greeks, for relating all the possible arguments (*pantas ... tous enontas logous*) on all subjects (*pros panta*) in the course of inventing arguments (*heuresilogôn*) on every topic (*pros pasan hypothesin*). He himself insists that historians must select only a few of the possible arguments that are appropriate, that is, consistent with the situation, objective and character of the speaker as well as the outcome of his address. Thus Polybius is chastising his predecessor, not in principle for inventing possible arguments, but specifically for including in his work all the possible arguments he could devise.

The same point is made in 12.25k-26, where Polybius explains the accusations he has made against Timaeus in the previous chapter (12.25i). After Gelon the Elder, tyrant of Syracuse, the most capable leaders in Sicily (Polybius says) were Hermocrates, Timoleon and Pyrrhus, to whom one should least of all ascribe childish and pedantic speeches. Timaeus, however, introduced Hermocrates making contradictory statements before a meeting of delegates from the cities of Sicily that took place during the Peloponnesian War (in 424 BC). According to Timaeus, Hermocrates praised the people of Gela and Camarina for ensuring that terms of peace among the Siceliotes should be discussed by the leading citizens, who knew well the difference between war and peace. But the same historian goes on to say that the delegates paid attention to Hermocrates and learned from his remarks the difference between war and peace! This inconsistency, declares Polybius, demonstrates the incompetence of the author. In addition, Timaeus used arguments that no one would believe Hermocrates had employed. The historian's entire procedure, he says, could be compared with the set themes of the rhetorical schools. This whole discussion presupposes that Timaeus has invented arguments but censures him, not in principle for embracing this practice, but specifically for inventing arguments that are not appropriate for the speaker, and for doing so with the carelessness and the indiscriminate zeal of the rhetorical neophyte.

Polybian speeches, therefore, may be taken to represent (with cautious elaboration) substantially what the historian regarded as the arguments actually used by the speakers.⁷ They are, however, composed in the author's own style (29.12.10-11). Like Champion, I find it difficult to

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believe that a writer who was so keen to articulate his historiographical principles, and enjoyed such privileged access to high-ranking sources of information about political events, would deliberately falsify or inappropriately invent crucial details in speeches.⁸ I therefore believe that Agelaus, Lyciscus and Thrasycrates did call the Romans barbarians, either in the speeches reported by Polybius or on other occasions. Such references are not gratuitous inventions of the ancient historian. But he did not hesitate to include them in his work.

One final passage may engage our attention before we leave this subject. In 151/0, after the senate had voted to release the Achaean exiles detained since 168/7, Polybius contemplated asking that a second request be brought before that body, namely, the restoration of honours previously enjoyed by those men in their own country. When he sought the advice of Cato the Elder on this matter, the Censor remarked with a smile that Polybius, like a foolhardy version of Odysseus, wanted to re-enter the cave of the Cyclops because he had forgotten his cap and belt (Polyb. 35.6). The comparison of Polybius to Odysseus may reflect Cato's awareness that the historian had cited the Homeric hero as his exemplar in patience and enterprise (cf. Polyb. 12.27.10-28.6; Paus. 8.30.8). Thus the Censor's Homeric image could be interpreted as innocuous pleasantries complimenting Polybius for his courage and persistence.⁹ But the equation of the *Curia* with the cave of Polyphemus carries darker undertones, for this image may intimate that Cato believed Polybius' deeper feelings about the civilization of Rome to be contemptuous, and it definitely suggests that the answer awaiting the historian, should he venture upon a second request, would not be cordial. On Cato's notion of how Greeks regarded Romans, we may recall what he thought about Greek doctors working at Rome. The medical practitioners of that tribe, he grimly opined, had taken an oath to kill all the barbarians (Pliny *HN* 29.14)! Thus the learned conceit that enlivened Cato's reply to Polybius may not have been intended entirely in a spirit of jest.¹⁰

Rome and Fortune

Polybius sometimes ascribes the growth of Roman power to the purposive agency of Fortune (1.4.1-5; 8.2-3-4; 15.20.5-8; 29.21).¹¹ But his main purpose was to explain this phenomenon in rational terms.¹² Indeed, he regarded the study of rational causes as one of the fundamental tasks of the historian. Thus Fortune, he declares, should be invoked as an historical cause only when events defy rational explanation.¹³

Polybius' attitude towards religion has been much debated. It is often thought that he was a sceptic who regarded religion merely as a useful device for restraining the masses and securing the authority of the political elite.¹⁴ Other scholars maintain that, although Polybius did not believe in the traditional gods, he adopted a philosophical conception of divinity.¹⁵

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Because of his strong rational inclination and his frequent use of metaphorical language on the subject, it has also been doubted that Polybius genuinely believed in Fortune as an objectively existing power governing the world.¹⁶ If Polybius was indeed a sceptic and a rationalist, his references to Fortune as a divinity or natural force should be interpreted as figures of speech devoid of serious theological or philosophical implications.

But even if this is true, how can one accurately chart the deep recesses of the human soul, or catalogue the hidden reserves of faith that spring to consciousness in moments of reflection, anxiety and crisis? How can we be sure that, for Polybius, acknowledging the social utility of religion excluded traditional piety, or that relentless search for rational causes ruled out belief in some inscrutable design? His condemnation of impiety (*asebeia*) committed against the gods, exhibited in the violation of sanctuaries, sacred objects and oaths and in other wicked actions (e.g. 4.17.11; 5.9-12; 11.7.2; 13.6.4; 15.20.4; 16.1.1-6; 18.54.6-12; 32.15.1-14), although sometimes involving awareness of practical disadvantages, may also reflect indignation arising from a deeply felt attachment to traditional religion. Perhaps, then, we may envisage in Polybius some traces of popular belief. Perhaps, *au fond*, even he nourished some residual conception of Fortune as an objectively existing power, divine or natural, that governs the world, and felt that she in some sense produced the universal dominion of Rome.¹⁷

At any rate, whether or not the historian at any level believed in Fortune as a divinity or natural power, his recourse to this concept tacitly expresses his conviction that some events are (in whole or in part) inexplicable. Whether in the *Histories* Fortune is nothing more than belletristic adornment or assumes the role of an objectively existing agent, divine or natural, her appearance betrays Polybius' sense that the imperial achievement of Rome enfolded at its core a residue of mystery. The dominion of Rome eluded the full comprehension of her subjects.

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During his march into Greece, Xerxes reviewed his forces at Abydos, on the shores of the Hellespont. Exalted by the spectacle presented by the vast armament, the king suddenly burst into tears. To his uncle Artabanus, perplexed by his change of mood, Xerxes remarked with sorrow on the brevity of human life, which puts an end to the enjoyment of success. When Artabanus seized this opportunity to voice warnings about the expedition itself, the king insisted on the fundamental soundness of his design, asserted the need to take calculated risks, and confidently predicted a Persian victory. His uncle, however, expressed fear that the campaign would come to grief (Hdt. 7.44-52).

It was probably with this scene in mind that Polybius (38.21.1) described the famous meeting between himself and Scipio Aemilianus that occurred during the formal destruction of Carthage carried out by Scipio in 146 BC.¹ While the surviving text of the *Histories* relates only part of the episode, the whole story may be read in Appian (*Pun.* 628-30), who tells us that Scipio wept as he beheld the destruction of Carthage, reflecting that all cities, nations and empires must endure a change of fortune, and that he recited the words of Hector from the *Iliad* (6.448-9):

*essetai êmar hot' an pot' olôlêi Ilios hirê
kai Priamos kai laos eümmeliô Priamoio.*

The day will come when holy Troy will fall,
Priam, too, and the people of Priam, wielder of the good ashen spear.

When Polybius asked what he meant by these words, Scipio explained that he foresaw with dread that one day someone else might give the same command with regard to Rome.²

Thus Xerxes, dejected in the season of prosperity by nothing more than banal meditation on the transience of human life, needed his uncle to warn of greater dangers. But Scipio himself, at the height of success, envisaged the eventual collapse of the Roman empire. His intelligent contemplation of the mutability of Fortune, in Polybius' view, marked the Roman general as a great and perfect man who deserved to be remembered (38.21.2-3; cf. 6.2.5-6). That Polybius should describe Scipio's reflection at a dramatic historical moment near the end of the *Histories* indicates the importance

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he attached to this theme. Indeed, he emphasized a similar reflection in Book 29, the final volume of the *Histories* as originally designed. At the end of his account of the Third Macedonian War, Polybius (29.21) recalls the words of the Peripatetic philosopher Demetrius of Phalerum who, in his treatise on Fortune, observed how astonishing had been the fall of the Persian empire and the rise of Macedonian rule in his own lifetime, during the reign of Alexander, but declared that Fortune had conferred the wealth of Persia upon the Macedonians only until she might decide to deal with them otherwise. Polybius says that this prediction was fulfilled in the time of Perseus, although it had been made nearly one hundred and fifty years earlier by Demetrius, whose utterance seemed more divine than human, and who therefore deserved to be remembered. Here too, the fact that Polybius described the prediction of Demetrius at a dramatic historical moment near the original end of his work emphasizes the importance of the mutability of Fortune in the historian's thinking. In the season of prosperity, both Demetrius and Scipio reflected on the eventual downfall of a great empire. Their reflections mark the transience of imperial power as a leading motif in Polybius' work. Thus the *Histories* conclude with the suggestion that Roman supremacy would pass away even as the empires of Persia and Macedonia had vanished.³

The eventual fall of the Roman Empire

Polybius believed that the power of Rome was founded on her constitution.⁴ Conversely, he maintained that the Roman empire would eventually fall when this very constitution broke down as a result of corruption. The constitution of every state (he explained) evolves in a natural progression through a limited number of standard forms. As each constitutional form decays, it is succeeded by the next form in the series, and when each series is complete, the same forms are repeated in a new series, indefinitely (Polyb. 6.3-9). This process, can, however, be arrested for a long time by the device of a mixed constitution, which combines the good features and distinctive characteristics of the best forms, the mixed constitution itself being the best system of government (6.10; cf. 6.3.7; 6.18.1). The Romans adopted a mixed constitution (6.11-18), which attained its highest development during the Hannibalic War (6.9.12; 6.11.1-2; 6.51.5; 6.57.10). Nevertheless, since even this type of government eventually declines, the Roman constitution would itself one day change for the worse (6.9.10-14; 6.51.4-5; 6.57.1-4). Moreover, as it was the mixed constitution that sustained the internal unity enabling the Romans to overcome external threats (6.18.1-4), the collapse of this structure would finally result in the loss of their empire.

Polybius offers clear indications of how the Roman constitution would break down. In 6.51, he explains that, during the Second Punic War, the mixed constitutions of Rome and Carthage had reached different stages in

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their evolution. That of Carthage, now in the process of decay, was inferior; that of Rome, now at its prime, was superior. Consequently, while among the Carthaginians the populace (*ho dêmos*, *hoi polloi*, representing the democratic element) was already (*édê*) predominant, among the Romans the senate (*hê synklêtos*, *hoi aristoi*, representing the aristocratic element) was still (*akmên*) most powerful. As a result, the Romans made better decisions and therefore prevailed in the war. Thus, according to Polybius, the ascendancy of the populace marks the decline of the mixed constitution. Since (as he points out in this passage) all states move through a natural cycle of growth, prime and decay, he expected the Roman constitution one day to reach the stage of decline, in which the populace would exercise predominance in public affairs.

At 6.57.5-9, Polybius forecasts what will happen in the end to the Roman constitution. His reference here to a state that has attained unassailable supremacy and power (*eis hyperokhên kai dynasteian adêriton*) clearly indicates that he is talking about Rome, as comparison with several other passages will show. Thus at 1.2.7 Polybius says that the Romans, having made almost all the inhabited world subject to themselves, left behind the supremacy of their own power ([*hyper*]okhên ... [*tês hautôn*] *dynast[eias]*), which was irresistible ([*anyposta*]ton) to contemporaries. At 3.4.2-3 he states that, with the fall of the Antigonid monarchy, the growth of Roman power (*dynasteias*) was now complete, and everyone acknowledged that henceforth Roman orders must be obeyed. He declares at 31.25.6 that, after this time, young Romans thought the power (*exousian*) of their country was unassailable (*adêriton*). Another indication that 6.57.5-9 refers to Rome appears in the fact that the remaining fragments from the *Excerpta Antiqua* at the end of Book 6 (57.10-58.13) contain the historian's concluding remarks about Rome.

How exactly would the mixed constitution of Rome collapse? As a result of long prosperity, the standard of living (he explains) becomes more lavish, and men become more contentious than is proper regarding political office. Love of power (*philarkhia*) and the disgrace entailed by obscurity, as well as the pretension and extravagance of men's lives, initiate a change for the worse. It is, however, the populace (*ho dêmos*) that bears formal responsibility for this change. When they think they are being wronged by some of their political leaders, who are driven by covetousness, and when they are flattered and filled with conceit by others, who are motivated by love of power (*philarkhia*), the populace are no longer willing to obey their political leaders or to exercise equality of power with them, but want all (or the greater) power themselves. When this happens, the constitution changes its name to the finest of all, namely, freedom and democracy, but changes its nature to the worst of all things, namely, mob-rule (*okhlokratia*). Thus Polybius maintains that when the political elite under a mixed constitution become excessively covetous and ambitious, they defraud the people and corrupt them with flattery. The

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people in turn embrace a revolutionary course inspired by their own sense of grievance and their inflated ambitions.

The decline of the mixed constitution to some extent resembles that of democracy, the result in both cases being mob-rule. Several generations after the establishment of democracy, wealthy men especially want to have more power than the many. When they fall prey to lust for power (*to philarkhein*), but cannot achieve their goal through merit, they ruin their estates, ensnaring and corrupting the multitude in every way. Thus, because of their foolish hunger for prestige (*doxophagia*), they make the many hungry for gifts and accustomed to receiving them. When the multitude have grown used to consuming the property of others and to expecting to live at the expense of their neighbours, they choose a bold leader excluded from political office because of his poverty. Now they institute the rule of violence (*kheirokratia*) and resort to massacres, banishments and redistributions of land. In this way democracy is abolished and changes into the rule of force (*bia*) and violence (*kheirokratia*) (6.9.5-9). From the violence (*hybris*) and lawlessness (*paranomia*) of democracy emerges mob-rule (*okhlokratia*) (6.4.10; cf. 6.4.6). In the case of democracy, then, Polybius ascribes the decline of the constitution to the ambition of the political elite, who corrupt the people with material benefits and incite them to improve their estate through revolution.

There are significant differences between the two situations described in 6.57.5-9 and in 6.9.5-9 together with 6.4.10. In the first case, the political elite are driven by greed as well as ambition; they defraud and corrupt the people; the corruption takes the form of flattery; and the people are primarily interested in power. In the second case, the political elite are motivated by ambition; they corrupt the people; the corruption takes the form of material benefits; and the people are primarily interested in material gain. But in both situations, the political elite, because of their ambition, corrupt the populace, who turn to revolution and institute mob-rule.⁵ Since both the mixed constitution and democracy degenerate into mob-rule through similar causes, it appears legitimate to suppose that the process of deterioration in both cases should not be too sharply distinguished. At any rate, Polybius discerned in Roman society of his time certain signs of moral decay corresponding to those he ascribed to both the mixed constitution and democracy in their decadent phase. This in turn indicates that he believed the Romans had taken the first steps towards mob-rule.

First of all, Polybius observes that Rome was still uncorrupted in morals, and moderate in fortune, at the time of the First Punic War (1.13.12). But Roman society had become prosperous after the fall of the Macedonian kingdom, when the riches of that country were carried off by the victors. As a result, there was much display of wealth in private and public life. Moreover, young Romans now thought their universal empire was unassailable. For these reasons, most young men of the upper class (though not Scipio Aemilianus) indulged in extravagant pleasures. Cato

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the Elder declared that this was evidence of deterioration in the state (Polyb. 31.25.2-8).

Polybius, moreover, observed corruption and greed among Romans of the upper class. Writing after 167 BC, he declares that, among the Romans, nothing is considered more shameful than to accept bribes and to derive gain from inappropriate sources (6.56.1-4). Moreover, Roman magistrates and envoys are scrupulously honest in their administration of large sums of money, so that among the Romans one rarely detects a man embezzling public funds (6.56.14-15). Of course, this kind of honesty had also prevailed in earlier times. Thus, when Flamininus conferred with Philip V after the battle of Cynoscephalae (197 BC), the Aetolians (Polybius says) wrongly assumed that the Roman general was treating the king with courtesy because he had accepted a bribe. Furthermore, the historian asserts that, before the sequence of overseas wars fought by the Romans, as long as they preserved their own manners (here he probably means the campaigns waged against Philip V, Antiochus III and Perseus in the years following the Hannibalic War), no Roman would have done such a thing. But, with reference to his own times (*en de tois nun kairois*), probably the years after 146, when he was writing Book 18, he can only say that, individually (*kat' idian*), many men (*pleionôn andrôn*) are able to preserve their integrity. He cites as examples of honest men Lucius Aemilius Paullus, who defeated Perseus, and Scipio Aemilianus, who captured Carthage. Neither of these men took for himself any of the treasures seized from his vanquished enemies (Polyb. 18.34-5; cf. 31.22; 31.25.9-10).⁶

Several passages illustrate Polybius' views about the grinding parsimony of the Roman upper class. Scipio Aemilianus (declares the historian) distinguished himself through his magnanimity and integrity with regard to money. For example, he generously gave to his natural mother impressive items from the estate he inherited from the mother of his adoptive father (the widow of Scipio Africanus). Polybius adds that Scipio's conduct was astonishing because no one at Rome willingly gave away any of his own property to anyone. Scipio, moreover, paid the outstanding half of the dowries owed to the two sisters of his adoptive father, turning over the whole amount at once even though the law allowed three years to complete the transaction. Polybius observes that the husbands of the two women were incredulous because no Roman would part with any sum of money before it was due, so extreme was everyone's exactitude with regard to the balance-sheet and desire to profit from every moment of time. Both men (he continues) were astounded by Scipio's generosity, and felt ashamed of their own meanness, a quality that marked these men even though they were second to none at Rome. After the death of his biological father, Lucius Aemilius Paullus, he gave his entire share of the inheritance to his natural brother, Quintus Fabius Maximus Aemilianus. By such acts of generosity, Scipio acquired a firm reputation for nobility of character (31.25.9-28.13).⁷

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The historian also observes that young men of the wealthy class were very ambitious. They spent their time in the forum, busy with law cases and formal salutations, endeavoring by these means to introduce themselves to the multitude. Once again, Scipio Aemilianus proved the exception. Through illustrious deeds he acquired a universal reputation for courage and far outdid the others in this respect (31.29.8-12).

Finally, Polybius discerns some evidence of ambitious leaders willing to corrupt the people through material benefits. In 232, the tribune Gaius Flaminius sponsored a law dividing the *ager Gallicus* into allotments assigned to Roman settlers. The historian calls this measure a demagogic policy (*dēmagōgian ... kai politeian*) marking, as it were, the beginning of the turn for the worse of the people (*tēs epi to kheiron tou dēmou diastrophēs*) (2.21.7-8). In describing his conduct as consul, Polybius calls the same Flaminius a demagogue (*dēmagōgon*), a servant of the masses (*okhlokopon*), a poor general who feared the mockery of the multitude and yearned to fight against Hannibal before the arrival of his colleague because he wanted all the credit for the victory he anticipated (3.80.3-4). Thus Flaminius resembles the mob-leader who emerges when democracy turns into mob-rule. He may be compared with similar figures from the Greek world described by Polybius (see pp. 138-41 above). According to Polybius, Rome was at her prime during the Hannibalic War, at least as far as her system of government was concerned (*kata ge tēn tēs politeias systasin*) (6.51.5). Perhaps the reservation expressed in this phrase alludes to the scheme of Flaminius and to the process of Roman colonization in general. Polybius must have thought that these practices would make the multitude hungry for gifts and accustomed to receiving them, a dangerous situation that portended revolution.⁸

According to Polybius, every type of constitution is corrupted in two ways, that is, by external and internal causes. While no fixed principle can be stated regarding external causes, internal ones follow a prescribed rule. Thus, although the mixed constitution of Rome may be corrupted at any time by an unpredictable external cause, the process of internal decay makes it possible to predict the next stage of development. Although the mixed constitution stands outside the regular cycle, the historian applies the theory of *anakyklōsis* (i.e. cyclical evolution of constitutions) to it as well because the phenomena causing its destruction are similar to those compassing the fall of democracy, and permit the conclusion that in both cases the next stage is mob-rule (6.57.1-9). Roman society after the fall of Perseus displayed symptoms of decline apt, in his view, to produce that result. The progress of this corruption would eventually destroy the mixed constitution, whose disappearance would in turn lead to the collapse of the Roman empire.

Some disquieting symptoms of military decline were already visible after 168. First of all, at 1.64.1-2, Polybius observes that the Romans were not able to man as many ships, or to operate such large fleets, as during the First Punic War. He dates this situation explicitly in the period after

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the defeat of Perseus, when Rome had attained universal dominion (*kekratêkotes tôn holôn*). In the same passage, he declares that he will explain the reasons for this problem when he comes to discuss the political institutions of Rome in detail (i.e. in Book 6). Thus Polybius connected this instance of military decline with political causes. Could it be that the Roman populace and their brethren among the allies were no longer willing to serve in sufficient numbers aboard ship? If this was the explanation offered by Polybius, the ancient historian will have traced military decline to corruption of the mixed constitution.

Furthermore, Polybius (35.4) describes how, in 152/1, when Rome was fighting the Celtiberians, an unusual fear gripped young Romans, the likes of which old men had never witnessed before. This fear, he explains, arose when reports were received about the brave resistance put up by the enemy and the heavy losses suffered by the Romans. As a result of cowardice, men eligible to serve as military tribune did not come forward in sufficient numbers to fill the required number of posts, and legates named by the consuls would not comply with the summons. Worst of all, young men of the rank and file avoided enrolment. When the senate and magistrates could find no remedy for the situation, it was only the example of Scipio Aemilianus, who offered to go to Spain as military tribune or legate, that shamed young men into serving as legates or presenting themselves for enrolment in the ranks.

This general unwillingness to perform military service indicates that young Romans, instead of heeding the magistrates implicitly, made a personal decision based on their own assessment of conditions in the field. Once again, it is possible to trace a military problem to political causes, for young Romans in this case would not respect the authority of the magistrates. Polybius would have connected the military crisis with corruption of the mixed constitution, for men of all classes were resisting the authority of the magistrates. Both of these cases illustrate how the decline of the mixed constitution might already endanger Roman dominion.

The indefinite continuation of Roman rule

Polybius, however, does not suggest that the fall of the mixed constitution is imminent. At 6.18.5-8, he explains that whenever the Romans, freed from external fears, experience continuous good fortune and abundance stemming from success and, in the enjoyment of prosperity, flattery and idleness, turn towards insolence and arrogance (symptoms he describes at 31.25.2-8), the mixed constitution itself cures the problem. For whenever one part of the state is contentious and has too much power, the other parts counteract it and the original balance is restored. Thus the mixed constitution and the Roman empire will persist for some time.

Another reason to think that Polybius did not expect the imminent demise of Roman power may be found in his judgement of Rome's policy

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towards subject states. As noted earlier (see pp. 87-101 above), the historian maintained that empire is preserved through moderation and beneficence, but lost through injustice and severity, and he believed that the Romans on balance followed the right course, both before and after the fall of the Macedonian monarchy. Indeed, it can be argued that one of his principal reasons for writing the extension of the *Histories* was a desire to show that Rome continued to observe moderation and beneficence in the years after 168. Respect for this principle suggested to Polybius that Roman power could be expected to continue indefinitely.

In 3.4.1-12, the historian explains his decision to extend his account beyond 168 to the year 145 BC. This passage represents an addition belonging to the expanded programme of the *Histories*. With the destruction of the Macedonian monarchy in 168, Roman power (he writes) was now complete, and everyone admitted that henceforth all must obey the Romans (3.4.2-3). If on the basis of success or failure alone we could adequately judge whether men and states deserve blame or praise, he might have ended his work at that point (3.4.1). However, judgements about conquerors and the conquered based exclusively on such criteria are not definitive, for what appears to be the greatest success has brought the greatest misfortunes to many peoples if they fail to use their success properly; conversely, the most astounding calamities have often turned around to the advantage of many peoples when they accept them nobly (3.4.4-5). Therefore (Polybius concludes) he must add to his previous account a description of the subsequent policy of the victors, showing how it served to govern the world, along with an exposition of the attitudes and judgements formed by other states about the rulers, as well as a statement of the impulses and inclinations prevailing both in private life and in public policy within each state (3.4.6). This material (he says) will permit contemporaries to judge whether Roman domination should be rejected or accepted, and future generations to determine whether the Roman empire deserves praise and imitation, or blame (3.4.7). The usefulness of the *Histories* for the present and future will consist precisely in the facilitation of such judgements (3.4.8). The expanded version of Polybius' work will prove useful in this way because it will show why the Romans subjugated all nations. As in all human endeavours, the Romans acted for the sake of the resulting pleasure, good or advantage (3.4.9-11). Thus the final result of Polybius' history will be to determine the condition of each people after the world was conquered by the Romans, until the period of confusion and disturbance that followed (i.e. until the years 152-146) (3.4.12).⁹

Thus Polybius expanded the *Histories* beyond the year 168 in part because he wanted to give contemporaries and future generations the material necessary for making a fully informed judgement about Roman domination. Contemporaries needed to determine whether Roman rule should be rejected or accepted. The expanded programme of the *Histories* would enable them to do this by demonstrating that nothing substantially

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had changed after the destruction of the Macedonian kingdom. The descriptions of Roman policy and of the attitudes, judgements, impulses, inclinations and conditions prevailing in other states, promised by Polybius (3.4.6, 12), were intended to show that Roman policy continued to be moderate and beneficent, that some nations and leaders seriously misjudged Rome, and that subject nations continued to be weaker than the ruling power. Indeed, in the extension of the *Histories*, Polybius demonstrates that Roman policy on balance continued in this period to exhibit moderation and beneficence (see pp. 95-101 above). Accordingly, in his view, the Romans did not, like many imperialist states, court misfortune through failure to use their success properly (3.4.4-5). The historian also shows that some foreign nations and leaders, by surrendering to misguided impulses and inclinations, formed erroneous attitudes and judgements inciting them to engage in destructive wars against a much stronger adversary (see pp. 114-24 above). Thus they had failed to recognize that Roman power was now complete, and that henceforth all must obey the Romans (3.4.2-3). Furthermore, Polybius notes that the relative position of conquerors and conquered may be reversed after an initial decision (3.4.1-5). But the whole extension of the *Histories* demonstrates that no such change had occurred with respect to the Romans and their world after 168, for they crushed their opponents and maintained their supremacy (see pp. 114-24 above). Thus the extension of the *Histories* was intended to show that Roman power would endure in the foreseeable future. Contemporaries must accept Roman rule, not only because Rome was stronger but also because her dominion was moderate and beneficent.¹⁰

As already noted, Polybius maintained that Roman policy was on balance moderate and beneficent both before and after 168. Indeed, the historian drew attention to these very qualities near the close of the *Histories* as originally conceived and in their expanded form. First Aemilius Paullus, upon the overthrow of Macedonian power (29.20), and then Scipio Aemilianus, during the formal destruction of Carthage (38.20.1-3), remembered the mutability of Fortune and advocated moderation even in the moment of triumph. But (as Arthur Eckstein reminds us) Polybius regarded both Aemilius Paullus (18.35.4-8; 31.22; 31.25.9-10) and Scipio Aemilianus (18.35.9-12; 31.25.2-28.13) as men whose exceptional moral stature had become increasingly outmoded. Thus his positive evaluation of their conduct, although signalling the continuation of Roman rule in the immediate future, also suggests the possibility that it might collapse if power came into the hands of lesser men.¹¹

The penultimate sentence of the *Histories* confirms Polybius' belief that Roman power was still indisputable after 146. At 39.8.3-6, the author recapitulates his work covering the entire period 264-145. Then he declares that the best and most useful result of his *oeuvre* will be the knowledge of how and under what sort of constitution almost the whole world came under Roman domination (39.8.7). Thus, at the very end of the *Histories*, Polybius still

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viewed the entire world as subject to Rome. Ostensibly he refers to the situation at the terminal date of his work (146/5), but since he was writing the final books after 129 (cf. 31.28.12-13 and 38.21.3, treating Scipio Aemilianus as no longer alive), it may be supposed that he continued even then to consider the Romans the masters of the world.

It may be emphasized here that Polybius recorded the judgements made by subject peoples about Roman domination in the period 168-146, not because he proposed to evaluate Roman power from their perspective, or to establish a principle justifying imperialism, but simply in order to show that in certain cases subject nations had misjudged Rome, with dire consequences. Weaker states, therefore, needed to understand that they could not hope to challenge Rome in the foreseeable future.¹²

The judgement of future generations on Rome

Polybius wrote especially for the instruction of statesmen in political affairs (see pp. 129-31 above). How did he expect future generations to judge Roman rule? At 3.4.7, he declares that the information he will provide about Roman policy and the attitude of subject states in the extension of his account will enable future generations to determine whether the Roman empire should be praised and imitated, or censured. The usefulness of his work for the future (he continues) will consist precisely in facilitating this sort of judgement (3.4.8). The *Histories* (he implies) will be useful in this way because they will explain why Rome conquered the world. As one may observe in all human endeavours, the Romans acted for the sake of the resulting pleasures (*hêdeôn*), good things (*kalôn*) or advantages (*sympherontôn*) (3.4.9-11). This formulation suggests that Polybius believed future generations would deliver a mixed judgement.¹³

Posterity (he thought) would censure the Romans when they acted for the sake of pleasure or expediency, without regard for the good. That he despised pleasure as the principal aim of life is clear from his comments about Scipio Aemilianus, whose efforts to win a reputation for temperance (*epi sôphrosynêi*) are described as evidence of an impulse towards the good (*tôn kalôn*), and are contrasted with the hedonistic pursuits of most young men of his generation (31.25.2-8). In addition, Polybius criticized the Romans for removing works of art from Syracuse after recovering the city in 212/1, during the Second Punic War. These objects, he observes, were used by the Romans to decorate their houses and public buildings. However (he continues), cities are properly adorned not by imported objects and works of art but with virtue (*aretê*), dignity (*semnotês*) and magnanimity (*megalopsykhia*). The Romans on this occasion failed to act rightly (*orthôs*) or even expediently (*sympherontôs*), for their action served only to alienate their subjects, the most dreadful of all situations for imperialist states (see pp. 87-90 above). Therefore (he concludes) those who succeed to empire at any time (*tôn metalambanontôn aei tas dynasteias*) should not

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despoil cities under the mistaken notion that the misfortunes of others are an ornament to their own countries (9.10).

The historian, furthermore, regularly compared expediency (*to sympheron*) unfavourably with the good (*to kalon*) (8.11.6; 15.24.5; cf. 24.12.2), even though he maintained that the two principles sometimes coincide (21.23.12; 21.32c). Moreover, as noted earlier (see pp. 80-5 above), he believed that the Romans sometimes committed injustice by pursuing expediency in the sphere of international relations. Thus Polybius expected future generations to condemn the Romans when they aimed at utility divorced from justice.

On the contrary, future generations (he believed) would praise the Romans when they acted for the sake of the good. At 6.50.1-4, Polybius says that if one aims at greater things (*meizonôn*) than mere preservation of territory and freedom, and if one believes that the exercise of power over many nations is a finer (*kallion*) and more glorious thing (*semnoteron*), one must admit that the Roman constitution is superior to, and more effectively organized than, the Spartan system. This passage implies that Polybius himself considered imperial rule a finer and more glorious thing than mere preservation of territory and freedom. First of all, the historian in his own voice includes it among the greater objectives. Second, other passages in the *Histories* show that he definitely considered imperial rule a fine and glorious thing of outstanding worth (see pp. 65-7 above). Thus the historian himself considered the very pursuit of universal dominion by Rome a fine and glorious objective. In addition, the Romans (he declares) adopted a mixed constitution, a system of government perfectly suited to the realization of their aims (6.50). Furthermore, Polybius maintained that the Romans took great care to cite decent pretexts when going to war (see pp. 73-7 above), and on balance observed moderation and beneficence in their treatment of weaker nations (see pp. 91-101 above). Thus the Romans, in his view, not only set themselves an intrinsically praiseworthy goal but also adopted the appropriate means to achieve it, and they generally proceeded to acquire, expand and preserve their dominion by the most effective and admirable methods. Finally, the result of their enterprise was the greatest empire of all time (1.1.5 and p. 67 above). These aspects of Roman policy would merit the approbation of future generations. Indeed, the fundamental importance of these factors would lead men of later ages, on balance, to praise and emulate Roman rule.

Finally, the Romans (declares Polybius) left behind the supremacy of their empire ([*hyper*]okhên ... [*tês hautôn*] *dynast[eias*]), which was irresistible for men of the present time and unsurpassable for those of future generations (1.2.7).¹⁴ Thus empires would be created in ages to come (cf. 9.10.13). The men who would create and govern them had much to learn from the policy and conduct of the Romans, but they would never eclipse the unprecedented achievement of the great dominion forming the subject of Polybius' *Histories*.

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Polybius wrote the *Histories* in an intellectual environment disposed, for the most part, to accept the principle of imperialism. Thus, in the middle of the second century BC, Greek philosophers debated whether government and international relations, including imperialism, should be based on natural justice, which is realized through beneficence and moderation, or on expediency, achieved through convention or self-aggrandizement (Chapter 1). Among the poets and prophetic writers of the second and early first centuries who reflected on Roman power, some glorified while others condemned Rome, but even the latter sometimes praised or yearned for the rule of Hellenistic or eastern kings. This indicates a fundamental acceptance of imperialism (Chapter 2). Greek and Roman historians of the third, second and first centuries, as well as the Jewish author of 1 *Maccabees*, generally shared the same outlook, for they often defended the policies and actions of great powers such as Rome or Carthage. Only Agatharchides, a contemporary of Polybius, condemned imperialism as both unjust and inexpedient (Chapter 3). Thus Polybius' admiration for imperialist expansion in principle, and for Roman domination in particular, accords with attitudes common among Greek intellectuals of his time (Chapter 4).

Polybius was acquainted with the philosophical defence of imperialism based on justice or expediency, for he attended the lectures given by Carneades at Rome (33.2), and he implies (at 3.4.9-11) that the Romans conquered the world for the sake of the resulting pleasures (*hêdeôn*), good things (*kalôn*) or advantages (*sympherontôn*). But he did not actually defend imperialism on the basis of justice or expediency, for he regarded imperial rule as intrinsically noble and glorious (Chapter 4). On the other hand, he insisted that imperialist states should cite decent pretexts when they initiate wars (Chapter 4), observe justice in foreign policy not involving warfare (Chapter 4), and practise beneficence and moderation towards subject nations at all stages of their imperial development, from acquisition through expansion to preservation (Chapter 5). Moreover, he believed that the Romans generally did cite decent pretexts when they initiated wars (Chapter 4). Furthermore, although he acknowledged that Roman foreign policy not involving warfare was sometimes unjust, in such cases he often criticized not only the Romans but also foreign governments and leaders, when the latter unnecessarily weakened their own states, and he occasionally explained that the Romans made unjust decisions because

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they were misled by their own good intentions or deceived by foreign leaders (Chapter 4). In addition, Polybius maintained that the Romans, on balance, practised moderation and beneficence at all stages of their imperial evolution (Chapter 5). Thus, in the *Histories* as a whole, he takes a generally favourable view of Roman domination (Chapters 4-5). But he did not justify Roman power on these grounds. On the contrary, imperial rule, which he considered intrinsically noble and glorious, is in his view merely promoted through the use of decent pretexts (Chapter 4), the adoption of a just foreign policy in matters not involving warfare (Chapter 4), and the practice of beneficence and moderation towards subject states (Chapter 5). Finally, Polybius admired Roman domination even though he acknowledged that it was based ultimately on an aggressive drive, and believed that it was a goal deliberately pursued (Chapter 4).

That the historian did not defend imperialism on grounds proposed by the philosophers is probably the result of his practical experience in politics and warfare, which taught him that the orderly theories and categorical judgements of intellectuals are often baffled by the tumultuous inconsistencies and tortuous complexities of world affairs. How does one determine which nations are truly inferior, and therefore require the beneficent ministrations of an imperial state? Is imperialism still justified when the ruling power is mistaken about its own interests or commits a momentary lapse in moderation and beneficence? Polybius therefore concentrated not on justifying but on shaping imperial rule. His unabashed admiration of imperial dominion, coupled with insistence upon mitigating principles, although rooted in conventional thinking, at least in some measure addressed the concerns of weaker nations facing the harsh reality of Roman power.

In several important ways, Polybius exhibits an intellectual distance from Rome. He admired imperial dominion in principle, not exclusively that of Rome (Chapter 4). He acknowledged that imperial rule, including that of Rome, is the result of an aggressive drive (Chapter 4). On one occasion, he criticized the Romans for threatening to declare war on another state even though they had no decent pretext for taking up arms (Chapter 4); he observed that they sometimes made unjust decisions in foreign policy not involving warfare (Chapter 4); he suggested that they sometimes failed to treat subject states with beneficence and moderation (Chapter 5). He showed concern for the subjects of Rome. This concern may be seen especially in the advice he gave to imperialist states and their dependencies. In advising imperialist states to observe moderation and beneficence towards subjects, he explained that such qualities best advance the interests of the ruling power, but this advice also served indirectly to promote the welfare of subject peoples (Chapter 5). That he was indeed concerned about their welfare is evident in the fact that he advised them to ensure their own survival, and to preserve as much independence and dignity as possible, through prudent cooperation with

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Rome. It was in order to emphasize this point that he censured states and leaders that practised subservience or engaged in destructive wars against Rome, presenting them as cautionary examples for the instruction of the Greek political classes (Chapters 4 and 6). Since the *Histories* were also intended to guide future generations in warfare, Polybius sometimes praised the military decisions and actions of Rome's enemies, or showed how they might have fought more effectively, when he deemed such observations to be instructive (Chapter 6). His presence in North Africa during the Third Punic War can be ascribed in part to a desire to bring the *Histories* to an appropriate conclusion (Chapter 7). His readiness to promote the new constitutions imposed by the Romans in Achaea after 146 can be explained in large measure by his own political convictions (Chapter 7). Polybius depicted the Romans in their behaviour as akin at times to Greeks, at times to barbarians. Moreover, he reported occasions on which Greeks explicitly called them barbarians; he himself implicitly called the Romans barbarians in at least one passage, and possibly elsewhere (Chapter 8). By ascribing the growth of Roman power to Fortune, he betrayed a sense that the phenomenon eluded full rational explanation (Chapter 8). Polybius envisaged the eventual collapse of Roman domination, and explained the conditions that would bring this about. He expanded the *Histories* (among other reasons) in order to help future generations to determine whether the Roman empire should be praised and imitated, or censured. He expected new empires to be created in future ages (Chapter 9).

Among these instances of Polybius' *distance intérieure*, three call for special comment. The first is the belief that subject states should ensure their own survival, and preserve as much independence and dignity as possible, through prudent cooperation with Rome, whenever feasible avoiding action that would intensify Roman control or even taking positive measures to limit the increase of Roman power (Chapter 4). For example, in 182/1 the senate asked the Achaean League to allow some Spartan exiles to return home (Polyb. 24.1-2). In the following year, however, Lycortas and his associates declared that the prevailing arrangements should be maintained. Moreover (they insisted), by stressing that compliance with the senate's request would undermine the regulations and the interests of the League, the Achaeans might persuade the Romans to withdraw their request. On the contrary, Callicrates and his allies advocated obedience to Roman demands. In the end, the League sent an embassy to Rome with instructions to ask the senate to withdraw their request. Callicrates, although a member of this delegation, advised the senate to take measures to ensure that Roman instructions should in future be obeyed. He recommended that the senate support those politicians in the Greek states who advocated obedience to Rome, and humble their opponents. Elected *stratêgos* for 180/79, Callicrates proceeded to restore the Spartan exiles. Polybius condemned Callicrates for urging the

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senate to intervene directly within the internal affairs of the Achaean League, advice that in his view marked a change for the worse because it resulted in a weakening of the League in relation to Rome. On the contrary, he praised the party of Lycortas, who strove intelligently to defend national sovereignty (24.8.1-10.13).¹

In connection with his discussion of Lycortas and Callicrates, Polybius compared the policies of the Achaean statesmen Philopoemen and Aristaenus. Aristaenus readily did whatever suited Roman interests, sometimes even anticipating their orders. He strove, however, to be seen to observe the laws, and he assumed that sort of image, though yielding whenever any Achaean law clearly conflicted with Roman demands. In justification of this approach, he explained that there are two aims of all policy, these being honour (*to kalon*) and expediency (*to sympheron*). Political leaders should pursue honour when that goal is attainable; otherwise they should aim at expediency. Since the Achaeans were not strong enough to pursue honour through military confrontation with Rome, the only sensible course was to aim at expediency through ready compliance with Roman demands.

Philopoemen fulfilled without hesitation any requests that were consistent with the laws of the Achaean League and the alliance with Rome. When these were in conflict, however, he maintained that the Achaeans ought in the first instance to defend their own position, and then to present a counter-argument. If in the end they failed to persuade the Romans, they should yield and carry out the order, as if calling on the gods to witness the injustice.

Although (like Aristaenus) he acknowledged Roman superiority (*hyperbolê*), Philopoemen argued that it was expedient for subjects (*tois hypotattomenois*) as far as possible to resist demands of the imperial power (*hyperokhê*) that violated their own rights (*tôn idiôn dikaiôn*). By this means the Achaeans might postpone the day, which was bound to come, when they and all the Greeks would be forced to comply with every Roman command, for the Romans respected oaths, treaties, good faith towards allies (*tous symmakhous*) and justice, and could therefore be persuaded to withdraw improper demands. But if the Achaeans readily submitted to every order like prisoners of war (*hoi dorialôtoi*), they would be exactly like the people of Sicily and Capua, who for a long time had been the acknowledged slaves of Rome (*tôn homologoumenôs kai palai douleuontôn*).

Thus, for Philopoemen, unquestioning obedience to Rome would entail an abasement of the Achaean League tantamount to provincial status or incorporation into the Roman state without full civic rights. The Achaeans would be transformed from subject allies into virtual prisoners of war and slaves - a trenchant observation on the progressive stages of relations with the Roman state and the evolution of Roman power in the Greek east.

It should be noted that, while both Aristaenus and Callicrates advocated ready compliance with Roman demands, Aristaenus did not advise

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the Romans aggressively to foster a corps of politicians in Achaea (and elsewhere in Greece) who would constantly work against their nationalist opponents to enforce obedience to the imperial power. For this reason, Polybius treated him with respect. The historian called the policy of Philopoemen honourable (*kalê*), and that of Aristaenus decent (*euskhêmôn*). Moreover, he considered the policies of both men safe (*asphaleis*), for each in his view protected the rights (*ta dikaia*) of Achaea against Rome. Thus, even though he respected Aristaenus for his correct appreciation of Roman superiority and for his patriotism, he clearly favoured the position of Philopoemen, who always made an effort to defend Achaean sovereignty against Roman encoachment (24.11-13; cf. 39.3.4-8).²

Throughout the *Histories* Polybius took the same position, calling upon subject states to maintain as much independence and dignity as possible. Thus he praised Hiero II of Syracuse for aiding Carthage during the Mercenary War (241-238), as this policy would limit Roman domination (1.83.2-4). On the contrary, he condemned Prusias II of Bithynia for his abject servility towards the Romans, who were pleased by the king's attitude (30.18). In 169/8, Polybius himself as an influential leader of the Achaean League initially supported a plan to send military aid to the brothers Ptolemy VI and Ptolemy VIII, who at that time were threatened by Antiochus IV. On this point he opposed Callicrates, who insisted that the Achaeans should hold their entire resources at the disposal of Rome. In the end, however, Polybius withdrew from the debate and allowed the proposal for military assistance to be abandoned, because the consul Marcius Philippus asked the League to support the Roman policy of diplomatic intervention (29.23-5). Polybius relates that, on the eve of the Third Macedonian War, the Epirote leader Cephalus had prayed the gods that war should not occur, and that the political question should not be decided in favour of either Rome or Macedonia; once the conflict was in progress, however, he proposed to act correctly towards the Romans, in accordance with the Roman-Epirote alliance, but did not wish to run ignobly to their assistance beyond this obligation, or to be unduly subservient. Polybius describes Cephalus as a wise and steadfast man who, even at this time, held the best opinion (*epi tês aristês hypêrkhe gnomês*) (27.15). Like Cephalus, some Achaean leaders understood with apprehension that a clear victory in the Third Macedonian War would establish the supremacy of one side or the other. This is evident from 28.6.1-5, where Polybius reports that, in 170/69, his own father Lycortas advocated strict neutrality in the conflict between Rome and Perseus because the victors would enjoy enormous power. On this occasion, however, the *stratêgos* Archon, supported by Polybius himself, then hipparch, persuaded the League to provide full military support to the Romans. In supporting this course of action, Archon contended that he and the other nationalist leaders had to act as circumstances demanded; that is, they had to avoid giving their enemies an opportunity to attack them, and exposing themselves to depor-

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tation at the hands of the Romans (28.6.7-7.1; 28.12.1-6). Thus Polybius realized that it was not always possible for weaker states to avoid action that would strengthen the ruling power. Indeed, at 30.6.5-8 he notes that three classes of Greek political leaders were later accused because of their conduct during the war (cf. 30.13 for their deportation to Italy). The first of these, he says, was composed of men who did not view with pleasure a decisive resolution of the conflict and the subjection of the world to a single imperialist power, and who for this reason observed strict neutrality. The policy of Archon was therefore a sensible one based on prudent foresight. But, in general, Polybius lauded statesmen and rulers who, within prudent limits, took measures to check the intensification of Roman control.³

Thus, while Polybius on the one hand admired Roman dominion, he simultaneously advised weaker states to limit the increase of Roman power. Perhaps the ancient historian was able to reconcile these contradictory responses to Roman supremacy. One key to understanding how he might have done this, I suggest, may be found in his view that the Achaean nationalists, men like Philopoemen, Lycortas and Archon, who sought to defend the sovereignty of their country, were the only true friends of Rome (24.10.5; cf. 39.3.4-8). Thus Polybius seems to imply that maintaining the internal autonomy of subject states best served the imperial interests of Rome. In this way he could both advocate some measure of independence for subjects and defend the rule of the imperial power.

The second aspect of Polybius' intellectual distance from Rome to be discussed here is the nature of the cooperation with the ruling power that he advocated. In most cases, he undoubtedly envisaged straightforward assistance or collaboration. Thus Hiero II is praised for making peace and alliance with the Romans in 263 BC, and for consistently providing them with the supplies they needed during the First Punic War (1.16.5-11). In 170/69, when the consul Quintus Marcius Philippus asked Polybius himself, then hipparch of the Achaean League, to prevent the Achaeans from granting military aid to Appius Claudius Cento, the Roman commander in Epirus, Polybius contrived to prevent the granting of military assistance (28.13.7-14). Similarly, in 169/8, Polybius initially supported a plan calling for the dispatch of Achaean military forces to help the Ptolemies, who were threatened by Antiochus IV, but he immediately ceased to support this proposal when a letter arrived from Marcius Philippus, asking the Achaeans to follow the Roman policy of promoting a negotiated settlement between the kings. Although the Achaeans had favoured the plan arranging for military aid, in deference to Roman wishes they decided to send envoys to work for a negotiated settlement (29.23-5).

On some occasions, however, Polybius must have envisaged a certain degree of subtlety in the way that weaker states should cooperate with the Romans. At any rate, this kind of subtlety may be observed in his own management of Achaean collaboration with Rome during the Third Macedonian War. Once again, his attitude (as the following discussion will

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demonstrate) betrays a fundamental concern for the interests of subject states.

Polybius admired Roman domination (Chapter 4). Moreover, he believed that Perseus was responsible for the war he fought against Rome. According to Polybius, the king carried out a project originally planned, ill-advisedly, by his father, Philip V (22.18). Furthermore, in his effort to excuse the Greeks for sympathizing with Perseus at the beginning of the Third Macedonian War, Polybius explains that the multitude had forgotten the troubles inflicted on the Greeks by the royal house of Macedonia as well as the advantages conferred on them by the Roman empire; they had also failed to consider the undesirable consequences that were bound to follow a Macedonian victory, namely, the overwhelming supremacy of one man and the subjection of the Greeks to the rule of an absolute monarch (27.9-10). But even though Polybius identifies good reasons for preferring a Roman victory, his actions as hipparch of the Achaean League in 170/69 indicate something less than unreserved dedication to the Roman cause.

In the year 169 BC, the League had in fact resolved to provide full military assistance to the consul Quintus Marcius Philippus in what was expected to be the decisive engagement of the Third Macedonian War. Nevertheless, Polybius and the other Achaean envoys who were sent to the consul postponed meeting with him to discuss the details of Achaean military collaboration. Polybius explains that they delayed the meeting because of the impending dangers, and waited until (as they believed) Marcius Philippus had achieved the greatest part of his objectives. Meanwhile, however, Polybius and the other envoys themselves participated in the fighting that occurred during the advance of the Roman forces into Macedonia. When Polybius and his colleagues finally met with the consul, the Roman commander declined the offer of Achaean military support on the grounds that the situation no longer required the assistance of the allies. Polybius himself, however, took part in subsequent Roman campaigns until Marcius Philippus sent him back to Achaea to prevent the League from providing troops to aid Appius Claudius Cento in Epirus (28.12.1-6; 28.13.1-7; 29.24.1-2). Thus, although Polybius was prepared to risk his own life in the Roman cause, he was reluctant to commit Achaean troops in military operations that he considered especially dangerous. For this reason, we should not assume that, because he participated in the Third Punic War, he would have been ready to engage Achaean forces in this conflict had he held political office at the time.

It is also instructive to examine Polybius' reasons for supporting the Achaean policy of full military cooperation with Rome, adopted in 170/69, for his motives shed further light on the extent of his collaboration. When a group of Achaean nationalist leaders met to discuss the embassy sent to various Greek states by the consul Aulus Hostilius Mancinus in the fall of 170 (cf. 28.3-5), Lycortas proposed that the Achaeans should observe strict

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neutrality in the Third Macedonian War (28.6.1-5).⁴ Others were in favour of vigorous opposition to the pro-Roman party (28.6.6). Archon, supported by Polybius and others, argued that the nationalists should act as the situation demanded, that they should avoid giving their enemies an opportunity to make false accusations, and should not expose themselves to the same fate as other Greeks, who had been deported to Rome (28.6.7-9; cf. 28.4.6). Thus, when a decisive engagement seemed imminent at the beginning of 169 BC, Archon (now *stratêgos*) decided to defend the nationalists against suspicions and false accusations, by positive action this time.⁵ He therefore proposed a decree enjoining the Achaeans to support the Romans in full force and unreservedly. The decree was adopted, and various steps were taken to put it into effect (28.12.1-6). The suspicions and false accusations anticipated by Archon were those of political enemies (cf. 28.6.7) and the Romans (cf. 28.3.3-9).

Thus Polybius' reasons for supporting a policy of full military collaboration with Rome seem very negative: the need to accept necessity and to avoid giving political enemies or the Romans an opportunity to make false accusations against himself and other nationalist leaders, as well as fear of deportation to Rome. To this grim rationale may be opposed the fervour and enthusiasm that the historian felt for the cause of the brothers Ptolemy VI and Ptolemy VIII, who in 169/8 asked the Achaean League for military assistance against Antiochus IV and requested that Lycortas and Polybius should command these auxiliary forces (29.23-5). Polybius as well as Archon and Lycortas supported a proposal to provide such assistance on the grounds of the alliance that existed between Achaea and the Ptolemaic kingdom (29.23.3; cf. 22.3.5-6; 22.9.1-12; 24.6.3-5). Polybius also indicates that the present kings had a rather close connection with Lycortas and himself (29.23.7; cf. 22.3.5-6; 24.6.3-5), and that relations between the League and the Ptolemaic kingdom were very friendly (29.23.8). Polybius himself argued that aid should be sent because of the treaty binding Achaea and the Ptolemies as well as the benefits conferred on the League by the kings of that house (29.24.4; cf. 22.9.3; 24.6.1-5). Eventually Lycortas prevailed in the debate on the question of whether to aid the Ptolemies, for he explained that the benefits conferred by the rulers of that dynasty on the Achaeans had been so many and so great that no one could expect more (29.24.11-16). Although in the end the League deferred to the wishes of the consul Marcius Philippus, who wanted the Achaeans to help bring about a negotiated settlement between Antiochus IV and the brothers Ptolemy (29.25.1-6), we cannot avoid noting the contrast between Polybius' enthusiastic feelings for the Ptolemaic kingdom and the pallid circumspection of his attitude towards Rome.

Thus, although Polybius admired the dominion of Rome (Chapter 4), although he believed that the Greeks had benefited from it (27.10.3), although he proclaimed his loyalty to the Romans (*tês pros Rhômaious eunoias*, 39.8.1), the latter could not claim the most privileged place in his

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affections. Accordingly, if he had held a position of authority at a time when Rome faced mortal peril, we cannot be confident that he would have enjoined Achaean soldiers to share her danger and to risk their lives in her defence. The historian, deported by the Romans from his native Achaea, who undertook in exile a monumental work advocating cooperation with the ruling power, who later returned to his own country invested with the confidence of prominent Romans, always fixed his regard on the horizon of Greek interests.

The historian's deepest loyalty was to his own country. At a very late stage of composition, after the *Histories* were substantially complete, Polybius inserted into Book 2 a proud summary of Achaean history (2.37-71), a survey written at a much earlier date, between 168 and 150 BC (see pp. 3-4). Perhaps these chapters initially seemed too parochial for inclusion in a universal history focused on Rome, and won their place in the *oeuvre* of Polybius only many years later, when the author reflected on the achievement of his own country and sadly dreamed of what might have been. The *Histories* also demonstrate Polybius' special attachment to Megalopolis and Arcadia (2.55.1-9; 2.61.1-12; 4.16.11-21.12).⁶ Thus he judged Philip II of Macedonia from the perspective of the Arcadians and their Messenian neighbours (18.13-15).⁷

Perhaps the ancient historian betrayed a hint of his deeper feelings about Roman domination when he remarked at 5.33.4 (speaking of the mainland Greeks) that 'all of us were compelled to fix our eyes' (*pantes de ênagkasthêmen ... apoblepein*) on the Hannibalic War because of its magnitude, dreading the final impact of its future consequences (*dediotes tèn synteleian tòn apobêsomenôn*). Reflecting on this seemingly casual statement, made when (in the author's view) Rome had already achieved universal empire, one might sense that, deep in his heart, Polybius wished the Romans had not extended their power over the Greeks. Of course, this is something he could not declare openly without offending the Romans, though perhaps his own admiration for imperialism, especially that of Rome, also deterred him from rejecting Roman domination. On this point, what he says at 8.8.7-8 may (*mutatis mutandis*) be relevant. Historians, he declares, must give a truthful, consistent and accurate account of kings, but this perhaps is very hard to do because there are many different situations and circumstances to which men yield in the course of life, with the result that they are unable to speak or write their real opinion (*to phainomenon*). Possibly the constraint of Roman power and his own imperialist outlook constituted a situation and circumstance that checked the promptings of his deeper instincts.

The third aspect of Polybius' intellectual distance from Rome that may be considered at this point is the historian's realistic perception of how expansionist nations may behave in the quest for dominion. Although he glorified imperialism, Polybius did not ignore the outrages committed by powerful states when they seek to control other nations. He knew, for

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instance, that the Persians destroyed religious sites when Xerxes invaded Greece (5.10.8); that the Spartans abandoned the Greek cities of Asia Minor to Persian rule in return for the subsidies they needed in order to continue dominating mainland Greece after the Corinthian War (6.49.3-5); that Alexander destroyed the rebellious city of Thebes and sold the surviving population into slavery (5.10.6; 9.28.8; 38.2.13-14); that Antipater, after his victory in the Lamian War, ordered the arrest of anti-Macedonian leaders who had taken refuge in various cities of Greece (9.29.3-4); that Philip V destroyed the Aetolian sanctuary at Thermon (5.9.1-7; 5.10.9-12.4); that the same king, although he had promised to grant generous terms if Thasos surrendered to him, enslaved the population once he was admitted into the city (15.24). He knew that the Romans plundered the artistic treasures of Syracuse when they recovered the city during the Second Punic War (9.10); that in concert with the Aetolians they enslaved the population of Anticyra during the First Macedonian War (9.39.2-3); that their general Flamininus sanctioned and abetted the assassination of Brachylles, a Boeotian leader devoted to preserving his country's link with Macedonia (18.43.1-12); that their rude soldiery contemptuously abused works of art and religious offerings after the capture of Corinth (39.2). He knew that the Romans massacred the population of New Carthage when they seized the town during the Second Punic War (10.15.4-6); that they destroyed seventy Epirote cities and enslaved 150,000 persons at the end of the Third Macedonian War (30.15); that they annihilated the Carthaginians in the Third Punic War (3.5.5; 38.1.6). Thus Polybius did not conceal the harsh aspects of imperialism. On the contrary, he usually condemned such malpractices, brutalities and crimes, directly or implicitly. To sum up, Polybius, although a firm supporter of Rome, never became thoroughly identified with, or assimilated by, the dominant power. He never became an uncritical or exclusively dedicated partisan of Rome. In his heart he remained a Greek and an Achaean.

How, then, could Polybius glorify imperialism, a phenomenon that, by his own account, might tempt the mighty to perilous excess and therefore required the most scrupulous restraint? In a study of English utopian literature entitled *The English Utopia*, A.L. Morton writes that, in the eyes of H.G. Wells and the Fabians, 'there was something terribly impressive about imperialism, about its power, its smoothness, its order, its science, its ideal of a world subdued and organised, its headlong technical advance'.⁸ The attitude of Polybius, I would suggest, closely resembled Wells' response to British domination. The Achaean politician, soldier, intellectual and *homme de droite* instinctively respected authority, power and order. Moreover, Polybius the traveller was deeply impressed by the contribution of Roman supremacy to the expansion of knowledge about distant parts of the earth. In his own times, he declares, as a result of Alexander's empire and Roman domination, almost all regions of Asia and the rest of the world had become accessible by land and sea, whereas

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previously very few Greeks had endeavored to pursue detailed investigation of remote countries because of the enormous dangers and difficulties posed by such an undertaking (3.58.5-59.5).

Secondly, Polybius could balance admiration of imperialism with concern for the welfare of subject states. As an historian Polybius acknowledged that there always had been, and always would be, nations more wealthy, more influential, and more powerful than others. He knew that such inequalities always expose weaker peoples to the possibility of domination, attack, exploitation and repression at the hands of imperialist states. In the realm of international affairs, he explains, everyone would agree that it is honourable (*kalon*) to prove very moderate in times of success, but one may reasonably doubt (he adds) whether such virtue is possible in certain situations (27.8.8-9). It is easy, he declares, to have impulses towards what is honourable (*ta kala*) and to strive for this quality up to a certain point, but it is difficult to be consistent and steadfast of purpose in every circumstance, considering nothing more valuable than honour (*tou kalou*) and justice (*tou dikaïou*) (29.26.2). To his credit, however, he maintained that great powers should observe justice, moderation and beneficence in their relations with less powerful states. Indeed, his emphasis on these qualities as the foundation of imperial rule mark Polybius as one of the earliest Greek authors to judge Roman power in these terms. Moreover, he recorded the injustices associated with imperialist expansion. Thirdly, Polybius avoided proposing any doctrinaire justification for a complex phenomenon not easily pronounced categorically good or evil. Thus, although the tough Arcadian was dazzled by the sheer grandeur of imperial dominion, it would be unfair to conclude that, in the *Histories*, Polybius was guilty of *la trahison des clercs*.⁹

In what must rank as one of the most derogatory judgements ever made about Polybius, Gaetano De Sanctis concluded his review of Carl Wunderer, *Polybios: Lebens- und Weltanschauung aus dem zweiten vorchristlichen Jahrhundert*, with the observation that the more thoroughly one studies Polybius, the more one's respect for the writer and the man diminishes.¹⁰ He connected this withering denunciation with the comments he had made about Polybius in volume 4.1 of his *Storia dei Romani*, where he condemned the Achaean as a traitor who sacrificed his intellectual integrity.¹¹ The present study, which builds on the foundations of earlier scholarship, may be taken as a protest against this unjust verdict. The abundant evidence of *réserves mentales* in the *Histories*, including the author's willingness to denounce misdeeds committed by the ruling power, refutes the suggestion that Polybius surrendered his intellectual integrity. Moreover, in the course of his public life, both prior to and following his period of internment, he cooperated with Rome in accordance with his judgement of necessity, his view of the Achaean interest, and his own ideological preferences. Certainly his own actions promoted Roman aims and, in the aftermath of the Achaean War, he

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cooperated with a victorious power that dealt harshly with his country.¹² But would the Achaean League have prospered if Polybius had induced his fellow citizens to embrace the cause of Perseus, or if no one of Polybius' stature had come forward after the Achaean War to help restore calm and order? Thus the historian certainly took on a moral burden that could expose him to disapproval, but if a traitor is one who delivers his own country into the hands of an enemy for personal advantage, Polybius was no traitor.¹³

In *History as the Story of Liberty*, Benedetto Croce wrote that 'An historical work should then be judged solely on its historical merit What constitutes history may be thus described: it is the act of comprehending and understanding induced by the requirements of practical life Historical works of all times and of all peoples have come to birth in this manner and always will be born like this, out of fresh requirements which arise, and out of the perplexities involved in these. We shall not understand the history of men and of other times unless we ourselves are alive to the requirements which that history satisfied'¹⁴ The great *oeuvre* of Polybius, an example of *pragmatikê historia* concentrating on political and military affairs, addressed the most important requirement of public policy in the author's day, namely, understanding how less powerful states should conduct their relations with the dominant force of the known world, the Roman Republic.

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Notes

Introduction

1. On the life of Polybius, see most recently Marincola, 2001: 113-16; Champion, 2004a: 15-18.

2. There are two major views about the lifespan of Polybius. These are represented (with bibliography of earlier studies) by Dubuisson, 1980: 72-82 (c. 208-132) and Eckstein, 1992: 387-406 (c. 200-118).

3. On Lycortas see the references in Champion, 2004a: 16 n. 3, with Walbank, 1979: 258-9.

4. Philopoemen as an Achaean nationalist: Polyb. 24.11-13; 39.3. The connection between Lycortas and Philopoemen: Plut. *Phil.* 20.3; Just. *Epit.* 32.9. Lycortas as an Achaean nationalist: Polyb. 24.8-10; 28.3.7-10; 28.6.1-7.1. On Philopoemen in general see Errington, 1969.

5. On the *Philopoemen* of Polybius see Ziegler, 1952: 1472.

6. Polyb. 3.48.12; 3.59.6-8; 9.25; 10.11.4; 34.16.2 (= Pliny *HN* 8.47); cf. 12.28a.4; 34.8-10.

7. Polyb. 3.59.6-8; 34.15.7 (= Pliny *HN* 5.9). On the voyages of Polybius see Walbank, 1957: 382, 393-5; Walbank, 1972: 11; Eichel and Todd, 1976: 237-43; Walbank, 1979: 612, 633-8; Foulon, in: Foulon and Weil, 1990: 27-8; Eckstein, 1995: 12-14; Eckstein, 1997: 197 n. 71.

8. Panaetius (c. 185-111/0) probably first met Scipio Aemilianus in the period 146-140: see Dorandi, 1989: 87-92.

9. Ziegler, 1952: 1474, suggests that he worked on the *Numantine War* in the years 133-129.

10. On the *Via Domitia* see Walbank, 1972: 13 n. 62; Eckstein, 1992: 393-7.

11. On the interpretation of Polyb. 39.8.8 see Walbank, 1972: 16 n. 82; Walbank, 1979: 743.

12. On Polybius' plans to extend the *Histories* beyond 169/8 see Walbank, 1972: 13-19. On Polyb. 2.37-71 see Musti, 1972: 1116 n. 6; Walbank, 1977: 140-2; Walbank, 1979: 740-1. In three passages (1.3.7-10; 3.32.2-3; 39.8.4-6), Polybius discusses the introductory books without mentioning the *Achaica*. More recently, Walbank, 1995b: 278 n. 46, has expressed the view that it remains uncertain when Polybius composed the Achaean chapters, and when these became an integral part of Book 2. On Polyb. 39.5.4-6 see Walbank, 1979: 735.

13. Ziegler, 1952: 1474, 1488-9, suggests that Polybius interrupted his labours on the *Histories* during the years 133-129 in order to compose his monograph on the Numantine War.

14. Walbank, 1972: 13-25; Walbank, 1977: 139-45.

15. For a list of these references see p. 201 n. 31.

16. On the stages of composition of the *Histories* see Pédech, 1964: 563-73; Walbank, 1972: 13-25; Walbank, 1977: 139-45; Musti, 1978: 46-8; Eckstein, 1995: 10-11; Champion, 2004a: 10-11.

17. On Vergil's Evander see *Aen.* 8.175-369. Polybius discussed the origins (6.11a.2; 6.11a.5-6), customs (6.11.3-9; 6.53.1-56.5) and religion (6.56.6-15; 12.4b-

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4c; 21.13.9-14) of Rome. He expected Romans to read his work (3.21.9; 4.18.10; 6.11.3-9; 31.22.8-11). He dealt with Italian Pallanteum and the Italian Pallas, whom he made the grandson (rather than the son) of Evander (6.11a.1). The biography of Vergilian Evander resembles that of Polybius. When he had been expelled from his native land and was journeying towards the farthest reaches of the sea, all-powerful Fortune brought him to his present abode on the future site of Rome (*Aen.* 8.333-5). Evander conducts Aeneas into his humble dwelling, setting him down on a bed of strewn leaves covered with the skin of an African bear (*Aen.* 8.366-8), the last detail recalling the African sojourns of Polybius.

18. Shrimron, 1979-1980: 94-117.

19. Millar, 1987: 1-18. The quote appears on p. 4.

20. Mommsen, 1868 (1866): 3.487-91.

21. Prudent cooperation: Musti, 1978: 44-8, 67-78. Mixed judgement: Musti, 1978: 50-7, 79-84.

22. Eckstein, 1985: 277-81 (cf. Champion, 2004a: 17 n. 7).

23. Eckstein, 1985: 265-82; 1995: 197-225.

24. Eckstein, 1995: 100-9, 229-30.

25. Fustel de Coulanges, 1893 (1858): 119-211.

26. De Sanctis, 1935: 625-30; cf. Walbank, 1983: 465-77.

27. Green, 1990: 279-83.

28. Gigante, 1951: 33-53.

29. Dubuisson, 1985: 273-87; 1990: 233-43.

30. Momigliano, 1972-1973: 697-9; 1975: 29-31, 48-9; 1977: 67-77.

31. Momigliano, 1975: 48-9.

32. Stages of composition: Walbank, 1972: 13-25; 1977: 139-45. Evolution of Polybius' attitude towards Roman domination: Walbank, 1972: 166-83; 1974: 3-31; 1977: 151-9; 1981-1982: 237-56. Petzold, 1969: 59-64, and Gruen, 1984: 346-51, maintain that Polybius expressed a negative view of Rome in Books 30-9.

33. See n. 22 above.

34. See n. 23 above.

35. See n. 24 above.

36. Ferrary, 1988: 286-91, 306-48.

37. Musti (see n. 21 above) and Shimron (see n. 18 above) rejected Walbank's thesis on similar grounds (though Shimron believed that Polybius was fundamentally hostile to Rome). Shimron (p. 114), like Ferrary, contests Walbank's vision of an historian who expresses sharply contradictory attitudes in portions of his narrative written after 146 (e.g. traces of a cynically detached or critical attitude in Books 30-3, which are supposed to have been written when the author was thoroughly pro-Roman).

38. Shimron, 1979-1980: 94-117.

39. Millar, 1987: 1-18. Lehmann, 1989-1990: 66-77, notes that Polybius addressed himself especially to the Greeks of the mainland as well as the Aegean, and that he was well informed about all periods of Greek history, but showed a particularly vital interest in the intervention of Philip II within the states of continental Greece as a model for Roman policy.

40. Fustel de Coulanges, 1893 (1858): 119-211.

41. Sasso, 1961: 73-6.

42. Labuske, 1969: 339-44.

43. Petzold, 1969: 43-53, 91-100.

44. Momigliano, 1972-1973: 697-9; 1975: 29-31; 1977: 67-77. In a brief statement, Wunderer (1927: 46-7) recognizes that although in the *Histories* Polybius

accepted Roman supremacy, he also expressed concern for the Achaeans and other Greeks, and exhibited intellectual independence and integrity.

45. Musti, 1965: 399-400.

46. Musti, 1978: 44-8, 50-7, 69-88, 129-30, 143-7.

47. Eckstein, 1985: 265-82; 1995: 197-225.

48. Green, 1990: 279-83.

49. Ferrary, 1988: 291-306, 321-48.

50. Walbank, 1974: 29-30.

51. See Derow, 1979: 1-15; Richardson, 1979: 1-2. According to Richardson, Polybius in the extant text shows no awareness of the Roman concept of *provincia*, involving a magistrate and the *imperium* he exercised within his allotted sphere. But at 7.3.1, 24.13.4 and 36.5.8-9, Polybius does appear to demonstrate some knowledge of the provincial status of Sicily (cf. Musti, 1978: 57-62).

52. I have tried to demonstrate this point elsewhere (Baronowski, 1991: 173-81). Richardson, 1979: 1-11, who places more emphasis on the territorial provinces in the Roman concept of empire, concludes that Polybius' understanding of the Roman *arkhê* was substantially different from that of the Romans themselves. This conclusion, however, does not seem justified. Although some of the evidence cited by Richardson, especially passages from Cicero and the *Res Gestae* of Augustus, does illustrate a concept of *imperium* focused on formal provinces, the broader concept based on Rome's dominant position in the world is more prevalent in Roman authors of the second and first centuries BC (cf. Nicolet, 1991: 29-56). Indeed Richardson himself, in a later article (1991: 1-9), implicitly qualified his original view, for he now acknowledged that use of the word *imperium* in the sense of a territorial entity became especially frequent during and after the Augustan age, but that the meaning of this term was less well-defined in earlier texts. Vogt, 1960 (1929): 151-71, and Ehrenberg, 1974: 119-25, show that the Roman concept of empire based on the indefinite extension of power remained important even after the age of Augustus.

53. Surveys: H. Magdoff, *Imperialism: From the Colonial Age to the Present*, New York 1978; P. Braillard and P. de Senarclens, *L'impérialisme*, Paris 1980; W.J. Mommsen, *Theories of Imperialism*, tr. P.S. Falla, Chicago 1982; W.J. Mommsen and J. Osterhammel (eds), *Imperialism and After: Continuities and Discontinuities*, London 1986; R.H. Chilcote (ed.), *Imperialism: Theoretical Directions*, New York 2000. Raaflaub, 1996: 273-314, who studies the origins of Roman domination, provides a succinct theoretical discussion of imperialism. An elegant theory was framed by J. Galtung, 'A Structural Theory of Imperialism', *Journal of Peace Research* 8 (1971): 81-117, who defines imperialism as a form of dominance (economic, political, military, communications, cultural) exercised by one state over another, in which the elites of both the dominant and the subordinate state collaborate in the exploitation of the latter. In his monograph entitled *Mediterranean Anarchy, Interstate War, and the Rise of Rome* (Berkeley 2006), Arthur Eckstein applies the Realist approach to international relations in a study of imperialism as practised by the Greeks of the classical and Hellenistic periods and, especially, by the Romans from the foundation of the Republic to the defeat of Antiochus III. He applies the same theory in his recent book *Rome Enters the Greek East: From Anarchy to Hierarchy in the Hellenistic Mediterranean, 230-170 BC* (Oxford 2008). Realist theory maintains that states are disposed to expand their power and influence in large measure (though not exclusively) because, throughout history, there has been no supranational authority capable of regulating their interactions. In the climate of mutual fear and suspicion arising from the funda-

mental nature of international relations, states are impelled to adopt aggression, violence and expansionism as the means of achieving success in the struggle for survival, security and resources. The definition of imperialism as the exercise of power in the broadest sense has also been applied by western scholars to the study of inter-state relations in the Orient. Thus, under the Ch'ing dynasty of imperial China (1644-1912 AD), foreign peoples entering into relations with that power formally acknowledged the supremacy of the emperor and accepted various obligations as well as a place within the Chinese world order. They were sometimes (though not always) subject to political-military control or payment of tribute. On these issues see J.K. Fairbank (ed.), *The Chinese World Order: Traditional China's Foreign Relations*, Cambridge, MA 1968.

54. This is noted by Musti, 1978: 13, 41-2; Harris, 1979: 1; Gruen, 1984: 343-4. Polybius formulated no comprehensive analysis of motives comparable to modern theories such as that of Galtung (see n. 53 above). Unlike modern scholars, he did not systematically articulate a particular explanation of Roman expansionism, such as the realization of aggressive and acquisitive drives (e.g. Harris, 1979) or a response to external pressures (e.g. Gruen, 1984). He did not view the Roman *arkhê* as a political community and commercial system, a role envisaged for the British empire by various authors before the First World War in C.S. Goldman (ed.), *The Empire and the Century*, London 1906. He produced no survey of attitudes underlying Roman imperialism resembling the study of E.W. Said, *Culture and Imperialism*, New York 1993. He did not investigate the psychological damage inflicted on subjugated peoples by imperialist nations, as did Frantz Fanon in *Peau Noire, Masques Blancs*, Paris 1952. He did not describe the techniques of economic exploitation in the kind of detail to be found in works by Susan George, such as *How the Other Half Dies: The Real Reasons for World Hunger*, Montclair, NJ 1977; *Ill Fares the Land: Essays on Food, Hunger and Power*, London 1990; *A Fate Worse than Debt*, Harmondsworth, England 1994. Nor did he explore systematically the costs of domination borne by imperial powers (for a recent survey of modern writing on this topic see L. Colley, 'The difficulties of empire: present, past and future', *Historical Research* 79 [2006]: 367-82).

55. The beneficent ideals of British imperialism at the zenith of its worldwide dominion are expounded by Evelyn Baring, Earl of Cromer, 'The Government of Subject Races', in *Political and Literary Essays, 1908-1913*, London 1913, pp. 3-53 (reprinted from *The Edinburgh Review*, January 1908). As Consul General from 1883 to 1907, Cromer in effect directed the administration of Egypt for almost a quarter of a century. Recent statements appear in M. Hardt and A. Negri, *Empire*, Cambridge, MA 2000; N. Ferguson, *Empire: The Rise and Demise of the British World Order and the Lessons for Global Power*, London 2002; M. Ignatieff, *Empire Lite: Nation-Building in Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan*, London 2003; D. Lal, *In Praise of Empires: Globalization and Order*, New York 2004.

56. See Musti, 1978: 13-34, 57-64, 88-124; Raaflaub, 1996: 273-6.

1. Greek Philosophers and Roman Imperialism

1. Cic. *Rep.* 3.8; 3.9; 3.11; 3.12; 3.25; 3.26; 3.27 (cf. Lact. *Div. Inst.* 5.17.14). All references from the *De Re Publica* of Cicero are cited according to the edition of Bréguet, 1980. Our text of the *De Re Publica*, very incomplete, is based on a palimpsest that preserves about a quarter of the original work, supplemented by fragments derived from various authors of classical antiquity. The most important fragments are preserved by Cicero himself as well as Lactantius, Augustine and

Macrobius. Glucker, 2001: 57-82, maintains that the speech of Furius Philus does not substantially represent the arguments of Carneades. This view depends chiefly on the conviction that Lactantius seriously misunderstood what Cicero had written about the significance of Carneades, Plato and Aristotle within Book 3 of the *De Re Publica*; that Carneades would have argued not against Plato and Aristotle but against the Stoics; and that if the statements of Furius Philus are taken to represent substantially the arguments of Carneades, they must also be assumed – implausibly – to represent the professional views of that philosopher. The arguments of Carneades are derived from the sophists and Epicureans (see Capelle, 1932: 86-91; cf. Bréguet, 1980: 1.58-62, 106, 110-12; Alberti, 1995: 161-90; Schofield, 1999: 748-56; Winton, 2000: 89-101; Schofield, 2000: 437-43).

2. Cic. *De Or.* 2.155; Cic. *Rep.* 3.9-12; Cic. *Att.* 12.23.2; Cic. *Acad. Priora* 2.137; Cic. *Fin.* 2.59; Cic. *Tusc.* 4.5; Quint. *Inst.* 12.1.35; Pliny *HN* 7.112; Plut. *Cat. Mai.* 22; Gell. *NA* 6.14.8-10; 17.21.48; Ael. *VH* 3.17; Lact. *Div. Inst.* 5.14.3-5; Macrobi. *Sat.* 1.5.14-16. See Habicht, 1997: 266 n. 5.

3. See Ferrary, 1977: 152-6; Bréguet, 1980: 1.110-12; Ferrary, 1988: 356-61. According to Ferrary, although Carneades did in fact speak at Rome, Cicero invented the detail that he treated the subject of justice. By this fiction, he maintains, Cicero enhanced the dramatic quality of his dialogue, for the character Furius Philus could now be represented as citing arguments heard directly from Carneades himself rather than learned through the works of Clitomachus. It is, however, more likely that Cicero accurately represented the subject of Carneades' lectures, for the existence of an historical tradition about them would have made it difficult for Cicero to invent or falsify that detail. Cato the Elder, author of the *Origines*, attended the lectures of Carneades (Cic. *Rep.* 3.9; Pliny *HN* 7.112; Plut. *Cat. Mai.* 22.1-7), as did Polybius, who described the oratorical styles of the three philosophers (Polyb. 33.2 = Gell. *NA* 6.14.8-10). Two other Roman historians came into personal contact with the philosophers during their visit to Rome. Of these, the senator Gaius Acilius at his own request served as their interpreter in the House (Plut. *Cat. Mai.* 22.5; Gell. *NA* 6.14.9). As *praetor urbanus* in 155 BC, Aulus Postumius Albinus must have introduced the philosophers into the senate (cf. Polyb. 33.1.3-8). Enthusiastically devoted to Greek language and culture (Polyb. 39.1.1-3), Postumius Albinus is said to have conversed with Carneades at this time (Cic. *Acad. Priora* 2.137). In view of their interest in the philosophers, it is likely that both men attended the lectures of Carneades. Cato, Acilius and Postumius Albinus probably mentioned the lectures of the philosopher in their historical works, as Polybius certainly did. In the next generation, Rutilius Rufus appears to have followed Polybius' account of this subject (Polyb. 33.2 = *FGrHist* 815 F. 3 = Gell. *NA* 6.14.8-10). On the historical tradition concerning the lectures of Carneades see Walbank, 1979: 543-5; Erskine, 1990: 190-1. On the accuracy of historical detail in the dialogues of Cicero see Boyancé, 1936: 305-6; Jones, 1939: 307-25; Ruch, 1948: 61-3; Rawson, 1972: 39-42; Brunt, 1980: 316; Fleck, 1993: 264-79. On the fragments of Cato, *Origines*, see p. 189 n. 2. Fragments of C. Acilius: *HRR* 1², F. 1-6, pp. 49-52; *FGrHist* 813 F. 1-7; Chassignet, 1996: F. 1-8, pp. 62-5; *FRH* 1², F. 1-8, pp. 234-41 (on C. Acilius see Chassignet, 1996: lxxxvi-lxxxviii; *FRH* 1².232-3). Fragments of Postumius Albinus: *HRR* 1², F. 1-3, pp. 53-4; *FGrHist* 812 F. 1-3; Chassignet, 1996: F. 1-4, pp. 59-61; *FRH* 1², F. 1a-4, pp. 228-31 (on Postumius Albinus see Chassignet, 1996: lxxix-lxxxv; *FRH* 1².225-7). Fragments of Rutilius Rufus: *HRR* 1², F. 1-6, pp. 187-8; *FGrHist* 815 F. 1-6; Chassignet, 2004: F. 1-8, pp. 2-5; *FRH* 2, F. 1-7, pp. 103-8 (on Rutilius Rufus see Strasburger, 1965: 40-2; Chassignet, 2004: x-xvi; *FRH* 2.100-2). The testimonia and 'fragments' of

Carneades are assembled and discussed by Mette, 1985: 53-141. For Clitomachus see Mette, 1985: 142-8. On Carneades see *DPA* 2, no. C 42 (Carnéade de Cyrène). On Clitomachus see *DPA* 2, no. C 149 (Cleitomaque).

4. Survey: Schmidt, 1973: 307-14; Aalders, 1975: 99-100; Bréguet, 1980: 1.64-70; Ferrary, 1988: 363 nn. 39 and 41; Erskine, 1990: 194 n. 27; Gabba, 1991: 196 n. 20. Plato and Aristotle: Strasburger, 1965: 41-53; Ferrary, 1974: 745-71; Dumont, 1983: 113-28; Ferrary, 1988: 363-81; cf. Roberts, 2000: 344-65. The Stoics: Rist, 1969: 198-200; Watson, 1971: 216-38; Erskine, 1990: 192-200; cf. Schofield, 2000: 446-53. On elements drawn from Roman history and experience see Rawson, 1972: 33-45; Ferrary, 1977: 152; Bréguet, 1980: 1.123-4; Ferrary, 1988: 358-9; Powell, 1995: 9 n. 22. On Laelius' justification of imperialism and Aristotle's defence of slavery and imperialism see Moraux, 1957: 65-73; Ferrary, 1974: 745-71; Dumont, 1983: 113-28; Ferrary, 1988: 363-81; Brunt, 1993: 348-88. The most important Aristotelian references are: *Pol.* 1.1252a1-1255b20; 1.1256b20-5 (cf. 1.1255b37-9); 1.1259a37-1259b17; 3.1278b30-1279a21; 7.1324b1-1325a15; 7.1333b5-1334a2. Of special importance is *Pol.* 7.1324b22-41, where Aristotle maintains that to force imperial rule on unwilling populations is unlawful, unjust and inexpedient except when they are meant by nature to be subordinate.

5. Plato: Boyancé, 1954: 195-222; Bréguet, 1980: 1.115-18; MacKendrick, 1989: 7-9; Long, 1995: 43-50. The Stoics: Bréguet, 1980: 1.106-10, 121; cf. Posidonius T. 29-34 E-K.

6. On Cicero's knowledge of Aristotle see Bréguet, 1980: 1.64-5; 1.118-20; Dumont, 1983: 113-14; Rawson, 1985a: 40-1, 289-91; Gottschalk, 1987: 1083-97; Ferrary, 1988: 366 n. 55; Fortenbaugh and Steinmetz, 1989; Frede, 1989: 77-100; MacKendrick, 1989: 9; Long, 1995: 42-3, 52-8; Barnes, 1997: 1-69; *DPA* 1, no. A 414 (Aristote de Stagire), pp. 434-5. Fragments of Aristotle, *On Justice*: Ross, 1955: 96-9; Gigon, 1987: 257-63, with Moraux, 1957: 23-77; Moraux, 1960: 113-32. Passages demonstrating Cicero's knowledge of Aristotle's popular works may be found in Ross, 1955: 1-99, *passim*, and Gigon, 1987: 195-6, 257-333, *passim*.

7. Boyancé, 1936: 288-309; Desmouliéz, 1976: 86-93; Jocelyn, 1976-1977: 335-40; Wood, 1988: 45-8; Powell, 1995: 17-18.

8. Lact. *Div. Inst.* 5.14.5 (Cic. *Rep.* 3.9) says that Carneades assembled all the arguments made in defence of justice with the intention of refuting Plato and Aristotle. According to Cic. *Rep.* 3.12, Furius Philus included Chrysippus among the philosophers who defended justice. This passage, derived from Carneades' attack on justice, implies that the Academic philosopher had cited the arguments of Chrysippus in his defence of justice. Chrysippus wrote a work entitled *Peri dikaiosynés*, mentioned by Philodemus, *Index Stoicorum*, col. 39, lines 3-4, ed. Dorandi, 1994 (cf. Dorandi, 1994: 20, 161). The fragments of *Peri dikaiosynés* are listed in *SVF* 3.195 (to these add *SVF* 2, nos 724 and 1182). On Carneades' disagreements with Chrysippus and other Stoics see Bréguet, 1980: 2.57 n. 1; Mette, 1985: 123. On Chrysippus see *DPA* 2, no. C 121 (Chrysippe de Soles).

9. See pp. 55-60 above.

10. On Panaetius and the defence of imperialism see Capelle, 1932: 86-113; Moraux, 1957: 65-77; Walbank, 1965a: 12-16 (rejected in Walbank, 1972: 182); Garbarino, 1973: 1.37-43; Erskine, 1990: 192-200; Gabba, 1991: 196; cf. Bréguet, 1980: 1.106-9. Against the view that Panaetius developed this justification of imperialism: Strasburger, 1965: 44-5; Astin, 1967a: 299-302; Ferrary, 1973-1974: 840-2; Momigliano, 1975: 31; Ferrary, 1988: 363-78. The fragments and testimonia of Panaetius are collected by van Straaten, 1962, and Alesse, 1997.

11. On the Stoics and natural law see Schofield, 1995: 191-212; Schofield, 1999:

760-8; Schofield, 2000; 446-53. According to Aristotle, the rule of master over slave resembles that of soul over body. In Laelius' speech, however, the rule of master over slave is compared to that of reason (*ratio*) over passion (*perturbationes*), a change that suggests a Stoic adaptation of Aristotle (see Moraux, 1957: 65-77). Laelius treats reason and passion as separate parts of the soul. This is significant because both Panaetius and Posidonius divided the soul into two fundamental parts, the rational and the irrational. In particular, Panaetius identified the primary faculties of the soul as reason (*ratio*, *logos*) and appetite (*appetitus*, *hormê*), maintaining that the latter, if not controlled by reason, gives free scope to the passions (*perturbationes*, *pathê*), defined as excessive motions of the soul that are ungoverned by reason (Ferrary, 1988: 372-4; Alesse, 1994: 194-217). In *Rep.* 3.39, Laelius treats the *perturbationes* (properly speaking, emanations of the irrational part of the soul) as constituting the irrational part itself, and he never mentions *appetitus*, but his statements merely reflect a simplified version of Panaetius' scheme, according to which *ratio* (*logos*) is the rightful master of *appetitus* (*hormê*), which may give free scope to *perturbationes* (*pathê*). Since it is the *perturbationes*, not the *appetitus*, that Laelius calls evil, Cicero in fact adopts the conception of Panaetius. Ferrary, 1988: 372-4, as I understand him, denies this, concluding that Cicero could not have been following Panaetius here. Posidonius (like Plato) sub-divided the irrational part of the soul into two faculties, namely, the competitive and appetitive (see Hahm, 1989: 1325-63; Alesse, 1994: 255-9; Kidd, 1999: 18-19).

12. Cic. *Fin.* 4.79 = van Straaten, 1962: no. 55. Further references relating to this theme may be found in Dorandi, 1994: 28, 169 (on Philodemus, *Index Stoicorum*, col. 61, lines 2-7, ed. Dorandi, 1994 = van Straaten, 1962: no. 57).

13. Cic. *Leg.* 3.14 = van Straaten, 1962: no. 61. Another passage referring to the practical tendency of Panaetius is Cic. *Off.* 2.35 = van Straaten, 1962: no. 62.

14. In Books 1 and 2 of the *De Officiis*, Cicero's major source was the *Peri tou kathêkontos* of Panaetius (Cic. *Att.* 16.11.4; Cic. *Off.* 1.7; 1.9; 2.16; 2.60; 3.7; Pliny *HN* Preface 22; Gell. *NA* 13.28.1; Lact. *Div. Inst.* 6.5.4, with Fedeli, 1973: 361-75; Erskine, 1990: 155 n. 7; Walsh, 2000: xxvii-xxx; *DPA* 2, no. C 123 [Marcus Tullius Cicero, *père*], pp. 375-6). Cicero did not simply translate or reproduce Panaetius, but rather selected material from his source and used it to serve his own didactic and political ends (see Lefèvre, 2001, with Powell, 2002).

15. On Panaetius' connection with Scipio Aemilianus see Astin, 1967a: 15 n. 3, 127, 296-9; Dorandi, 1989: 87-92.

16. Garbarino (1973: 2.387-390), Ferrary (1988: 395-400), Steinmetz (1994: 646-7) and Dyck (1996: 21-3) date the *Peri tou kathêkontos* about 140 BC. Erskine, 1990: 160-1, following Pohlenz, 1934: 125-6, places it about 129 BC. On the date of the treatise see the Appendix on pp. 27-8 above. Walbank, 1965a: 13, believed at one point that the defence of imperialism found in the *De Re Publica* appeared in a work of Panaetius concerning politics. Although the references that he cites (Philodemus, *Index Stoicorum*, col. 62 [now see the edition of Dorandi, 1994; cf. Dorandi, 1994: 169]; Cic. *Leg.* 3.14) suggest that Panaetius devoted a special work to the subject of politics, such matters could also figure prominently in a treatise on ethics (cf. Cic. *Off.* 2.21-9). It should be noted, however, that Dyck, 1996: 147 n. 56, doubts whether Panaetius made room in his ethical system for imperialism in general.

17. For the views of Panaetius on justice and expediency see Cic. *Att.* 16.11.4; Cic. *Off.* 1.9; 3.7-10; 3.12-13; 3.18; 3.34-5 = van Straaten, 1962: nos 34, 35, 99, 100, 101, 102.

18. On Agatharchides see pp. 53-4 above.
19. On the death of Carneades see the Appendix, pp. 27-8 above.
20. Ferrary, 1988: 131. On the Romans as *koinoi euergetai* see p. 186 n. 12.
21. On Lactantius' knowledge of Greek literature see Ogilvie, 1978: 20-49, 55-7, 78-95; Parke, 1988: 19 n. 3, 163-70. On his knowledge of Cicero see Ogilvie, 1978: 58-72.
22. See Ferrary, 1977: 152-6; Ferrary, 1988: 351-63. Erskine, 1990: 190, maintains that Carneades did refer explicitly to Rome.
23. On this point see Haake, 2007: 106-17. Other scholars have sometimes thought that Carneades was critical of Rome. Thus Fuchs, 1938: 2-5, maintained that Carneades intended to undermine the confidence of the Romans in the justice of their policy. Garbarino, 1973: 2.362-70, suggests that he defended Athens on the charge of plundering Oropus by arguing that, since the Roman empire itself was based on self-interest, Athens had merely done within small compass what the Romans had done on a large scale.
24. On the method of Academic scepticism see n. 27 below. Clitomachus wrote two treatises on probability, which he dedicated to L. Marcius Censorinus (consul in 149 BC) and to the poet Lucilius (Cic. *Acad. Priora* 2.102-4). Cicero himself wrote on the Academic doctrine of probability (*Acad. Post.* 1; *Acad. Priora* 2).
25. On the reception of Carneades in Rome see Astin, 1978: 174-8; Gruen, 1984: 341-2; Ferrary, 1988: 356-8; Gruen, 1990: 174-7; Haake, 2007: 106-17. On Athens, Oropus and the fine see Walbank, 1979: 531-3. Reduction of the fine: Paus. 7.11.5.
26. See Ferrary, 1988: 425-33, 447-8, 471-3.
27. On the method of Academic scepticism see Cic. *Acad. Priora* 2.7; 2.60; *Tusc.* 2.9. On Carneades' employment of this method see Cic. *Acad. Priora* 2.131; 2.139; *Fin.* 5.20; *Acad. Post.* 1.45-6; *Tusc.* 5.11; *Nat. D.* 1.11; 3.44; *Div.* 2.150; *De Fato* 31. On Carneades, scepticism and probability see Ferrary, 1977: 150-1; Long, 1986: 88-106; Wilkerson, 1988: 131-44; Thorsrud, 2002: 1-18.
28. See p. 196 n. 77.
29. On Herodotus and Thucydides see p. 197 nn. 82 and 84. A succinct discussion of Cic. *Rep.* 3.8-29, 33-41, focusing on the distinction between positive and natural law, may be found in Pöschl, 1936: 127-32, and Berti, 1963: 79-99. That distinction, which goes back to the sophists, is also found in Arist. *Eth. Nic.* 5.7. In a fascinating article, M.P. Fitzpatrick, *G&R* 57 (2010): 1-20, discusses the intellectual antecedents of, and modern parallels to, Carneades' arguments in favour of justice and expediency. Carneades, he maintains, intended to demonstrate that imperialism can be defended simultaneously on either basis.

2. Poets, Prophecies and Roman Imperialism

1. On *Anth. Plan.* 5 see Gow and Page, 1965: 1.4-5, no. 5; 2.12-13. On Plut. *Flam.* 9.1-4 and *Anth. Pal.* 7.247 see Gow and Page, 1965: 1.4, no. 4; 2.11-12. There exists a six-line Latin version of the latter epigram (Speyer, 1963: no. 71). On Alcaeus' hostility towards Philip V and his approval of Rome see Edson, 1948: 116-21; Webster, 1964: 233-7; Walbank, 1993: 1721-2; Coppola, 1998: 469-75. In a work entitled *Synkriseis*, written before 164/3 BC, a certain Alcaeus, probably Alcaeus of Messene, ridiculed the literary scholar Isocrates, later an avowed enemy of Rome. Alcaeus' mockery of Isocrates does not in itself prove that Alcaeus supported Rome, for Isocrates had not yet begun to make pronouncements on public affairs when Alcaeus wrote the *Synkriseis*. In that work, he derided the literary manner of the sophist (Polyb. 32.2; cf. 31.2; see Walbank, 1979: 519-20).

2. Text: Mascialino, 1964, with Hurst, in Fusillo et al., 1991: 53-6; Hurst and Kolde, 2008. Scholia: Scheer, 1881-1908. Bibliography: Momigliano, 1959: 551-2; Hornblower, 1981: 249-50; Parke, 1988: 16-17; Hurst, in Fusillo et al., 1991: 49-52; Hurst and Kolde, 2008: lxxxiv-xci. On Lycophron see Hurst, in Fusillo et al., 1991: 9-48; Hurst and Kolde, 2008: vii-xxxvi.

3. The six generations are: Alexander, Antigonus I Monophthalmus, Demetrius Poliorcetes, Antigonus II Gonatas, Demetrius II, Philip V.

4. Fraser (1972: 2.1065 n. 331) and Gruen (1984: 320 n. 18, 326-7; 1992: 18-19, 38-9) regard lines 1226-30 and 1446-50 as interpolations made after 196 BC. Hurst (in Fusillo et al., 1991: 20-7), and Fusillo (*ibid.*, pp. 293, 314), believe these lines may have been inserted during the early second century BC. West (1983: 122-31; 1984: 127-51), dates the additions in the period between the early second and the late first century BC, arguing that lines 1446-50 probably refer to Augustus (cf. Braccesi, 1992: 506-11). The two passages could not have been interpolated after the late first century BC, for they are known to the scholiasts, who depend on the commentary of Theon, active at that time (see Wendel, 1934: 2054-9). Fraser (1979: 328-43; 2003: 895-7) now argues that the *Alexandra* was composed after the Second Macedonian War by another poet writing under the name of Lycophron.

5. On relations between Philip V and the Ptolemies see Walbank, 1967b: 108-37; Will, 1982: 102-49.

6. On these oracles see Parke, 1988: 128-32.

7. On *Alexandra*, lines 1226-30 and 1446-50, see Hammond and Walbank, 1988: 486-7.

8. See Mellor, 1975: 121, 128-33; Gruen, 1984: 329-30. *Fides Romana* (*Pistis Rhômaiôn*), which represents the fidelity of the Romans to solemn agreements, received cult among the Romans and was honoured by Greeks who were impressed by this deified quality (see Boyancé, 1972: 105-19). Some elements among the honours granted to Flamininus at Chalcis (libations, paeon, the honorand addressed as a divinity) may be found among the honours accorded to Demetrius Poliorcetes at Athens (Demochares, *FGrHist* 75 F. 2; Duris of Samos, *FGrHist* 76 F. 13).

9. Text: Melinno, in Stob. *Ecl.* 3.7.12 (Diehl, 1925: 2.315-16; Lloyd-Jones and Parsons, 1983: no. 541). Translation: Lévêque, 1960: 51-2 (French); Lind, 1972: 256 (English); Raimondi, 1995-1998: 286 (Italian). Discussion: Bowra, 1957: 21-8; Webster, 1964: 237-8; Bengtson, 1974: 552-4; Gabba, 1974: 636; Mellor, 1975: 121-4; Alonso-Núñez, 1983: 422; Gruen, 1984: 337; Ferrary, 1988: 268-71; Raimondi, 1995-1998: 283-305. Bibliography: Gabba, 1991: 196 n. 18; Raimondi, 1995-1998: 305-7. Lind, 1972: 255-6, notes that Melinno, like Polybius, ascribed the power of Rome to both the favour of heaven and military strength.

10. Text: *F.Delphes* 3.2.138; *CID* 3.2, pp. 84-129 (text, translation and commentary), pp. 168-73 (transcription into Latin letters with more ample restorations) (Diehl, 1925: 2.306-9; LeGuen, 2001: 1.84-8, no. 9, including text, translation and commentary); cf. *SEG* 42.447, 1776, 1777. According to *F.Delphes* 3.2.47, lines 21-2 (*SIG*³ 698A), Limenius participated as a citharist in the Pythais of 128/7 BC. Discussion: Webster, 1964: 244-6; *CID* 3.2, pp. 53-4, 133-42; Habicht, 1997: 275-9. Bibliography: *CID* 3.2, pp. 15-19.

11. Text: Marcotte, 2000: 101-49. Manuscripts: Diller, 1952: 20-1, 165-76; Marcotte, 2000: lxxvii-cxlv. Authorship and date: Müller, *GGM* 1.lxxiv-lxxviii (unknown, 91-76 BC); Jacoby, 1902: 15-16 (unknown, c. 100 BC); Gisinger, 1929: 672-5 (unknown, 133-110 BC); Diller, 1955: 276-9 (Pausanias of Damascus, c. 100 BC); Bianchetti, 1990: 23-35 (unknown, 137-133 BC); Habicht, 1997: 119-20

(Pausanias of Damascus, 144-110 BC); Marcotte, 2000: 7-16, 35-46 (Apollodorus of Athens, after 133 or 127 and before 120 or 110 BC); Boshnakov, 2004: 33-78 (Semos of Delos, 127-120 or 110 BC). Pausanias of Damascus is otherwise unknown (*FGrHist* 854 T. 1 with Diller, 1955: 276-9; Habicht, 1997: 119-20). Jacoby (*FGrHist* 854 T. 1) wrongly identified him with Pausanias of Antioch, an author of the Roman imperial age. Semos of Delos, who may have lived in the second half of the second century BC, wrote two books of *Periodoi*. For a survey of scholarly opinion on the authorship and date of the *Periêgêsis* see Marcotte, 2000: 35-40; Boshnakov, 2004: 1-6. On the date also see the appendix to this chapter (pp. 40-2 above). On Pseudo-Scymnus in general see Marcotte, 2000: 1-100.

12. On the Romans as common benefactors see Habicht, 1957: 248 n. 126; Wehrli, 1978: 479-96; Gruen, 1984: 196-7; Ferrary, 1988: 124-32; Erskine, 1994: 70-87. The attested examples range in date from 182 to 62 BC.

13. Text: *FGrHist* 257 F. 36, III; Giannini, 1966: 184-96.

14. See Ballesteros Pastor, 1999: 83-90. Lactantius (*Div. Inst.* 7.15.19; 7.18.2) mentions a prophecy ascribed to Hystaspes, identified as a king of ancient Media who, long before the foundation of the city itself, foretold the destruction of the Roman empire and people by a saviour king. Eddy, 1961: 18-19, 32-6, 176-80, argues that the *Oracle of Hystaspes* was first created in the late third century BC, in the context of Antiochus III's eastern campaigns, and was later adapted in Greek translation for use against Rome by Mithridates VI. Gozzoli, 1978: 57 n. 14, and Ferrary, 1988: 237, believe that it was first composed in the late fourth century, after Alexander's conquest of the Persian empire, and subsequently modified in a Greek version for use against Rome, in the middle of the second century BC (Gozzoli) or in the time of Mithridates (Ferrary). Widengren, 1983: 87-8, 126-7, believes that the oracle was composed about 100 BC or earlier; in a previous study (Widengren, 1975: 90-1), he had also suggested that it was circulated in Greek translation by Mithridates. Hinnells, 1973: 145-6, dates it no later than the first century BC, and possibly earlier, suggesting that it may have been recycled in a Greek translation by Mithridates. Kippenberg, 1978: 70-5, who traces the oracle in its anti-Roman form to Asia Minor in the first century BC, suggests that it was originally created in the context of Iranian opposition to the Seleucids.

Eddy, 1961: 18-19, observes that many details in Lact. *Div. Inst.* 7.15-19 correspond to elements in the *Bahman Yasht* (on these similarities see Hinnells, 1973: 135-42; Widengren, 1983: 121-6). Eddy explains these correspondences by positing the *Oracle of Hystaspes* as a common source of Lactantius and the Hellenistic *Bahman Yasht*. In his view the latter, composed about 300 BC, was later revised by the addition of material from the *Oracle of Hystaspes*, created in the late third century BC, and Lactantius (*Div. Inst.* 7.14.3-19.9) made extensive use of a Greek version, adapted for circulation against Rome in the time of Mithridates VI. Hinnells, 1973: 135-42, explains the similarities by identifying the Hellenistic *Bahman Yasht* as the source of the *Oracle of Hystaspes*, a Greek version of which (adapted for use against Rome) was later used by Lactantius.

Eddy's date for the composition of the *Oracle of Hystaspes* depends ultimately on the observation that much of Lact. *Div. Inst.* 7.14.3-19.9 derives from it. The basis for his chronology appears in Lact. *Div. Inst.* 7.14.5-11, where the passage of 6,000 years marks the end of time, a detail known from independent evidence to have occurred in the *Oracle of Hystaspes* (cf. Bidez and Cumont, 1938: 2.359-76). Although in the final analysis the date of composition remains uncertain, the fact that the *Oracle of Hystaspes* is closely connected with the *Bahman Yasht*, and that the Greek version displays an anti-Roman orientation, suggests that an Iranian

prophecy of earlier Hellenistic date was modified in Greek translation for use against Rome. Probably this occurred in the time of Mithridates VI, who employed oracles as propaganda (cf. McGing, 1986: 103). It is unlikely that the Parthians, who entered into conflict with Rome following the eastern campaigns of Pompey, sponsored the Greek version of the *Oracle of Hystaspes*, for they aimed at limiting Roman power rather than destroying it (on Roman-Parthian relations between the time of Lucullus and the end of Arsacid rule see Bivar, 1983: 45-97).

15. On Phlegon of Tralles see Sacks, 1990: 135; Hansen, 1996: 1-22; Hansen, 1998: 249-53. On his anti-Roman tales see Collins, 1974a: 7, 31; Gabba, 1974: 634-6; Gauger, 1980: 225-61; Gruen, 1984: 327-8; Ferrary, 1988: 238-50; Hansen, 1996: 101-12. On the identity of Antisthenes see Walbank, 1967a: 518; Gauger, 1980: 238-44; McGing, 1986: 102-3; Ferrary, 1988: 250-63; Hansen, 1996: 103. Ferrary suggests that Antisthenes was the author of that name who wrote on the history of philosophy in the late first century BC (see the citations in *FGrHist* 508 F. 3-15). Gauger suggests that he was an Athenian Peripatetic philosopher connected with Athenion.

16. Editions: Rzach, 1891; Geffcken, 1902 (cf. Nikiprowetzky, 1970: 284-5). Translations: Terry, 1890; Lanchester, 1913: 2.368-406 (Books 3-5 only); Collins, 1983: 317-472 (cf. Nikiprowetzky, 1970: 285-6). Bibliography: Charlesworth, 1981: 184-8, 300-1; Collins, 1983: 325-6; Collins, 1984: 381; Collins, 1987: 422-7, 456-9; Parke, 1988: 19 n. 1; Merkel, 1998: 1045-6, 1071-80. Analysis: Collins, 1983: 327-472; Collins, 1984: 357-81. On the evolution of the Sibylline texts see Ogilvie, 1978: 28-36.

17. According to Collins (see the works cited in n. 18 below), Book 3 originated among Egyptian Jews connected with the temple founded by Onias at Leontopolis, while Book 4 emerged in Palestine among Jewish baptists. Gruen, 1998: 15-36, ascribes the Jewish prophecies of Book 3 more generally to Palestine and the Diaspora.

18. On the prophecies of Book 3 see Eddy, 1961: 10-14; Nikiprowetzky, 1970: 55-70; Fraser, 1972: 1.298-300, 708-13; Collins, 1974a: 21-71, 85-7; Collins, 1974b: 1-18; Collins, 1983: 354-80; Collins 1984: 365-71; Collins 1987: 430-6; Gruen, 1998: 15-36; Merkel, 1998: 1059-64; Collins, 2000: 83-97, 144-6. Collins believes that lines 97-349 and 489-829 of Book 3 formed an original main corpus created around 163-145 BC, to which later material was added. Gruen sees Book 3 as a conglomerate of prophecies gradually assembled between the middle of the second century BC and the late first century AD.

19. On the prophecies of Book 4 see Flusser, 1972: 148-75; Collins, 1974c: 365-80; Collins, 1983: 381-9; Collins, 1984: 363-5; Collins, 1987: 427-9; Collins, 1995: 34-8; Merkel, 1998: 1064-5.

20. Titles: The Pahlavi epitome is commonly known as the *Bahman Yasht*, though the title is not found in any of the manuscripts (these are described by Cereti, 1995: 2-7). One of the sources of this work was the Sassanian *Zand-i Vohuman Yasn* (not extant), behind which (it seems) lies a late Avestan *Vohuman Yasn* (not extant). For convenience, the title *Bahman Yasht* (with appropriate distinguishing terms) will be used here to denote the several stages in the evolution of this work. Cereti, 1995: 11-27, who believes that the bulk of the material found in the Pahlavi epitome derives from late Sassanian or early Islamic times, doubts the existence of an Avestan *Bahman Yasht*, but recognizes that the epitome contains various layers of tradition, some reaching back to Avestan compositions. *Bahman Yasht* 1.1-5 is generally taken to represent an early tradition, possibly from a late Avestan *Bahman Yasht*. That the fourth branch of the

tree in this passage originally denoted Alexander and the Macedonians is suggested by the reference to this king at 7.32 as an enemy of the true religion who prevailed at the end of the millennium of Zarathustra. At 1.11, the fourth branch is equated with the evil rule of 'parted hair *deus*'. This passage may reflect a later re-interpretation of the fourth branch, for those demons appear to be peoples of Central Asian origin (see Cereti, 1995: 174). On the *Bahman Yasht* see Söderblom, 1926: 205-10; Eddy, 1961: 15-21, 26-32; Boyce, 1968: 31-66, esp. 48-50; Widengren, 1983: 104-27, 151-4; Boyce, 1984: 57-75; Boyce, 1989: 59-77; Sundermann, 1989: 492-3; Hultgard, 1991: 114-34; Koenen, 1994: 11-13; Widengren, 1995: 28-42; Hultgard, 1995: 63-162. On Persian apocalyptic literature see Hultgard, 1999: 39-83. Translations: West, 1880: 189-235; Cereti, 1995: 149-68 (English); Widengren, 1961: 183-95, 198-208 (German). Eddy, 1961: 343-9, modifies the translation of West in a proposed reconstruction of the late Avestan text. To the best of my knowledge, the edition of *Bahman Yasht* announced by Anders Hultgard, 1991: 122 (A. Hultgard, *The Bahman Yasht: A Critical Edition with Introduction, Translation and Commentary*, Uppsala, forthcoming), has not been published. References to the *Bahman Yasht* in this work follow the division in chapters and paragraphs adopted by Cereti, 1995: 149-68.

21. English translation and commentary on the *Babylonian Dynastic Prophecy*: Grayson, 1975: 24-37; Sherwin-White, 1987: 10-14; cf. Collins, 1993: 168. Here I have ventured my own suggestion about the evolution of the text.

22. *Dan.* 2.31-45 (cf. 5.28); 7.1-8.27 (cf. 9.1-12.13). On the emergence of the book as a unified whole see Collins, 1993: 24-38, and commentary on 7.25, 8.14, 8.25, 9.27, 11.45, 12.7, 12.11, 12.12. On the structure, composition and historical content of *Daniel* see Millar, 1997: 89-104. Collins, 1993: 304-10, and 1995: 34-8, maintains that the future kingdom envisaged in the book of *Daniel* cannot properly be called Messianic because the saviour in this work is the archangel Michael.

23. Hengel, 1974: 1.176 and nn. 458-9; 1.187-9; Widengren, 1975: 85-129; Isaac, 1983: 5-12; Sparks, 1984: 169-84; Black, 1985: 272-80, 285-95.

24. Translation: Vermes, 2004: 616. Discussion: Brooke, 1998: 296-7; Collins, 1999: 415-17; Flint, 1999: 55, 60-1. The second tree represents 'the one who rules over all the powers of the sea and over the ports and over ...'. That the Macedonian kingdom of Seleucid Syria is meant here may be suggested by 1 *Macc.* 15.1, which relates that Antiochus VII sent a letter to Simon, priest and ethnarch of the Jews, 'from the islands of the sea'.

25. Dependence of *Daniel* on the Iranian tradition: Eddy, 1961: 16-26; Boyce, 1984: 70-5; Hultgard, 1991: 116-17; Collins, 1993: 163-5; Koenen, 1994: 10-14; Widengren, 1995: 48-59. Also see n. 26 below. The phrase 'intermixed iron' of the *Bahman Yasht* has been emended to read 'iron mixed with dust' (see Boyce, 1989: 73). If correct, this emendation would imply direct borrowing on the part of *Daniel*.

26. On the Near Eastern motif of the four kingdoms or periods see Swain, 1940: 1-21; Flusser, 1972: 148-75; Hasel, 1979: 17-30; Momigliano, 1980: 157-62; Mendels, 1981a: 330-7; Momigliano, 1982: 533-60; Collins, 1993: 166-70; Widengren, 1995: 23-62; Mazza, 1996: 315-50. Momigliano ascribed to *Daniel* a greater measure of originality than is suggested here.

27. On Hesiod see West, 1978: 172-7, 197; Koenen, 1994: 2-26; Widengren, 1995: 23-62; West, 1997: 312-19; Nagy, 1999: 151-64, 168-73, 206-7.

28. Momigliano observed this sort of incongruity in *Daniel* (see n. 26 above).

29. Sulla required the cities of Asia to pay five years' arrears of tribute and a war indemnity (App. *Mith.* 62-3; Plut. *Sulla* 25.4-5).

30. On the *Sibylline Oracles* and the Greeks see Eddy, 1961: 251-2; Collins, 1974a: 53-5, 118; Simon, 1983: 219-33; Gruen, 1998: 31-6; Collins, 2000: 160-7.

31. On *Anth. Pal.* 7.297 see Gow and Page, 1965: 1.166, no. 2; 2.481.

32. On *Anth. Pal.* 7.493 see Gow and Page, 1965: 1.35, no. 68; 2.88-9. On *Anth. Pal.* 9.151 see Gow and Page, 1965: 1.31, no. 59; 2.81. On Antipater of Sidon see Webster, 1964: 204-8; Krings, 1989: 333-4. Polybius (38.16.4-7) relates that many Greeks ended their own lives during the Achaean War. According to Paus. 7.16.8, after the capture of Corinth Mummius burnt the city, killed most of the free-born adult male inhabitants, and sold the women and children as slaves.

33. A papyrus dated by the editor to about the first century BC preserves the text of a fictitious letter of Hannibal to the Athenians, in which the Punic general reports his victory over the Romans (probably at the battle of Cannae), offers rewards for persons who undertake to describe in Greek verse the military valour of the Carthaginians, and promises to inflict a severe defeat on the Romans. The bombastic and infelicitous style of this composition gives an unflattering impression of the supposed writer (Merkelbach, 1954: 62-3, lines 106-37; cf. pp. 51-4 and 71-3). According to Candiloro, 1965: 171-6, who dates the papyrus in the middle of the second century BC, the author wished to represent the legendary character of Hannibal, not to deride him, and therefore expressed hostility towards Rome. In my view, Merkelbach correctly identifies the tone of the letter. The papyrus containing this text preserves a collection of fictitious letters. The four missives preceding that of Hannibal are ascribed to Darius III of Persia and to the Indian king Porus. All of these contain extravagant language. In the third letter, for instance, Darius even threatens Alexander. Thus the first five letters preserved on the papyrus appear to be rhetorical compositions illustrating the immoderate character of the supposed non-Greek writers. For this reason, Hannibal's letter is unlikely to imply that the author was hostile to Rome. Gruen, 1984: 353 n. 197, is inclined to accept Merkelbach's interpretation.

3. Historians and Roman Imperialism

1. Fragments: *HRR* 1², F. 1-28, pp. 5-39; *FGrHist* 809 F. 1-27 (Greek text); *HRR* 1², F. 1-6, pp. 112-13; *FGrHist* 809 F. 28-33 (Latin text); Chassignet, 1996: F. 1-32, pp. 16-54; *FRH* 1², F. 1-32, pp. 62-136 (Greek and Latin texts). Although Fabius Pictor is known to have written a history in Greek, fragments of a Latin work are also ascribed to a Fabius or a Fabius Pictor. The Latin history is probably a translation from the Greek made by Fabius Pictor himself or by another writer. On Fabius Pictor see Walbank, 1945: 1-18; Meister, 1975: 142-9; Meister, 1990: 145-8; Chassignet, 1996: l-lxxiii; Rich, 1996: 4 n. 8; *FRH* 1².55-61; Koch, 2002: 71 n. 6; Ambaglio, 2005: 205-22. D'Ippolito, 1998: 142-55, maintains that the Latin version preceded the Greek.

2. Fragments: *HRR* 1², F. 1-125, pp. 55-93; Chassignet, 1986: F. 1.1-7.15, pp. 1-54 (fragments assigned to specific books), and F. 1-6, pp. 55-6 (fragments not assigned to specific books); *FRH* 1², F. 1.1-7.15, pp. 155-223 (fragments assigned to specific books), and F. 1-6, pp. 223-4 (fragments not assigned to specific books). Cato began composing the *Origines* about 174 BC and continued working on it until his death in 149. On the *Origines* see Astin, 1978: 211-39; Chassignet, 1986: vii-xxx; *FRH* 1².148-54.

3. On the *Pro Rhodiensibus* of 167 BC, see n. 10 below. On the *Contra Servium Galbam* of 149 BC, see *ORF*³, no. 8, F. 196-8; *HRR* 1², F. 106, 108, 109 (cf. Livy *Per.* 49), with Scullard, 1973: 271; Astin, 1978: 111-13.

4. *HRR* 1², F. 84, with Hoyos, 1987: 112-21, and Hoyos, 1990: 31-6.
5. *Rhet. Her.* 4.14.20; Quint. *Inst.* 9.3.31. These passages belong to the speech *De Bello Carthaginiensi* (see Nenci, 1962: 363-8; Baronowski, 1995: 24 n. 22).
6. Attack on Rome: *ORF*³, no. 8, F. 195; Plut. *Cat. Mai.* 26.1-27.1; App. *Pun.* 310-15. Threat to Roman domination: Plut. *Cat. Mai.* 27.4; cf. Polyb. 36.9.3-4; App. *Pun.* 633. On these arguments see Baronowski, 1995: 21-7.
7. Historical context: Polyb. 29.10-11; 29.19; 30.4; Livy 44.29.6-8; 45.3.3-8; 45.20.4-25.5; cf. Livy 44.14.8-13.
8. Cato, in *ORF*³, no. 8, F. 164; *HRR* 1², F. 95b.
9. Cato, in *ORF*³, no. 8, F. 55. On this speech see Scullard, 1973: 258-9; Astin, 1978: 60.
10. Cato, in *ORF*³, no. 8, F. 163-70; *HRR* 1², F. 95a-g; Calboli, 1978: F. 1-7, pp. 253-60 (direct citations), and F. 1-4, pp. 261-3 (indirect citations). On the speech *Pro Rhodiensibus* see Astin, 1978: 137-9, 273-83; Calboli, 1978: 3-243. Although Malcovati, *ORF*³, no. 8, F. 170, and Calboli, 1978: F. 2, p. 261, include App. *Pun.* 290-1 as a fragment of the *Pro Rhodiensibus*, Peter more cautiously printed it as a note (*testimonium*) to *HRR* 1², F. 95b. The text of this passage should be read as emended by Hoffmann, 1960: 318-23. That Cato did invoke the argument based on *metus hostilis* is guaranteed by an observation made by Gellius to the effect that, according to Cato, an attack on Rhodes would create the danger of revolution at Rome (Gell. *NA* 6.3.47).
11. Cf. Fantham, 1991: 115-25.
12. On this trial see Shatzman, 1972: 191-2; Scullard, 1973: 259; Astin, 1978: 59-60.
13. On this speech see Shatzman, 1972: 184; Scullard, 1973: 270; Astin, 1978: 107-8, 135-7.
14. On this speech see Scullard, 1973: 259; Astin, 1978: 96.
15. On the Roman general's control of booty see Shatzman, 1972: 177-205.
16. On this speech see n. 3 above.
17. In her excellent discussion of Cato's attitude towards Roman imperialism, Chassignet, 1987: 285-300, concludes that Cato opposed all eastern wars. I find more persuasive the view of Astin, 1978: 267-88, who maintains that Cato's opposition was more limited. The political and economic motives ascribed by Calboli, 1978: 150-224, to Cato in his opposition to a war against Rhodes find no certain expression in what survives of the *Pro Rhodiensibus*. Chassignet, 2005: 195-224, explores the connection between the speeches of Cato and the *Origines*, and discusses how the text of the speeches was preserved and disseminated. If Livy 34.2-4, representing Cato's speech against repeal of the *Lex Oppia*, is based on a text of the actual oration, it may be argued that Cato wanted to repress vice in order to preserve Roman supremacy (see esp. Livy 34.4.1-3). It is, however, uncertain to what extent Livy reflects the original speech, of which no traces remain. While Tränkle, 1970: 274-85, and Letta, 1984: 21 n. 110, believe there was a close correspondence, Scullard, 1973: 257, and Gruen, 1992: 69-70, consider Livy's version to be a literary confabulation. The fact that Livy 34.5.8-10 has L. Valerius (one of the tribunes who proposed repeal of the *Lex Oppia*) refer to the *Origines* of Cato may suggest that Livy was using a text of Cato's oration included in that work.
18. Fragments: *FGrHist* 174 F. 1-5.
19. Diod. 23.2; Dio 11, frag. 43.7-8, 11-12; Zonar. 8.8.6-9.7.
20. Diodorus: Schwartz, 1903: 688; Walbank, 1945: 84 n. 37; Meister, 1975: 139-40. Dio Cassius: Schwartz, 1899: 1694; Meister, 1975: 127-34.

21. Meister, 1975: 134-8, Ruschenbusch, 1980-1981: 56-7, 75-6, Scullard, 1989: 530-7, Scardigli, 1991: 129-62, and Serrati, 2006: 120-9, who argue for the authenticity of the treaty, assign it to the year 306 BC. Eckstein, 1987: 77-8, and Hoyos, 1998: 7-11, maintain that it is spurious. Survey of scholarly opinion: Musti, 1972: 1138-40; Scullard, 1980: 486-8 n. 3; Hoyos, 1998: 10 n. 10; Serrati, 2006: 120 n. 25.

22. On Philinus see Meister, 1975: 127-42; Alonso-Núñez, 1989: 161, 172-3; Meister, 1990: 143-4.

23. Fragments: Silenus, *FGrHist* 175 F. 1-9; Sosylus, *FGrHist* 176 F. 1-2; Chaereas, *FGrHist* 177 F. 1.

24. In Silenus, *FGrHist* 175 F. 2, Zeus and Hera appear in their Roman guise because Silenus' account of the two dreams is known through Cicero, *Div.* 1.48-9, who found this information in the text of Coelius Antipater. On Polyb. 3.47.6-48.12 see Krings, 2005: 234.

25. On Silenus see Meister, 1975: 155-9; Alonso-Núñez, 1989: 161, 172-4; Meister, 1990: 144-5; Krings, 2005: 226.

26. The accounts of Polybius and Livy are similar because both Polybius and Coelius Antipater, Livy's principal source for military campaigns in Books 21-30, used Fabius Pictor and Silenus. On Livy's sources in the third decade see Walsh, 1961: 124-32; Burck, 1971: 26-8; Walsh, 1974: 14-15; Jal, 1988: xiv-xxxi; Händl-Sagawe, 1995: 10-12.

27. Since in column 2 of *FGrHist* 176 F. 1 Sosylus declares that the entire Roman side fought with distinction, especially the Massaliotes, it would appear that the rebuke in column 1 can only apply to the Carthaginians.

28. Printed by Jacoby as *FGrHist* 176 F. 2 and T. 3.

29. Fragments: *HRR* 1², F. 1-7, pp. 40-3; *FGrHist* 810 F. 1-8; Chassignet, 1996: F. 1-13, pp. 54-9; *FRH* 1², F. 1-13, pp. 139-47. Roman senator: Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 1.74.1. Cincius Alimentus was praetor in 210 BC, propraetor in 209-8, *legatus* in 208 (see *FGrHist* 810 T. 1-5; *MRR* 1.279, 286, 293; 3.53). Captured by Hannibal: Livy 21.38.3. Probably Cincius Alimentus was captured after his mission to the consul T. Quinctius Crispinus (208), whom he found either at Capua or at Tarentum (Livy 27.29.1-6; 27.33.6-7). On Cincius Alimentus see Chassignet, 1996: lxxiii-lxxix; *FRH* 1², 137-8.

30. According to Schwartz, 1899: 1694-6, Dio's account of the Second Punic War (Books 13-17) is based on late Roman annalists. Klotz, 1936b: 68-116, argued that Dio used Coelius Antipater and Valerius Antias. De Sanctis, 1968: 195-202, 656-60, maintained that Dio used Coelius Antipater and late Roman annalists.

31. Polybius, in referring to Sosylus and Chaereas, speaks of only two alternatives (opposition and approval), while Dio mentions three (opposition, conditional approval, and approval). Polybius simplified the situation because he thought the proposal to declare war was not questioned in any way. Täubler, 1921: 84-6, suggested that both Sosylus and Chaereas obtained information about the debate directly from Cincius Alimentus during his captivity. The fact that Cincius Alimentus consulted Hannibal himself for statistical data reveals his concern for accuracy (*HRR* 1², F. 7). On the value of Dio's report concerning the senatorial debate of 218 BC, see Walbank, 1957: 331-2; Astin, 1967b: 577-96; Sumner, 1967: 239-44; De Sanctis, 1968 (1917): 197; Rich, 1996: 12-13, 29-33.

32. Polybius' evaluation of other historians is often unfair: see Walbank, 1962: 1-12; Walbank, 1972: 32-58; Meister, 1975; Boncquet, 1982-1983: 277-91. On Sosylus in particular see Meister, 1975: 167-71. Lehmann, 1974: 174-82, however, shows that Sosylus embroidered the story of Heraclides and the battle of Artemisium in *FGrHist* 176 F. 1. Thus Polybius did have some reason to describe

him as a colourful writer. The account of Sosylus and Chaereas is defended by Cassola, 1962: 236-8, who argues that Polybius, influenced by the Scipios, deliberately rejected the truth in his desire to portray the senate as unanimously in favour of war. This view is shared by Krings, 2005: 231-2. That some senators may have hesitated to support a declaration of war against Carthage in the spring of 218 is suggested by the fact that the colonies of Cremona and Placentia were not formally established until 31 May of that year, and the completion of these colonies was essential for holding Cisalpine Gaul in the event of a conflict with Carthage (Polyb. 3.40.3-7 with Eckstein, 1983: 255-72).

33. On the attitude of Sosylus towards Rome and Carthage see Manganaro, 1959: 283-5; Lehmann, 1974: 174-82. Zecchini, 1997: 1061-7, suggests that the history of Sosylus, written about 201-195 BC, was intended to demonstrate that Antiochus III could benefit from the talent of Hannibal and the military science of the Greeks in a possible conflict with Rome. I am not persuaded by Taïfakos, 1982: 817-32, that Polybius, in the text of the *Histories* underlying Livy 34.31, used as his source a Spartan historian hostile to Rome and favourable to Nabis and his revolutionary policies, to be identified as Sosylus. Although Sosylus probably was a Spartan, there is no evidence that he wrote about the history of his own country or that he supported social revolution. Moreover, Polybius could have obtained information about the meeting held in 195 BC between Nabis and Flamininus, directly or indirectly, from the accounts of witnesses who had attended the parley. These included Aristaenus, in that year *stratēgos* of the Achaean League (Livy 34.30.6-7; note the similar ideas in Livy 34.31.2-5 and Polyb. 24.13.3, reporting statements of Nabis and Aristaenus, respectively). On Sosylus, especially *FGrHist* 176 F. 1, see Lehmann, 1974: 174-82; Lazenby, 1978: 126-7; Alonso-Núñez, 1989: 174; Ferone, 1992: 125-39; Krings, 2005: 223-36.

34. Text: *StV* 3.294-5. *Editio princeps*: Roberts, 1938: no. 491. Bibliography: Walbank, 1967a: 441-2; *StV* 3.294-5; Musti, 1972: 1145; Beck, 2005: 351 n. 124.

35. The most important sources are Polyb. 15.1-4; 15.8.7-9; Livy 30.16; 30.21.11-25.10; Diod. 27.11; App. *Pun.* 129-37, 143-6, 155-6; Dio 17.57.74-5; Zonar. 9.13.8-10; Eutrop. *Brev.* 3.21.1-22.2.

36. On Polyb. 5.33.5 see Walbank, 1957: 563-4.

37. Text: *SIG*³ 702; *F.Delphes* 3.3.124 (*FGrHist* 835 T. 1; Chaniotis, 1988: 309-10, E 17). On the decree see Gruen, 1984: 196. On Postumius Albinus and Cato's reference to the Delphic Amphictyony see Walbank, 1979: 726-7. On the pro-Roman stance of this organization after 168 BC, see Lefèvre, 1998: 126. Momigliano, 1978: 59-66, shows that, throughout classical antiquity, public readings often preceded or accompanied the publication of historical works.

38. That the equestrian statue honoured Aristaenus of Dyme is known from the dedicatory inscription (note to *SIG*³ 702; *F.Delphes* 3.3.122), also inscribed on the base.

39. Other proxeny decrees inscribed on the base: *F.Delphes* 3.3.123 (128/7), 3.3.125 (c. 157/6), 3.3.126 (c. 157/6), 3.3.127 (early first century BC: see Daux, 1943: 65-6).

40. I find persuasive the view of Deininger, 1966: 376-80, who differentiates Aristaenus of Megalopolis (the *stratēgos*) from Aristaenus of Dyme, son of Timocades, honoured with an equestrian statue at Delphi (*F.Delphes* 3.3.122), Aristaenus the Achaean, son of Damocades, honoured with a proxeny decree by Cretan Aptera (*I.Cret.* 2.3.6 F), and Aristaenetus of Dyme, hipparch of the Achaean League in 208/7 (Polyb. 11.11.7), suggesting that the last three may represent one person (Aristaenus of Dyme, son of Timocades). This solution is accepted substan-

tially by O'Neil, 1984-1986: 36-7, 55. Lehmann (1967: 216-17, 391-2), Errington (1969: 276-9) and Walbank (1979: 187) identify all four as the famous *stratēgos* under the name Aristaenus of Dyme. Support for this identification may be found in an inscription recorded on the base of a statue dedicated at Corinth by Aristaenus (the *stratēgos*) in honour of T. Quinctius Flamininus, most likely in 196/5 BC, when Aristaenus was *stratēgos* of the Achaean League (cf. Errington, 1969: 251). Bousquet, 1964: 607-9, who re-edited the inscription, restored line 2 (containing the name of the dedicator) as follows: *Aristain[os Timokadeos Dymaios]*. If this restoration is correct, the evidence appears to indicate a single individual (Aristaenus of Dyme, son of Timocades, the well-known *stratēgos*). However, line 2 might also be restored as follows: *Aristain[os stratagos tōn Akhaiōn]* (cf. *SIG*³ 600, line 1: *epi stratagou tōn Akhaiōn Philopoimenos to teta[r]ton*, in which the name of the magistrate appears without patronymic or ethnic; according to Errington, 1969: 41-2, 80-1, 248-65, the fourth *stratēgia* of Philopoemen occurred most likely in 201/0). If the latter supplement is correct, one can still distinguish between Aristaenus of Megalopolis and a homonymous statesman from Dyme. It may be noted that the hipparch of 208/7 commanded the Achaean cavalry at the battle of Mantinea, in which the League defeated Sparta. This service would have justified the dedication of an equestrian statue in his honour by the Achaean League.

41. Fragments: *FGrHist* 821 F. 1-3.

42. Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 1.5.1; 1.89-90, with Gabba, 1959: 364-9; Gabba, 1991: 87-8, 97-9, 106-10, 114-19, 134-42, 152-8, 197-8.

43. Cato: *HRR* 1², F. 6, 19, 47, 56, 70, 71. Acilius: *HRR* 1², F. 1; *FGrHist* 813 F. 1. Pseudo-Scymnus: *Periēgēsis*, lines 226-35. On the date of this composition see pp. 40-2 above. In Cato, *HRR* 1², F. 51, derived from Servius Auctus (*ad Verg. Aen.* 8.638), the ancestor of the Sabines is said to have been Sabus the Lacedaemonian. This statement appears to represent a genealogy erroneously imputed to Cato, for in F. 50, preserved by Dionysius of Halicarnassus (*Ant. Rom.* 2.49.2-3), Cato is said to have identified Sabus, son of the local god Sancus, as the eponymous ancestor of the Sabines, and Dionysius would not have failed to cite Cato as evidence for the Hellenic origin of the Sabines had Cato accepted a tradition to that effect (see n. 42 above). Moreover, Dionysius (*Ant. Rom.* 2.49.4-5) goes on to say that, according to another tradition (i.e. not Cato), the Sabines were descended from Lacedaemonian colonists. It therefore appears that Servius Auctus combined details from two separate stories, deriving the name of Sabus the eponymous ancestor from Cato, and converting him into a Lacedaemonian on the basis of the other tradition reported by Dionysius, which probably occurred in one of the Roman annalists. Letta, 1984: 432-8, maintains that Cato himself reported both traditions in order to refute the second, and that Servius Auctus combined details from the two stories. The same scholar (pp. 424-32) argues that Cato treated stories about Greek origins as unimportant in comparison with traditions emphasizing non-Greek and indigenous origins. My suggestion about why Cato ascribed Greek origins to some Italian communities is based on the analysis of Gruen, 1992: 52-83 (specific passages are discussed on pp. 59-60).

44. Jacoby (*FGrHist* 821) placed Zenodotus around the time of Cato. At any rate, he must have written between the time of Hieronymus of Cardia, the first Greek author who treated Roman affairs in any detail (Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 1.6.1), and that of Dionysius of Halicarnassus, who cites him (*Ant. Rom.* 2.49.1).

45. On Zenodotus see Abel, 1972: 49-51.

46. On Agatharchides see Fraser, 1972: 1.173-4, 515-17, 539-53; Brown, 1973: 182-94; Gabba, 1974: 638; Pédech, 1976: 127-34; Hornblower, 1981: 27-32; Gruen,

1984: 337; Ferrary, 1988: 232-6; Burstein, 1989: 1-41; Meister, 1990: 150-3; Verdin, 1990: 2-5; Clarke, 1999: 62-3; *DPA* 1, no A 32 (Agatharchidès de Cnide).

47. Text: *GGM* 1.111-95 is now out of date. The principal sources providing evidence for the contents of *De Mari Erythraeo* are Phot. *Bibl.*, Codex 250; Diod. 3.12-48; Strabo 16.4.5-20, C 769-79 (cf. Burstein, 1989: 36-41). *Testimonia: FGrHist* 86 T. 1-5. Translation: Burstein, 1989: 42-175.

48. Diod. 3.47.8.

49. Phot. *Bibl.*, Codex 250.102, 459a-b. On the interpretation of this passage see Fraser, 1972: 1.545; Ferrary, 1988: 233 n. 32; Burstein, 1989: 168.

50. Palm, 1955: 15-55; Fraser, 1972: 2.774 n. 165.

51. Criticism of Rome: Sacks, 1990: 117-59. On Diod. 5.38.3 see Ferrary, 1988: 233 n. 34.

52. Fraser, 1972: 1.541-2; Gozzoli, 1978: 54-79; Ferrary, 1988: 232-6; Burstein, 1989: 28-9. I agree with Ferrary and Burstein that Gozzoli overrates the importance of Rome in *On the Erythraean Sea*.

53. Speech of the elderly counsellor: Phot. *Bibl.*, Codex 250.11-18, 444b-445b. Scholars disagree about whether the elderly counsellor advocated (e.g. Burstein, 1989: 13, 24) or opposed (e.g. Gozzoli, 1978: 69-70) an expedition against the Ethiopians (survey in Ferrary, 1988: 234 n. 37). That he opposed it appears to be implied by the author's general hostility to imperialism and by the fact that, in the surviving fragments, the advisor consistently enjoins caution and restraint over the indulgence of reckless impulse. The fragment in which he seems to maintain that the physical appearance of the Ethiopians should not deter anyone from attacking them may be understood as an imprudent argument cited by the counsellor for rhetorical purposes, and subsequently shown to be ill-founded.

54. Goldstein, 1976: 14-17, 62-4, 355-6.

55. Goldstein, 1976: 347; Gruen, 1984: 338-9.

56. On this treaty see Timpe, 1974: 133-52; Gruen, 1976: 86 n. 91.

57. The reference to the Achaean War of 146 BC in 1 *Macc.* 8.9-10 is anachronistic, for Judas was killed in 160 BC (Goldstein, 1976: 353-4, 372). Sordi, 1975: 98 n. 17, maintains that this passage refers to events of 192-168 rather than 146, but in my view the ancient author's reference to the people of Greece (*hoi ek tēs Hellados*) indicates a separate item in the roughly chronological sequence of enemies confronting the Romans.

58. Although Goldstein, 1976: 55-89, maintains that the author of 2 *Macc.* opposed the Hasmonean dynasty, this work actually eulogizes the ruling family.

59. Goldstein, 1976: 347-8.

60. On *Or. Sib.* 4.47-106 see Goldstein, 1976: 355, and pp. 33-9 above.

61. Text: Müller, *FHG* 3, F. 1-67; Jacoby, *FGrHist* 87 F. 1-27, 29-44, 47-71, 90, 103-5, 108-16; Theiler, 1982: F. 80-250; Edelstein and Kidd, 1989: F. 51-78, 252-84. Müller and Jacoby as well as Edelstein and Kidd accept as fragments of Posidonius only those texts containing an explicit reference to him, while Theiler also includes passages (chiefly from Diodorus, Strabo, Plutarch and Appian) that lack definite attribution. Although such passages are relevant to the study of Posidonius (Malitz, 1983: 34-42; des Places, 1985: 114-15; Marcovich, 1986a: 110-11; Marcovich, 1986b: 290-3), reconstruction of the *Histories* must commence with securely attributed fragments (Rist, 1969: 201-2; Joly, 1984: 366-7; Sandbach, 1984: 218; Bringmann, 1986: 31-2; Kidd, 1988: 293-5, 896-9, 903-5, 910-14; Edelstein and Kidd, 1989: xvii-xx; Hahm, 1989: 1327 n. 5; Meister, 1990: 168; Algra, 1991: 316; Alonso-Núñez, 1994: 87-9; Kidd, 1997: 225-36).

62. On the date of composition see Ferrary, 1988: 488 n. 6. Ruschenbusch, 1993:

70-6, and Bringmann, 1997: 151-4, maintain that the *Histories* ended in 88/7 BC. Theiler, 1982: 2.78-80, Malitz, 1983: 69-71, Ferrary, 1988: 488 n. 6, and Kidd, 1988: 276-80, identify the terminal date as 86/5. Strasburger, 1965: 40-53, Verbrugghe, 1975: 189-204, and Alonso-Núñez, 1994: 91-2, believe the work extended to 63 BC. Strasburger and Verbrugghe demonstrate that certain passages from Strabo, Plutarch and Appian dealing with the rise and destruction of piracy in the Mediterranean, and with the revolt of Spartacus, contain structural similarities pointing to a common origin in the work of Posidonius, most likely a description of Pompey's campaigns, which they assign to the *Histories*. Although a terminal date of 86/5 BC would preclude a treatment of Pompey's campaigns in that work, an obscure reference in Strabo (Posidonius, F. 79 E-K) may suggest that Posidonius wrote a separate account of this subject (cf. Ferrary, 1988: 488 n. 6; Meister, 1990: 166-7). However, some scholars doubt that Posidonius wrote about Pompey's campaigns at all (Theiler, 1982: 2.59-60; Malitz, 1983: 71-3; Kidd, 1988: 331-3, 738-42). On the organization of the *Histories* see Malitz, 1983: 60-74; Alonso-Núñez, 1994: 87-108; Clarke, 1999: 154-70.

63. Scholars have often maintained that Posidonius justified imperialism on the basis of a natural law whereby superior rules over inferior for the advantage of the latter (see Capelle, 1932: 86-113; Walbank, 1965a: 12-16 [but cf. Walbank, 1972: 182]; Astin, 1967a: 300-1; Gabba, 1974: 640; Aalders, 1975: 102-5; Erskine, 1990: 192-204; Gabba, 1991: 196). Some scholars who do not believe that Posidonius defended imperialism in this way nevertheless agree that he advocated beneficent treatment of subjects (see Strasburger, 1965: 46-9; Desideri, 1972: 481-93; Desideri, 1973: 255-8; Momigliano, 1975: 32-6; Malitz, 1983: 141-2, 424-7; Gruen, 1984: 351-5; Ferrary, 1988: 378-81; Kidd, 1988: 296-7). On Posidonius as the student of Panaetius see Posidonius, T. 1a, 9, 10 E-K. Despite the reservations of Strasburger, I agree with Capelle, who maintained that Panaetius, although a Stoic, acknowledged a natural division of humanity into superior and inferior nations, and defended imperialism on that basis. That Posidonius, also a Stoic, adopted this view is evident from F. 60 E-K, on the subordination of the intellectually inferior Mariandynoi to the more capable Heracleotes, who provided for their needs. In F. 284.5 E-K (derived from Seneca *Ep.* 90.5), Posidonius describes the beneficent rule of philosophers that prevailed during the Golden Age. This passage stresses the intellectual and moral superiority of the philosophers as well as the corresponding inferiority of their subjects. Strictly speaking, Posidonius refers here to natural distinctions occurring within a single community rather than to differences between nations, but the important point is that he acknowledges the existence of natural gradations among human beings. In *Ep.* 90.4 (not part of F. 284 E-K), Seneca states that philosophy teaches the natural submission of inferior to superior (*naturae est enim potioribus deteriora summittere*). This general rule introduces his discussion of Posidonius and the powerful influence of philosophers throughout history (Sen. *Ep.* 90.5-13, 20-5, 30-2 = Posidonius F. 284 E-K), and is indeed cited as the grounds (Sen. *Ep.* 90.5: *ergo*) upon which Posidonius ascribed rule to philosophers in the Golden Age. This seems to imply that Posidonius himself derived the rule of philosophers in the Golden Age from the general principle. The interpretation of Posidonius proposed here agrees only in part with Garnsey, 1997: 159-74, who cites F. 60 and F. 284 E-K as evidence that the voluntary submission of inferior to superior was not in principle unacceptable to Stoics, but concludes that Posidonius was not concerned to defend such relationships. On Panaetius and the defence of imperialism see pp. 21-2 above.

64. On Posidonius, F. 284 E-K, see Kidd, 1988: 960-2.

65. On Posidonius, F. 60 E-K, see Kidd, 1988: 295-7.
66. On Posidonius, F. 263 E-K, see Kidd, 1988: 905-7.
67. On Posidonius, F. 254 E-K, see Kidd, 1988: 887-8. Scipio's mission belongs to the years c. 140-139 BC.
68. On Posidonius, F. 265 E-K, see Kidd, 1988: 910-16.
69. On Posidonius as the source of Diodorus for the First Sicilian Slave War, see Verbrugghe, 1975: 189 n. 1; Malitz, 1983: 134, 144; Bringmann, 1986: 32-3; Kidd, 1988: 293-5. Broughton (*MRR* 1.481-99) originally dated the rebellion in the period 139-132 BC, but the first year of the war is uncertain. Bradley, 1989: 59, 140-1, who demonstrates that the revolt must have started between 141 and 136, believes it lasted at least five years.
70. The last detail is anachronistic, for the juries of the extortion court were not transferred to the equestrian order until the legislation of C. Gracchus (122 BC). According to Sacks, 1990: 142-54, it was Diodorus who erroneously introduced the equestrians and their control of the extortion court into this context. In my view, the error goes back to Posidonius and reflects his conservative outlook on Roman politics (see Desideri, 1972: 481-93; Desideri, 1973: 249-54; Malitz, 1983: 365-405). I agree with Verbrugghe, 1975: 197-200, that other inaccuracies in the text of Diodorus derive from Posidonius, who assumed that the social and economic conditions of Sicily in the second century resembled those prevailing in Italy during the first century BC.
71. On Diod. 36.3 see Desideri, 1972: 489. Verbrugghe, 1975: 189-204, argues that common elements in Diodorus' treatment of the First (34/35.2, 8-11) and Second (36.1-11) Slave Wars suggest that Posidonius was the source of Diodorus in both instances.
72. On the governorship of Mucius Scaevola in Asia see *MRR* 2.7; 3.145-6; Sumner, 1978: 147-53; Kallet-Marx, 1990: 128.
73. On L. Sempronius Asellio and C. Sempronius Longus see *MRR* 2.9-10; 3.188-90.
74. On Posidonius as the source of Diod. 34/35.33.3-6 see Desideri, 1972: 481-93; Hackl, 1980: 151 n. 2; Malitz, 1983: 364. Hackl, 1980: 151-66, argues that Posidonius viewed the year 146 BC as a major turning-point in the history of the Roman Republic (cf. Meister, 1990: 169 n. 157). According to Bringmann, 1977: 28-49, for Posidonius the turning point was 102 BC. On the authenticity of Scipio Nasica's arguments see Lintott, 1972: 632-4; Zecchini, 1995: 229-30; Desideri, 2002: 741 n. 8.
75. On Posidonius' interest in the family history of the Roman nobility see Malitz, 1983: 68-9, 361-4. The conservative outlook of Diod. 34/35.33.1-8 emerges from the author's condemnation of demagoguery and redistribution of land, and from the fact that he applauded the assassination of Tiberius Gracchus by Scipio Nasica Serapio (cf. Botteri, 1980: 77-87, who shows that in this passage Diodorus praises the civic virtues of the Nasicae, whom he extols as exemplary citizens). On the conservatism of Posidonius, see n. 70 above.
76. It is generally believed that the *Histories* of Posidonius were the chief source of Diodorus in Books 33-7 (see Schwartz, 1903: 690-1; Desideri, 1972: 481 n. 1; Verbrugghe, 1975: 189-204; Cassola, 1982: 763-9; Malitz, 1983: 37; Ferrary, 1988: 490-4; Meister, 1990: 176-9).
77. Philodemus: *On the Good King according to Homer*, with Gigante, 1995: 63-78. Cicero: *Rep.* 3.38-9; *Off.* 1.34-5; 2.21-9; *Att.* 5.16; 5.21; *QFr.* 1.1, with Capelle, 1932: 93-8; Erskine, 1990: 192-200. Sallust: *Cat.* 9.5-10.1; 10.6; 12.5. Diodorus: 11.70.3-4; 14.2.1-2; 15.1.1-5; 34/35.33.3-6, with Sacks, 1990: 42-4, 78-9.

Nicolaus of Damascus: *FGrHist* 90 F. 125. Dionysius of Halicarnassus: *Ant. Rom.* 1.4.2; 1.5.2-3; 2.16-17, with Gabba, 1959: 363-4; Gabba, 1991: 196, 200. Pompeius Trogus: *Just. Epit.* 44.5.8, with Alonso-Núñez, 1990: 74-7. Livy: 22.13.11, with Walsh, 1961: 82-109. Vergil: *Aen.* 1.278-9; 1.291-6; 6.851-3, with Clausen, 1966: 75-8; Williams, 1967: 29-41; Austin, 1977: 263-4; Lyne, 1983: 188-203; Lyne, 1987: 4 n. 2. Under the principate we may cite Strabo 6.4.2, C 288; Plut. *De fort. Rom.* 316c-317c; Plut. *Ad princ. inerud.* 779f-781a; Ael. Aristid. *Roman Oration*. On Greek intellectuals and Hellenism under the principate see Swain, 1996. The Jewish author Philo (*Leg.* 8-13) praised the benefits of the Roman empire.

78. On Posidonius' fundamental support of Rome see Malitz, 1983: 426-7, Ferrary, 1988: 488-94, and the bibliography cited in Alonso-Núñez, 1994: 97 n. 21.

79. On Posidonius, F. 272 E-K, see Kidd, 1988: 922-32; on F. 263 E-K see Kidd, 1988: 905-7; on F. 253 E-K see Kidd, 1988: 863-87; Desideri, 1973: 249-54.

80. See Strasburger, 1965: 46-9; Momigliano, 1972-1973: 699-702; Malitz, 1983: 142.

81. On this point see Walbank, 1965a: 12-16 (but cf. Walbank, 1972: 182). Yarrow, 2006, shows that Posidonius and other Greek historians of the late Republic and the Augustan age who accepted Roman rule expressed reservations about Rome.

82. On Thucydides see Hunter, 1982: 17-49; Rahe, 1996: 105-41; Bagby, 1996: 169-93. Also see pp. 26-7 above.

83. On the *Histories* of Posidonius in general see Gigon, 1967: 83-99; von Fritz, 1977: 163-93; Malitz, 1983; Candau Morón, 1985: 107-27; Kidd, 1989: 38-50; Meister, 1990: 166-71; Alonso-Núñez, 1994: 87-108.

84. On Herodotus see Fornara, 1971: 75-91; Moles, 2002: 33-52; Raaflaub, 2002: 149-86. That Thucydides included Herodotus among the *logographoi* criticized at 1.21.1 and 1.22.4 is suggested by his comments at 1.20.3, correcting Hdt. 6.57.5 and 9.53.2.

4. Polybius on Legitimate Expansion

1. On Polybius' unfavourable view of Macedonian threats to the independence of Achaëa see Welwei, 1963: 22-8; Welwei, 1967: 306-14.

2. On the text of Polyb. 1.2.7 see Walbank, 1957: 41; Pédech, 1969: ad loc. At 1.4.1-4, the historian declares his obligation to describe properly the unification of world events that has resulted in the universal empire of Rome. This whole process he calls 'the finest and most profitable undertaking of Fortune' (*to kalliston hama d'ophelimôtaton epitêdeuma tês tykhês*). This phrase should be read in association with 6.2.3 and 39.8.7, where Polybius says that the finest and most profitable result (*kalliston ... hama d'ophelimôtaton*) of his project for students is understanding how the Romans conquered almost the entire world. Thus it is not the unification of world events itself that is finest and most profitable, but understanding it. The same line of thought may be observed at 15.20.5, where Polybius says that the punishment of Antiochus III and Philip V, who had conspired to partition the Ptolemaic empire, served as an excellent example (*kalliston hypodeigma*) for the correction of their successors. It is not the punishment of the kings itself that is excellent, but understanding it. Similarly, it is not the spectacle of events (*to kalliston theama tôn gegonotôn*) mentioned at 9.44.2, and the example of Roman policy (*kalon deigma*) discussed at 39.5.1, that are fine, but understanding these things.

3. At 1.11.1-2, Polybius refers to an initial refusal of the senate to assist the

Mamertines, and their subsequent decision to do so. Finally, the decree of the senate approving assistance was ratified by the assembly (1.11.3). The interpretation of Polyb. 1.11.1-3 adopted here follows the conclusions of Eckstein, 1980: 175-90 (for a parallel cf. Polyb. 33.18.11). According to Hoyos, 1984: 88-93, the initial refusal of the senate to aid the Mamertines was followed directly by a positive decision of the assembly (this view is accepted by Walbank, 2002: 21-2).

4. My conclusion agrees essentially with that of Walbank (1963: 5-6; 1972: 160-3), who suggests that the aim of universal rule was formulated after 241. Derow, 1979: 2-4, dates the formulation of Rome's objective in 202.

5. On beginnings, pretexts and causes in Polybius see Pédech, 1964: 75-93; cf. Walbank, 2002: 4 and n. 22.

6. On the word *euskhēmōn*, which has a morally positive meaning in the phrase *prophasin euskhēmōna* (Polyb. 36.2.1), see p. 211 n. 2 below.

7. On Rome's threat to declare war against Carthage in 237 see Walbank, 1957: 149-50 (Rich, 1976: 64-71, maintains that war was definitely declared). On Polybius' moral objection to this policy see Eckstein, 1995: 100-2.

8. On Polybius' treatment of Philip V and Antiochus III see Eckstein, 1995: 88-9.

9. See Eckstein, 1995: 56-70, 84-117, 194-236, 272-84.

10. Derow, 1979: 1-15.

11. Walbank (1965a: 4-6; 1972: 166-83; 1974: 11-13; 1977: 151-3; 1981-1982: 240-9) argues that in Books 30-3, covering the years 167-152, Polybius made cynical and detached comments on Roman policy, and that in these passages he criticized but did not condemn Rome (cf. Walbank, 2002: 18-19). Eckstein, 1995: 103-9, 229-30, shows that Polybius disapproved on moral grounds of certain Roman policies described in those books. In my view, he demonstrates that Polybius' criticism of Rome is not cynical and detached but earnest. Ferrary, 1988: 286-91, 306-18, maintains that, although in some instances he definitely criticized Roman decisions, Polybius expressed a generally favourable opinion of Roman policy in Books 30-3, for in other cases within these volumes he took a positive view of Roman intervention, or criticized not Rome but foreign states whose errors were exploited by the Romans for their own advantage, or explained that Roman decisions were the result of deceptions practised by foreign leaders. My own analysis owes most to Ferrary. I agree with Walbank and Eckstein that Polybius criticized but did not condemn Rome, and with Ferrary that the historian's judgement of Roman policy was on balance favourable.

12. On the adverb *pragmatikōs* and the corresponding adjective see Ferrary, 1988: 311 n. 152 (cf. Mauersberger 2.2.617-23). Note especially 22.19.3, where Polybius contrasts *ho pragmatikos anēr* (the capable man) with *tou kakopraxmonos* (the unscrupulous man), a distinction that clearly illustrates the positive moral sense usually conveyed by this word.

13. See Momigliano, 1975: 48-9; Musti, 1978: 44-8, 69-78; Shimron, 1979-1980: 94-117; Eckstein, 1985: 265-82; Eckstein, 1995: 206-25, 233-6.

5. Polybius on the Acquisition, Expansion and Preservation of Imperial Rule

1. On the favourable attitude of Polybius towards Philip II see Welwei, 1963: 22-8; Walbank, 1967a: 85; Walbank, 1970b: 291-307.

2. Polybius suggests that the king first conceived the ambition of universal rule in the year 218/7, after he learned about Hannibal's victory over the Romans at the battle of Lake Trasimene (5.101.10-102.1).

3. Polyb. 3.1.9; 3.3.8; 29.21.8; 31.2.12; Livy 45.16.1-2; 45.17.7-18.7; 45.29.4-31.1; 45.32.1-2; 45.32.7.

4. Restraint enables us to avoid not reversal itself, which is the work of inexorable Fortune, but the humiliation wrought by arrogance (see Walbank, 1957: 19-20). Thus Polybius cites with approval the words of Demetrius of Phalerum (29.21) and of Scipio Aemilianus (38.21) concerning inevitable changes of Fortune. But when they are overthrown by her, men who in the moment of success behave arrogantly because they have disregarded the mutability of Fortune suffer humiliation that is quite avoidable. Polybius emphasizes this point by contrasting arrogant behaviour with the corresponding humiliation that is suffered when a reversal of circumstances occurs. Thus Marcus Atilius Regulus, who had refused pity and mercy to the Carthaginians, was soon compelled to beg those very people to spare his life (1.31.4-8; 1.35.1-3). Similarly King Perseus of Macedonia, who had boasted immoderately and had taken arrogant and irreparable measures, became a prisoner of the Romans (29.20). After his death, the statues of Callicrates were cast into darkness, while those of his opponent Lycortas, which he himself had consigned to obscurity, were restored to their original positions in the light of day (36.13.1-2). Hasdrubal, who had often proclaimed that he would never live to witness the destruction of Carthage, begged Scipio Aemilianus to spare his life as the city burned (38.20). The Seleucid pretender Achaeus, who had spoken boastfully, was captured, mutilated and put to death by Antiochus III. Polybius notes that although Achaeus had taken all reasonable precautions, he was overcome by the perfidy of those whom he had trusted (8.15-21). It is true that, according to Polybius, Hannibal implored Scipio Africanus, before the battle of Zama, to avoid arrogance by agreeing to settle the dispute between Rome and Carthage through negotiation, because Fortune might turn against him if he insisted on fighting (15.6.4-7.9); Scipio himself acknowledged the instability of Fortune but maintained that he had no choice but to fight (15.8). Thus one could avoid the immediate danger of a reversal by refusing to take risks; but the purchase of immediate security does not negate the universal sovereignty of Fortune.

5. On this point see Eckstein, 1995: 216-18.

6. Polybius ascribes the four views to European Greeks. Modern scholars have sometimes maintained that the persons expressing these opinions were members of the Greek community in Rome (Walbank, 1977: 147-8), Roman senators (Casola, 1983: 40), or influential people in Rome, both citizens and foreigners (Nistor, 1985: 45-9).

7. Gelzer, 1931: 289-92. It will be argued in the next section of this chapter that Diod. 32.2 and 4, although derived from the *Histories*, do not represent the views of Polybius.

8. Petzold, 1969: 62-3.

9. Walbank, 1965a: 7-12; 1970b: 296 and n. 35; 1972: 173-81; 1974: 13-21; 1977: 156-9; 1979: 663-4; 1981-1982: 247-56.

10. Ferrary, 1988: 327-43. Earlier Momigliano (1972-1973: 697-9; 1975: 29-30), Gabba (1977: 71-3) and Musti (1978: 54-7) had maintained that Polybius agreed with the first and fourth statements but expressed reservations by including the second and third. Walbank, 2002: 19-20, later favoured this approach. It should be noted that scholars who believe Polybius accepted the first and fourth statements (with or without reservations) sometimes think that he supported ruthlessness. This is true of Gelzer (n. 7 above), Walbank (nn. 9 and 10 above) and Momigliano (n. 10 above).

11. On Polybius and *deditio* see Pédech, 1964: 199.
12. See Eckstein, 1995: 84-117.
13. Nissen, 1863: 252; Klotz, 1940-1941: 19; Tränkle, 1977: 134 n. 6.
14. It may be observed that Livy's distinction between *utile* (expediency) and *honestum* (honour) corresponds to Polybius' distinction between *to sympheron* and *to kalon* (see Polyb. 15.24.5; 21.32c; 24.12.2; implied at 13.3.1). On Livy 42.47.1-9 and Polybius' criticism of Rome see Gabba, 1977: 68; Eckstein, 1995: 108-9.
15. The first embassy (Diod. 32.1) asked how the Carthaginians might make amends for having engaged in war against Massinissa; the second (Diod. 32.3; App. *Pun.* 342-4) reported that the Carthaginians had punished the men responsible for that mistake; the third (Diod. 32.3, combining the second and third embassies; App. *Pun.* 345-6) asked what satisfaction the Romans demanded.
16. Walbank, 1965a: 10-11, Ferrary, 1988: 334-9, Sacks, 1990: 44-6, 137-42, Eckstein, 1995: 225-6, and Desideri, 2002: 738-41, argue that Diod. 32.2 and 4 belong to the prologue of Book 32.
17. On the Roman pretext for declaring war on Carthage see Baronowski, 1995: 16-20.
18. Thus Touloumakos, 1971: 28 n. 22; Walbank, 1974: 18-20; Ferrary, 1988: 324-41; Sacks, 1990: 44-6, 137-8; Eckstein, 1995: 225-9.
19. Schwartz, 1903: 689-90; Cassola, 1982: 763.
20. It may be noted that Polybius (29.12.9-10) excused his tendency to repeat the same structural, conceptual and verbal elements in his accounts of battles, in speeches and in other parts of the *Histories* (on the text and interpretation of this passage see Walbank, 1979: 375-6).
21. Thus Gelzer, 1931: 289-92; Pédech, 1964: 201-2; Walbank, 1964: 254; Walbank, 1965a: 10-11; Walbank, 1972: 178-9; Momigliano, 1972-1973: 697-9; Gabba, 1974: 637-8; Momigliano, 1975: 29-30; Desideri, 2002: 738-55. Later Walbank (1974: 18-20) rejected the view that Diod. 32.2 and 4 are based on Polybius and represent his judgement. Petzold (1969: 62-3) and Gabba (1977: 60-72), who believe that the fragments of Diodorus are based on Polybius and represent his views, maintain that they reflect Polybius' condemnation of fear and terror as practised by the Romans. But the fragments, which say that Roman policy after 168 was based on fear and terror, actually declare these to be effective means of preserving imperial rule. Therefore, if they believe that the fragments represent the views of Polybius, Petzold and Gabba ought to conclude that the ancient historian advocated fear and terror as practised by the Romans. On this question see the bibliography given by Ferrary, 1988: 335 n. 217.
22. See Sacks, 1990: 42-4, 103-8.
23. It is in the prologues, speeches and polemical discussions that Diodorus most frequently expresses his own views (Sacks, 1990: 9-22, 83-116). Such views are recorded throughout the *Bibliotheca* (Sacks, 1990: 23-82, 117-203).
24. Walbank, 1965a: 10-11, Ferrary, 1988: 334-9, Sacks, 1990: 44-6, 137-42, and Eckstein, 1995: 225-6, maintain that the fragments, which advocate severity as expedient, represent Diodorus' own view, as expressed in the prologue of Book 32. Although he demonstrates that Diodorus regularly condemned ruthless oppression of subjects (see n. 22 above), Sacks believes that the historian made an exception in the case of Rome. Walbank (1992: 250-1) later doubted that the fragments can represent the view of Diodorus himself.
25. Diodorus: Sacks (1990: 98 n. 59) lists 8.12; 10.34; 13.20-32; 13.52-3; 14.65-9; 21.21; 27.13-18; 31.3. Polybius: Pédech (1964: 277 n. 117 and 280 n. 133) lists 4.22.10; 9.28-39; 11.4-8; 21.10.5-10.

26. Thus Touloumakos, 1971: 28 n. 22; Walbank, 1974: 18-20; Ferrary, 1988: 337.

27. Thus Walbank, 1965a: 11. Later Walbank (1974: 18-20) concluded that the organization of the argument in Diod. 32.4 is indeed too inept to represent material derived from Polybius.

28. Polyb. 12.25b.1; 12.25i.8; 29.12.9; 36.1.7, with Sacks, 1981: 79-95.

29. We may note, for instance, the reference to Antigonos Doson (Polyb. 9.36.1-5), which follows discussion of Philip V (9.35.5-8), as well as the inaccurate statement regarding Aetolia and the Acarnanian League (9.38.9). On the speeches made by Chlaeneas and Lyciscus at Sparta in 211/0 (Polyb. 9.28-39), see Walbank, 1967a: 162-82.

30. Thus Walbank, 1974: 18-20.

31. Polyb. 3.59.4 (the limited military and political activity of the Greek elites after 146: see Walbank, 1957: 393-4); 34.14 (Polybius visited Alexandria during the reign of Ptolemy VIII, 145-116); F. 76 B-W (the diplomatic mission of Scipio Aemilianus to the eastern Mediterranean, c. 140-139: see Walbank, 1979: 749-50; cf. Posidonius, F. 265 E-K, with Kidd, 1988: 914-15; on the date of the embassy see Kidd, 1988: 291); 30.2.6 (the future Attalus III, who became king of Pergamum in 138); 3.37.11 (the Atlantic coast of the Iberian peninsula had recently become known to the inhabitants of the Mediterranean world; this comment may refer to the expedition of D. Iunius Brutus Callaicus to that region in the period 138-136: see Walbank, 1957: 369-70; *MRR* 1.483, 485, 487); 31.28.12-13 and 38.21.3 (Polybius speaks of Scipio Aemilianus, who died in 129, in terms suggesting that he was no longer alive); 3.39.8 (a reference to the Via Domitia, built in 118: see Walbank, 1972: 13 n. 62; Eckstein, 1992: 393-7).

32. Pédech (1964: 202 n. 516) and Walbank (1972: 178-9; 1974: 18-20) tentatively suggest an addition by Diodorus. Since Carthage and Numantia were often coupled as historical examples in Latin literature of the first century BC (see Zecchini, 2003: 33-42), Diodorus might have been influenced by this Roman habit of thought.

33. We may assume that the fragments accurately represent what Polybius wrote, for in general Diodorus faithfully condensed speeches for which his model was Polybius (see Sacks, 1990: 98-9).

34. Walbank, 1979: 44-5, suggests that Diod. 32.2 and 4 represent a passage that may be derived from the *Histories*, but do not represent Polybius' views about the character of Roman policy after 168 or the expediency of fear and terror as a means of preserving imperial rule. The present analysis agrees with this suggestion. Ferrary, 2003: 23 n. 30, believes that Diodorus himself composed the passage from which these fragments are derived by assembling elements drawn from the *Histories*.

35. Ferrary, 1988: 334-41. Andrew Erskine (2003: 229-43) maintains that, although Polybius recognized the Romans sometimes acted with great severity after 168, he avoided criticizing them because he thought the normal consequences of such conduct did not apply to them.

6. Polybius on the Enemies of Rome

1. Walbank, 1972: 173-81; 1974: 13-18; 1977: 156-9; 1981-1982: 247-52.

2. Momigliano, 1975: 48-9; Musti, 1978: 44-8, 69-78; Shimron, 1979-1980: 94-117; Eckstein, 1985: 265-82; Eckstein, 1995: 197-225.

3. See pp. 99-101 above.

4. See pp. 97-8 above.
5. See pp. 99-100 above.
6. The *fascēs* symbolize the *imperium* of Roman magistrates (Caes. *B Gall.* 7.77.16; Hor. *Carm. Saec.* 53-4; Livy 31.29.6; 35.16.4; Sen. *Apocol.* 12; Plut. *Sert.* 23.4-24.5). Although I believe that Macedonia and parts of Greece came under formal Roman control at this time (Baronowski, 1987: 125-38, and 1988: 448-60), I agree that Polybius' reference to the rods and axes does not in itself constitute definite proof of this status. In his excellent study of Roman imperialism during the period 148-62 BC, Robert Kallet-Marx argues that, in many cases, the emergence of a formal Roman province resulted from a continuing military presence and the gradual evolution of administrative structures rather than from a single, definitive act (Kallet-Marx, 1995a: 11-41, 347-9).
7. On the embassy of L. Aurelius Orestes see Walbank, 1979: 698-700.
8. The translation 'ill-disposed and perverse' is adopted from Walbank, 1979: 701.
9. On the identity of this council see Walbank, 1979: 715.
10. On Teuta, Demetrius of Pharos and Hieronymus of Syracuse see Eckstein, 1995: 210-11. Also note Eckstein's discussion of Aetolia and the Seleucid War (pp. 212-13).
11. On the death of Demetrius see Walbank, 1957: 331.
12. On Philip V and the First Macedonian War see Eckstein, 1995: 211-12.
13. Polyb. 22.6.1-7; 22.10.1; 22.11.1-4; 22.12.4; 22.13-14; 23.1-3; 23.7-8; 23.9.4-7.
14. On Philip V and his alleged preparations for a war against Rome see Eckstein, 1995: 214-15.
15. On Hannibal see Foulon, 1993: 333-79; Eckstein, 1995: 210-11.
16. On Antiochus III see Eckstein, 1995: 213-14.
17. On the Polybian origin of Livy 44.27.8-12 see Nissen, 1863: 264-76; Klotz, 1940-1941: 20.
18. On Perseus see Eckstein, 1995: 215-16.
19. Polyb. 1.1.1-2; 1.35; 3.7.5; 3.31; 3.118.11-12; 7.11.2; 9.10.13; 10.22.6-10. On the didactic purpose of the *Histories* see Sacks, 1981: 122-44, 180-6.
20. Polyb. 1.14.1-8; 8.8.7; 10.21.8; 12.15.9; 16.14.6; 38.4.
21. Polyb. 9.9.9-10; 9.12-20; 9.26a; 10.16.1-17.5; 10.23-24; 10.32.7-33.7; 10.43-7; 23.14.12 with 23.13. It may be noted that Polybius wrote a treatise on military tactics (not extant), to which the author himself refers at 9.20.4.
22. On the text of Polyb. 9.9.9-10 see Davidson, 1991: 11-12. Davidson explains how generals and leaders, in Polybius' view, make use of or react to appearances and interpretations of events and situations.
23. On this point also see Eckstein, 1995: 210-16.

7. Polybius in the Service of Rome

1. Siege operations: App. *Pun.* 124; cf. Val. Max. 3.7.2.; Florus 1.31.15; Paus. 8.30.9.
2. See Eckstein, 1995: 13-14.
3. On Polybius and prudent cooperation with Rome see n. 12 below.
4. The relationship between Polybius and Scipio might be described as one between client and patron (see Edlund, 1977: 129-36; Walbank, 1979: 498-9; Green, 1990: 276-8), but this could be true only in a non-technical sense (see Eilers, 2002: 2-37, 182-6). The connection between the two men is more accurately

regarded as *amicitia* in the sense of a personal friendship (see Brunt, 1965: 1-20; Eckstein, 1995: 8-9).

5. On Scipio's appointments see *MRR* 1.459, 462, 463, 467.

6. Deeds: Polyb. 35.5.1-2 (cf. F. 6 B-W and F. 18 B-W); 36.8.3; 36.16.10; 38.19a.3; 38.20.4-6; F. 67 B-W. Statements: Polyb. 35.4.8-12; 36.8.4-5; 38.8.1-4; 38.19; 38.20.1-3; 38.21; cf. App. *Pun.* 132. Astin, 1967a: 248-69, gives a list of statements attributed to Scipio Aemilianus.

7. On Polybius' plans to extend the *Histories*, see Walbank, 1972: 13-19.

8. Historians and personal observation: Polyb. 3.4.13; 3.59.3-8; 4.2.1-3; 12.2.1; 12.25e; 12.25g.3-4; 12.27a.1-28.6; 12.28a.3-4. Polybius and Odysseus: Polyb. 12.27.10-28.6; cf. Polyb. 35.6.3-4; Paus. 8.30.8, with von Scala, 1890: 67; Walbank, 1948: 171-2; Vercruysse, 1990: 300-1; Eckstein, 1995: 281; Hartog, 2001: 163-71; Marincola, 2001: 138.

9. Cuntz, 1902: 51-4, believed that Polybius went to North Africa when war broke out, drawn by his interests as a statesman, soldier and historian. Eckstein, 1995: 12-13, maintains that Polybius (who originally agreed to join Manilius at the behest of the Achaean League) subsequently joined Scipio Aemilianus either in response to an official request from him, or because of the close friendship that existed between the two men.

10. On the establishment of oligarchies by Rome see the appendix on pp. 142-8 above.

11. On Polybius' concern with the constitution and laws of the Achaean cities, also see Paus. 8.30.9. Honours for Polybius: Polyb. 39.3.11; 39.5.4; Paus. 8.9.1; 8.30.8; 8.37.2; 8.44.5; 8.48.8; *I.Olympia* 302, 449, 450; *IG* 5.2.304; *IG* 5.2.370 (inscribed on the lintel above a sculptured relief representing Polybius; see Walbank, 1957: ix-x and 5 n. 8; Bol and Eckstein, 1975: 83-93; Eckstein, 1995: 14-15).

12. See Momigliano, 1975: 48-9; Musti, 1978: 44-8, 69-78; Shimron, 1979-1980: 94-117; Eckstein, 1985: 265-82; Eckstein, 1995: 197-225.

13. On the hostility of Polybius towards the masses, radical democracy and social revolution see Welwei, 1966: 290-301; Musti, 1967: 178-81, 201-5; Mendels, 1979-1980: 85-93; Mendels, 1982: 86-110 (fundamental for the discussion that follows); Musti, 1982: 637-8; Labuske, 1984: 479-87; Eckstein, 1995: 129-40; Walbank, 1995a: 201-4. Champion, 2004b: 199-212, suggests that the animosity expressed by Polybius against revolutionary demagogues may in large measure represent an indirect response to political enemies who denounced him as an anti-Roman demagogue.

14. On the Achaean League as a democratic state see especially Polyb. 2.41.5-6; 2.44.6; 4.1.5; 11.13.5-7; 22.8.6; 23.12.8; 24.9.2-4; 38.12.1-13.7, with Walbank, 1957: 221-2; Eckstein, 1995: 1-2. An additional point is that the members of the Achaean *boulê* appear to have received pay in the second century BC. This conclusion emerges from the fact that, when Eumenes II of Pergamum offered to provide an endowment for that purpose, objections to the proposal focused on the existence of laws prohibiting magistrates and private citizens from accepting gifts from kings, and on the danger that Achaean interests might be compromised through acceptance of such munificent largess (Polyb. 22.7.3; 22.7.8-8.8). Walbank, 1979: 187-8, expresses uncertainty on this question.

15. Democracy in the narrower sense meaning rule by the people: Polyb. 6.4.1-6; 6.9.2-4; 6.44.3-9; 7.10.1 with 4.31.1-2 and 4.32.1; 8.35.6 with 6.44.9; 10.25.6; 23.12.8 with 23.14.1. I accept the doctrine maintaining that, in the Hellenistic period, the term 'democracy' was used both in a narrower sense to denote rule by the people, and in a broader sense to mean a republican form of government; this

is true of Polybius as well as other sources (see Musti, 1967: 155-63; Musti, 1972: 1152; Veyne, 1975: 815 n. 4; Musti, 1978: 124-9; Musti, 1982: 629-34; Nicolet, 1983: 23-5; Bernhardt, 1985: 8-9; Walbank, 1995a: 201-3; Rhodes, 1997: 39-61, 531-6). This divergence in the terminology finds a parallel in the problem of how to interpret the formally democratic institutions of the Greek cities. Quass, 1979: 37-52, demonstrates that, in the Hellenistic period, democracy (featuring as standard institutions the *ekklesia*, *boulê* and *arkhai*) was the typical (though not universal) form of constitution. In this article, he takes the view that such constitutions were as a rule genuinely democratic, though of moderate character. In later studies (1992: 422-4; 1993), however, he refines this interpretation and maintains that, although these constitutions did have genuinely democratic features, a small upper class exercised effective control. Gauthier (1984: 82-107 and 1993: 217-25) emphasizes the persistence of genuine democracy in the Hellenistic period until the second century BC (cf. Gruen, 1993: 352-4). Ferrary, 1987-1989: 203-16, maintains that, under Roman influence, genuine democracy began to be replaced by its more attenuated form during the course of the second and first centuries BC (cf. Müller, 1995: 41-54; Fröhlich, 2002: 75-92). Habicht, 1995: 87-92, argues that genuine democracy survived until the end of the Hellenistic age.

16. On democracy in the broader sense, see the works cited in n. 15 above.

17. On religion as an instrument of political control in Polybius' thinking see van Hooff, 1977: 106-9. On the inconstancy, irrationality and violent passions of the multitude see Polyb. 6.44.1-9; 6.56.11; 10.25.6; 11.29.9-11; 21.31.8-14; 23.12.8; 33.20, with Walbank, 1995a: 203-5.

18. On the Achaean League as a conservative state see Walbank, 1957: 221-2; Welwei, 1966: 282-9; Musti, 1967: 195-201; Walbank, 1970a: 13-27; Quass, 1979: 51-2; O'Neil, 1984-1986: 33-44; Walbank, 1995a: 204-5. A succinct account of its political organization is given by Rhodes, 1997: 106-8. On the *synodoi* and *synklêtoi* see Walbank, 1979: 406-14. Lehmann, 1967: 377-85, points out that ordinary citizens could exercise real influence in the federal assembly.

19. According to Nicolet, 1974: 221 n. 1, the word *kheirokratia*, which occurs twice in Polyb. 6.9.7-9, means 'rule by the majority in the assembly'. Against this interpretation is the uneasy fellowship of 'force' (*bia*) and 'majority rule' (*kheirokratia*) as terms describing the degenerate offspring of democracy, which Polybius elsewhere calls mob rule (*okhlokratia*) (6.4.6; 6.4.10; cf. 6.57.9). It is more likely that *kheirokratia* as well as *bia* represent the violent methods of mob rule, which is marked by outrages such as massacre, banishment and redistribution of property (6.9.9). Further considerations support this view. At 6.4.10, Polybius writes that democracy is transformed into mob rule when the multitude practice violence (*hybris*) and lawlessness (*paranoia*). At 6.10.3-5, Polybius says that kingship, aristocracy and democracy degenerate into their corrupt forms through the infection of a latent vice, identified as the monarchic manner (*ho monarkhikos tropos*), the oligarchic manner (*ho tês oligarkhias* [sc. *tropos*]), and the savage and 'cheirotocratic' manner (*ho thêriôdês kai kheirokratikos* [sc. *tropos*]). At 6.9.9, Polybius remarks that, in the final stages of *kheirokratia*, the multitude are reduced to savagery (*apotethêriômenon*). Thus the violent associations of mob rule and of *kheirokratia* (which refers to the same point in the constitutional cycle) preclude a bland constitutional reference. Finally, because the principle of rule by a majority of votes in the assembly is already established under democracy (6.4.5), it would not have to be instituted when the latter evolves into mob rule. The term *kheirokratia* therefore designates the rule of violence. Perhaps it also alludes to the socio-economic position of those accused of resorting to such methods. In

sixth-century Miletus, the two competing political factions were called *Ploutis* and *Kheiomakha*, corresponding to wealthy property owners and poor labourers respectively (Plut. *Mor.* 298c; cf. Ath. 12.524a-b).

20. At 4.81.14, Polybius writes: 'The early events and, to a greater degree, these more recent ones involving the Spartans have been debated by many writers, but the situation is very clear from the time when Cleomenes completely abolished the ancestral constitution' (cf. Walbank, 1957: 535). For his account of Cleomenes, Polybius followed Aratus. Unlike Aratus (*FGrHist* 231 F. 4), Phylarchus (*FGrHist* 81 T. 3; F. 44, 51-5, 59) wrote favourably of Cleomenes (see Polyb. 2.56-61). On Phylarchus see Alonso-Núñez, 1989: 165-6; Pédech, 1989: 439-45. On Polybius' treatment of Cleomenes see Mendels, 1978: 161-6; Mendels, 1981b: 95-104.

21. See Walbank, 1967a: 419-20.

22. On Polybius' treatment of Nabis see Mendels, 1979: 311-33.

23. On the events at Messene see Walbank, 1967a: 56-61. Mendels, 1980: 246-50, maintains that Polyb. 7.10 refers to an earlier oligarchic revolution of 219 BC.

24. On Polybius' treatment of conditions in Boeotia see Feyel, 1942: 273-83; Aymard, 1946: 309-16. Polybius disapproved of cancellation of debt (13.1-1a; 20.6.1-4; 25.3.1-3).

25. On Polyb. 38.11.10 see Fuks, 1970: 79-81; Walbank, 1979: 703-5.

26. See Walbank, 1979: 705-7. The *arkhontes* of the Achaean League included the *stratêgos* and his board of advisors, the ten *damiourgoi* (Polyb. 23.5.14-17; Livy 32.22.2; 38.30.1-5). The *arkhontes* attacked by Critolaus in Polyb. 38.12.7 and 38.13.4-5 appear to be the members of the *gerousia*, who tried to restrain him in Polyb. 38.13.1. The term *gerousia* is probably another name for the *damiourgoi*. On the Achaean magistrates see Walbank, 1957: 219-20; Walbank, 1979: 707; Rhodes, 1997: 106-7. On the *damiourgoi* in particular see Veligianni-Terzi, 1977: 103-7.

27. See Walbank, 1979: 707-8.

28. The standard date for the tribunate of C. Flaminius (232 BC), adopted by Broughton (*MRR* 1.225), is supported by Vishnia (1996: 138-45) and Beck (2005: 244-68). Beck argues that the agrarian bill of Flaminius enjoyed strong support within the senate, and that Flaminius as tribune actually cooperated with (rather than opposed) the senatorial establishment, of which he later became a successful member. Polybius, of course, appears to think that he acted independently.

29. Although I agree with Walbank, 1995a: 215-17, that Polybius' statement at 23.14.1 is less definitive than what he says in 6.11-18, I do not believe that Polybius called the Roman constitution aristocratic at 23.14.1 merely in order to create a rhetorical antithesis to 23.12.8, where he says that Philopoemen pursued fame in a democratic and composite state (*en dêmokratikôi kai polueidei politeumati*). The historian was comparing the political gifts of Scipio and Philopoemen, both of whom, in different circumstances, retained the good will of the populace. Philopoemen, who carried out his political duties in accordance with his convictions (*meta parrhêsias politeuomenos*), consistently avoided incurring the ill-will of the multitude (23.12.8-9), while Scipio gained both the good will of the multitude and the confidence of the senate (23.14.1-2). The one constant element in the Achaean League was the federal assembly, for the magistrates and *boulê* were elected annually; in Rome, however, a public figure had to deal not only with the assembly but also with a body of senators who held their seats for life and dominated political affairs. Thus Polybius' statements at 6.51 and 23.14.1-2 indicate that, although he applied Greek political theory to his study of the Roman political

system, he correctly discerned the predominant role of the senate. Polybius, however, did not believe that Rome was actually an aristocracy (see Walbank, 1995a: 215-17; Walbank, 1998: 49-51, 56). It may also be noted that, according to Aristotle (*Pol.* 4.1293b14-18), an aristocratic constitution may contain a mixture of democracy and aristocracy. Since he was acquainted with the *Politics* of Aristotle at first hand (von Scala, 1890: 132-48) or through a Peripatetic treatise (Cole, 1964: 443-56, 465-71), Polybius' statement at 23.14.1 may have been influenced by Aristotle's doctrine that a mixed constitution might in certain cases be considered aristocratic.

30. Hor. *Carm.* 3.1.37-40: 'But Fear and Forebodings / clamber to the same place as the propertied magnate. / Clinging to the bronze-beaked trireme and / seated behind the rider is gloomy Care.' It is interesting to note that, in the weeks preceding the battle of Pharsalus, Brutus, champion of the Roman oligarchy, wrote a summary of Polybius (Plut. *Brut.* 4.8; Suda, s.v. Brutus). The only surviving portrait of Polybius, a sculptured relief from Cleitor in Arcadia, represents the historian with his right arm raised in a gesture of prayer (see Walbank, 1957: ix-x; Bol and Eckstein, 1975: 83-93). I agree with Lehmann, 1974: 191, who maintains that in 39.8.2 Polybius prayed for the continuation of the political regime established in Greece after 146 BC. Walbank, 1979: 741, objects that, if this passage referred to the political arrangements in question, the historian would not have limited the scope of his prayer merely to his own lifetime. Therefore he concludes that Polybius was praying for his own continued prosperity. For the same reason Eckstein, 1995: 269 n. 122, believes that Polybius was concerned here with conditions of his personal life that would enable him to complete the *Histories*. According to Hartog, 2003: 28, Polybius prayed that he might retain the confidence of the Romans for the rest of his life. Lehmann's interpretation seems more accurate to me because the historian's prayer is motivated by the recollection that Fortune is apt to overthrow a man precisely in that respect wherein he considers himself most fortunate and successful. Since Polybius took the greatest pride in his political work (39.5.1-3; 39.8.1), the conditions and terms in which he prays his life will continue (*en toutois kai epi toutôn diameinai*) must be his reputation as the successful and respected statesman who helped to create a new regime in Achaea after 146, and that reputation in turn depended upon the permanence of his political work. That the historian should limit the scope of his prayer to the span of his remaining years is perfectly in order for a man who, like Scipio Africanus, Aemilius Paullus and Scipio Aemilianus, recalls the instability of Fortune and therefore avoids saying or doing anything arrogant (see pp. 94-5, 98-9 above).

8. Polybius, Rome, Barbarism and Fate

1. Erskine, 2000: 165-82; Champion, 2004a. Erskine points out that, according to Polybius, the uncivilized manners of the Romans in their barbarian guise were sometimes based on rational calculations; paradoxically, therefore, they were rational barbarians. Champion (see esp. pp. 220-6, 232-8) argues that, by connecting Hellenism with conservative values and depicting the Romans as similar to Greeks at their best, Polybius sought to please the Romans and to emphasize his own conservative credentials against Greek and Roman critics who denounced him as a demagogue; conversely, by referring (usually indirectly) to the Romans as barbarians, he aimed at assuring Greek readers that he had preserved his integrity and patriotism. On this point, I agree with Michael Fronda, 2005: 181-7, who

regards this contrast as evidence, not of an effort to address separate audiences, but of the ancient historian's complex attitude towards Rome. Perhaps 23.13.2 as well as 12.4b.2-3 can be interpreted to imply that Polybius himself implicitly called the Romans barbarians. In the first passage the historian remarks that, during seventeen years of military campaigning, Hannibal passed through many barbarian nations (*ethnê ... barbara*).

2. Surveys of scholarly opinion on the authenticity of speeches in Polybius may be found in Musti, 1972: 1125; Champion, 1996: 321 n. 27; Marincola, 2001: 128-33; Walbank, 2002: 11.

3. Walbank, 1965b; Sacks, 1981: 79-95.

4. Pédech, 1964: 254-302.

5. Champion, 1996: 321-4; 1997: 112-17; 2000a: 436-7; Marincola, 2007: 123-6.

6. Invented: Morkholm, 1967: 240-53; Morkholm, 1974: 127-32. Genuine: Deininger, 1973: 103-8; Champion, 1996: 321-4; Champion, 1997: 111-28; Champion, 2000a: 436-7. According to Pédech, 1964: 264-9, while the speech of Agelaus is authentic, Polybius invented those of Lyciscus and Thrasycrates.

7. We should, however, be particularly sceptical about battle exhortations in ancient historians, Polybius included (see Hansen, 1993: 161-80).

8. Champion, 2000a: 436-7.

9. Thus Eckstein, 1995: 281 n. 31. On Polybius' representation of himself as an Odyssean figure see p. 203 n. 8 above.

10. Shimron, 1979-1980: 116 n. 99, appears to think that Cato was hinting at what he felt to be Polybius' real attitude towards the Romans.

11. Walbank (1957: 16-26; 1972: 60-4; 2007: 349-55) shows that, in Polybius, Fortune (*Tykhê*) may represent simply that which happens, something inexplicable or unforeseeable, a capricious or retributive power, or a governing principle resembling Fate or Providence. Mioni (1949: 141-3), Alvarez de Miranda (1956: 40 n. 1), Roveri (1956: 281-2), Pédech (1964: 336-43) and Balasch (1972: 366-78) discuss a similar range of meanings. Eckstein, 1995: 254-84, emphasizes Polybius' treatment of Fortune as a capricious power that strikes down the prosperous, and as a retributive agent that punishes wrongdoers.

12. Abundance of Roman soldiers, supplies and production: 1.3.7-10; 1.63.4-9; 2.15.1-7; 6.50.6; cf. 2.23-4; 21.31.8. Superiority of Roman military practices: 6.27-42; 10.16.1-17.5; 18.18; 18.28-32. Roman military experience: 1.63.4-9; 2.20.8-10. Effectiveness, reliability and courage of Roman and allied soldiers: 6.52; 6.55. Resourcefulness and determination of the Romans: 1.20.9-21.3; 1.22.3-23.10; 1.37; 6.58. Excellence of the Roman constitution: 1.1.5; 3.2.6; 3.118.9; 6.2.3; 6.18; 6.50; 8.2.3; cf. 39.8.7. Excellent customs and religious practices: 6.53-4; 6.56. Eckstein, 1997: 175-98, demonstrates that Polybius ascribed Roman success not to any inherent natural superiority but to consciously adopted manners, including customs, religious practices, military organization and political structure.

13. The importance of rational causes in historiography: 1.12.5-9; 3.7.4-7; 3.31.12-13; 3.32.6; 6.2.8; 9.12.1-7; 11.19a; 12.18.6; 12.25b; 12.25i.8; F. 83 B-W. Fortune and causality: 2.38.5; 10.2; 10.5.8; 10.9.2-3; 15.34.1-2; 15.35.7; 18.28.2-5; 31.30.1-3; 36.17.1-12. On causality in Polybius see Pédech, 1964: 75-8; Sacks, 1981: 123-32, 136-7; Derow, 1994: 73-90.

14. Polyb. 6.4.4-5; 6.56.6-15; 9.19.1-4; 10.2; 10.8.6-7; 10.11.7-8; 10.14.7-12; 16.12.3-11; 29.16; 39.8.2. On Polybius' religious scepticism see Ziegler, 1952: 1532-43; Alvarez de Miranda, 1956: 27-65; Roveri, 1956: 280-1; Walbank, 1967c: 54-69; van Hooff, 1977: 101-28; Doering, 1978: 119-30; Vaahtera, 2000: 251-64.

15. Mioni, 1949: 135-40; Pédech, 1964: 395-7; Pédech, 1965: 35-68; Balasch, 1972: 378-91; Aalders, 1987: 119-30.

16. Ziegler, 1952: 1532-43; Walbank, 1957: 16-26; 1972: 58-65; 1980: 42-3; 2007: 349-55. On the cult of Fortune (*Tykhê*) in the Hellenistic world see Gasparro, 1997: 67-109.

17. Scholars disagree on the question of how to interpret Polybius' references to Fortune when she is depicted as a divinity or natural power (a valuable survey of earlier literature appears in Roveri, 1964: 218-20). Siegfried, 1928: 47-8, maintained that Polybius oscillated between a rational view of the world and a religious attitude regarding history as the evolution of a plan contrived by a purposive Fortune (a similar interpretation has been given more recently by Aalders, 1987: 119-30). Von Scala, 1890: 174-84, argued that Polybius' attitude toward religion evolved from pious belief to rationalism (Walbank, 1957: 22-3, outlines several attempts to trace the evolution of Polybius' attitude in one direction or the other). Other scholars (Mioni, 1949: 140-7; Roveri, 1956: 275-93; De Sanctis, 1967 [1916]: 209-11; van Hooff, 1977: 101-28; Ferrary, 1988: 265-76) have inferred that, in Polybius, Fortune is merely a figure of speech denoting what is inexplicable in a rational history. This appears to be the view of Samokhina, 1995: 128-57, a Russian work that I know only through the review of Sizov, 1997: 1997.04.19. Pédech, 1964: 343-54, maintains that Polybius believed in Fortune as an objectively existing power that operates in harmony with rational causes, the primary focus of the historian, and constitutes the residual element of the inexplicable in any situation. Elsewhere the same author (Pédech, 1965: 35-68) elaborates on this theory, arguing that Polybius believed in a supreme deity, which he sometimes represented under the name of Fortune. Here too Pédech maintains that Polybius believed Fortune intervenes in human affairs in a manner compatible with free will (i.e. with rational causes). Alonso-Núñez, 1969, takes the same view, tracing this conception of Fortune to Stoic doctrine. According to Balasch, 1972: 366-78, Polybius believed in Fortune as an objectively existing superhuman agency that directs the course of history. According to Walbank (1957: 16-26; 1972: 58-65; 1980: 42-3; cf. 1994: 28-42; 2007: 349-55), Polybius as a religious sceptic did not (at least in his more cautious moments) believe in Fortune as an objectively existing power, for he defined this term as a convenient label for what is inexplicable on rational grounds. Popular usage, however, which treated *Tykhê* as a divinity, induced Polybius to employ verbal elaboration investing Fortune with personality. Thus, when he ascribed the growth of Roman power to Fortune, his tendency to personify this concept unwittingly led him to invest the process of Roman expansion with a teleological character, though he failed to recognize any contradiction between the latter idea and the rational spirit that dominates his work. Wunderer, 1927: 11-13, believed that Polybius fundamentally was a rationalist who retained in his mind a substratum of traditional belief, which occasionally surfaces in his work. Green, 1990: 271-3, maintains that Polybius, by ascribing Roman dominion to the agency of Fortune, invoked divine sanction upon this phenomenon.

9. Polybius on the Future of the Roman Empire

1. Astin, 1967a: 283-4, demonstrates that the context of Polyb. 38.21.1 is the formal destruction of the city rather than the final hours of the siege (cf. App. *Pun.* 639). DeRomilly, 1977: 8-9, connects Polyb. 38.21.1 and Hdt. 7.44-52. Although Herodotus is never cited in the extant portions of the *Histories* (cf. Walbank, 1967a: 408-9), several passages (see especially 1.63.8; 2.35.7; 22.20.6-7; 38.2.1-5) suggest

that Polybius knew this author (see Lehmann, 1989-1990: 67-74). Jane Hornblower (1981: 102-6) demonstrates that, in 38.21.1, Polybius employed a literary motif popular in the Hellenistic period, one that seems to appear for the first time in the final scenes of the history of Alexander's successors written by Hieronymus of Cardia. There the victor (Antigonos Gonatas), weeping over his vanquished enemy (Pyrrhus), reflects on the instability of Fortune and the loss of empire. Polybius may have imitated that passage.

2. An allusion to Polybius' question and a report of Scipio's explanation are the only parts of the scene for which Polybius' own words are preserved (38.21.1). Scipio's explanation appears to be the last element in Polybius' version of this episode. Complete versions of the scene are preserved in the work of Diodorus (32.24) and Appian (*Pun.* 628-30). Diodorus' version differs somewhat from that of Appian. The Sicilian gives the following sequence of events: Scipio weeps, Polybius asks why, Scipio explains, Scipio recites Homer. Since Book 32 of Diodorus was based primarily on Polybius (Schwartz, 1903: 689-90; Cassola, 1982: 763), it might be argued that Diodorus' version substantially represents that of Polybius. This, for instance, is the view of Astin, 1967a: 282-3, and Walbank, 1979: 722-4. Walbank suggests that the Homeric verses, originally reported by Polybius, were omitted after Scipio's explanation by the *Excerpta de Sententiis* in what is now Polyb. 38.21.1. In my view, Appian more faithfully represents Polybius. In *Pun.* 302-643, this author used Polybius for his account of the Third Punic War (Schwartz, 1895: 219-22; Badian, 1958: 131; Hahn, 1982: 271-5; Ferrary, 1988: 321 n. 186; 323 n. 191); moreover, he specifically names Polybius as his source for this scene (*Pun.* 631). Since in the *Histories* of Polybius Scipio's explanation is not followed by the Homeric verses, while a short reference to Scipio's tears and the words of Hector could have occurred in the first lines of Polyb. 38.21.1 (of which only scattered traces subsist), it seems better to conclude that Polybius' version is more accurately reflected in that of Appian.

According to Appian, Scipio recalled the collapse of the Assyrian, Median, Persian and Macedonian empires, thus foreseeing the end of Roman domination. Since the sequence of four oriental empires followed by Rome is a theme first securely attested in Greek and Latin literature only in the middle or the second half of the first century BC, this detail probably represents an embellishment contributed by Appian (see Flusser, 1972: 153-4; Ferrary, 1976: 283-4; Mendels, 1981a: 330-7; Mazza, 1996: 322-3). On the theme of four kingdoms in Near Eastern literature, see pp. 33-9 above.

According to Cicero (*Off.* 1.90), Panaetius reported a statement of Scipio Aemilianus, who used to say that men who are undisciplined and overconfident because of success should be led around within the circuit of reason and learning so that they may observe the fragility of human affairs and the mutability of fortune. Scipio's reflection on the fall of Roman power (Polyb. 38.21.1) may be taken to illustrate the general rule, a point made by Polybius himself (38.21.2-3).

3. On Scipio's reflection see Astin, 1967a: 284-7. Jane Hornblower (1981: 104-5) points out that Polybius ended both the original (29.20-1) and the expanded version of the *Histories* (38.20-1) with reflections on the instability of Fortune and the impermanence of empire. Eckstein, 1995: 268-69, connects the fall of Macedonian power (29.21) with the eventual collapse of Roman domination (38.21) as elements of a single theme.

4. Polyb. 1.1.5; 3.2.6; 3.118.9; 6.2.3; 6.2.8-10; 6.18; 6.50-1; 8.2.3; 39.8.7.

5. On the differences between Polyb. 6.57.5-9 and 6.9.5-9 together with 6.4.10, see Walbank, 1995a: 217-21.

6. Brink and Walbank, 1954: 105-6, in their excellent discussion of Polybius and the theme of decline at Rome, understand that the probity of which the historian speaks at 6.56.1-4, 14-15, belongs to the period of the Second Punic War. Therefore they conclude that the overseas wars of 18.35.1, which mark the decline of Roman manners, must be the eastern campaigns of the period 200-167 BC. While I agree that these are indeed the wars to which Polybius refers (cf. Lintott, 1972: 626-38), I believe that 6.56.1-4, 14-15, refer to conditions after 167, when the historian was writing Book 6. Polybius, however, committed no inconsistency in treating the years 200-167 as a period of decline and viewing the Romans as honest even after 167, because the decline mentioned in 18.35.1 is not an instantaneous event but a gradual process, whose full consequences are not visible until a later time, after 146 (18.35.2).

7. On these episodes illustrating the generosity of Scipio Aemilianus see Eckstein, 1995: 79-82. Polybius overestimated the degree of probity among the Romans in what he considered an age of moral decline (200-167 and beyond), and even earlier, when (in his view) their virtue remained unimpaired (see Lintott, 1972: 630-1).

8. At 31.28.12-13 and 38.21.3, Polybius speaks of Scipio Aemilianus in terms suggesting that he was no longer alive. Since Scipio died in 129, Polybius must have known about the career of Tiberius Gracchus, who surely represented even more emphatically in his eyes the slide towards mob-rule (see Boren, 1961: 358-69).

9. On the period of *tarakhê* and *kinêsis* (3.4.12), see Walbank, 1965a: 3-4; 1972: 173-4; 1974: 24-5; 1977: 148-50; 1981-1982: 243-5. At 3.4.6, Polybius proposes to relate the impulses and inclinations prevailing both in private life and in public policy within the subject states because he believed there was a close connection between the two spheres (6.47.1-6).

10. On this point also see Ferrary, 1988: 339-43.

11. Eckstein, 1995: 230-6, notes that Polybius reported the words of Aemilius Paullus (29.20) and Scipio Aemilianus (38.20.1-3) about the need for moderation in emphatic positions within his narrative. By this device, the author warned against oppressive exercise of power by men of lesser worth.

12. Walbank (1965a: 11-12; 1972: 181-2; 1974: 22-7; 1977: 159-62) maintains that, in the extension of the *Histories*, Polybius intended to judge Roman domination from the perspective of subject peoples, or to propose a justification of imperialism, but never realized this aim because the principal reason for continuing his account was a desire to present material he had been collecting since 168, and because he identified strongly with the Romans in his treatment of their wars against Carthage, Macedonia and Achaëa in the period 149-146. My own analysis agrees with and develops a suggestion made by Walbank himself (1981-1982: 252-3): in order to facilitate judgement of Roman rule, Polybius proposed to demonstrate that the relative strength of Rome and subject nations had not changed after 168. I also accept the view of Ferrary, 1988: 286-91, who argues that the historian undertook to show that Roman policy continued on balance to be moderate and beneficent (Millar, 1987: 4, however, believes there is no simple or unambiguous way of stating Polybius' conclusion about Roman policy after 168). Thus I conclude that Polybius discussed the opinions formed by subject nations about Roman rule in order to explain how they sometimes misjudged the dominant power and their own situation. Eckstein, 1995: 11 n. 43, states that although Polybius attempted to answer the questions posed in 3.4.6-7, his answers were complex and equivocal; on p. 197, he says that it is unclear how or whether the

historian answered the questions set forth in 3.4. In Chapters 4-6, I have endeavored to show that Polybius did indeed suggest answers to the questions posed in 3.4: after 168, Roman policy continued on balance to be moderate and beneficent; subject nations remained weaker than the Romans; the judgements formed by subject nations about the ruling power were sometimes badly mistaken; contemporaries must accept Roman rule; future generations will praise and emulate Roman dominion.

13. According to Ferrary, 1988: 339-43, Polybius believed that the Romans sought dominion precisely in order to win the support of contemporaries and the praise of future generations. Thus my interpretation of Polyb. 3.4.9-11, which allows for a diversity of motives, differs from that of Ferrary, who maintains that Polybius thought the Romans aimed strictly at the good.

14. On the text of Polyb. 1.2.7 see Walbank, 1957: 41-2.

Conclusions

1. On Polybius' judgement concerning Callicrates see Derow, 1970: 12-23.

2. Although I once believed that the word *euskhêmôn* means 'plausible, outwardly presentable', with a suggestion of false appearances (Baronowski, 1995: 17 and n. 5), I am now persuaded by Ferrary, 1988: 297 n. 102, and Eckstein, 1995: 202-3, that it means 'honourable' (cf. Mauersberger 12.2.1053) and that, at 24.13.8 in particular, it indicates a degree of honour inferior to that implied by the word *kalê* (cf. Walbank, 1995b: 273 n. 4). To distinguish *euskhêmôn* from *kalê* in this passage, I have translated the former as 'decent'. Eckstein, 1995: 203, suggests 'respectable'; another possibility might be 'presentable'. In his translation of the same word at 36.2.1, Derow, 1979: 14, has 'respectable'.

3. On Polybius' call for prudent cooperation with Rome and preservation of independence and dignity see especially Eckstein, 1985: 265-82.

4. On the rank of Hostilius at this time see Walbank, 1979: 329.

5. I have adopted the phrase 'this time', rendering *palin*, from Paton's translation of Polybius (28.12.1).

6. This point is discussed by Roy, 2003: 88-9.

7. On Polyb. 18.13-15 see Walbank, 1970b: 299-302.

8. A.L. Morton, *The English Utopia*, London 1952 (reprinted 1978), 240.

9. I have borrowed the French expression from J. Benda, *La trahison des clercs*, New edition, Paris 1975 (1st edn, 1927), who referred thereby to the failure of intellectuals to defend justice, truth and reason.

10. De Sanctis, 1928: 144-5.

11. De Sanctis, 1969 (1923): 291, 340-1; cf. Walbank, 1983: 465-77.

12. On Rome's treatment of Achaëa after 146 see Niese, 1903: 350-2; Schwertfeger, 1974; Kallet-Marx, 1995a: 42-96. A number of measures reported by the ancient sources (e.g. provincial status, tribute, abolition of democracy, contraction of Achaean boundaries) have been rejected as dubious or unhistorical by some scholars, notably Kallet-Marx. However, even if this view is correct, the continuous Roman presence now established in Macedonia marked an intensification of Roman power in the Greek peninsula, and a transition from the period before the Achaean War (see Perrin, 1999: 1223-7). Because the heaviest punishment was borne by Corinth (destruction of the city, slaughter of men, enslavement of women and children, confiscation of territory), Kallet-Marx (pp. 90-2) agrees with Polybius' judgement that Mummius' overall settlement of Greek affairs was mild (39.6). But even though Polybius' judgement was indeed realistic in a comparative

sense, in my view the intensification of Roman power as well as various decisions widely accepted as historical (e.g. executions, monetary penalties, plunder, demolition of city walls) justify Niese's description of Roman policy towards the defeated Greeks as harsh.

13. Walbank, 1995b: 273-85, concludes that Polybius' actions were positively advantageous to the Achaeans, and suggests that modern historians should abstain from passing moral judgement on him.

14. B. Croce, *History as the Story of Liberty*, tr. S. Sprigge, Chicago 1970 (Italian edn, 1938), 17-18.

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